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Summary 
The aim of this work is to attempt to read the text of Genesis 18-19 in line with the 
canonical approach of Brevard S Childs in order to critique his programme through its 
actual praxis. In chapter 1 a historical introduction to the discipline of 'biblical 
theology' and its texts provides a background against which to contextualise Childs's 
own work and its historical development. A detailed description of the approach in 
terms of its historical justification and its actual praxis appears in chapter 2. There 
certain common criticisms are encountered and refuted. It is also suggested that 
Childs's approach is often the target of unwarranted criticism based upon an assumed 
foundationalist view of hermeneutics. In chapter 3, this is developed further and it is 
argued that the non-foundationalist hermeneutics of Stanley E. Fish provide a 
heuristically powerful way of understanding the canonical approach and its 'community 
of faith'. Two aspects of the praxis of the canonical approach form the core of 
chapter 4: the necessary role of narrative presuppositions and the potential role of 
diachronic studies of biblical texts. A description of presuppositions necessary for 
understanding Genesis 18-19 are drawn from Genesis 1-17 and outlined, and the 
diachronic studies of H. Gunkel is used as an exemplar to test the illumination which 
diachronic studies may provide to readers of the canonical text. In chapters 5 and 6, a 
detailed exegesis is provided of the canonical text of Genesis 18 and Genesis 19. A 
short section on the effects of this exegesis on subsequent Old Testament texts 
completes chapter 6. In conclusion, the experience of reading the texts in this way is 
used to point out certain aspects and implications of the canonical approach which are 
missed when the approach is considered in purely theoretical terms. 
\11 
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What Must the 'Judge of All the Earth' Do Exactly? 
A Critique through Praxis of the Canonical Approach of Brevard S. Childs 
Introduction 
In approaching [the subject of the canonical approach], I have to begin by 
expressing my gratitude to my friend Professor Brevard Childs for the 
stimulus that his thinking has been to me in the entire field of biblical 
theology. Though I have come to disagree with almost everything in his 
proposals about the subject and in the values with which he has 
approached it, I realise how very much lowe to him, in that his thinking 
has been the catalyst for much that has become my own. 
J. Barr (1999:378) 
There can be little doubt that Brevard S. Childs has been one of the foremost 
'movers and shakers' in Old Testament study over the last forty years. The 
development and expounding of his canonical approach during almost all of that period 
has taken up much of his academic life, and pushed him into areas foreign to many Old 
Testament scholars (the New Testament, for one!) In so doing, he has earned the 
approbation of some and the appreciation of others and, as Barr shows, these feelings 
are often mixed and combined in the same respondent. Perhaps, this is to be expected 
because pushing at the boundaries is often both a risky and a thankless task. Such 
exploration is almost bound to 'fail', either going too far for some, not being 
adventurous enough for others or some combination of the two and this may well 
serve as a summary of the experience of Childs and his interpreters. 
This thesis is essentially the story of one such 'mixed' response-my own. 
Though I can identify with the feelings expressed by Barr's comment above, I see very 
different pros and cons in Childs's work. With many of those who have begun to 
expend time and effort on the canonical approach (or versions of it), I have been 
alternatively intrigued by Childs's work on the canonical approach, recognising in it 
something more than the dicta probantia approach recognised by Barr, yet frustrated 
by its lack of a degree of clarity which would allow me to get a firm grip on its 
practices. As only a recent member of a church community I found my early 
experience of biblical studies as a discipline fascinating but distant. When I was either 
told or encouraged to find out 'what the text really meant '-and Sheffield is by no 
means a 'fundamentalist' university-I was interested but it did not seem to touch the 
text of my experience. Was I really destined for a sort of textual dual personality, the 
fate which P.R. Davies has suggested should await ecclesiastical users of the biblical 
text within the academy (1995: 50-51)? 
As I completed my undergraduate course, however, I discovered Childs's work 
and wondered if here perhaps was a possible answer (though, even at that stage, I did 
not believe that his was the only way in which the Bible should be studied within the 
academy). Opportunities for further study led me to make an initial exploration of the 
possibilities of Childs's work. At that stage, I did what almost everyone seems to do, 
carrying out a theoretical appraisal of the canonical approach. But it soon became 
obvious that such appraisals-and the reconstructions they usually involved-lacked 
credibility precisely because they were purely theoretical. Theorising about the 
canonical approach is fine so far as it goes, but it almost seemed that actual exegesis 
was being avoided (with notable exceptions such as Moberly and House). How could 
any approach be critically considered if no-one actually carried it out? And in the 
light of Childs's own rhetorical aim-describing, validating, and gaining acceptance for 
a confessional canonical approach to these texts-the relative lack of what R.W.L. 
Moberly has termed 'memorable exegesis' seemed to be a potentially fatal flaw 
(1993 :373-4~ 1994:273-74~ echoed by Barr, 1999:405). 
It was with this in mind that I began this present project, an attempt to 
investigate a particular aspect of the canonical text aimed at the provision of 
'memorable exegesis'. My first supervisor, A. T. Lincoln, on being asked for a suitable 
topic for a biblical theology in the Childs mould, suggested among others 'God as 
judge'. Since, as G.B. Caird notes, this forms one of the five most common 
metaphors used to express God's relationship with humanity (with king, husband. 
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father, master, 1980: 177), his suggestion seemed eminently suitable. When the time 
came to choose texts, two naturally came to mind: first, the question of Abraham to 
YHWH in Gen. 18: 25, 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do justice?', and its 
narrative setting in the story of Sodom and Gomorra. Second, the passion narrative in 
John 18-19 in which Dr Lincoln was then himself outlining what he terms the 'cosmic 
lawsuit' motif (1994). But two factors led to my exclusive focus on the former: the 
relentless march of time and my discovery that the canonical approach applied to the 
story of Abraham and Sodom had very unexpected results, resulting in an unforeseen 
rejection of all other readings of this text. The implications of this unexpected 
discovery of a new reading of the Sodom narrative form the conclusion to this work. 
In chapter 1, the history and definition of the discipline of biblical theology and 
its constructions of the biblical text are considered. The historical development of 
Childs's own approach is in turn detailed and contextualised within both the history of 
biblical theology and its present (and future). In chapter 2 a necessary distinction 
between Childs's biblical theology and the canonical approach is made, before a 
detailed outline of the canonical approach is provided. 'Canon' for Childs is a rubric 
which includes four connected notions, the acceptance of each of which is, he believes, 
vital for the canonical approach in its attempts to justify the use of the final form. First, 
Childs takes the position that the concept of the canon is implicit in the formation of 
the final form of the text, the 'canonical process'. This historical process extends into 
the period during which the canonical text was stabilised and the canon completed, a 
period which forms the second element of the rubric 'canon' and which he terms 
'canonisation proper'. As the third element of his rubric 'canon', he argues that the 
stabilised canon was ( and is) received and acknowledged as authoritative by two 
communities of faith, the Church and the Synagogue. The fourth element of the rubric 
involves the assertion that these communities of faith read the final form of the text in 
line with what Childs calls the text's 'canonical intentionality'. Each of these four 
elements is taken in turn, with the first three being critically considered in terms of their 
justification. Criticisms of the fourth element, termed here the 'praxis' of the canonical 
approach, are also considered, but the main aim of this section is to lay a foundation 
for the subsequent exegesis. In light of this, two aspects of praxis arise which clearly 
should be dealt with before exegesis can be carried out. First, the narrative 
presuppositions necessary to read the text in its place within the final canonical form 
must be described and understood prior to exegesis. Second, in the discussion of the 
role of diachronic studies in the canonical approach, I.W. Provan's suggestion that 
they may provide a useful source of information on the final form (1997: 3 5) is taken 
up for further investigation. Strictly speaking, such studies do not need prior 
description but a critical answer to Provan' s suggestion is best acquired through the 
detailed description of a single diachronic study, here that of H. Gunkel, and a 
subsequent attempt to use it-and all of its claims-as a source of illumination (the 
sheer complexity of their justification also tends to militate against an easy 
incorporation of their detail into exegesis, though certain of the results of the 
diachronic studies of von Rad, Ben Zvi, and Westermann do prove highly useful in 
defining the canonical reading proposed here). 
The hermeneutics of the canonical approach are deliberately left to one side 
until chapter 3. There, the occurrence of two distinct types of language within 
Childs's work forms the basic material for a discussion of foundational and non-
foundational reconstructions of the canonical approach, with the former represented by 
P.R. Noble's and the latter by my own proposal involving the work of S.E. Fish. 
Criticisms of Fish, primarily by A.C. Thiselton, are then considered before certain 
implications of a non-foundationalist canonical approach for its self-description and 
apologetics are outlined. 
In chapter 4, the two aspects of canonical praxis which must be treated prior to 
exegesis-mentioned above-are dealt with. In chapter 5, a detailed exegesis of 
Genesis 18 is carried out in the style of a commentary, followed in chapter 6 by an 
identical investigation of Genesis 19 (the sheer size of these exegetical chapters is the 
only reason for their sub-division along traditional lines). Chapter 6 closes with a brief 
exploration of the Old Testament in the light of the exegesis of Genesis 18-19 
presented here. Finally, critical conclusions which have arisen as a result of carrying 
out the canonical approach are detailed. 
Chapter 1 
The History of Biblical Theology and Its Text(s) 
I. The Development of Biblical Theology Through History and its View(s) of the 
Biblical Text 
A. Introduction to Biblical Theology: The Problem of Definition 
Biblical theology is the only discipline or sub-discipline in the field of 
theology that lacks generally accepted principles, methods, and structure. 
There is not even a generally accepted definition of its purpose and scope 
(McKenzie, 1974: 15). 
Historically, the discipline of biblical theology has been plagued by an often 
unacknowledged lack of consensus about almost every aspect of its theory and praxis. 
J.L. McKenzie's sentiment is echoed by P. Trible: 'Biblical theologians, though coming 
from a circumscribed community, have never agreed on the definition, method, 
organisation, subject matter, point of view, or purpose of their enterprise' (1991:53). 
This lack of agreement means that any attempt to define biblical theology through an 
investigation of its historical development must be able to account for the diverse 
expressions of critical enquiry which have earned themselves the name 'biblical 
theology'; 1 from the use of the scriptures by the Church Fathers, Medieval exegetes, 
and the Reformers through the eighteenth-century 'biblical theology' of J.P. Gabler to 
the 'non-ecclesiastical' version of W. Wrede and the various twentieth-century 
attempts by such as G. von Rad and W. Eichrodt. But, perhaps most importantly, any 
1 Since the earliest known use of the term 'biblical theology' itself was in the dicta probantia 
approach of seventeenth century scholars such as W.J. Christman (Teutsche biblische Theologie. 
1629). its application to any 'study of the Bible' before this date is a relatively modem conceit. 
Nevertheless. the decision of modem scholars to call certain early works 'biblical theologies' raises 
the question of the definitional criteria in use and returns us once again to the need for a definition 
which can encompass this aspect of 'biblical theology'. 
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definition must be able to cope with the present state of flux as biblical theology enters 
the twenty first century. 
C.H.H. Scobie has proposed a broad definition of biblical theology which is 
able to take into account the apparent disjunctions between the various historical 
definitions of the term (1991 a:3 5-6). According to Scobie, there are three components 
within a 'biblical theology': first, the area of study defined by the adjective biblical, he 
suggests, is that of the books accepted by the Christian Church as their canonical 
scriptures, the Old and New Testaments (of course, those with a different Bible, such 
as adherents to Judaism, would alter this element accordingly). Second, theology has 
as its subject, God, theos, and a biblical theology should have as its subject what 
Scobie describes as 'God as he [sic] has revealed himself in the biblical tradition' 
(1991a:36) or perhaps, in somewhat different terms, the Bible's portrait (singular) of 
the (Christian) deity.2 Third, the term Logos denotes a rational, systematic, study of a 
given area. Though some have argued that there is little or no 'theology' in the Bible 
(e.g., Ritschl's chapter titled 'The Fiction of a Biblical Theology', 1986~ cf. Barr, 
1988: 19), Scobie rejects such arguments as presupposing too rigid and narrow a 
conception of theology. Instead he argues that the Bible does give 'expression to an 
understanding ( or understandings) of God in his relation to the world and humankind', 
2 Sailhammer distinguishes between two definitions of 'theology', one based on 'revelation' 
and one based on 'religion': first, theology as normative, being based upon the Bible as the divinely 
revealed word of God ('revelation'). Second, theology as descriptive, being based on an 
understanding of the Bible as recording human thoughts about the divine ('religion'; 1995:11-15). 
On the basis of this distinction, he might perhaps see Scobie's definition of theology as taking up the 
language of the former, and my alternative as using the language of the latter. effectively polarising 
them. 
His labelling of Scobie's 'theology' as normative and my 'theology' as merely descriptive is 
problematic, however. because there is no reason why a religion-based theology could not also be 
normati,'c: after all. Barth's criticism of 'religion' was not that it played no role in people's livcs. but 
rather that it was normative for them. Projectionist views of the deity are essentially descriptivc since 
there is no revealer, but it would be a mistake to say that they are not normative (cf. e,g., Cupitt and 
the 'Sea of Faith'. 1988). Such a 'God' may only be the best that humanity can come up with but is 
no less rcal in terms of affecting people's lives. Therefore. there seems little practical difference 
between Scobie's definition of theology and my alternative phrasing when actually doing biblical 
thcology. This said. I do not personally see my fornlUlation as projectionist or at odds with Scobie's. 
But cvcn if it were, nothing actually changes. normativity rcmains 'the norm'. 
7 
and that 'it is the testimony of the community which accepts the Bible as canonical 
scriptures that this understanding, though diverse and culturally conditioned, 
nevertheless is based on the revelation of God'. For Scobie, then, the task of biblical 
theology should be defined as the 'ordered study of the revelation of God contained in 
the canonical scriptures of the Old and New Testaments' (1991a:36).3 It is in placing 
this definition alongside a study of the historical development of biblical theology that 
the accrued nuances which have allowed such diverse enterprises to be called by that 
term will become clear. 
B. 'Integrated Biblical Theology': From Irenaeus to the Post-Reformation 
Period 
In placing his definition over against the history of Christian use of the Bible, 
Scobie notes that in Irenaeus of Lyon (c130-c202 CE) there was 'a Christian writer 
who in defending the Christian faith in the face of the Gnostic threat turn[ ed] to the 
Church's scriptures and [sought] to understand them in an ordered way' (1991a:37). 
Irenaeus wrote his great work Against Heresies in confrontation with a bewildering 
number of heresies. Foremost among them was the form of Gnosticism derived from 
Valentinus, a Gnosticism which claimed apostolic authority and interpreted the 
scriptures in such a way as to cause its adherents to deny the unity of the Creator God 
of Israel with the Father of Jesus Christ (cf Danielou, 1973: 224).4 Here Irenaeus 
describes the effect of the Valentinian exegesis: 
By combining and distorting fragments and so changing their original 
meaning they deceive many with their ill-constructed phantasms, made by 
3 On the arguments of Barr. Downing, and Gottwald that religions based on the Old 
TestamentlHebrew Bible have no revelation. see Childs. 1985:20-27. 
4 Another who split the biblical texts apart was Marcion. His decision to elevate Paul above 
the other apostles involved dismissing the Old Testament and the rejection of a number of the books 
which would eventually form the New Testament. Irenaeus' response to Marcion' s truncated canon 
matched that which he offered to the Gnostics. There was no conflict between the writings of the 
apostles because 'Peter was an apostle of the "ery same God as Paul was' (Ad\'. Haer. III.13. L cf. 
Pelikan. 1971: 113). 
twisting the Lord's words. It is as if someone should take a portrait of a 
king, which an artist had carefully fashioned out of precious stones, break 
up the mosaic, and reassemble the stones to form a picture of a dog or a 
fox-and badly done at that-and should then claim that this was the fine 
picture of the king which the clever craftsman had made, pointing out 
that the stones were indeed the very ones which had been arranged by the 
first artist to make the king's portrait (Adv. Haer. 1,8,1; cf. also Childs, 
1984a:28). 
The response put forward by Irenaeus to the heresies of Valentinus and others 
contained two important elements. First, he argued for a theological view of history 
in which there was an essential unity within God's salvation which proceeded from 
creation to its fulfilment in Christ (11,9,1; 111,9,1; 111,12,11), thus denying that there 
was any split between the Creator God of Israel and the Father of Jesus Christ 
(111,1,2). Because of this unity it was essential that both the Old Testament and the 
texts which would become the New should be seen as one harmonious witness to the 
singular purpose of the one God. The difference between them, according to Irenaeus, 
came from their relationship to Christ; the Old typologically foreshadowed him 
whereas the later Christian texts witnessed to his actual appearance in the flesh (e.g., 
IV,26, 1; IV,32,2; IV,34, 1). 
Second, Irenaeus, having safeguarded the texts from dismemberment, utilised 
the concept of a 'rule of truth' (1,9,4; 1,10,2), also called a 'rule of faith' (in his 
Demonstration oj the Apostolic Preaching, 6), in order to provide the proper 
interpretive context for the two testaments. This was necessary because the Gnostic 
use of interpretive methods such as allegory was identical with that of the churches, 
rendering the notion of what could be considered 'false' or 'arbitrary' problematic. 
Irenaeus needed a way of ruling out certain interpretations which were producing what 
he considered to be 'a synthesis alien to the Christian faith' (Danielou, 1973 :225; cf. 
Lawson, 1948: 103-4). The exact contents of the 'rule of truth' he used are unknown 
to us, but it was a polemical formulation-perhaps almost a creed-of unchanging 
'apostolic' church tradition (Adv. Haer. 111,2,2). It had, Irenaeus claimed, always been 
publicly proclaimed within each and every church (1,10,2) and he intended that it 
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should be set over against the Gnostic appeal to secret traditions. The effect of the 
rule was to show that Gnostic interpretation was 'wrong because it [was] novel. It 
was not known in apostolic churches before the arrival of the heretics' (Minns, 
1994: 119). The rule of truth was not a form of tradition over and above scripture, 
however~ both were the 'apostolic teaching'. In 1. Lawson's words, for Irenaeus 'the 
truth hangs by two cords ... apostolic tradition is not an independent quantity over 
against Scripture. Nor for that matter is Scripture an independent quantity over 
against apostolic tradition' (1948:103). It is the identical nature of the 'rule' and the 
scriptures which enabled Irenaeus to suggest that the Church could survive without the 
latter (111,4, 1-2~ cf Pelikan, 1971: 116). 
These formulations constitute a powerful attempt to view the biblical material 
in a theologically ordered way, and Childs's conclusion that 'Irenaeus was indeed a 
biblical theologian' seems fully justified in the light of Scobie's definition (1992:32~ cf 
also Lawson's title, The Biblical Theology of Saint Irellaeus). There also seems little 
doubt that this form of biblical theology can also be found among the later Church 
Fathers (e.g., Augustine), the Medieval Church (e.g., Aquinas), and the early 
Reformers (e.g., Luther, Calvin). 
It was during the post-Reformation period (seventeenth to eighteenth-
centuries) that one of the most common definitions of biblical theology, that of the 
discipline as a discrete historical task set completely apart from the dogmas of the 
Christian tradition, arose (cf e.g., H.D. Betz 1962:432~ Childs, 1992a:3~ Ebeling, 
1955:214~ Ollenburger, 1985:39~ Moberly, 1992b:142). Although the Bible was 
studied before this, it is usually argued that it had previously fulfilled only a subservient 
role, functioning within a dogmatic ecclesiastical framework in order to support 
various theological systems. The Reformation of the sixteenth century began a move 
towards freeing the Bible but complete independence only came two centuries later 
with the Enlightenment (though how independent it has ever actually been is highly 
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debatable; cf Levenson, 1987).5 With Scobie's definition in mind, it can be asked 
how biblical theology defined in this way differs from that of Irenaeus and all other 
pre-seventeenth-century biblical theologians. 
According to Scobie, the principal distinguishing feature of the earlier biblical 
theologies is not that they were necessarily subservient to ecclesiastical dominance but 
rather that no explicit distinction was made between biblical theology and dogmatic 
theology; the teaching of the Bible was not clearly distinguished from the teaching of 
the Church.6 Rather the two were moulded together in a form of biblical theology 
which he designates 'integrated biblical theology' (1991a:37-8). It is with the 
(relatively) modern distinction between these two disciplines that biblical theology as 
defined by such as Betz arose, causing the disjunction between pre-eighteenth-century 
'integrated biblical theology' and what Scobie terms post-eighteenth-century 
'independent biblical theology'. 
The sources of the distinction between biblical and dogmatic theology can be 
found in two intertwined historical processes; the first is the more general, the rise of a 
'modern historical consciousness'. This is a complicated phenomenon which has been 
briefly summed up by H-G. Gadamer as an awareness 'of the temporal distance 
separating us from antiquity and of the relativity of different cultural traditions'. 7 The 
primary consequence of this awareness is, as Gadamer puts it, the appreciation 'that 
something distant has to be brought close, a certain strangeness overcome, a bridge 
built between the once and the now' ( 1976: 23). J.P. Langan suggests that 
developments in five broad areas are responsible for the growth of modem historical 
5 On defining this important phase in history, see Porter (1990: 1-11). and Outram (1995: 1-
13 ). 
6 This is perhaps the reason why the earliest known use of the term 'biblical theology' was in 
the dicta probantia approach of seventeenth-century scholars such as W.1. Christman (Teutschc 
biblische Theologie. 1629) and H.A Diest (Theologia Biblica, 16~3); cf. Hayes and Prussner, 
1985: 15-19. 
7 Gadamer notes that 'I s Jomething of this awareness was contained in the theological claim 
of Reformation Biblical exegesis... but its true unfolding only came about when a "historical 
consciollsness" arose in the Enlightenment.. .and matured in the Romantic period' (1976:22-2): cf. 
Thisclton, 1980:51). 
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consciousness: (1) critical historical scholarship; (2) the modernist fascination with two 
'normatively weighty periods', the apostolic church and classical antiquity, (3) the 
Romantic movement~ (4) the development of Science~ and (5) revolutionary politics 
(1989: 137-40).8 The net result of sweeping intellectual changes in these areas was the 
development of an awareness of the 'pastness of the past' (Thiselton, 1980:53-63). 
Before the rise of modern historical consciousness, attitudes to history had been very 
different, as A.C. Thiselton notes: 
From the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century history was viewed very 
differently from the conception of history held by most modern historians. 
Alan Richardson underlines the profound consequences which followed 
from viewing history under the dual headings of "history sacred and 
profane." Sacred history was valued highly as a source of knowledge on 
the basis of divine revelation, and its traditions accepted uncritically. 
Secular history was valued as a source of knowledge only by a small 
minority. . . . This "sacred history"... spoke to the present with divine 
authority (1980:63). 
The rise of modern historical consciousness in effect inverted the relationship between 
sacred and secular history, and produced an awareness of historical distance based 
upon the acceptance of a more secular understanding of history. 
The second historical process leading to the distinction between biblical and 
dogmatic theology is a more specific one: the rise of an independent biblical theology 
out of the ecclesiastical disputes of the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries. In the 
later seventeenth century, the pietist movement rejected what it perceived to be the 
dogmatically oriented theology of a dead Protestant orthodoxy and turned towards the 
development of theologies which were to be based solely upon the Bible (e.g., PJ. 
Spener's Pia Desideria, 1676~ C. Haymann's Verslich einer biblischen Theologie in 
8 Alongside these factors, Langan places four more specific reasons for historical 
consciousness to impact upon Bible and theology (1989: 136-37): (I) the pioneering scyenteenth-
century work of the French Catholic priest R. Simon (1638-1712) and the Jewish philosopher B. 
Spinoza (1632-1677) on historical biblical criticism: (2) the rationalistic and anti-supernaturalistic 
critique of the biblical materials by writers such as Voltaire (169~-1778): (3) the philosophy of 
Leibniz (1646-1716), which stressed the dynamic nature of the individual over against the notion of 
passi,·ity under the control of the divine: and (~) the work Nell' Science, a theologically inspired 
interprctation of history by Vico (1668-17~~). 
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Tabel/en, 1708~ and 1. Deutschmann's Theologia Biblica, 1709~ cf. Hayes and 
Prussner, 1985:38-62}. This challenge to produce a 'biblical theology' was taken up 
from a different quarter in the second half of the eighteenth century by rationalists such 
as K. Bahrdt (Versuch eines biblischen Systems de Dogmatik, 2 vols., 1769-70), G. T. 
Zecharia (Biblische Theologie oder Untersuchung des biblischen Gnmdes der 
vornehmsten theologischen Lehren, 1771-1786), and W.F. Hufnagel (Handbllch der 
biblischen Theologie 1785-9). The rationalists sought to discard the dogmas of the 
Church, calling for a return to a simple and historical biblical religion which could then 
be mined for timeless and universal truths which accorded with reason (cf. Scobie, 
1992:4 and Childs, 1992a:4). 
With such emphasis upon the Bible as the source of truth, biblical theology 
became increasingly a discipline formulated apart from the control of Church 
authorities. The work of scholars such as A.F. Biisching (Gedanken von der 
Beschaffenheit und dem Vorzug der biblischdogmatischen Theologie vor dem alten 
und neuen Scholastischen, 1758) and 1.S. Semler (Abhandlung von freier 
Untersuchung de Canon, Vols. 1-4, 1771-5) pointed the way towards the idea of 
biblical theology as a purely historical discipline (cf. Hayes and Prussner, 1985: 55-60~ 
H.D. Betz, 1962:432). The necessary methodological clarity to truly launch the new 
discipline would, however, only arrive with the theoretical work of Gabler (cf. Childs, 
1972d:22; Reventlow, 1985 :3-4). 
But this growing change in the status of biblical theology in the late eighteenth 
century was also accompanied by a change in the status of the biblical text. H. Frei, in 
his study The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, demonstrates how increasing historical 
study of the text resulted in a shift away from a perception of revelation through the 
words of the text towards an emphasis on revelation through the historical substance 
behind the text (1974:51-65; cf. also Sailhammer's distinction between 'text'/'event' 
based theologies~ 1995:36-85). As Childs puts it, the exegetical task lay in 'working 
out the true historical reference since revelation no longer consisted in the words, but 
exclusively in the subject matter to which the words referred' (1977b:89). This 
subject matter could be either the actual historical events themselves or the 
psychological beliefs of the authors of the texts. Previously, exegetes had attempted to 
derive meaning from the text itself, and had generally understood the text to have had 
what has been termed a sensus literalis. (This sensus literalis was not, however, a 
'literal sense' but rather was the plain sense of the text which could be non-literal in 
form.) Of course, some early critics did define other senses of the text (e.g. Origen, 
Nicholas de Lyra), but it was still the case that these approaches consisted in moving 
beyond the sensus literalis when it was perceived to be inadequate rather than 
replacing it with a purely extra-textual historical referent (cf Scalise, 1988). This 
altered view of meaning is clearly discernible from the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, and by the mid-nineteenth century it provided the 'normal' text for 
interpretation. The developing 'independent biblical theologies' would not only differ 
from the 'integrated biblical theologies' that preceded them by distinguishing between 
dogmatic and biblical theology but also by this turn to what is essentially an alternative 
object of study. 
C. Towards an 'Independent Biblical Theology': From Gabler to Wrede 
On the 30th May, 1787, Gabler delivered his much celebrated inaugural lecture 
at the University of Altdorfunder the title 'De justo discriminae theologiae biblicae et 
dogmaticae regundisque recte utriusque finibus' (on Gabler, see Hayes and Prussner, 
1985:62-6~ Ollenburger, 1985~ Sailhammer, 1995:161-2; House, 1998:15-19). He 
argued that biblical theology should be wholly separated from the ecclesiastical 
dominance of dogmatic theology, defining these two disciplines in the following 
manner: 
There is truly a biblical theology, of historical origin, conveying what the 
holy writers felt about divine matters; on the other hand, there is a 
dogmatic theology of didactic origin, teaching what each theologian 
philosophises rationally about divine things, according to the measure of 
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his ability or of the times, age, place, sect, school, and other similar 
factors (1980: 137). 
But, and contrary to popular belief, Gabler was not interested in producing a biblical 
theology which was simply a historical description of 'what the holy writers felt about 
divine matters'. His eventual aim was rather the provision of a Christian biblical 
theology which was both fully contemporary and firmly founded upon biblical truth (cf 
Ollenburger, 1985:39). In the remainder of his address, he explicated his view of 
biblical theology as a three-stage process. First, each of the texts was to be studied 
carefully and classified according to historical-critical and linguistic categories. 
Second, a comparison of the different authors should follow, with agreements and 
disagreements being noted (1980: 140-41). Third, and finally, an attempt should be 
made to discern the universally true from the husk of the time-bound texts through the 
use of reason, the universally true then forming a purified 'biblical theology' suitable as 
a foundation for dogmatic reflection (1980:142-4~ cf Ollenburger, 1985:43). 
It is perhaps significant that biblical theology was first formulated in this way 
by the rationalist, Gabler. Some of the assumptions which such modernistic thought 
was eventually to bring to the discipline of 'independent biblical theology' have been 
outlined by A.K.M. Adam, and include 
a proclivity for the adj ective 'scientific', . . . a pattern of citing newer 
sources as most authoritative ... a reluctance to admit that current biblical 
interpretations stand in continuity with biblical interpretation through the 
centuries, [and] the assumption that any interpretation which does not 
exercise historical criticism is 'uncritical' or 'precritical', as though [this] 
provides the only legitimate criteria for judgement (1990a:2). 
This latter characteristic has often been combined with the claim to objectivity which 
has been-and indeed still is-a major preoccupation of modernist thought, and these 
assumptions have been greatly influential in the development of 'independent biblical 
theology' . 
Gabler himself did not pursue his project any further, and the first attempt to 
put his approach into practice was that of G.L. Bauer towards the end of the 
eighteenth-century. Bauer's biblical theology was of great significance because it 
contained separate Old (Theologie des Alten Testaments vol. I, 1796) and New 
Testament theologies (four volumes-Biblische Theologie des Nellell Testaments vols. 
I-IV, 1800-02). This soon became overwhelmingly the standard model because of 
both the amount of historical material being generated in the early nineteenth century 
and the unlikelihood-at least to a rationalist-of finding universal truths in the Old 
Testament (House, 1998: 17-19). Other biblical theologies followed from scholars 
such as W.M.L. de Wette (Biblische Dogmatik des Alten lind Neuen Testaments, oder 
kritische Darstellullg der Religionslehre des He braism us, des Judentums lind 
Urchristentums, 1813). But with the rise of Romanticism9 and German Idealism lO 
during the period from 1800 to 1880, eighteenth-century rationalism's search for 
'eternal truths '-the supposed content of the final part of Gabler's three stage biblical 
theology-fell out of favour. Lessing's famous ditch between attainable 'historical 
particularities' and unattainable' eternal truths' contributed to the transformation of the 
nineteenth century into what K. Stendahl has called the era of the 'liberal' Jesus, 'the 
refined teacher of the Golden Rule, the fatherhood of God, and the eternal value of the 
individual' (1962:418; cf Rogerson, 1984). 
In stark contrast, however, the first two stages of Gabler's project, the 
historical study of the texts and their critical comparison, developed greatly during the 
9 Sail hammer defines Romanticism as being 'characterised by an emphasis on (l) 
Irrationality and feeling. over against reason; (2) history as the central category of thought, over 
against logical propositions; and (3) organic developmentalism, that is. a model of intellectual 
development that stressed growth and development of ideas, over against artificial systems' 
(1995: 165). 
10 Russell notes certain common characteristics of the German Idealism which initially arose 
from the work of Kant: 
The critique of knowledge, as a means of reaching philosophical conclusions. is 
emphasised by Kant and accepted by his followers. There is an emphasis upon mind as 
opposed to matter. which leads in the end to the assertion that only mind exists. There 
is a vehement rejection of utilitarian ethics in favour of systems which are held to be 
demonstrated by abstract philosophical arguments (1961 :677). 
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nineteenth century. The increasing application of critical notions of history to the 
biblical text by scholars such as F. C. Baur and 1. Wellhausen revolutionised the stud\' 
of both Old and New Testaments. Although the questioning of traditional claims about 
authorship and dating had been around for some time (e.g., B. Spinoza [1632-1677] 
and R. Simon [1638-1712]), the sheer radicality of their proposals resulted in 
reconstructions of Israelite religion and Christian origins which accorded with the 
critical theories of the Wellhausen and Tiibingen (Baur) schools rather than with the 
biblical self-presentation. The meaning of the biblical texts according to these studies 
was to be found only in the' ostensive reality' critically discovered behind the text. In 
1860 B. Jowett argued that the meaning of the text was not that associated with the 
history of its Christian and Jewish exegesis but the 'original one: the meaning, that is, 
of the words as they first struck on the ears or flashed before the eyes of those who 
heard and read them' (338). This, Childs suggests, means that the senslls Iiteralis had 
been replaced by the sensus historicus, a very different creature indeed. The 
consequences of the replacement Childs defines as follows: 
[B]y identifying the literal sense with the historical sense, which is then 
interpreted within the model of meaning as ostensive reference, any claim 
for the integrity of the literal sense is virtually destroyed. The 
explanation of the biblical text is now governed by historical research. 
The role of the literal sense of the text functions to provide a way behind 
the text to some historical reality. The literal sense of the text in itself has 
lost all significance (1977b:90). 
This change of approach to the biblical text was followed by both liberal and 
conservative exegetes and debate shifted from its meaning as text to the veracity of the 
events it reports. II 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the dominant approach to the biblical text 
used in the construction of 'Old and New Testament theologies' was that of the history 
11 Even those who still attempted to write systematic accounts of Old Testament theology 
prefaced their works with a large section on such historical-critical matters (cf. e.g .. Schultz's Old 
Testament Theologv. f '01. J. 1898). 
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of religion school (religionsgeschichtliche Schule) , a loose movement largely based 
upon the theoretical assumptions of historians such as E. Troeltsch (cf. Brett, 1991 :87-
88). The aspirations of this school may best be exemplified by Wrede's 1897 essay, 
'Uber Aufgabe und Methode der sogenannten neutestamentlichen Theologie', 12 
perhaps the epitome of this kind of thought as related to biblical theology (but cf. also 
Troeltsch's essay of 1898, 'Ueber historische und dogmatische methode in der 
Theologie).13 For Wrede, the principal problem afflicting the discipline was the 
inability of its practitioners to carry out even Gabler's first stage-what was to be his 
discipline's only stage-without being influenced by dogmatic considerations; it was 
just not historical enough. 14 Wrede writes: 
1973. 
Can it ... be claimed as self-evident that New Testament theology must be 
considered and done as a purely historical discipline? Formally and in 
theory most people would say yes. When the material is contemplated, 
however, a different view emerges. So long as New Testament theology 
retains a direct link with dogmatics as its goal, and people expect from it 
material for dogmatics to work on-and that is a common view-it will 
be natural for biblical theology to have an eye to dogmatics. Biblical 
theology will be pressed for an answer to dogmatic questions which the 
biblical documents do not really give, and will endeavour to eliminate 
results which are troublesome for dogmatics. The writings which contain 
the material are burdened with definite dogmatic predicates like 
normative, which say nothing about their character as documents. So 
long as this continues to be the case, it is at least psychologically probable 
that New Testament ideas which go contrary to expectation will be 
worked on and arranged till they fit those predicates (1973 :69).15 
12 References to Wrede's essay are to those of the English translation found in Morgan, 
13 Since Wrede and a number of influential Old Testament specialists including Gunkel and 
Eichorn had formed a group known as 'the little faculty' at Gottingen around 1890 (cf. Hayes and 
Prussner, 1985:89), his ,-iews may be considered representative of a group who intended to work with 
both Testaments in their historical context. 
14Wrede concludes his essay with the words '[New Testament Theology] is not yet in the true 
and strict sense a historical discipline at all. May it become one!' (1973: 116). 
15 With these comments about normativity, Wrede demonstrates his belief that the only 
valid-or 'normative'---<haracteristic of these writings is that they are historically defined documents, 
thus de-legitimising any other concept of normativity. It is this denial of the existence of any other 
way of reading the texts which is the foremost characteristic of an 'independent biblical theology' in 
the Wrede mould. Particularly interesting is his comment that the normativity predicated by dogmatic 
theology means that the texts will probably be massaged to fit dogmatic presuppositions: Wrede 
understandably is not eager to point out the irony that historical criticism has its own versions of 
fitting the material to the' normative' thesis at hand (cf. the questionable exegetical practices of some 
I~ 
For Wrede, the very term 'New Testament theology' is a misnomer: 'The name 
New Testament theology is wrong in both its terms'(1973: 116). First, Wrede argues 
that the term 'New Testament' is inappropriate because any concept of a limiting 
canon is illegitimate in the discipline he envisages (1973 :70-73), thereby implying that 
he would not accept Gabler's second stage because any comparison of the texts could 
not be limited to just the canonical texts as Gabler suggests. Second, he states that the 
discipline 
is not concerned merely with theology, but is in fact far more concerned 
with religion. The appropriate name for the subject-matter is: early 
Christian history of religion, or rather: the history of early christian [sic] 
religion and theology. If anyone protests that this is no longer a New 
Testament theology, that is a strange objection. The name is obviously 
controlled by the subject matter, not vice-versa (1973: 116). 
On the relationship between the results of his work and the task of Christian theology, 
Wrede writes that how the 'systematic theologian gets on with its results and deals 
with them-that is his own affair. Like every other real science, New Testament 
theology's has its goal simply in itself, and is totally indifferent to all dogma and 
systematic theology' (1973:69).16 In the 1920's, H. Gunkel would summarise the 
arguments against biblical theology in Old Testament study thus: 'The recently 
experienced phenomenon of biblical theology being replaced by the history of Israelite 
religion is to be explained from the fact that the spirit of historical investigation has 
historical critical constructs pointed out in recent years by Goulder on the synoptic problem, 1985; 
and Whybray on the excesses of the Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis, 1987). 
16 In the formulation of Stendahl, perhaps the most influential defender of a Wrede-style 
biblical theology in recent years, this means that there must be a complete separation between the two 
questions 'what the text meant' and 'what the text means' (l962AI9-20; 1965:199-202). Answering 
the former was the province of the biblical theologian, and involved the use of historical criticism. It 
was a descriptivc task that could in principle be carried out by any scholar. regardless of whether the 
scholar was a believer or not (1962:422; 1965:202). Stendahl was careful, however. not to claim that 
the project was absolutely objective. As to the question of what a text means today. this went beyond 
the descriptivc task and was not a question which Stendahl's descriptive biblical theology could-<>r 
should-answer: that was a task for those offering a contemporary interpretation (l962A2·t 'the 
systematic theologian', 1965:205). 
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now taken the place of a traditional doctrine of Inspiration' (1927-31:1090-91; cf. 
Childs, 1992a:6). 
It is significant that Trible has recently characterised the period when this 
concept of 'independent biblical theology' was in the ascendancy (1880-1920) as the 
discipline's forty years of wandering in the wilderness (1991:54). Gabler himself 
would presumably have been surprised to find that the historical features which he had 
wished to ultimately discard had now become the centrepiece-indeed, the only 
piece-of an 'independent biblical theology' (so Ollenburger, 1985:48). The logical 
consequences of a biblical theology as defined by Wrede are clear; the term has 
stretched its similarity with Scobie's definition to breaking point. 17 As Childs has put 
it, 'the full problematic of Biblical Theology emerged with great clarity. On the one 
hand, Gabler's case for the independence of Biblical Theology from dogmatic 
constraints appeared to ... be fully justified. On the other hand, the pursuit of Biblical 
Theology as a historical discipline resulted in the dissolution of the very discipline 
itself (1992a:6). 
D. Biblical Theology in the Twentieth Century: An Initial Rejection of Wrede's 
project (Eichrodt-Ei13feldt) 
The idea of a scientific and objective historical 'biblical theology' based upon 
the assumptions of the history of religion school have not gone unchallenged in the 
twentieth century. K. Barth's attack on the scientific dogmatic theology of liberal 
Protestantism following the carnage of the First World War had its counterpart within 
the disciplines of Old and New Testament theology.I8 In the 1920's, the shape of a 
17 Childs would presumably agree with Moberly that such a project is better described as the 
. history of religion' with the term 'biblical theology' being reserved for a normative discipline which 
combines both historical and theological concerns in its attempt to interpret the biblical texts Within 
the setting of-in Childs's case-Christian theology (Moberly. 1992b: 1..J2; cf. Childs. 196..J:437-8; 
1970:99; 1982:6; 1985:28f; 1992:7). 
18 On thc impact of new theological developments on Old Testament Theology in the 1920's. 
see Hayes and Prussner (1985 154-58), Re\'cntlow (1985: 13-27). and Childs (l994b). 
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possible Old Testament theology was slowly being hammered out in the writings of O. 
Ei13feldt (1926) and Eichrodt (1929), spurred on by the publication of E. Konig's 
Theologie des Alten Testaments kritisch und vergleichend dargestellt (1922; cf 
Sailhammer, 1995: 129-31). EiBfeldt suggested that two disciplines should be 
distinguished: the History of Religion and Old Testament theology. He argued that 
these two disciplines corresponded to two 'differently constituted functions of our 
spirit, to knowing and to believing', and that the only choice for the theologian was 
whether to 'effect a compromise between them, or to recognise and attend to each in 
its own character and integrity' (Ei13feldt, 1992:24-25)~ 19 Ei13feldt chose the latter 
course. In defining these two disciplines, he writes that 
[History of Religion] is, as the name implies, a historical discipline. It 
presents Old Testament religion as an entity having undergone historical 
development, and treats it with the usual philological-historical tools .... 
To it belongs the instrument of empathy with the subject, which is 
especially important in this particular field. But this is then sufficient for 
accomplishing the historical task: it requires no other means. The 
historian does not answer the question of absolute value, of the 'truth' of 
the subject (1992:27). 
[Old Testament theology] is a matter of presenting that which, with 
respect to the Old Testament, has become revelation, God's word, for the 
interpreter and his religious community .... It will thus bear the character 
of witness ... and its validity will be restricted to the circle of those whose 
piety is the same as, or similar to, that of the interpreter (1992:28). 
For Ei13feldt, the tension produced between these two disciplines should be tolerated 
by believers because 
it is nonetheless finally the case that, seen from a higher vantage point, 
they form a unity .... [W]e are confident that it is the one identical truth 
for which knowledge strives and by which faith is grasped. Knowing and 
believing belong to two parallel planes and they must meet each other in 
infinity-but only in infinity (1992:29). 
19 References to EiBfeldt's and Eichrodt' s essays are to those of the English translations 
found in Ollenburgcr. 1992. 
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Eichrodt objected to this partition forcefully, however, arguing that historical 
critical methods were appropriate to the discipline of Old Testament Theology (cf 
Reventlow, 1985 :49-51). He began by agreeing with EiI3feldt that the question of the 
ultimate truth of Old Testament religion was beyond the judgement of the historian, 
but then argued that its actual content was not. For Eichrodt, reducing the work of the 
historians to a presentation of the growth of Old Testament religion was to deny the 
historical discipline its 'noblest task'. Historical research suitable for an Old Testament 
Theology 
must layout a cross section through the developed whole in order to 
demonstrate the inner structure of a religion in the mutual relationship of 
its various contents. It would be wrong to see in this systematic task an 
opposition to the historical method [as conceived by the History of 
Religion School]. It is an impermissible restriction of the concept 
"historical" to relate it, as if self-evidently, only to observation of the 
growth process, to the genetic method~ rather, "historical" may be 
understood as the opposite only of anything normative. Thus, the 
systematic consideration is to be comprehended completely within the 
historical (1992:33). 
This is Eichrodt's attempt to preserve 'Gabler's legacy', freeing the Bible from 
dogmatic control (1992:32). 
An important part of Eichrodt' s recasting of Old Testament Theology was his 
recognition of the problem of the selection of 'material' in historical study. Eichrodt 
asks, 'is there a universally valid principle of selection?' He continues, 'work in logic 
and methodology, in any event, has been unable to establish one' (1992:34). He also 
notes the related question of how the historian's perception of the purpose of the 
material affects its construal, and argues that this is principally defined by the 
historian's own presuppositions. These factors introduce an element of subjectivity 
into history, and Eichrodt, rejecting those who would quest for an ideal objective 
starting point, casts his history as containing a legitimate 'subjective' theological 
component, the faith presupposition of Christian scholars which leads them to see the 
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Old Testament as culminating in the New. Thus the distinction between Eichrodt' s 
Old Testament theology and a history of Israelite religion only consists of their 
different subjective presuppositions; both have a place within empirical-historical Old 
Testament scholarship. 
In his Theology of the Old Testament (volume 1 of which first appeared in 
1933), Eichrodt took a single concept, that of the covenant between God and Israel, 
and made it the basis of his systematic study of the biblical materials. However, he 
proceeded to incorporate in his work as a necessity the very history of religion 
approach against which he had defined his Old Testament theology. He suggested that 
one should have 
the historical principle operating side by side with the systematic in a 
complementary role. In treating individual religious concepts the major 
elements of their historical background must be taken into account. Only 
so can we hope to do justice to the great unitive tendency that runs 
through the whole history of Israel and makes it with all its variety a self-
consistent entity (1961 :32-his italics). 
In his Theology this involved an introductory examination of the growth of the concept 
of covenant within a reconstructed history of Israel, starting with the relationship 
between the Canaanite and Israelite religions, and then tracing the historical 
development of the covenant through the JDEP layers of the Graf-Wellhausen 
hypothesis (1961:45-69). However, the exact relationship between these two forms 
of critical history is unclear, the History of Israelite Religion approach appearing only 
occasionally after the introductory section (for example, on the priesthood; 1962:392-
402). This has led E. Martens to conclude that 'history' is thus tangential to 
Eichrodt's work (1994:315-17,330-5), a conclusion which fails to recognise that for 
Eichrodt the systematic task is itself 'history'. More important is N.K. Gottwald's 
view that Eichrodt tended to confuse normative (for which, read theological) and 
descriptive (for which, read historical) categories, leading to the conclusion that, in 
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practice, he was 'an insufficiently precise historian and an insufficiently precise thinker' 
(1970:54). 
Nevertheless, Eichrodt's theology-described by Gottwald as 'the single most 
important work of its genre in the twentieth century (l970:25)-was highly influential. 
Other theologies followed in a series of works on both Old and New Testaments which 
showed a broad consensus as to their task of combining theology and the historical 
critical method. By 1958, Eichrodt could write of the situation that 'there has been a 
happy revival of theological work on the Old Testament, and such work has now won 
back its rightful place in academic studies in a field where the religio-historical 
approach for a long time held well-nigh undisputed sway' (in his Preface to Fifth 
Edition, 1961: 13). But it is important to realise that, despite the explicit rejection of 
some of Wrede's assumptions, those involved continued to work within the framework 
of modernist assumptions about the defining role of the historical critical method and, 
in general, its understanding of the text as something to be excavated for verifiable 
'facts'. For example, it is noteworthy that, even though traditio-historical criticism is 
foundational in von Rad's two volume Theologie des Alten Testaments, first published 
in 1957 and 1960, his partial turn away from 'event' back towards the 'text' was 
severely criticised by such as F. Hesse (1958, 1960) for its failure as a biblical 
theology to be sufficiently concerned with historical events (cf. Reventlow, 1985:67-
68). This continuing emphasis in biblical theology on the historical Israel behind the 
formation of the text (even in von Rad's work on the 'text') leaves little contact with 
the integrated biblical theology mentioned earlier. 20 It is also perhaps significant that 
the division between Old and New Testament theologies remained firmly in place 
during this period (cf. Scobie, 1991 a:41). 
20 In the so-called 'biblical theology movement' prevalent in the Anglo-American theological 
world. attention was generally concentrated on the mighty acts of God which stood behind the text. 
and both archaeology and historical data were considered of the first importance in the formulation of 
biblical theology (e.g .. Wright. 1952: cf. Childs. 1970: 13-87: Reventlow, 1986: 1-9: Pcnchansk)·. 
\995:51-70). For the view that the Biblical Theology Movement. as commonly understood. did not 
exist. see Smart (1979). 
E. Biblical Theology in the Twenty First Century: After the Loss of\\'rede's 
Project, Where to Next? 
Recent years have, however, not been kind to these twentieth century biblical 
theologies. None has gained wide acceptance, the consensus as to their task has been 
dissolved, and many of their founding historical assumptions challenged (e.g., the very 
existence of von Rad's credo). Biblical theology-as opposed to Wrede's historical 
project-has been declared to be in crisis~ as Adam has put it, 'the evident problem is 
not so much that no one wants to do biblical theology as that no one seems capable of 
living up to the demands of those who theorise about [it]' (1990a: 1). Some even gave 
up completely on the idea as an impossibility. In 1974 1. Barr wrote that the prevailing 
tendency was to say that 'there is no one theology, either of the Old Testament or of 
the New, and still less of the entire Bible' (270). This viewpoint remains typical of 
many today; the work of H. Raisanen is particularly striking, his book Beyond New 
Testament Theology (1989) being essentially a call for a return to Wrede's project (cf. 
Barr, 1999:530-40). 
But the impasse in which biblical theology either dissolves into the history of 
religion or suffers the persistent failure of any attempt to formulate a normative biblical 
theology within the framework of historical criticism is now itself being recognised and 
challenged. 21 The particular tenet of modernism which created the impasse-its 
objectivism, expressed in its insistence upon the foundational nature of historical 
criticism-is being questioned and increasingly rejected. The recognition of the role of 
interpretation in the attainment of human knowledge has given rise to a rather different 
perspective on the distinction between the objective 'meant' and the subjective 'means' 
so important to Jowett, Wrede, and Stendahl (cf. Moberly, 1992b: 147~ Ollenburger, 
21 In Childs's words. the . painful lesson which has emerged in the last fifty years is that the 
many serious attempts at a theological compromise which would build a confessional Old Testament 
theology directly on the foundation of historical critical methodology ha\·e ... failed (199:' 2~:') 
1986~ Watson, 1994:30-33).22 The ideal objective starting point for the historian 
which was not available to Eichrodt in 1929 is now increasingly recognised as being 
absent across the whole of the Enlightenment project. 23 Thus the 'objective' text 
which once seemed so self-evident has dissolved away and the requirement that all 
biblical theologies must deal with that text may-at least for the present-be 
disregarded. 24 F. Watson gives Childs the credit for the introduction of this 
22 That proponents of independent biblical theology have so far consistently failed to carry it 
out seems undeniable (cf. Levenson, 1987). Barr, for example, has pointed out that Stendahl himself 
is not consistent in defining his own account of the distinction between biblical theology and 
systematic theology. In defining the systematic task, Stendahl writes that the 'question as to the 
meaning of the Bible in the present-as distinguished from the meaning in the past as stated by 
descriptive biblical theology-receives its theological answer from the canonical status of scripture' 
(1962:429; this section is titled 'The Significance of 'Canon' for Biblical Theology, ..J28-30) But he 
adds that when ' the descriptive task is addressing itself to the interplay between different parts of the 
Bible, .. .it naturally takes cognisance of the limits of, as well as the very idea of, canon' (428; cf. Barr. 
1999:380), a position which Wrede would surely repudiate. If even Stendahl could be 'infected' by 
dogmatic concerns, one wonders why Wrede's advice has not been taken more seriously and the name 
of the discipline changed to one which does not have such a deleterious effect on exegetes, perhaps the 
'history of religion' . 
Though some have continued to insist that provision of a fully descriptive 'biblical theology' 
is feasible (e.g., Barr. 1988: 12), the problem of how 'independent' such biblical theologians can be 
continues to haunt the independent discipline. The true nature ofthe problem is not that a Christian's 
normativity must be swapped for a historian's normativity, but rather that a modern normativity must 
be swapped for an ancient's normativity. This is, of course, impossible, as Stendahl's 
acknowledgement that absolute objectivity is beyond the independent biblical theologian shows 
(1962:422). If the independent biblical theology can never be truly independent, then perhaps it 
should be asked why it should be given nonnative precedence over any other reading strategy (in 
exactly the same way that Barr has asked Childs why the canonical approach should be given 
priority). 
23 As Fish notes, this argument has been made in a wide variety of disciplines: 
[I]n Philosophy by Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Willard Quine; in Anthropology by 
Clifford Geertz and Victor Turner; in History by Hayden White; in Sociology by the 
entire tradition of the sociology of knowledge and more recently by the 
ethnomethodologists: in Hermeneutics by Heidegger, Gadamer, and Derrida: in the 
general sciences of man by Foucault; in the history of Art by Michael Fried; in Legal 
theory by Sanford Levinson and Philip Bobbit; in Literary theory by Barbara Hernstein 
Smith. Walter Michaels. Steven Knapp. John Fekette, Jonathan Culler, Terry 
Eagleton. Frank Lentricchia. Jane Tompkins, Stanley Fish, and on and on' 
(l989:J..J5). 
24 Though some have claimed that an essentialist foundation can never be attained. such an 
open-ended claim is deeply problematic and leaves them open to the charge of asserting a new truth. a 
new foundationalism (as Fish's posited critic does, 1989:29-30). A better approach is simply to state 
that in its continuing absence, people are free to redefine their world-views in the terms of non-
foundationalism. 
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perspective into the biblical theology debate (Childs himself attributes this insight to 
Barth, 1964:437, footnote 14). 
The conventional debate circles round the concept of description, with 
one side [i.e., Wrede and Stendahl] insisting on its autonomy while the 
other [i.e., the dogmatic theologians] asserts its inadequacy as an 
approach to its object. Both sides tend to accept, however, that the term 
'description' is a fair representation of historical-critical practice. In his 
1964 article, and in explicit opposition to Stendahl [and Wrede], Childs 
already sees the limitations of this naIve empiricism: "It is commonly 
assumed that the responsible exegete must start with the descriptive task 
and then establish a bridge to the theological problem. It is felt that the 
real problem lies in the second task. Rather, the reverse is true. What is 
the content which is being described and what are the tools 
commensurate with this task? This is far from obvious" [1964:437]. To 
appeal for an autonomous 'description' is to ignore the fact that there is 
no such thing as a pure description of a neutral object (1994:32-33). 
As Childs later put it: 'Can one actually read a text meaningfully without some sort of 
conceptual framework?' (1992a: 12~ cf also Sailhammer on the weakness of a 
descriptive approach: 'we cannot read the text from a neutral corner', 1995:168).25 
The removal of the major assumption which had created the impasse has left 
the way open for new approaches to the problem, though some, like Raisanen, still 
champion Wrede's solution to it. Continuing interest in the possibility of a biblical 
theology is signified by the continuing appearance of a series of publications attempting 
to define and carry out the project: collected works such as The Promise and Practice 
of Biblical Theology (1991), New Directions in Biblical Theology (1992), and 
Problems in Biblical Theology (1997), along with synthetic volumes by Childs 
(Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testament, 1992a)~ R. Knierim (The Task of 
Old Testament Theology, 1995), W. Brueggemann (Theology of the Old Testament, 
1997) and numerous others have appeared but have not yet led to any substantial 
25 This questioning of a monistic Enlightenment attitude to the biblical texts is taken by Barr 
to indicate Childs's deep distrust of the Enlightenment itself (1999:423-33). Childs's attitude to this 
important era in history is not monolithic. howeycr. Though his personal theology is. at many points. 
contrary to Enlightenment trends, he also considers the recognition of diversity within the biblical 
texts to be one of the 'gre.1t truths' of the Enlightenment (1992a:8). 
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agreement among those interested in relating Bible and theology. There are 
fundamental differences of method and approach, 1. Reumann listing at least sixteen 
different possible sources for biblical theology currently being investigated (1991: 12-
19).26 In Moberly's words, 'there is still everything to play for' (1992b: 141). 
Whatever kinds of solution finally gain acceptance amongst theologians-
whether academically or ecclesiastically based-it seems unavoidable that a historical 
aspect will have to be incorporated. Given the rise of modem historical consciousness, 
there is no possibility of returning to the integrated biblical theologies; the historical 
method is here to stay in some form (Scobie, 1991:49; Moberly, 1992:142-3). Clearly, 
biblical theologians must seek to act as mediators of the historical study of the biblical 
texts to the dogmatic theologians rather than simply as those undertaking a historical 
task. They should not attempt to provide a purely descriptive biblical theology of what 
is behind the text, an approach better left to Raisanen, but rather to provide a 
normative biblical theology. This type of approach Scobie designates 'intermediate 
biblical theology'. 27 
In section II below, a brief account of the historical growth of one such 
'intermediate biblical theology', that of Childs, will be given before a more detailed 
description of his approach is outlined in chapter 2. The purpose of the following 
personal history is not that of a detailed introduction to the development of the 
canonical approach to the biblical texts or of Childs's concept of biblical theology (for 
which see Brett, 1991:27-75; Hartzfeld, 1989:90-169; and Dyck, 1986:27-73) but is 
26 Briefly, according to Reumann, the options for biblical theology currently being explored 
are: (1) the New Testament's use of the Old; (2) the allegorical method; (3) typology; (-l) the sensus 
plenior: (5) lectionaries; (6) word study methods; (7) the topical approach; (8) chronological or 
traditio-historical approaches; (9) credal approaches; (10) heilsgeschichte or salvation history: (It) 
canonical criticism-Childs's and Sanders's disparate methods are held together here: (12) narratIve 
approaches: (13) sociological approaches; (14) liberation and feminist theologies: (15) rhetorical 
criticism; and (16) the history of exegesis. 
27 Scobie notes a certain linkage between this conception of the task and that of Gabler'S 
second stage, the collecting. comparing. and digesting of the biblical materials in the search for a 
'pure' biblical theology (1991a:51-52). Although the rationalist categories by which Gabler would 
ha,'c carried out this task are clearly to be rejected. it can nevcrtheless be said that, in a limited sense 
at least. biblical theology is a discipline which has come a very short way in a very long time! 
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rather a detailed continuation of this historical survey, and of Childs's place within that 
history. 
II. The Historical Development of the Biblical Theology of Brevard S. Childs and its 
Canonical Approach to the Biblical Text 
A. Childs's Early Education 
Childs's attempt to provide an 'intermediate biblical theology' IS the 
culmination of an interest in the discipline held throughout his academic career. 
However, the route he has taken towards the formulation of his own solution to the 
problematic question of biblical theology has been long and somewhat complicated. 
Childs, an American, was born in 1928. He graduated from the University of Michigan 
(A.B. and M.A. in History), before pursuing the critical study of both Old and New 
Testament at Princeton (B.D.), Heidelberg and Basle (Th.D~ 1950-1954~ 1992a:xv). 
His move to Europe enabled him to study under many of the great biblical scholars of 
an era when a certain consensus as to the task of biblical theology existed: H.-W. 
Wolff, W. Zimmerli, Eichrodt, and von Rad in Old Testament, and O. Cullmann, G. 
Bomkamm and K.L. Schmidt in New Testament (cf Childs, 1969:30~ 1974:x~ 
1980a:208; 1985:xiii). However, the need to learn the languages essential for his 
doctoral work under the supervision of W. Baumgartner seriously curtailed Childs's 
early interest in biblical theology simply through time considerations (1992a:xv). His 
dissertation, Der Mythos als theologisches Problem im Alten Testament, was 
completed in 1953, and a book published on the same subject in 1955. An important 
footnote to his experiences in Europe is that he had the opportunity at Basle to hear 
many of the lectures of Barth, the Swiss theologian who has become perhaps the 
greatest influence upon Childs's work on biblical theology. 
Childs left Europe in 1954 and returned to the United States, first gaining the 
post of Professor of Exegesis and Old Testament at Mission House Seminary, 
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Plymouth, before being appointed to Yale Divinity School in 1958 (1967a:inside cover; 
1992a:xv; cf Tucker et aI, 1998:xii). Publications began to appear almost 
immediately, and a series of monographs and essays utilising traditional historical 
critical methods helped establish Childs as one of the foremost practitioners of the 
historical critical method of his day (according to Sanders, 1976:289; and Priest, 
1980:260). Alongside his Old Testament work Childs also became involved in other 
areas of study, learning Akkadian under A. Goetze and studying Jewish exegesis 
(1992a:xv). His interest in New Testament was also given room to develop with 
several months of 1964 given up to studies at Tubingen University (in what was then 
West Germany), at a time when E. Kasemann was at his most influential (1984a:xxiii). 
In the ten years that followed, he also attended the New Testament lectures of his Yale 
colleague N. Dahl (1984a:xxiii). 
B. Realising the Need for a New Approach to Biblical Theology 
Alongside these studies, however, Childs began to write about the need for a 
new approach to the discipline of biblical theology. Elements of his approach began 
to appear as early as 1958 in an essay entitled, 'Jonah: a Study in Old Testament 
Hermeneutics'. D.F. Hartzfeld notes three such elements: First, the fully 'legitimate 
use of biblical criticism'; second, the 'inter-relation of the New Testament with the Old 
and thus a canon' (though the term is not used); third, 'the interaction of the [Holy] 
spirit to enable the reader' (1989:93-4). When applying these presuppositions to an 
exegesis of Jonah, Childs argued that the non-historical text is the true Word of God 
which calls for a response from those with 'eyes of faith' (1958:60). 
In 1964 Childs published one of his most influential essays, 'Interpretation in 
Faith: The Theological Responsibility of an Old Testament Commentary,' in the 
journalll1lerpretatioll. 28 Taking as his starting point the lack of good Old Testament 
28 In a report commissioned by the Vatican. 'La critique canonique', Barthelemy cited this 
essay as the first antecedent to the new field of 'Canonical Criticism' (cf. Sanders. 1991 :88). 
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commentaries, Childs attempts to provide an approach to the task of commentary 
writing which would remedy this situation. Here Childs took explicit issue with the 
role of historical criticism in biblical theology, claiming that as practised in a 
descriptive biblical theology such as that proposed by Wrede and K. Stendahl these 
methodologies rendered the texts theologically mute. 29 Childs wrote that approaches 
starting from 'a neutral ground never can do full justice to the theological substance 
because there is no way to build a bridge from the neutral, descriptive content to the 
theological reality' (1964:438; cf. 1979:79; 1985:17).30 
According to Childs, one must understand the task as a theologically normative 
one concerned with the reality to which the text witnesses. Anticipating the criticism 
that wild subjectivity will result from such a devaluation of the descriptive task, he 
argues that there are two other controls operative on the hermeneutical process aside 
from that of 'neutral' description. Hartzfeld writes that: 
Childs's solution to this problem appears in two tangible forms. First, he 
refers ... to the framework of faith, which seems to be a synonym for the 
idea of canon. Hence the scriptures become the rule of faith, the body of 
information from which normative categories are developed.... Thus he 
approaches 'reality' within this context and not through any criteria 
which the exegete would impose. Secondly, he refers to the Church, 
another tangible form, diverse as it may be! As part of the Church the 
exegete functions within the fact of God's redemptive activity within that 
Church and thereby understands 'reality' in light of the Scripture. Childs 
here introduces another important concept to which he will return, that of 
the community of faith (1989: 111). 
This characterisation of the scriptures as a rule of faith in this early article will lead 
eventually to Childs's characterisation of the canonical shape as the 'rule of faith' 
(1992a: 71). But it is important to note that he has unfortunately also invoked the type 
29 Barr has noted that Stendahl's article in the interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible does not 
so much describe biblical theology as it was being done at that time but rather describes biblical 
theology as Stendahl thought it should be done (1976: 106). 
30 In the light of Childs's comments elsewhere within this essay (e.g .. ~37), it seems clear 
that he is using the word 'neutral' here in its common usage. rather than suggesting that Stendahl and 
Wrede's approach is truly neutral. 
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of 'rule of faith' utilised by Irenaeus, that of an external hermeneutical constraint 
(1984a:27-33), and so a confusion exists in Childs's work as to the correct usage of 
this term. In this historical survey, his usage will be followed, but in later chapters, 
'rule of faith' is taken to refer not to the shape of the text (for which the more useful 
term 'arena' will be preferred) but rather only to the hermeneutical constraint operating 
alongside Scripture from outside, that of Jesus Christ, Lord of the Church. 
At some point during Childs's early career-perhaps even before 195831-a 
significant change occurred in his theological thinking: he began to revise his opinion 
of the theological approach of Barth. In an essay written the year after Barth's death, 
he comments upon this change (1 969a). He had first encountered Barth's work at 
Princeton, and remembers spending much of this first encounter trying to come to 
grips with the density of the theological language (l969a:30). At Basle, he remarks, 
there existed a tension between the 'biblical people' and the great dogmatician, a 
tension which lead to neither side taking the exegesis of the other seriously. In an 
anecdote about Barth's response to von Rad's lectures, Childs shows that he was at 
that time firmly on the side of the biblical scholars, though his admiration for Barth's 
acumen is also clear (l969a:30-1). But by 1969 Childs was wondering if Barth was 
not correct after all. The work of von Rad and those who had followed his lead in the 
so-called 'Biblical Theology Movement' had dated badly, but Barth's work seemed to 
Childs to be invulnerable to the criticisms which were destroying their work 
(l969a:31-2). In his 1969 depiction of Barth's normative stance one can see some of 
the features which had already appeared in his work and which would further come to 
constitute his own approach to the biblical texts. 
Barth came to the Bible, from the outset, from a confessional standpoint. 
He confessed that the Old and New Testaments were Scriptures of the 
Church, that they contained the prophetic and apostolic Witness, that this 
was the normative Witness, and that in this context (as the Church had 
received it) one remembered how the Church fathers and the Church had 
31 Scalise notes a similarity between the work of Barth and Childs's terminology in Childs's 
1958 Jonah essay, 1994b:61. 
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heard the Word, and yet waited in expectation that the Word of God 
would become alive through the Holy Spirit for them. And here Barth 
stood, of course, in the light of Calvin in stressing very much the Holy 
Spirit making the Scriptures alive to the people of God (1969a:32). 
It is noteworthy that certain reconstructions of Childs's programme have been faulted 
for their failure to recognise Barth's influence on Childs (e.g., Barr on Brett, 
1992: 130-40; on comparing Barth and Childs, see Scalise, 1987, 1994a, 1994b; Barr, 
1983: 142-47; 1999:405-38; and Wharton, 1972). 
C. The Evolution of Childs's Canonical Approach as Foundation for His Biblical 
Theology 
In 1970 Childs published his first major contribution to biblical theology with 
his book, Biblical Theology in Crisis. Taking further the negative comments he had 
made about the Biblical Theology Movement in his 1969 essay on Barth, the first four 
chapters of the book describe the movement's demise during the Sixties. The 
dissolution of the European consensus concerning biblical theology in which Childs 
had been trained had also occurred during this period, and it was into this vacuum that 
Childs offered a sketch of a possible solution to the problems of the discipline. The 
elements of his previous essays were expanded and combined explicitly with an 
emphasis on the final canonical form of the text as the authoritative and definitive 
Word for the Church; according to Childs, the 'Canon of the Church is the most 
appropriate context from which to do biblical theology' (1970:99). 
Childs soon decided that he had not got to the heart of the hermeneutical issues 
involved, however; he later wrote that he slowly began to realise that 'everything 
turns on how one understood the [biblical] material being described' (1992a:xv). From 
this realisation has grown his understanding of biblical theology as the study of two 
independent witnesses (the Old and New Testaments) to the one reality that is Jesus 
Christ, witnesses created by a 'canonical process' during which the tradents of the 
texts altered them with the intention that they be more easily appropriated by the later 
community of faith, a process culminating in the final form of the canonical text 
(1977a; 1978a; 1979:77-79; 1984a:25-27, 42-43; 1985:6-7, 11-13). Historical 
criticism, on this view, is to be subordinated to the canonical text and is primarily to be 
used to sharpen the exegete's appreciation of the shape of the final form through a 
knowledge of its tradition history (1992a: 70-1), a position which may be seen as an 
attempt to combine the insights of Childs's early mentor von Rad with the insights of 
Barth (cf. Wharton 1972:12).32 At some point he also began to recognise that the 
lack of a basic introductory textbook outlining the appearance of the texts when 
defined by his approach was a serious deficiency (1980a: 199, 206). These two 
elements, how to understand the shape of the biblical material and the need for 
introductory texts, occupied his biblical theological reflection for the next decade. 
During the 1970's a steady stream of essays on topics such as midrash and 
formal features of the biblical texts such as psalm titles demonstrated Childs's 
developing understanding of the biblical material. This stream was interrupted only by 
the publication of a major theological commentary on the book of Exodus. This work 
was the culmination of an interest in Exodus traced by Childs to a 1952 lecture on 
Moses by Baumgartner (l974:x), and is essentially an attempt to carry out the project 
outlined in Childs's 1964 essay. The commentary has proved to be an influential 
contribution to Exodus studies, if a somewhat flawed one with respect to the 
developing canonical approach (cf. Wharton's review article, 'Splendid Failure or 
Flawed Success?', 1975; Brett, 1991:38-47; Barr, 1999:391-2). 
Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture appeared in 1979, and was the 
first that many scholars had seen of Childs's radical attempt to subordinate the 
historical critical method to the particular use of the biblical texts as the scriptures of 
the Church. Responses appeared in large numbers, Childs receiving over sixty reviews 
of the work (1984:xv)~ two journals, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament (16, 
1980) and Horizons in Biblical Theology (2, 1980), each showcased several reviews 
.n A similar conclusion is drawn by Sanders. who sees Childs as combining the work of 
Barth and M. Noth (1976:289). 
and a response from Childs. Some reviewers were wholly negative. Barr, who had 
been cautiously in favour of Childs's work in the early seventies, now rejected the 
approach outright and has since proved to be one of his most vocal, if not most 
accurate, critics (1983:130-171,1999:378-438; cf. 1974:273-4.). R.N. Whybray 
wrote of the approach that it was a new form of 'obscurantism', and 'a dangerous 
method of interpretation which ought to be resisted' (1981 :29,34). Others, however, 
were more positive. The Old Testament scholar R. Smend called the volume 'the 
most important new publication of recent years in our discipline' (1980:45). On 
reading Childs's Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture, R. Rendtorff saw a 
'promising method' which provided a 'genuine alternative' to the historical critical 
methodologies then in use (1993: 195, 217; cf. also Murphy's' original' and' exciting', 
1980:40). Most were not fully convinced either way: H. Cazelles, for example, called 
Childs's proposal 'a profound and-in my opinion-very successful renewed 
approach' while suggesting that the loss of interest in the theologies of J, D, E and P 
would mean that the results of the canonical approach would be 'rather obvious', 
rather than 'fruitful and secure' (1980:29). 
But one comment that was consistently made was that the approach was 
incomplete as it stood; to be complete it must include the New Testament as well as 
the Old, a point which Childs had already realised (1984:xxiii). The next step was a 
daring one for an Old Testament scholar-Childs wrote an introduction to the New 
Testament. His interest in the New Testament had continued during the 1970's, and 
had included the running of a course on Paul's Epistle to the Romans as seen through 
the eyes of Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and Barth (1992a:xvi). Between 1980 and 1984 
Childs committed his research time to critical issues concerning the New Testament. 
Alongside his Old Testament teaching schedule, he recalls 'early rising hours, long 
periods at night and many summers of intensive study' (1984a:xxiii), one of which 
included a sabbatical at Tubingen in 1981 where he heard P. Stuhlmacher, M. Hengel, 
O. Hofius, and O. Betz (1984a:xxiii). In 1984 his New Testament as Canon: An 
Introduction was published. Responses were forthcoming but were disappointing for 
Childs. Whereas his Old Testament Introduction had caused even his critics to shift 
their ground this did not happen in the New Testament field. He later remarked that 
'the New Testament Guild closed ranks against the book, and it languished in silence, 
often unread' (1 993:xv). 
With these introductory texts complete Childs returned to the question of 
biblical theology, publishing a popularised Old Testament Theology in a Canonical 
Context in 1985. This work was considered disappointing by many (but in contrast cf. 
Scobie, 1992:6) not least because Childs was deemed inconsistent, his treatment of the 
relationship between the priests and the prophets seeming to owe more to Wellhausen 
than to his own canonical approach (House, 1998:47~ cf also W. Brueggemann, 
1986:284, 286-87). 
Seven more years were to pass before Childs presented the fullest exposition of 
his biblical theology in his massive Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, 
published in 1992a~ a work which has also received some criticism (cf the reviews of 
W. Brueggemann, 1993~ Moberly, 1993~ 1994~ Adam, 1994~ Bauckham, 1994~ Brett, 
1994~ Reumann, 1994~ and the comments of Watson, 1997:213-19~ Barr, 1999:396-
400). A large part of this volume was given over to extensive but non-canonical 
tradition histories of the Old and New Testaments which were, presumably, to be used 
to illuminate the canonical form of the text by those using the approach. The actual 
canonical sections included two 'detailed' exegeses of the Akedah and the parable of 
the vineyard and ten sections under systematic headings such as 'The Identity of God' , 
'God the Creator', 'Covenant and Election', etc.). Sadly, in Moberly's words 
(1993 :373-74), no 'memorable exegesis' resulted from Childs's canonical approach in 
his Biblical Theology, and though in one sense this large volume is the crowning 
achievement of his career, one cannot escape the feeling that the central jewel is 
missing. In subsequent years, Childs has contented himself with producing occasional 
essays. It remains to be seen whether anything more substantial will be forthcoming. 
In the following discussion, it is Childs's Biblical Theology which provides the 
basic understanding of the canonical approach applied here, but it will become clear 
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that, like many others, I have tended to pick and choose amongst Childs's many fruitful 
suggestions, discarding those which I have deemed unhelpful. Doubtless, others would 
question the correctness of those decisions and strike out in different directions but , 
that should be considered in many ways the greatest tribute that can be offered to the 
richness of Childs's contribution to the discipline of biblical theology. 
D. Conclusion 
In conclusion, Scobie's three-part definition has proved itself capable of 
accounting for the many different critical ventures which have passed historically under 
the name of biblical theology. Nuances have emerged which are able to explain the 
disjunction between the 'integrated biblical theology' of Irenaeus, the 'independent 
biblical theology' of Wrede, and the hoped-for 'intermediate biblical theology' of the 
near future. Clearly the relationships of the canonical text to both its component texts 
and its subject (its referentiality) are of fundamental importance in defining the 
resulting type of biblical theology, its shape and its content. The seemingly necessary 
rejection of the objectivist historical-critical text and the inability of modem humankind 
to return to the state which existed before the rise of historical consciousness serve to 
define the parameters of future attempts at producing biblical theology. Though 
Childs's canonical approach to biblical theology falls into this area, it remains to be 
seen how successful it will be and for whom. 
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Chapter 2 
The Canonical Approach to Biblical Theology 
I. The Canonical Approach and Biblical Theology 
A. Introduction 
In suggesting his own approach to the discipline, Childs has built upon G. 
Ebeling's influential 1955 attempt to redefine biblical theology (1 992a: 6-9~ cf 
Reventlow, 1986: 145).33 Ebeling wrote that in doing biblical theology 'the theologian 
who devotes himself specially to studying the connection between the Old and New 
Testaments has to give an account of his understanding of the Bible as a whole, i.e. 
above all of the theological problems that come of enquiring into the inner unity of the 
manifold testimony of the Bible' (1955:224). At the core of Childs's proposal for a 
new biblical theology lies his 'canonical approach' to the biblical texts. In this chapter 
Childs's development of Ebeling's statement will be taken up and combined with 
details drawn from his other writings to produce an outline of the canonical approach 
to biblical theology. In Section I, the historical and confessional basis of the approach 
will be outlined and defended against some common criticisms. In Section II some of 
the consequences of the canonical approach for exegetical praxis will be discussed. 
The question of how the hermeneutics of the approach are best understood will be 
considered in Chapter 3. 
33 Ebeling himself did not develop his definition further. and Childs has noted that he would 
probably have moved in a different direction than the one outlined here (1992a:7). 
B. Two Essential Distinctions: Canonical TextlBiblical Theology and Closed 
Canon/Open Canon 
Before continuing, there are two necessary distinctions which should be noted 
when considering the justification of the canonical approach. The first is that a logical 
distinction exists between Childs's canonical approach and his biblical theology in that 
one does not need to hold to certain of the assumptions of his wider theological 
thought in order to use the canonical approach to the biblical texts. This distinction 
may be formulated thus: 
The canonical approach to the biblical texts may form either one part of 
Childs's theological system or one aspect of any number of different 
theological systems. 
The second distinction is that the Christian 'Church' is divided into two broad types, 
each with a very different attitude to its scriptures. This may be formulated thus: 
Church communities typically hold to either a closed canon (henceforth, 
type 1) or may use an open canon of some kind (type 2).34 
The implications of each of these distinction for the study of Childs will be outlined in 
turn. 
The guiding principle of Childs's 'personal theology' is that the witness of the 
two Testaments, of scripture, is 'the true source of the knowledge of God' 
(1992a:369~ cf 1979:76,671). This emphasis also carries over into the way in which 
he sees his biblical theology relating to its wider theological context. Biblical theology 
should, according to Childs, operate as a sub-discipline within the discipline of biblical 
~4 In one sense. the use of 'closed' and 'open' to describe these two Church types and their 
use of (something which approximates) the canonical approach or some other 'canonical text' is 
problematic. The distinction is not really between being open or closed but is rather between two 
different kinds of closure (since. by definition, limits always exist on what is 'canonical'). 
Nevertheless. this terminology is often usefully applied to this situation and will serve here to mark 
the di fTcrenccs betw cen these two types of Church. 
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studies which mediates between that discipline and systematic theolol!:v Its aim and 
~. , 
the aim of all of the theological disciplines, is to provide illumination for the canonical 
scriptures of the Church. For those, such as D.H. Kelsey (1980:395) and Ollenburger 
(1985:53), who wish to see biblical theology operating in an ecclesiastical setting 
shaping, ordering and critiquing the continuing life of the Christian Community rather 
than as a mediating bridge, Childs has only polemic. For him, biblical theology cannot 
function within the Church before establishing in mediation between the Bible and 
systematic theology the identity of the 'God who in Jesus Christ calls the Church into 
being' (1992a:23, 723; cf also the similar formulations of Knierim, 1984:47; and 
Scobie, 1991a:49-50). 
Even for those who would accept such a mediating role for biblical theology, 
however, Childs's emphasis on the Bible as sole revealer may prove problematic. 1. 
McQuarrie notes that it is possible to create a typology of theologies on the basis of 
the dominant role given to formative factors such as revelation, scripture, tradition, 
experience, reason, and culture (1977:4). For some the Bible should only be treated as 
equal to (or even less than) these factors, it then being the task of the systematician to 
supply the unity the Christian faith requires by weighing each and deciding what is 
acceptable language about God (e.g., King, 1983). This formulation would be totally 
unacceptable to Childs, who rejects the assumption 'prevalent since the Enlightenment 
that the theological enterprise has other avenues [than scripture] to the truth' 
(1992a:370). For Childs the task of systematic theology is two-fold: first, to reflect 
upon the unity of the Christian faith taking account of the creeds and the history of 
dogma, not in order to create a complete doctrinal position, but rather to create a 'tool 
which will help better understanding of scripture' (1992a:369); and second, to deal 
with present day language and questions, including mediating such concerns to the 
biblical theologians. Without the mediatory work of biblical theology, Childs believes 
that it would be impossible for systematic theologians to make sense of 'the 
bewildering exegetical complexities arising from biblical exegesis' (1992a: 483). The 
theological enterprise envisaged by Childs is clearly a complex one which must be set 
within the life and worship of the whole community of faith, and requires co-operation 
between those studying biblical theology, systematics, pastoral theology, patristics, 
Church history, philosophy, anthropology and many other fields but always with the 
Bible firmly in the centre (l980a:200~ 1977c:359). 
Barr, in particular, has raised questions about Childs's claim to be providing 
'the' correct understanding of biblical theology and its relationship to the other 
theological disciplines. Most significantly, he has problematised Childs's definition of 
systematic theology and has dismissed his assertion that the assumption that there are 
other avenues to the truth originates with the Enlightenment by pointing to the use of 
natural theology by classical theologians (1999:414).35 But a distinction should be 
made between Barr's arguments against Childs's definition of theology as a whole and 
his arguments against Childs's use of a final form of the text. In asserting this, I am 
pointing out that the arguments which have been used to justify the canonical approach 
to the text are not identical to those which Childs has used-or should have used, if 
one takes Barr's position that Childs does not actually argue for his view (1999:401)-
to justify his theological claims. Childs's tendency to use absolutist rhetoric in defining 
both of these separate projects must therefore be treated individually~ to argue as if 
scripture is the only way to the truth and to argue as if all exegetes must work on the 
canonical approach are not the same thing and cannot be refuted as one. 
This thesis is concerned only with understanding and applying a canonical 
approach to the final form of the text which is capable of functioning as the biblical 
component within any number of theological systems. It will attempt to respond to 
Barr's criticisms as and when necessary, but it is not concerned with defending the 
claims of theological exclusivity which Childs has advanced. This is because there 
seems no good reason why those who see the Bible as having a complementary role 
alongside other sources of knowledge of God could not quite happily accept Childs's 
15 Barr notes that Childs's disparaging comments on the 'free church theology' of Taylor 
points out his tendency to ask for theological readings but then to disagree with those who offer them. 
implying that the truth is to be found only in his o"n formulations (1999:39-t; citing Childs. 
1984:548). For Barr, Childs is thus idealising 'theology', but only his form of it (1999:50). 
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arguments for the final form while remaining committed to an alternative, perhaps 
more contemporary, source of revelation. This second source would be allowed to 
impinge upon the canonical text and revise it in some way theologically. 
One such group might be (the less radical) Christian feminists, some of whom 
do utilise the canonical text alongside women's experience as a source of revelation 
(e.g. Trible, 1978). This theological position would probably find it difficult to wholly 
accept Childs's view that the biblical text as it stands reveals the true relationship 
between male and female in God's creation (1985:188-195). According to Trible, his 
conclusion 'spurns feminist analysis' (1993:35) and could perhaps be challenged by 
modern thought in the area of feminism, gender studies, or just plain female experience 
of the world. Such a challenge could lead to the final form being recognised as a true 
source of revelation but one devalued by patriarchal assumptions, a text in need of de-
mythologising! 36 
But here the second necessary distinction outlined above becomes important. 
Kelsey has noted that the adoption of a certain concept of' church' by Christians brings 
with it the concept of an authoritative closed canon of scripture (1975: 164). W. 
Marxsen, however, has argued that the modern Church is free to decide whether or not 
the judgement of the canonisers was correct and to reject the closed canon in favour of 
an open one (1971: 18). One variant of this position is that implicitly taken by R. 
Murphy (1980:44) when he asks Childs why other layers of the canonical texts should 
not be regarded as normative? But some go even further and regard only other layers 
of the text as normative. 1. Rogerson, for example, notes that I. Mosala, a black South 
36 A second group with a similar but distinct position is (the many groupings associated 
with) the Charismatic wing of the Christian Church. Childs's emphasis on the present Church as 
containing neither prophets nor apostles (e.g., 1992a:78; cf. also Seitz. 1998: 102-109) would certainly 
not be accepted by these churches and their use of his approach would be altered accordingly. 
In lC. Thomas' essay, 'Women, Pentecostals, and the Bible', he notes that the Bible both 
affirms and denies the leadership role of women within the Church (1994:53). He goes on to cite as 
decisive the fact that the work of the Holy Spirit within the contemporary Pentecostal community has 
lead to leadership roles for women; therefore, he concludes that those parts of the scriptures which 
affirm this should themselves be affirmed (1994:5~). In this case the second source of rcvclation for 
the Church is not experience of modernity or post-modernity but the witness of the Holy Spirit 
unmeditated by the biblical texts. These 'charismatic' revisionists could use Childs's final form as 
one pole in their bi-polar hermeneutic. 
Mrican theologian, insists on using a 'hermeneutic of suspicion', believing that 'texts 
which originate from the class of the oppressors cannot be used in the struggle for 
liberation. If they are, they may undergird the interests of the oppressors even though 
they are being used by the oppressed' (1991:35). For such theologians, Childs's 
canonical text could only ever be considered an oppressive text (though some 
individual 'canonical' segments may eventually be considered ideologically 
acceptable). 37 
Kelsey's rejoinder to such attitudes is to point out that such moves do not 
involve a simple rejection of the canonical texts but rather, in analytic terms, involve 
the rejection of the concept of church adopted by much of the early Church 
(1975: 165). Childs, however, is concerned with those who do accept this concept of 
Church, and his defence of the canonical approach as normative should be understood 
as being primarily aimed at justifying a prior decision by this particular constituency of 
the Christian Church (though, his language does tend to assume that this group is the 
whole of the Church).38 
When combined with the first distinction made between Childs's canonical 
approach to the texts and his theology, four possible definitions of 'church' arise: first, 
a type 1 church which uses a closed canon which approximates to Childs's canonical 
approach to the Old and New Testaments and mirrors his personal theology 
(henceforth, called type 1 A)~ second, a type 1 church which uses something like the 
canonical approach as its closed canon but which rejects Childs's theology (type 1B)~ 
third, a type 2 church which has an open canon, perhaps in the form of layered or 
37 It will be of great personal interest to see if the canonical text of Genesis 18-19 
encountered here and expounded in Chapters 5 and 6 eventually attracts the accusation that it is 'an 
oppressor's text'. 
38 Barr's claim that Childs is isolated theologically (1999:401) seems to trade too much on 
the polemical nature of the latter's writing and ignores Childs's wide influence on 'church' 
theologians (e.g., Moberly, Rendtorff, Seitz). It is, of course, an open question as to whether or not 
these scholars are responding to Childs's te:\.1ual work rather than his actual theology. But given my 
characterisation of churches 1 A and I B as those who have already accepted the early church' s 
definition of 'church', it is quite possible that Childs is in tune with more church members than either 
Barr, Marxsen, or Mosala. Certainly my own-admittedly limited-4!xpcrience of churches in 
England would suggest that this is so. 
altered text, but uses Childs's theology (type 2A); fourth, a type 2 church which has an 
open canon but does not use Childs's theology (type 2B). 
Obviously, members of type IA and IB churches are-to a degree which 
perhaps depends upon how closely their particular closed canon approximates the 
canonical approach-already predisposed towards accepting the canonical approach to 
the biblical texts as normative. But members of 2A and 2B churches, while not 
presently viewing the canonical form as normative, may yet come to accept it as such, 
either through an acceptance of Childs's arguments for canon (especially perhaps the 
canonical process) or through some other kind of 'negotiation'. But to examine the 
issues which are involved in this kind of situation would involve dealing with major 
social, political, theological and ecclesiological issues, a task far beyond the scope of 
this present work. This thesis will concern itself only with the justification of a 
canonical approach in the context of type 1 A and 1 B churches, in the context of those 
who do already hold to something approaching the canonical form of the Bible. 
II. A Theoretical Justification for the Role of 'Canon' in the Canonical Approach 
A. Defining' Canon' 
The biblical theologian's task, as defined by Childs's interpretation of Ebeling, 
is to reflect upon the connection between the two testaments in an attempt 'to give an 
account of his understanding of the Bible as a whole ... enquiring into its inner unity' 
(1992a:8). For Childs, the canonical approach which he has developed provides the 
'arena'-the canonical text of the Old and New Testaments-in which biblical 
theology should perform this task. 
In terms of its historical development, the distinctive feature of the canonical 
approach to the biblical texts is a simple one; Childs argues that the historical critical 
method should be subordinated to the final form of the text as used by the community 
of faith. 39 But the historical criticism dominant in his early academic career has left its 
mark on his work in that certain aspects of his argument for using the final form are 
heavily indebted to the historical critical method. 40 Other aspects, however, are 
primarily confessional in nature, and this combination of the historical and the 
confessional has lead to some confusion about Childs's extended usage of the term 
'canon' .41 
'Canon' for Childs is a rubric which includes four connected notions, the 
acceptance of each of which is, he believes, vital for the canonical approach in its 
attempts to justify the use of the final form (l992a:70-71 ~ cf earlier formulations, e.g., 
1979:68-60~ 1985 :6-7). First, he offers an historical argument against the view of such 
as Wrede that the canon was a late ecclesiastical decision which is fundamentally 
irrelevant to the modern interpreter. Rather Childs takes the position that the concept 
39 With the recent emphasis on literary approaches to the final form it is perhaps hard for 
younger scholars to appreciate what was once the radicality of Childs's aim. However, in the 1950's 
and 60' s. such an emphasis on the final form was wholly lacking, biblical scholarship being 
dominated by critical reconstructions of the multiple layers of the biblical texts. Although the rise of 
New Criticism in the 1940's and 50's. with its emphasis on the autonomous text, has been seen by 
some as an influential precursor to Childs's work (e.g .. Barton, 1984: 141-45), he has denied any 
direct link. 
40 Barr has suggested. on the basis of Childs's polemic against the historical critical method, 
that Childs has contradicted himself, the canonical approach being so heavily based upon that method 
that Childs is in effect cutting off the branch upon which he is sitting (1983:132-33). However, 
Childs's explanations of his approach and its relationship with historical criticism makes clear that he 
is not denying a very legitimate role for the method but only the insistence that it must be used in a 
particular 'atomistic' and 'genetic' way. Although his polemic is overstated, it is perhaps best 
understood as Childs's response to biblical theologians in the Wrede mould who would continue to 
insist upon that particular usage. 
Barr is thus correct in seeing these two approaches as attempting to describe 'as objectively 
as possible' two very different objects (cf. Childs. 1979:16); each uses historical methodologies in a 
different way, it being the difference between the objects of description that is of importance here and 
not the merits of the historical method as such (1983:153-4; later though, Barr was to be less 
affirmatory of Childs's acceptance of historical criticism, 1999:49). But Barr goes on to note Childs's 
comments on the impossibility of an objective descriptive enterprise, and suggests that ·this is an 
obvious confusion and canonical critics have not even tried to think straight on this theoretical issue' 
(1983:154). In chapter III. on the hermeneutics of the canonical approach, I shall attempt to resolve 
these so-called 'contradictory' views on the objecti,·e nature of canonical exegesis. suggesting that the 
term 'objective' should not be used in its absolute sense, but that it can legitimately be used as 
defining the nature of the study of a community of its texts. 
41 For example, Barr: Tanon in this book [Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripturel 
is vaguely and unanal~1ical1y treated' (1980: 13; cf. also 1983: 78-80). For a response. see Childs's 
review of Barr's 1983 book (l984b). 
of the canon is implicit in the formation of the final form of the text, the 'canonical 
process' . This historical process extends into the period during which the canonical 
text was stabilised and the canon completed, a period which forms the second element 
of the rubric 'canon' and which he terms 'canonisation proper'. But Childs now 
changes tack, moving from historical arguments about the 'canonical process' and 
'canonisation proper' towards a more confessional justification of the final form. As 
the third element of his rubric 'canon', he argues that the stabilised canon was (and is) 
received and acknowledged as authoritative by two communities of faith, the Church 
and the Synagogue. The fourth element of the rubric involves the assertion that these 
communities of faith read the final form of the text in line with what Childs calls the 
text's' canonical intentionality'. 
Although there are historical tones in that these last two elements could be held 
to refer to what has actually happened historically, Childs's emphasis on readers being 
part of these communities in order to do biblical theology is purely confessional, is 
essentially an invitation to read in a faith community with a firmly closed canon 
(1984a: 38-39; 1985:14-15,28-29). Since Childs has acknowledged that the present 
pluralistic intellectual climate is a good thing (1984a: 3 7), he presumably does not 
intend his historical argument about the canonical process to result in absolutely 
everyone-whether Christian or not-being forced to read these texts canonically 
(despite the fact that his language often appears to do just that). He is therefore reliant 
upon the impact of this third element of 'canon' in achieving full acceptance by any 
individual of his canonical approach.42 
42 Watson's arguments for the use of a canonical approach as normative appear to be based 
upon the presupposition that because of the 'canonical process' and 'canonisation proper' the 'full' 
meaning of the biblical text is that found within the Church when it reads its-in Watson's case, 
rather essentialist~nonical text (1994:3-6: 1996:95-126). Watson tends to belieye, as Childs 
apparently does, that all Christians read canonically (1994: 30-~5). 
It will be argued below, however, that there is no way to force all exegetes to read the biblical 
texts canonically. This is partly because the historical arguments for the existence of a canonical 
process are insufficiently well-founded to command universal assent and partly because in the present 
pluralistic interpretivc environment people are-generally-free to read as they will regardless of 
their vicw of the canonical process. On this last point see the debate between Watson (1996a:80-81: 
1996b:3-16), Marsh (1996a:76-80; 1996b; 1997:399-~1~), and Davies (1995: 17-55), and the 
reflections on Watson's Text. Church and World (1994) bv Rowland (1995:507-17: with Watson's 
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Although the interplay between these four elements has caused considerable 
confusion for both Childs and his critics, it may also be responsible for much of the 
strength of Childs's canonical approach. The problems associated with each 
individual element will be critically considered below and a defence offered. In some 
cases, however, resolution is best available through an invocation of the interplay 
between Childs's historical and confessional arguments~ of particular note will be the 
overlap between the 'historical' argument concerning the canonical process and the 
'confessional' acceptance of the final form. 
B. 'Canonical Process' 
The claim that the formation of the canon involved more than a late 
ecclesiastical decision and involved a prior canonical process is a historical one subject 
to the application of the historical-critical method. Developing the insights of von 
Rad, Childs claims that as the texts were formed, the Old Testament within Israel and 
the New Testament within the early Church, reflection upon the texts led to them being 
actualised within those communities, an actualisation which took the form, not of a 
concern to apply old texts to new existential situations, but rather of a theological 
concern to loosen the historical moorings of many of the texts in such a way as to 
render them applicable to future communities of faith (1977a~ 1978a~ 1979:77-79~ 
1984a:25-27, 42-43~ 1985:6-7, 11-13). Not all of the texts were so formed~ Childs 
notes that some texts were only actualised when accepted in their final canonical form 
(1979:79~ 1980a:206). However, the loosening which did take place was accompanied 
by the intentional and almost total obscuring of the identities and motivations of those 
who carried out this process (1979:59, 62-67, 77-79), the sole exception being the 
very occasionally expressed concern that 'a tradition from the past be transmitted in 
such a way that its authoritative claims be laid upon all successive traditions of Israel' 
response, 1995:518-23) and Riches (1998:205-34: with Watson's response, 1998:235-42), and on his 
Text and Truth (1997) by Pypcr (1998). 
(1979:78~ cf. Exod. 12: 14, 12:26-27~ Deut. 31:9-13). This obscuring leads Childs to 
claim that any attempt to recreate earlier layers of text by the use of historical criticism 
is 'to disregard the crucial theological intentions of the tradents of the tradition' 
(1985: 11). As E. Dyck puts it, for Childs 'the fact of a community is crucial to 
understanding the process, the identity of the community is not' (1986: 54). 
Childs's historical claim about the canonical process has proved problematic for 
two reasons: First, Childs's couching of claims about the effect of the canonical 
process on contemporary scholarship in exclusivist terms has attracted criticism. M. G. 
Brett, for example, sees Childs as having a totalitarian tendency, and suggests that he 
has two competing attitudes to biblical scholarship: the first is a 'coherent position' 
which Brett calls 'hermeneutical pluralism', and the second is an 'incoherent position', 
termed by Brett, 'hermeneutical monism'. Not surprisingly, the pluralistically inclined 
Brett argues that Childs is at his best with the former (1991: 11 cf. 41-2). The monistic 
'negative' side of Childs's work has also been attacked by Davies, who sees Childs as 
trying to 'absorb' all of biblical scholarship (1995:44).43 
There can be no doubt that Childs's language has the capacity to generate such 
views but, given his two tendencies, it seems strange-and somewhat ahistorical-to 
me that Brett and Davies have not taken account of Childs's academic context, and 
understood his often over-polemical rhetoric primarily as an unfortunate side-effect of 
his career-long difficulty in defining the canonical approach over against what he 
perceived to be an 'atomistic' and 'genetic' historical-critical method (cf. also Clines's 
description of historical criticism in these terms, 1978:7-10). Given that the logic of 
Childs's position favours a pluralist approach to the biblical texts in general but 
engenders the normativity of a single approach for one specific group of interpreters, it 
seems likely that these scholars are incorrect in their characterisation of Childs as a 
monist~ rather they should have asked the question, why he has so often used that kind 
of language. In fact, a monistic position is in no wayan essential component of a 
41 Barr traces Childs's monopolising tendencies to his indebtedness to Barth (1983:132. 
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canonical approach, as it need not impinge on the right of people to do what they like 
with these texts. Fundamentally, the canonical approach is a normative one, suitable 
for use within the Church (or perhaps rather some parts of it). But it is not 
necessary-or, I believe, even feasible-to insist that it is the only legitimate way to 
study the biblical texts. 
The second reason why the canonical process has proved controversial is that, 
as Brett notes, Childs has generally been dubious about recovering historical details of 
this process of canon formation, especially in his debate with the canonical criticism of 
lA. Sanders (e.g., 1979:57, 62-67~ 1980a:210-204).44 This has led Brett to argue that 
one of the key elements of the canonical approach, that the canonisers subordinated 
their own socio-historical situation to theological concerns, is a conclusion for which 
Childs can give no evidence. Brett further argues that 'there is a sense in which there 
can be no "primary" sources for human motives', and 'that one can hardly expect 
scholarly conjectures to secure a wide consensus when the relevant evidence is almost 
entirely lacking' (1991: 153). 
44 Sanders's canonical criticism is related to the traditio-historical method, and has been on 
the scene since he published his Torah and Canon in 1972. The Bible is seen as the result of a 
growth-process comprising three elements: the original text, a development of the text through re-
application which Sanders calls 'comparative midrash' and 'spontaneous revelation'. He assumes 
that within the process a consistent hermeneutic, 'theocentric monotheising pluralism', was operating; 
as pluralist material was incorporated into the process it was monotheised more or less successfully by 
this governing hermeneutic. The whole continued to grow through the use of comparative midrash 
until an aura of sacredness formed around the text, stabilising it. However, stabilisation did not close 
the canonical process; it was and is open-ended, and has continued with 'hardly a pause' (1984:32). 
For Sanders, there was no dramatic shift in interpretation towards the final form of the texts. Instead 
an ontological shift in the understanding of canon (its sacredness) required new hermeneutical 
methods which then allowed the text to stabilise. 
Thus Sanders understands the canonical function/shape of the scriptures as a combination 
of repetition-ensuring stability and potential adaptability. The stable core is the monotheism 
exemplified by the first commandment, 'I am the LORD your God, who brought you out of the land of 
Egypt. out of the house of bondage. You shall have no other gods before me' (Exod. 20:2-3). 
Adaptability is provided by the use of a hermeneutical triangle in interpretation; the three corners arc 
provided by the text(ual layer), its original social context, and the monotheistic hermeneutic. Since 
there is no essential difference between past and present communities of faith, these three elements 
are always present in a never-ending canonical process. The challenge for the modern reader is to 
apply the hermeneutic. to monotheise, in order to struggle with and against pol)1heism within their 
reading and their modern social context (see bibliography for Sanders's works. and Spina. 1982, for a 
comparison between Childs and Sanders.) 
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Additional criticism of the historical argument for the existence of a canonical 
process has come from Gottwald and Davies. Although the former accepts that a 
canonical process existed, he calls attention to the ideological nature of the social 
matrix in which it must have taken place and questions Childs's assumption that the 
final form has been 'loosened' from its socio-historical setting (1985:313-5~ cf. also the 
feminist criticism of Sanders by Bowen, 1996:327-52). The latter, an exponent of a 
materialistic historical criticism, has asked whether or not a historical justification for 
Childs's canonical process is methodologically available at all (1995:28-35). Davies 
suggests that in using terms such as 'religious dynamic' to describe the canonical 
process Childs is introducing into his historical discussion language which is 
confessional in nature and beyond the reach of historical study. For Davies, it is an 
uncontroversial fact that these writings were inspired by religious motivations but he 
does not believe that any more can be said. Instead, Davies gives the impression that 
there is a discourse available which is open to all because of its materialism, and that it 
is only the product of such a discourse which can be called 'history'. 
These kinds of criticisms have left an impression of 'weakness' in Childs's 
argument about the canonical process which has led to a number of attempts to 
reconstruct his approach, the most significant of which are those of Brett (1988, 1991, 
1994), Barr (1986, 1989), Dyck, (1986); E.E. Lemcio and R.W. Wall (1992), D.F. 
Morgan (1987~ 1990), P.R. Noble (1991, 1995), C.J. Scalise (1994a, 1996), and 
Watson (I 994, 1997). Despite this appearance of weakness, however, Childs's 
canonical process is by no means as vulnerable as it first appears, and responses can be 
offered to Davies, Gottwald and Brett. 
Davies's attempt to use a materialistic and positivistic historical method to 
define what can and cannot be said about history is, at present, philosophically 
indefensible. As a philosophy, positivism depends upon the reliability of 'empirical 
observation' and the public availability of 'facts', an availability now under very severe 
attack (cf Acton, 1989:255-6). But even if such facts were to become available, there 
can never be, strictly speaking, a positivistic approach to 'history' because historical 
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events are not themselves available for empirical verification. Instead a weak form of 
positivism must be posited in which one has only the traces left by historical eYents 
available for empirical study. Such 'weak' positivism has, according to P.L. Heath, 
'increasingly taken on the appearance of an ad hoc device for the exclusion of an 
already proscribed class of statements, rather than being in itself a reason for excluding 
them' (1989: 185). Since Childs can only be accused of illegitimately mixing two 
discourses if one holds to the propriety of a materialistic and positivistic historical one, 
there is no reason why Childs's claims cannot be evaluated using alternative historical 
criteria such as the concept of 'reliable testimony' found In the work of Barth 
(1956a:98-124; 1956b:457-740, especially 457-72,514-26), P. Ricoeur (1981:119-
54), and C.J.A. Coady (1992; on Barth, Coady and testimony, see Smith, 1997). 
There can be no doubt that Gottwald's position on the ideological effects of the 
social matrix on the canonical process and its final product is essentially correct; 
Childs's process is not a purification process in the sense of producing a context-
independent and ideology-free text. But what remains to be seen is how the passage of 
the texts through a historical series of social settings has altered them, and the resulting 
effect on the final form of the text. What, for example, is the effect upon their meaning 
of the insertion of what were once, presumably, socially grounded laws into the 
narrative setting of Deuteronomy (Childs 1985: 55)? Has there been any loosening of 
these laws, any change in their intended audience? What ideology is now expressed in 
the canonical text? 
It is futile to claim that the final form of the biblical text (or indeed any text 
whatsoever) is free of societal ideologies (this admission of futility, Barr terms the 
'common post-modern way', 1999:549). But it is certainly not the case that the 
canonical text must be ideology free in order for it to function as scripture. Barr makes 
much of Childs's castigation of such as Kraus's work as 'ideological' (1999:409; citing 
1992a:649) and views Childs as having only a negative view of 'ideology' in contrast 
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to Brueggemann (1999:549).45 But, as has already been mentioned (and as will be 
seen again), Childs has a tendency to over-polemicise, and here that tendency appears 
to have been combined with the unfortunate, though very common, tendency of a 
Christian scholar to regard the 'way of Christ' as 'perfect freedom' (and therefore, as a 
non-ideology) and not as a different form of slavery (an ideology). The rhetoric 
generated by this 'mixture' certainly gives the misleading impression that the canonical 
text is ideology free. Substantively, however, it is the exact form of the ideological 
nature of the canonical text which is important. Investigation of that nature, however, 
must await the results of exegesis, before its grain can be examined by those wielding a 
'hermeneutic of suspicion'. 
Brett's argument, that Childs's assertion that the process cannot be recovered 
means that no evidence exists for his claim that the canonisers subordinated their 
socio-historical situation to theological concern, is also problematic. For the 
assumption that all details of the canonical process are beyond recovery is not shared 
by many of the scholars working in this area. Although he acknowledges that Childs's 
claim for the historicity of the 'canonical process' lacks incontrovertible evidence, 
R.W.L. Moberly has noted that there is an 'inherent plausibility' about Childs's 
depiction of historical tradents forming and passing on these texts (1988: 107). His 
view is supported by the work of G. T. Sheppard and others on 'canon conscious 
redactions,' these being defined as attempts by 'editors to relate one canonical book or 
part of a book to some other canonical book or collection of books' (1982:23). As 
examples, Sheppard cites the use of psalm titles to relate psalms to the depiction of 
David found in the books of Samuel, the redaction of the books of Amos and Joel so 
that they are not ordered historically but rather 'ordered and redacted with a hinge 
between them on the theme of the Day of the Lord', and finally the epilogue to 
Ecclesiastes which sets the book in the 'broader context of solomonic wisdom and 
45 It is somewhat ironic that, despite Barr's view that Brueggemann is more open to the use 
of term 'ideology' than Childs (1999:5-t9), I have also heard the latter's use of the term 'advocacy' 
described as a cloak behind which to hide his own . ideology' . 
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identifie[s] this wisdom with Torah' (1982:23-4). These redactions and the 
development of collections of material demonstrate, Sheppard argues, the canonical 
process at work (cf. also Rendtorff, 1993:64). 
Provan has also argued that to limit evidence of canon consciousness to explicit 
references between biblical books alone as Sheppard implicitly does-and as Barr 
insists must be done (1983: 12-23 cf. Provan, 1997:8)-is essentially arbitrary. He 
draws attention to the 'extraordinarily high' levels of intertextuality amongst Old 
Testament texts as providing support for the existence of a canonical process. He 
writes that such intertextuality 
is not a trivial or marginal matter, this reality of cross referencing. It is 
rather a central matter. It is, for example, an intrinsic feature of the 
nature of our OT narrative texts that they have come into their present 
form in relationship with each other and with Torah and prophetic texts, 
the very form in which they are written inviting reference time and again 
to these other scriptural texts. If I may simply write of the narrative text I 
know best, the book of Kings, it is evident in that book that the whole 
way in which the story is told is designed to get readers thinking about 
the broader context of the story in Torah, especially in Deuteronomy~ to 
cause them to reflect on the way in which earlier events and characters in 
the story of Joshua-Samuel illuminate the events and characters of Kings~ 
and to bring to mind also prophetic perspectives on the story (1997: 8-9). 
Surprisingly, perhaps, Childs himself has also written that '[ c ]ritical historical 
research can provide evidence to show that this canonical shaping is not the creation of 
the Persian period. Rather the decisive forces of canonical shaping extended 
throughout the whole of Israel's history' (1980a:200). This positive attitude to such 
proofs can also be seen in many of Childs's essays, notably in his article on the Reed 
Sea tradition (1970b), and in the 227 page traditio-historical account included in his 
Biblical Theology (1992a:95-322). Why then has Childs occasionally shown such a 
reluctance to admit that the process can be seen at all? 
In answering this question, it once again seems significant that this reluctance 
has tended to appear in polemical discussion with Sanders and his • canonical criticism' 
(eg, 1979:57, 62-67; 1980a:210-204). In fact it is my contention that Childs's 
reluctance on this point should be understood as an unfortunate defensive response to 
the work of Sanders (and, indeed, of historical critics in general). Given that Brett is 
usually a fierce critic of Childs's tendency to over-polemicise against his opponents 
(e.g., 1991 :41-42), his one-sided characterisation of Childs as someone who believes 
that the process cannot be seen has the unfortunate air of one who has chosen-on this 
occasion-to over-emphasise the agnostic strand of Childs's rhetoric. By ignoring 
Childs's positive comments concerning the canonisers's intentions, Brett avoids calling 
attention to Childs's double-mindedness on this point and resolving it. And given 
Brett's own belief that-and this despite the hermeneutical difficulties-' historians can 
and do give plausible accounts of the intentions of historical individuals' (1991:143), 
the obvious resolution to this problem is that Childs can make use of our-admittedly 
limited-knowledge of the canonisers's intentions in order to establish the existence of 
the canonical process. 46 
For many scholars, Childs included, there does seem a certain amount of 
evidence that the canonical process took place, and they can discuss it without 
caveat. 47 It seems unlikely, however, that any attempt to prove this can ever move 
beyond Moberly's 'inherent plausibility'. The indicators seen in the text by Sheppard 
and Provan do not demonstrate Childs's thesis beyond all doubt; Sheppard's explicit 
references are relatively rare, and certain aspects of Provan' s intertextuality are open to 
the criticism that they are readerly constructions rather than authorial ones. In a 
certain sense then, it could be argued that Childs's view of the canonical process can 
be plaUSibly accepted by an exegete (contra Brett and Davies), though that there is 
insufficient historical-critical evidence to compel all readers to do so. 
46 This admission lessens the bite of Brett's attempt to criticise Childs's canonical process on 
the grounds that the 'pure intentions' of the canonisers are not ayailable for our perusal (1991: 153). 
Brett's own acknowledgement that plausible accounts of intention are provided by historians 
regardless of the hermeneutical difficulties involved does allow Childs the same freedom to postulate 
historically respectable 'intentions' for a canonising community. 
47 Goldingay. for example, cites this conclusion several times in his ,\/odels of Scripture 
(1994: 106, 164. 326). 
What Childs's approach loses in his historical argument for a canonical process. 
however, it more than gains in its invocation of the confessionally-based third aspect of 
the rubric 'canon', the reception of the canon by communities of faith. Even if the 
effects of the former were to be considered minimal, the effect of the latter was and is 
massive, fixing the texts, however disparate and disjointed, into the canonical shape of 
a final form or, to be more precise, forms, which can be seen even by those who do not 
accept the existence of the canonical process (who might then choose to read 
canonically on this basis alone). Perhaps surprisingly, what for Childs is only a minor 
point-that some texts were only actualised when accepted in their final canonical 
form (1979:79; 1980a:206)-effectively ends the discussion about the existence of the 
canonical process, since every text was actualised at that point regardless of its origin, 
its intended usage, or any anti-hermeneutical forces at work in its transmission 
(1979:79, 259; 1980b:55). But, of course, this is exactly the decision to canonise the 
biblical texts which Wrede once characterised as a late ecclesiastical imposition before 
rejecting it as necessary for interpretation-a value-laden characterisation which Childs 
seems unwilling to reject as ultimately irrelevant. 48 As an interpreter trained during a 
period when the hold of historical-critical research is somewhat looser, I do not find 
Wrede's complaint as compelling as Childs does, and so am not inclined to insist upon 
a 'canonical process' in order to refute it. It seems to me rather that a canonical 
reading can be pursued that is based on the simple recognition that a canonical shape 
now exists on one's bookshelf Nevertheless, I am persuaded that the existence of a 
canonical process is 'inherently plausible', 49 and merely note here that its 'invocation' 
48 Smend, implicitly drawing aspects from the positions of Childs, Sanders, and Wrede, 
describes what Childs calls 'canonisation proper' as the killing of a living process (1980:47). 
Childs's invocation of canonisation proper as a necessary part of canon means that he would 
acknowledge the living canonical process (with Sanders) but reject such a negative image as its killing 
by stabilisation (against Wrede). 
49 The relationship between Palestinian history and the biblical presentation is the subject of 
much debate at the moment. view ranging from those who see the biblical text as very faithful to 
historical events. t he so-called 'maximalists', and those who see biblical history as a late fiction 
created by the Hasmoneans, the so-called 'minimalists' (cf. e.g .. Provan, 1995: Davies. 1982. 1995b: 
Whitelam, 1996: Grabbe. 1997). But the canonical approach. at least as I understand it. should be 
unconcerned with this debate. and Childs's concern over the possibility that Deuteronomy was 
will allow canonical exegetes with Childs's sensibilities to avoid the charge that the 
canon is a late and massive ecclesiastical imposition and suggest that much of it was 
moulded to allow its availability to later generations. 
C. 'Canonisation Proper' 
With the stabilising of the text comes a further difficulty for the canonical 
approach, namely, that concerning the exact extent of the canon itself. There are a 
number of different canons: those of the Hebrew and Greek Bibles and those of the 
Eastern and Western traditions to name but four. Childs's initial work in this area was 
concentrated upon the Old Testament texts (1979:84-106). His argument that the Old 
and New Testaments were the products of two distinct tradents, and thus completely 
independent, led him to make the theological judgement that the 'canonical Old 
Testament text' is that which was first stabilised within the Jewish community around 
the end of the first century CE (1979:96-99; cf. 665). The Massoretic text, he argued, 
provides the vehicle by which the text has come down to the present day, and it is the 
task of textual criticism to provide us with this text (1979:100-101). This decision also 
took into account Childs's view that Christians and Jews shared a common text, and 
that this link between the two communities of faith is theologically important. A 
cautionary note was sounded concerning the possible inclusion of the apocryphal texts, 
however, but at that point in time Childs was not convinced that the larger canon 
would provide the link to the Jewish community which he deemed necessary 
( 1979:666). 
In his New Testament introduction Childs included an appendix in which he 
discussed the need for a canonical textual criticism (1984a:518-30). Rejecting as 
inadequate the attempts of textual critics since Westcott and Hort to get back to the 
original text, Childs suggested that two principles had been at work in the copying of 
origi nally propaganda (1985: 148-49) is therefore misplaced. On the stabilisation of the canon itself, 
sec Carr, 1996b. 
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texts (1984a:529). Firstly, there was an attempt to keep the texts as free from 
corruption as possible. But, secondly, there was also an attempt to critically include 
variants from other textual traditions. In order to do justice to these two principles 
Childs concluded that one must begin working with the textus receptus and work 
within the textual traditions in an attempt to find the text which reflected the true 
apostolic witness found in the Christian scriptures, the best received text (1984a:528). 
Childs approach to the Old Testament canon in particular has been widely 
criticised (e.g., D.A. Brueggemann, 1989:317-19; Barr, 1980:22; Murphy, 1980:40-
41; cf also Childs, 1992a:55-69). In his Biblical Theology he has, however, moved 
away from these positions, arguing instead for a canon which moves between an inner 
limit (the Hebrew canon as he had previously defined it) and an outer limit (that of the 
larger canon of the Septuagint), and which is defined by its relationship to the 'scope' 
of the texts, Jesus Christ (1992a:67-68). This flexible approach has also been urged on 
Childs by Scalise (1994a:64-67) and, somewhat more pragmatically, by Wall, who 
comments that God can work through different canons (1992b: 185). Provan, 
however, continues to argue that Childs was originally correct and that a canonical text 
claimed to be a discrete witness from its tradent, Israel, cannot be called either 
'discrete' or 'from Israel' if it is made to contain different LXX readings unknown to 
the Hebrew writers (1997:11-16). 
Perhaps, as Morgan has pointed out, the most important point about the canon 
is not the exact extent of it but rather that it exists at all (1986: 87). Morgan's 
conclusion seems valid in the light of the relatively slight importance attached to the 
question by Childs-'[it] remains a minor issue' (1984b:68)-and another leading 
canon critic, Rendtortf (1993: 3 7). Because of the relatively slight importance attached 
to the actual size of the canon and the time-consuming nature of the text-critical 
undertaking envisaged by Childs in and of itself, the exegesis at the heart of this thesis 
will simply use the text of Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartellsia (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Bibelgesellschaft Stuttgart, 1967/77), principally Eil3feldt's Libnlm Gelleseos (1969). 
D. 'Reception of the Canon' 
According to Childs, the canonical process eventually slowed and the texts 
stabilised into their final canonical forms. These canonical texts were eventually 
received as authoritative by two communities of faith, the Synagogue and the Church. 
This was not a case of previously unrecognised texts being declared authoritative but 
rather a recognition of the authority of the texts as they were already being used within 
the community. The final form of the text is regarded by Childs as the sole witness to 
the 'full history of revelation' (1979:76), and as presenting what Rendtorff has 
described as a 'theological message' in its canonical shape (1993: 126). Some parts of 
this final text were deliberately formed so as to allow their actualisation, though others 
had to be placed in positions which facilitated their actualisation by the canonisers of 
the texts (which ones and how are obviously open to question). But if, as noted 
above, Childs's historical argument as to why any exegete should ignore earlier textual 
layers and accept the final form of the canonical texts is only 'inherently plausible', the 
question arises: Why should the final form be accepted as normative for investigation 
over any other text? 
Childs's answer is to look towards the confession of 'the Church' that these 
texts are those accepted as sacred scripture in this form and to insist that biblical 
theologians must identify with this tradition (e.g., 1972a:711-14; 1974:xiii; 1977a:69; 
1980a:201; 1984a:38-39; 1985:14-15,28-29; 1992a:7-9). As noted earlier, Kelsey has 
noted that the adoption of a certain concept of 'church' by Christians brings with it the 
concept of an authoritative canon of scripture (1975: 164). To those who argue that 
the modern Church is free to decide whether or not the judgement of the canonisers 
was correct, Kelsey's points out that such moves involve the rejection of the concept 
of church adopted by much of the early Church (1975: 165). Childs, however, is 
concerned primarily with those who do accept this concept of Church and who are 
therefore already predisposed to accept the final form of the text. In answer to Barr's 
(and many others') question as to why anyone should accept the canonical approach to 
the texts as normative over the historical-critical method (1980: 14), he writes: 
In my judgement, the acceptance of the canon as normative does not 
function initially as a derivative of reasoned argument. The canon is the 
deposit of the religious community's sacred tradition which one receives 
as a member of that body. The acknowledgement of a normative rule 
functions confessionally as a testimony to one's beliefs. Earlier attempts 
to ascribe to the Hebrew canon special qualities of excellence, as if it had 
the best text, or reflected a superior form of literature, or possessed a 
unique claim to historicity, seem to have been misplaced. Does this 
mean that the relation to the canon is irrational and beyond the scope of 
all reasoned argument? Certainly not. The issue at stake is the classic 
theological problem of the proper relation of faith to reason. The 
testimony of faith and not reason establishes the canon. Yet there is an 
internal logic within the framework of confession (1980b:56). 50 
For Childs-and those who accept Kelsey's definition of church-the canon is 
a non-negotiable given~ clearly Barr's wish that Childs would use the word 
50 This element of Childs's use of canon corresponds strongly with Wall's (and Lemcio's) 
designation of the canonical approach as a post-critical method. Their suggestion-and a good 
indicator of the change in the status of the historical-critical method over the last forty years-is that 
the canonical approach should be regarded as a 'post-critical method' which has as its goal the 
interpretation of the final form of the text, and is based upon a 'religious epistemology that evaluates 
the Bible's normative role as canon, or rule of faith, as the foundation for the hermeneutical 
enterprise' (1992a: 143). In their own work this 'post-critical method' is combined with the 
canonical criticism of Sanders. As Wall puts it: 'My own version of canonical criticism is a synthesis 
of [the work of Childs and Sanders]. In setting forth what might be called "canon community 
criticism", I want to call attention to the fundamental importance of the final product of the Church's 
canonising process, the "canon", for faith and life (with Childs), and yet interpret it in the light of the 
fluid, dynamic reading of the Bible by the canonising community (with Sanders)' (1992b: 185; cf. also 
Landes, 1980:37). 
It seems likely that both Childs and Sanders would be troubled by Wall and Lemcio's move: 
the former because he sees the reading of the canon as involving a rather different dynamic to that of 
the canonical process, and the latter because he would see no reason to limit the community's reading 
to the final form. Despite this 'limitation', Sanders has generally been very appreciative of Lemcio 
and Wall, offering a response to one of Lemcio's articles (1981) and providing the foreword to their 
book (1992). 
In theory an approach which follows the first half of this reformulation but dismisses the 
second does not need the canonical process at all, and hence would be untroubled by the lack of 
evidence for such a process. Childs' insistence on an acceptance of the canonical process would then 
become optional, and his insistence upon it would perhaps be seen as a relic of his struggle to bring 
the canonical approach to fruition in an academic climate then dominated by historical criticism. 
Howe\'cr. it is questionable whether such an approach does full justice to Childs's efforts to use thc 
historical-critical method as a source of illumination for the final form. One's opinion here may well 
depend upon how convincing one finds Childs' praxis rather than his theory. 
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'sometimes' of the rightness of canon is a non-starter (1980: 13).51 This position picks 
up on two elements of Ebeling's definition, those of the normativity of the texts and of 
the confessional presuppositions of the exegete. Childs sees his approach as 
recombining the historical and theological elements sundered by Gabler; the task is 
normative and constructive in nature, and should be defined as a 'modem theologian's 
reflection on various aspects of the Bible' (1992a:7). Childs has consciously 
developed his own work as a confessing Christian theologian (cf e. g., 1972a: 711-14; 
1974:xiii~ 1977a:69~ 1980a:201~ 1984a:38-39; 1985:14-15,28-29; 1992a:7-9). He has 
rejected the view that a normative biblical theology should-or even could-be 
undertaken from the supposedly 'neutral' stance of historical criticism, a stance which 
he characterises as a 'philosophical commitment' to the 'Enlightenment's ... proposal ... 
to confine the Bible solely to the arena of human experience' (1992a:9; cf 1974:xiii). 
According to Childs, what is needed is a confessional approach with a dogmatic 
starting point more suited to those who wish to use the texts normatively. There is a 
risk of such a dogmatic stance obscuring the texts,52 but since one cannot read without 
such a framework, it must also illuminate the texts. Its success, therefore, is dependent 
upon the amount of illumination that it brings to the texts; this Childs defines as the 
'quality' of the dogma used (1992a: 12). The benchmark against which this quality is 
measured is that of the Church's confession that both testaments bear witness to the 
reality of Jesus Christ, 'the one Lord, in different ways, at different times, to different 
peoples, and yet both are understood and rightly heard in the light of the living Lord 
himself, the perfect reflection of the Glory of God' (1992a:85). This confession 
51 D.A. Brueggemann asserts that Childs is correct that 'the canon cannot be subjected to 
empirical justification or verification by anything external to itself (1989:318). Howevcr, 
Brueggcmann disagrees with Childs's formulation 'the testimony of faith... establishes the canon' 
(Childs. 1980b:56), preferring to say that 'it is the testimony of faith that God establishes the canon' 
(1989:318). Brueggemann notes that Barr would accuse both him and Childs of fideism regardless. 
but believes that 'there is a major difference in believing in the canonical process and believing in the 
One who superintended that process. making it reliable' (1989:318). Brueggemann's criticism. 
however, is misguided; Childs is arguing that it is the testimony of those who are the Church. the 
faithful. that the canon is a given. that an essential part of their Christian faith involves the 
acceptance of the Church' s canon. and not that they have faith in the canonical process itself. 
52 Childs himself has argued that both the literary approach of Alter and Kermode (1987) 
and the liberal dogmatics of Burrows (1946) have stifled the text (l992a: 12). 
defines what Childs has described as the proper 'scope' of the biblical texts, and the 
proper task of his biblical theology is to illuminate the subject matter of the texts, Jesus 
Christ (1992a:725). 
For many modern scholars-Christian and non-Christian alike-this has proved 
unacceptable. Modern pluralism is inimical to Childs's singular emphasis on the final 
form, and this has shown itself in a number of ways. 53 It is significant that Brett's 
reformulation of the canonical approach, though claimed to be 'charitable', begins with 
the implicit assumption that some universal rationale must be given for using the final 
form of the text. In his reconstruction Brett has chosen to ignore Childs's claims 
about the existence of a canonical process altogether, turning instead to a view of 
textual growth based initially upon an analogy with the growth of scientific knowledge 
as portrayed in the work of K. Popper. 54 Popper suggested that objective knowledge 
exists independently of a knower, a suggestion based upon a distinction between three 
worlds: 'first, the world of physical objects or states; secondly, the world of states of 
consciousness, or mental states, or perhaps behavioural dispositions to act; and thirdly, 
the world of objective contents of thought, especially of scientific and poetical 
thoughts and works of art' (1972:74,118-9,148; cf Brett, 1991:125). Popper's 
reference to poetical thoughts and works of art is taken by Brett to indicate the 
relevance of Popper's world three to literature, a view which he then extends using the 
reception aesthetics of H.R. Jauss (1982) in order to argue for a progressive 
refinement of the biblical texts. 
Brett notes that this does not account for the stabilisation of the text and so he 
argues that Childs should move towards Gadamer's view of the classic (1979) as a text 
'which has the power to demonstrate continually its truthfulness in new circumstances' 
(1991 : 134). He writes that if the canonical approach can be understood as 'a filtering 
S3 Especially noteworthy here is the persistent refusal of both Brett and Davies to resolve the 
confusion left by Childs's apparent misapplication of monistic language-rightly used of a specific 
community-to scholarship in general. The result is that Childs's project itself appears confused and 
misdirected rather than his terminology. 
~4 The first published seeds of this approach can be found in a 1985 article by Fowl. a post-
graduate student at the University of Sheffield during Brett's time there. 
61 
of tradition, then interpretation can be justifiably focused on the classical form of the 
Hebrew Bible rather than the earlier layers of tradition which inevitably reveal the 
prejudices of particular historical periods' (1991: 146~ such a view, he believes, can be 
legitimately held without recourse to Childs's 'dubious' canonical process, 1991: 23). 
From Brett's perspective, the wide range of arguments thrown up by alternative 
explanations of the biblical literature 'cannot be circumvented by claiming that the 
canonical approach has different interpretive interests. The classical text needs to 
demonstrate continually its truthfulness~ its authority cannot be asserted dogmatically 
in the face of all reasoned critique' (1991:147). 
Brett's approach is highly problematic, however. Questions as to how the final 
form should 'demonstrate continually its truthfulness' and who should judge its success 
would be answered differently by Childs and Brett (who would be followed by many 
historical-critical scholars, both Christian and otherwise). A response from the latter 
may follow this example from J. Day: 
The moving penitential Psalm 51, the Miserere, contains in vv 16-17 the 
striking words, 'For thou hast no delight in sacrifices~ were I to give a 
burnt offering, thou wouldst not be pleased. The sacrifice acceptable to 
God is a broken spirit~ a broken and contrite heart, a God, thou wilt not 
despise. ' The psalmist presumably rejects sacrifice here because it is 
inappropriate in his particular case~ he has committed a grievous sin (e.g. 
murder or adultery), for which the Law provided no sacrifice as a means 
of atonement, so that all he could do was to throw himself on Yahweh's 
mercy in abject surrender and humility. Verses 18-19 are surely the work 
of a later glossator, dating from the exile or post-exilic period, whose 
mundane statement that right sacrifices will be offered when the walls of 
Jerusalem have been rebuilt appears to have missed the profound point 
that the psalm is making. It illustrates the disadvantage in believing, as 
B.S. Childs appears to do, that it is always preferable to read the Old 
Testament theologically in its final canonical form! (1992: 134-my 
italics)55 
55 Collins also demonstrates this irony when he writes concerning Childs's approach that it 
means isolation from much that is ',ital and interesting' in biblical studies, including 'potentially 
fruitful' sociological work (1990: 1). One can only ask of Collins, vital, interesting, and potentially 
fruitful for \\hom? Or of Day, disadvantageous for whom? 
Childs's has offered his o\\n response to such challenges and. given the increasing emphasis 
on 'novelty' in our modem culture, it bears repeating in full here: 
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Day unwittingly points out the irony in Brett's attempt to justify the use of the final 
form as a 'classical' text; namely, that an individual or a group can-at any point and 
with no particular need for justification-decide to use a form of the text other than 
the final form. Certainly decisions as to what constitutes a profound or mundane 
reading will vary, the beauty of the biblical text being wholly in the eye of the beholder 
(cf e.g., Williams's review of Brett's book Biblical Criticism in Crisis?, 1993:327). 
Childs's canonical text is not a 'classic text' in the Gadamerian sense at all (cf also 
Provan, 1997: 20-21). 
Further problems exist for Brett's suggested alternative to Childs's canonical 
process. Barr, for example, criticises Brett because he proceeds with Gadamer's 
ideas-and, it could easily be added, Popper's ideas-' as if they are obviously right. ... 
In other words there is something accidental about the whole argument: one has the 
feeling, given Brett's wide-ranging knowledge of modem intellectual trends, that a 
comparable series of significant modem thinkers could be found who would support 
and justify almost any conceivable idea' (1992: 138). But more significantly, it is 
Brett's combination of Popper and Gadamer that has been questioned by both Barr and 
A.D.H. Mayes, the latter questioning the possibility of linking (the timeless free-
wheeling openness of) Popper and (the firmly closed 'classical' text of) Gadamer at all. 
Mayes writes: 
That Popper and Gadamer can be brought together in this way seems 
very unlikely. The essence of Popper's theory is its open-endedness: the 
It has often been suggested that the earlier stages of the biblical tradition are 
theologically more exciting that its final form. I certainly recognise the force of the 
argument. Who has not felt the excitement of von Rad's brilliant theory of the 'credo' 
or of the . Solomonic Enlightenment' (although both are probably wrong)? 
Nevertheless, I have serious objections to this approach to Scripture. First, I think that 
the criterion of excitement is a product of the Enlightenment, and grossly 
misunderstands the responsibility of the theological enterprise. Undoubtedly the 
Gnostics were more exciting than Irenaeus! Secondly, the development of a canon is 
by definition a community effort. It is characteristic of the Hebrew canon to play 
down individual contributions and to blur the marks of the creative genius. The effect 
is to provide the Old Testament with a radically theocentric focus which has always 
been a disappointment to those whose interest rests primarily in man and his 
accomplishments (1980b: 58). 
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process of development of objective knowledge through criticism never 
yields anything like a final text, and Gadamer's theory of the classic sits 
very uneasily by its side. The possibility of forgetting, refuting and 
dismissing earlier conjectures can scarcely be accommodated within 
Gadamer's understanding, in which tradition plays a much more 
informative role (1991: 56). 
Despite this difficulty, Barr has suggested that, since Brett is only attempting to 
legitimise the use of the final form within a pluralistic setting and not absolutise it, his 
use of Popper and Gadamer may provide acceptable justification to some to look at the 
final form~ after all, it is only meant to provide an analogy for the growth and 
formation of the canonical text (1992: 136-7). But this is hardly satisfactory. Brett's 
position is, it seems, unable to convince scholars such as Day as to the pre-eminence of 
the final form and remains theoretically uncertain at best. It will hardly serve, 
therefore, to justify a concentration on the 'truth-full' final form to a pluralistic world. 
And if his work does not make the canonical text pre-eminent but only makes it worthy 
of study, it must be asked why the study of the final form needs to be justified in terms 
of its growth at all-no other strand of the text needs such justification, each being 
considered worthy of study in its own right and for its own sake in Brett's pluralistic 
discipline. Brett's insistence on justifying the final form in this way in a pluralistic 
setting comes to a rather bizarre conclusion when he eventually recommends that 
Childs should move closer to the New Yale theologians (1991: 156-67), a group who 
would surely reject Brett's use of such 'foundationalist' categories out of hand (cf 
e.g., Lindbeck, 1984~ Wallace, 1987, 1990). It is hard to imagine Brett's arguments 
impressing Barth or any neo-barthian theologians, and if these theologians do not have 
to justify their theological work by Brett's criteria of reasonable truth, why should 
Childs have to do so with his confessional canonical approach? Brett's arguments sit 
uneasily with his claim to be 'pluralistic'. 
In contrast with the difficulties of Brett's position, Childs's rejection of the 
humanistic desire to judge the text means that he does not have to demonstrate the 
truthfulness of the text according to the criteria used by Day or any demanded by 
Brett. He is not interested in a best reading, an original reading, or disqualifying a text 
on the grounds that it is the product of an 'incompetent' (Barr, 1980: 18-19) or an 
ideology (although he has been somewhat inconsistent on this point: cf. 1985: 148-49), 
but he is interested in the reading of the canonical text established by the confession of 
the church. Brett's argument that one cannot just dogmatically assert the truthfulness 
of one's position is defused by Childs's refusal to submit to the epistemological 
requirements of the former's modernistic rationalism (cf. Topping, 1992: 248-51), a 
refusal which is paralleled in the work of Barth. D.F. Ford writes: 
The most common form of the doubts [about Barth's approach to 
theology] is about the grounding of what he says. Is Barth not a 'fideist', 
one who takes up a position of traditional faith and refuses to allow 
rational criticism? Is his confident theology possible only because he 
ignores the problem of its intellectual justification? So why did he not 
engage with [these questions]? The answer is he did but that his solution 
is a challenge to the very presuppositions of the debate. These 
presuppositions are sometimes empiricist, ... Kantian, .... [ or] reductionist in 
tendency, ... [and they] characterise the object of knowledge in terms of 
the way in which it is known by the human knower. Barth sees any such 
formal criteria, which are inevitably based on the norms of other areas of 
knowledge, as an infringement of the freedom of God to speak for 
himself, and a presumption that in the face of God one can step aside for 
a while to assess the situation neutrally. His confidence is that theology's 
object shines for itself. So theology is merely a reflection, but since its 
object is supremely good, true, and beautiful, simply being as faithful as 
possible a reflection is the best way to convince people. Hence Barth's 
maxim that the best apologetics is good dogmatics (1979: 194-95). 
Though there are obvious differences between the object of faith, God, and the (or a) 
source of knowledge of that object, I believe that Childs should justify his canonical 
approach in exactly the same fashion. 
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III. The Praxis of the Canonical Approach 
A. Consequences of the Canonical Approach for Praxis 
Up until this point Childs has plausibly argued that the canonical texts were 
formed by the two communities of faith, Israel and the early Church, in such a way as 
to loosen the texts from their historical moorings. During canonisation proper the 
communities closed their (various) canons around the now-stabilised texts, and 
acknowledged them as authoritative, in effect assigning the texts the status of a 
'given'. The implications of this position for the reading of the biblical texts by the 
continuing community of faith constitute the final part of his extended use of the term 
canon~ in this section (III), the principal consequences of the canonical approach for 
the praxis of biblical interpretation will be outlined. 
Though Childs has spent most of his career working on the canonical approach, 
it is unfortunately true that he has not actually produced a clear detailed example of 
what an exegesis of a particular text would look like. His Exodus commentary, while 
of great interest to students of the canonical approach, is from an early stage of 
Childs's work and must be considered flawed according to the implications of his later 
formulations of the approach. And as already noted, Moberly has pointed out that 
Childs's later work contains no truly 'memorable exegesis' (1993:373-4). This means 
that any attempt to describe how the canonical approach should look in practice can 
only be sketched from Childs's generalised examples and theoretical comments (and 
even these, Barr has-with some justification-categorised as imprecise, 1999:48, 
374). Though what follows should give some idea of just what is involved in 
attempting a canonical exegesis of a text like the Sodom narrative, a certain lack of 
clarity is unavoidable. Of course, this fuzziness also opens the door to a variety of 
different executions of the approach (e.g., House, 1995~ Lemcio and Wall, 1992~ Wall, 
1995; Watson, 1994, 1997~ Seitz, 1998~ Moberly, 1992b, 1998~ Gowan, 1994), but 
Childs's failure to provide a good exegetical 'model' means that the merit of each of 
66 
these members of the 'canonical family', including this present one, must be judged 
individually and on their own terms. 
B. 'Text as Arena' 
The most important consequence of the canonical approach for praxis lies not 
in the proposing of a particular exegetical methodology, but in its redefinition of the 
'object' being studied. Childs's aim was to describe the shape of the canonical 
scriptures and to argue that this formed the arena within which the canonical exegete 
should work rather than some historical critical reconstruction behind-the-text (e.g., 
1979:72-79~ 1985: 15). But this shape provides only a negative factor, restricting the 
area in which exegesis can take place. In consequence canonical exegesis is limited by 
the features of the text as defined by the approach but it is not restricted to a single flat 
interpretation. 
Within the arena defined by this negative shaping it is the work of the exegetes 
themselves which provides the positive creativity which the community needs, and 
thus, an element of reader competence is implicit within the approach (e.g., 1979:73, 
79~ 1984a:38-39, 41-42~ 1985:15~ 1992a:71, 335). Since, as Murphy notes (1980:43), 
there is also a certain ambiguity to the significance of many of the features which make 
up the constraining shape of canonical text, considerable scope for multiple readings is 
inherent in the canonical approach. Clearly, such an understanding of the nature of the 
canonical text does not provide the exegete with a step-by-step methodology, although 
some strong implications for exegetical praxis do follow from an acceptance of the 
canonical text as the object of study. In this way the need for reader competence 
extends to the development of exegetical strategies as well as to insightful 
interpretation. 
Childs recognises both the partial nature of this definition of exegesis and the 
time-bound nature of the community, and is prepared to acknowledge both multiple 
readings of the text and the relegation of previous readings to the history of exegesis 
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(cf. also his comment that there is 'no perfect system' of biblical theology, 1972d:28-
29). But since Childs does not view interpretation as progressing to a 'correct goal' 
the history of exegesis continues to provide a useful commentary upon the texts which 
should be used to illuminate the final form itself (1992a: 721). 
C. 'Formal Features' 
Within the canonical text there are what may be described as 'formal features', 
the function of which is to provide an exegetical guideline for the community of faith 
by indicating the direction in which the texts should be interpreted (1977a:69; 
1985:12-13; 1992a:71, 335, 724).56 Morgan has separated these features into two 
groups; the first, 'macro-canonical exegesis', deals with the relationship between the 
larger blocks of material (1986: 87). Childs has pointed out several areas of interest in 
discerning the macro-canonical shape of the final form, looking, for example, at the 
relationship between the two Testaments (1 992a: 73 -77, 91-93, 333) and between the 
four gospel narratives (1984: 157-209). Implicit in his work here is the assumption that 
the canonical placement of these blocks of texts has consequences for their 
interpretation. 
Morgan's second category, 'micro-canonical exegesis', deals with details 
within biblical books and their inter-relatedness. For Childs, these include the overall 
structure of books, written intentions, superscriptions, addressees (all 1984a:49), 
appendices, hymnic settings (1977 a: 71), the canonical re-setting of material (1971 : 137; 
1977a:70-71), its canonical intertextuality (1992a:327), changes in genre and semantic 
level-from literal to metaphorical, from everyday to eschatological (1977a:73-77; 
1978b), signs of re-interpretation (e.g., on Jeremiah, 1977a:71-71; cf. 1978a), the 
56 The use of the term 'formal features' may giYe the impression that Childs is echoing the 
work of the New Critics (cf. Barton. 1984: 141-45). Brennan has also suggested links with the work 
of Iser because of the constraining nature of Childs's canonical text (1997:66). It will be argued in 
chapter 3. however. that neither of these characterisations are accurate; these 'formal features' being 
better understood as loci within the texts which the hermeneutical presuppositions of the community 
of faIth define as important. 
backgrounding of unimportant elements of the text (1977a:69; 1980c: 129), and the 
grouping of details around a single character, Law around Moses, Psalms around 
David, and Wisdom around Solomon (1985: 198).57 It is these 'formal features' which 
primarily provide the structural shaping of the canonical text, the arena in which the 
exegete must work. 
D. 'Canonical Intentionality' 
In the context of the 'canonical process' and 'canonisation proper' Childs 
has argued that the texts were so formed that they now have what he terms a 
'canonical intentionality' (e.g., 1979:79, 300, 393, 486, 645; 1980a: 199-201, 206-207; 
cf also 1985:22-23). This signifies the manner in which the text itself stands in 
dynamic inter-relation with the community in a form which functions relatively 
independently of the canonisers themselves;58 meanings not intended by any of the 
tradents or canonisers of the texts arise as the texts function within the community of 
faith (e.g., 1979:79, 259). The source of this canonical intentionality and its 
relationship to other forms of textual intentionality requires further definition, however. 
The very existence of a canonical intentionality has been challenged by S.E. 
McEvenue, who has argued that there can be no such intentionality because no-one 
intended that 'the Bible as a whole' would have a meaning (1981:229-42). But his 
assumption that intentionality must reside within a real author-as Barr also implicitly 
does (1980: 13 -14 )-is open to criticism; it is possible to see 'intentions' as existing 
autonomously within texts (with the 'New Critics')59 or as being attributed to the 
57 Childs's two Introductions (1979) and (1984a) are particularly important in outlining the 
nature of these 'formal features', though the fact that many of his discussions concentrate on 
historical-critical issues means that helpful demonstrations of their actual effect occur with less 
frequency. 
58 This autonomy and the holistic effect that it has had on the community of faith is Childs's 
answer to those who question thc prioritisation of the final form over the hermeneutics of those who 
formed it (e.g., D.A. Brueggemann, 1989:315). 
59 'IE IYen a short lyric poem is dramatic, the response of a speaker (no matter how abstractly 
conceivcd) to a situation (no matter how universalised). We ought to impute the thoughts and 
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'authors' and 'texts' created by readers (with the reader-response critics).60 The 
attack of the latter on the idea of a free floating autonomous text (and hence the 
attribution of an 'intention' to any such a text by the New Critics) has been largely 
successful, and there is now no such text to which we can attribute the property of 
'canonical intentionality'. Rather, the attribution of a canonical intentionality to a 
group of scriptural texts is actually a product of the reading strategies of the 
community of faith, the community itself being the source of the canon's intentionality 
(Fish, 1989:99-100; 1995:14; cf Sperber and Wilson, 1995-in chapter 3, on the 
hermeneutics of the canonical approach, this position will be defended in more detail). 
If an intentionality can be ascribed to the canon as a whole, the question 
arises as to how that intention relates to the intentionality of the individual texts 
themselves and the intentions of their authors. There are two factors which are 
important here. First, a basic assumption of the canonical approach is that these texts 
were taken up within the canonical process and were eventually incorporated into a 
larger whole. This, Childs claims, has had the effect of loosening their specificity and 
widening (or perhaps, with Gottwald, simply changing) their applicability. In 
consequence, the original intentions of these texts and of their authors have been 
subordinated to what may be termed the 'dynamic intentionality' of the final form. 
But, second, and despite the canonical process, Childs insists that the biblical texts do 
continue to reflect something of their historical background and the intentions of their 
authors; thus, the exegete must do justice both to the particularity of the texts and to 
their loosened role as canonical text. 
The necessity for sensitivity and balance here is further demonstrated by 
R.E. Brown's argument that these texts do not always render the intention of their 
original authors correctly (1994:6-10). He argues that Luke, for example, gives the 
attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker and if to the author at all, only by an act of 
biographical inference' (cf. Wimsatt and Beardsley's essay 'The Intentional Fallacy', 1972:335-their 
italics). 
60 Scalise has also used the work of Ricoeur on the intentionality of texts to clarify Childs' s 
'canonical intentionality' in a similar way (1994a:69-71). 
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impression that the Jews crucified Jesus by neglecting to insert a Roman antecedent to 
his 'they' who lead Jesus away; grammatically it is the 'chief priests and rulers and the 
people' of Luke 23 :26 who lead him away and crucify him. But it is clear from the rest 
of Luke's text that he was aware that the Romans did crucify Jesus (cf. 23:36 
'[Roman] soldiers'; also it is the Gentiles who killed Jesus in 18:32-33 and in, the 
possibly Lukan, Acts 4:25-7). It would also probably be correct to deduce that no 
first-century Christian audience would have been unaware of this either (1994:9-10). 
Any canonical interpretation of this text must therefore reflect an awareness of the 
'intention' of both 'Luke' and of his text, and not argue for a Jewish crucifixion of 
Jesus.61 The essential task for the canonical exegete is to balance the subordinated 
intentions of authors, redactors and texts with the dominant intention of the canon. 
E. 'Narrative Presuppositions' 
Another significant aspect of the canonical approach is the recognition that 
blocks of material have been constructed into a (more or less continuous) sequential 
narrative. This structuring has consequences for the canonical interpretation of 
subsequent material. For example, Childs has argued that the J account of creation 
(Gen. 2:4b-25) has been joined to the P account (Gen. 1: 1-2:4a) in such a way as to 
subordinate it to the latter. As Childs puts it: 
The Priestly formula in 2:4a 'these are the generations of ... ' now 
introduces the J account in 2:4bff The J material thereafter functions, 
not as a duplicate creation account, but as a description of the unfolding 
of the history of mankind as intended by the creation of the heavens and 
the earth. The structure of the book has thus altered the semantic level of 
chapter 2 by assigning it a different role. The J material functions on the 
level of figurative language, once removed from its original literal sense 
(1992a:113). 
61 One example of a reading which does not demonstrate this sensitivity is the response of 
certain commentators to Luke's failurc to mention the Pharisees in the passion narrati\'es. Krodel. for 
c\ample, states that it is the L .... 'adducean leaders alone who are found fighting against God at the close 
of Acts 5. presumably making Gamaliel the only Pharisee In the Sanhedrin (1986: 129). 
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Similarly, he considers the creation narratives as a whole as now functioning as an 
essential introduction to subsequent narratives about Israel and its deity (cf. also 
Moberly, 1992a: 105-46). 
Moberly, in his work on Exodus 32-34, has incorporated into his exegetical 
approach an understanding of the role of allusion and presupposition in the 
interpretation of narratives which differs from that commonly found in historical 
critical exegesis. He writes that: 
A writer will frequently be allusive in style. He will not want or need to 
elaborate on matters of which the reader is already presumed to possess 
knowledge, either through general knowledge or through what the writer 
himself has previously said. The preoccupation of historical critical 
analysis with penetrating behind the text makes difficult an appreciation 
of this aspect of literary style. Silence about, or only a brief reference to, 
some feature in the preceding narrative is customarily taken as showing 
either ignorance of this feature, thus constituting evidence for the 
discernment of sources, or else a secondary gloss or harmonisation, thus 
providing evidence for redactional compilation. To interpret silence or 
allusions as assuming a knowledge of the preceding narrative may have 
far reaching implications. In the exegesis of Exodus 32-4 it is proposed 
that frequently sense may best be made on the assumption of a knowledge 
of the preceding narrative in Exodus 1-24; (26-31); and more generally 
Exodus 1-18 (1983 :32-his italics). 
In Moberly's work on Exodus 32-34 this assumption IS largely justified by its 
interpretive success in accounting for the features of the final form narrative. 
This basic stance on how to interpret biblical narratives does not require that 
the texts are the product of a single author or even that such allusions are necessarily 
intended at all. Redactors or simple compilers may 'create' textual situations in which 
allusions are generated as a result of the canonical process: for example, the Paul of the 
Epistles over against the canonically prior Paul of Acts or the pre-exilic Prophets over 
against the historical books (Joshua-2 Kings). It is the placing of a text within its 
canonical framework through either the 'canonical process' or the stabilisation of 
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'canonisation proper' which entitles the canonical reader to understand succeeding 
sections of a sequential narrative as presupposing knowledge of previous material. 
Childs's discussion of the canonical shape of 1 and 2 Samuel provides an 
example of the effect of the canonical process on disparate materials. Noting that 
historical-critical scholarship has accepted since Wellhausen the position that there are 
both (A) pro- and (B) anti- attitudes to the rise of the monarchy 'intertwined' in 1 
Sam. 7-12 (B = 8:1-22; A= 9:1-10:16; B = 10:17-27; A = 11:1-15; B = 12:1-25), 
Childs suggests that neither strand is suppressed by their editor and that each is 
allowed 'its full integrity' (1979:277). The effect of this move is to give the anti-
monarchial source, B, 
the pre-eminence. It now encloses the A source, coming both at the 
beginning and the end. The people think they are solving an immediate 
problem with the demand for a king, but the dominant note is the 
prophetic warning of Samuel against the dangers of their being "like other 
nations". Nevertheless, the message of the A source remains of great 
importance and its emphasis is enhanced by its new editorial function. 
The establishment of the kingdom-even though arising out of 
disobedience--is not to be viewed as a purely secular act. Although the 
establishment of the monarchy was not according to the original divine 
plan, God is still deeply involved. When Samuel anoints Saul, the divine 
blessing is given and the Spirit of God brings him the victory (1979:278). 
In his discussion of the place of the law in the Old Testament, Childs offers 
other examples of how canonical placing can affect the way subsequent narratives are 
read. He notes that 'in its canonical role the Decalogue forms a theological summary 
of the entire Sinai tradition. All the detailed legislation which follows is therefore 
subordinated to and interpreted by the heart of the Law found in the Ten 
Commandments' (1985:54). All subsequent Law material is therefore to be read as 
presupposing the existence and pre-eminent place of the Decalogue (colltra Cazelles, 
1980'29) But, of course, the Decalogue appears twice, Exod. 20: 1-17 and Deut. 5 :6-
21, and Childs considers a correct view of Deuteronomy as crucial to any 
understanding of the Sinai material. There Moses is explaining the Torah, the Sinai 
covenant, to a new generation, to those about to enter the land across the Jordan. He 
is not offering Israel a new law but is rather applying the 'divine law which had once 
and for all constituted the nation' to a new situation, offering them a 'new application 
of old tradition'. In the new situation of entering the land, Israel is 'not to continue as 
before but is given a new charter by Moses', thereby 'legitimating the principle of 
change within the law'. Each of the individual laws which are contained in 
Deuteronomy are now to be understood within this context regardless of their original 
socio-historical setting. Childs concludes that canonically, 'Moses is portrayed as 
explaining the divine will to a new generation which had not itself experienced the 
formative events of its religious history. Deuteronomy, therefore, serves as an 
authoritative commentary on how future generations are to approach the Law' 
(1985:55-56). 
Because much of Childs's work lacks fine detail, tending more towards the 
over-view approach necessary for Introductions, it is a major interest of this present 
work to investigate in rather more detail how the present canonical shape of the 
material influences the interpretation of subsequent text, initially Gen. 1: 1 to 19:38 
(chapter 411) and then in even finer detail from Gen. 18: 1 to 19:38 (Chapters 5 and 6). 
F. 'Sensus Literalis' 
Childs's emphasis on the canonical final form leads to a consideration of levels 
of textual meaning: How is the final form to be read? Childs has argued (following 
Frei's Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 1974) that the sole level of meaning should be the 
literal sense of the text, the sensus literalis (1977b:92). What he means by the sensus 
/ilerali. ... ·. however, must be carefully defined (cf especially Noble, 1993:8-17,21-22). 
Childs rejects the use of different levels of meaning altogether (1977b:92-93). Both 
the separate levels above the final form implicit in the allegorical methods of scholars 
such as Origen (cf Scalise, 1988) and the separate layers beneath the final form 
defined by historical criticism when its proponents de-canonise and read the biblical 
materials against reconstructed backgrounds (e.g., Murphy, 1980:44: Knight, 
1980: 143-46) are unacceptable because both effectively destroy the witness of the 
biblical texts. Neither is the sensus literalis the same as the historical sense 
(1977h:88). Rather for Childs the object of a canonical exegesis is scripture and the 
subject-matter of which it speaks, Jesus Christ, and the task must take place within and 
be defined by the assumptions of the community of faith. The sensus literalis, as 
defined by Childs, is not the 'original sense of the text or even the best sense but is the 
plain sense witnessed to by the community of faith' (1977b:92), and it is defined by the 
way that the shape of the text has been finally fixed so that the text can be actualised 
within the life of that community (1977b:93).62 
But Childs further argues that the sensus literalis also has a figurative sense 
which is not to be regarded as a different level of meaning, but rather as serving a 
different function in a unified text within the community of faith (1977b:93).63 His 
approach to biblical theology insists upon seeing the two testaments as independent 
witnesses, and investigating the Old Testament as a witness to Christ pre-Christ before 
looking at the New Testament (1979:77-79; 1985:9; 1992a:91-2). This takes place 
from a faith perspective-the interpreter already shares the interpretive assumptions of 
the Christian community of faith (1985: 14-15, 28-30)-but should not involve over-
writing the sensus Iiteralis with Christian concepts (1985:9, 17); Childs has described 
this as a 'descriptive analysis' (1979:72). This 'description' of the first part of the 
canon is essential for two reasons: first, because a good reading of the Old Testament 
is necessary for a good reading of the New, and second, because without the Old 
Testament the Church quickly becomes marcionite. The New Testament should then 
be read as a witness to Christ post-Christ. 
62 On the debate concerning the sensus litera/is, see Childs, (1977b: 1990), Barr (1988b: 
1996), Noble (1993. 1995:306-13). and Scalise (1989: 1994a:75-98). 
63 See further Noble's discussion of Frei' s concept of figural interpretation and the reasons 
\\ h)" modern historical scholarship is unable to distinguish between figurative and allegorical. 
rejecting both (1993: 14-17) 
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In his discussion of christology in the context of biblical theology, for example, 
Childs states that the 'central theological affirmation of the Old Testament is that God 
has indissolubly bound himself to Israel in a covenant: "I will be your God and you will 
be my people'''. In redeeming Israel, however, Childs notes that this 'divine movement 
towards Israel's reconciliation' has two aspects: that of 'God's self-revelation in 
countless different ways throughout Israel's history', of God-with-us, and that of the 
way in which, through the anointing of the Spirit, 'the various offices of the people are 
constantly ushering Israel into the presence of God' (1992a:478-79). In the New 
Testament's understanding of Jesus Christ, Childs argues, 'both Old Testament lines of 
revelation, from "above" and from "below", were united in the one Lord and Saviour' 
(1992a:480). Biblical theological reflection on this subject should therefore continue 
to regard the Old Testament's portrayal of both the self-revealing activity of Israel's 
God and the offices which allow the people access to that deity as witnessing to the 
reality of Christ. 
But when these two tasks have been completed Childs argues that it is then 
essential to look again at both Testaments in the light of the reality witnessed to by 
both Testaments (1992a:85-88, 333, 344, 444-46). Such a reading, says Childs, is not 
'intended to threaten the sensus literalis of the Old Testament text but to extend 
through figuration a reality which has only been partially heard' (1992a:87). This can 
take place because of the ability of the biblical texts to 'resonate' when read in the light 
of the divine reality, and Childs concludes that, although typology as a full-blown 
method should be rejected (1992a: 13-4, 45), 'allegory or typology, when properly 
understood and practised remains an essential part of Christian interpretation' 
(1992a:87).64 Uncovering the ontology of God to which all Scripture witnesses 
requires, according to Childs, just this kind of biblical theological reflection. 
64 Childs's understanding of the canon as that which defines the range of authoritative texts 
allows for a further use of a figurative sense. Childs writes that the canon 
establishes parameters of the apostolic witness within which area there is freedom and 
flexibility. It does not restrict the witness to a single propositional formulation. The 
role of the canon as scripture of the Church and vehicle for its actualisation through 
the Spirit is to prO\'ide an opening and a check to continually new figurative 
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Because of time and space considerations, this thesis will be concentrating in its 
exegetical chapters only upon the first aspect of Childs's biblical theology, its 
'description' of the Old Testament texts. But it is hoped that the foundational exegesis 
of the Sodom narrative laid here will allow a more detailed investigation of this 
particular aspect of Childs's work in the near future. 
G. 'Referentiality' 
Intimately tied to Childs's understanding of the sensus literali5; is the question 
of the 'referentiality' of Scripture. Describing the biblical text as a 'witness to reality' 
with Ebeling calls attention to the external referent to which Scripture, as understood 
by Childs, testifies. Noble notes that modern historical-critical scholarship has generally 
assumed that the referent for the text has been, in Childs's words, "'a positivity behind 
the text" rather than the referent rendered by the text itself (1970: 102); this positivity 
can take forms such as those typified by the ostensivist who believes that the 'meaning 
of the narratives is the state of affairs in the spacio-temporal world to which they refer' 
(Noble, 1993: 11), the rationalist who believes 'the narratives refer ideally rather than 
ostensively' (Frei, 1974:261), and the mythophile who sees the 'subject matter of 
biblical narratives ... in the consciousness they represented' (Frei, 1974:265). 
Childs, however, does not see the reality witnessed to by the Scriptures as a 
referent behind the text to which we have objective access through either historical 
reconstruction, rationalism, or demythologising (1980a: 204). Rather he sees the text 
and the referent as inseparable in the sense that it is only through the text that we have 
access to the theological reality, a reality which is only available through the testimony 
of Israel and the early Church (1985: 12). Brett has noted that 'from his earliest work 
onwards Childs has... been attempting to hold together two different theories of 
applications of its apostolic content as it extends the original meaning to the changing 
circumstances of the community of faith. These figurative applications are not held in 
isolation from its plain sense, but an extension of the one story of God's purpose in 
Jesus Christ (1992a: 724). 
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reference' ~ one 'in terms of "witnessing" or "pointing" to divine reality', the other 
'more straightforwardly connected with the historical background of biblical texts' 
(1991:32~ a point subsequently taken up by Barr, 1999:416). The fact that Childs has 
been trying to hold these two together demonstrates that he is not arguing that such 
external referents have no bearing at all on a canonical reading of scripture. But, 
according to Childs, any details drawn from a historical-critical referent can only be 
used to inform one's reading of the final canonical form in which the theological reality 
is rendered, and must not replace or distort it (1980b:58~ cf. 1980c:136-37~ 
1992a:334).65 
Barr has argued against the validity of Childs's approach to 'reality' (1980: 15-
16). R.R. Topping records Barr's objection as being that Childs's insistence that 'one 
must not take up a hermeneutical base extrinsic to the text' necessarily means that the 
author of the canonical approach has cut himself off from 'both the revelatory realities 
witnessed to in the text and the historical realities under the influence of which the text 
was produced, .. , It is as "if [for Childs] the text [is] objective reality'" (1992: 247, 
citing Barr, 1980: 16), This Childs would no doubt understand as an assertion that the 
canonical project is structuralist in tone and fully a-historical. 
Topping defends Childs's approach in two ways: first, by re-iterating Childs's 
own response to Barr that there is no independent access to either the revelatory 
realities or the historical realities (1980b: 5 7), a situation which results partly from the 
almost total lack of historically illuminating non-canonical material and partly from the 
self-effacing activity of the tradents of the canonical texts themselves. Any 
construction of the community, their socio-historical situation or indeed of any 
revelatory activity behind the text is therefore 'tenuous and hypothetical in character' 
(1992:251). Second, Topping argues that Barr basically ignores the fact that the 
historical critical method 'works with an overly ostensive theory of meaning and truth 
65 Oswalt also criticises Childs from a conservative pcrspectiyc for his use of what Oswalt 
dcscribes as 'historical fiction' (1987:320-21). This concentration on historicity Childs would no 
doubt dismiss: 'At times the [canonical] context hangs ycry loosely on history as it bears witness to a 
representatiyc reality which transcends any giYen historical situation' (l980a:20-l-my italics). 
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which flattens the canonical texts' (1992:251), and quotes approvingly in response 
Childs's statement in his later New Testament as Canon that the 'Bible bears witness to 
a multi-dimensional theological reality which cannot be measured solely on the basis of 
such a correspondence theory of truth' (1984a:36). Topping concludes that 
while independent access to certain historical events recorded in the 
canonical texts may be possible, the assumption that this in tum provides 
a kind of independent check on the excesses of the testimony of faith 
which obscures history is to distort the subtle hermeneutic complexity of 
Old and New Testaments. The revelatory activity of God in space and 
time necessarily gives rise to non-historical modes of depiction in the 
canonical texts of Scripture apart from which we have no independent 
access (1992:251-2). 
On the relation of the canonical text to ostensive history, Childs writes in his Old 
Testament Theology that 
the canon makes its witness in numerous ways in relation to historical 
referentiality. At times it forms a very loose connection whereas at other 
times a genuinely historical component belongs to the heart of the 
witness. It is fully inadequate to restrict the nature of the Old 
Testament's theological witness either by demanding absolute historical 
coherence or by positing in principle no relationship whatever (1985: 149; 
cf also Martens's formulation of this position, 1994:338) 
Clearly, attempts to brand the canonical approach as either structuralist (e.g., Barr, 
1980:16) or as a form of New Criticism (e.g., Barton, 1984:141-45) or to suggest that 
advantage be taken of the present tum away from history towards a-historical story 
(cf Childs's own understanding of the work of the Yale theologians, 1984:541-46; 
1992a:21-22)66 would also have to be rejected. 
66 Brett has consistently proposed just such a move, and characterises as misguided Childs's 
continued refusal to do because of his incorrect belief that Lindbeck assumes the non-existence of an 
extra-tex1ual reality (1991:156-67,1993:283). 
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It is in the holding of both history and non-history together in the final form of 
the text that the canonical approach is distinctive. 67 As Childs puts it himself in his 
commentary on Exodus 
The biblical writer brackets the Exodus event with a preceding and 
succeeding interpretation. He does not see the Exodus as an "act of 
God" distinct from the "word of God" which explains it. In theological 
terms the relationship between act and interpretation, or word and event, 
is one which cannot be separated' (1974:204). 
In a different context, J. Moltmann has written that 
according to Paul's understanding, in the 'word of the cross' the crucified 
Christ himself speaks. Consequently, the event of revelation consists not 
only of the event of the cross and resurrection of Christ, but also the 
preaching of the gospel. The modern distinction between fact and 
interpretation, which we assume in natural science and history, is 
inappropriate to the understanding of the 'word of the cross'. This 
distinction is essential to modern knowledge, which dominates, which 
defines in order to affirm and to control what has been affirmed, and 
which isolates facts in order to take possession of them (1974:74). 
But not, I believe Childs would argue, to biblical theology (1980a:204). The use of 
constructions of 'ostensive history' as a source of illumination for the shape of the final 
form, however, will be considered further in section IIIK. 
H. 'Unity and Diversity' 
In a canonical biblical theology the two testaments are to be described in such a 
way that justice is done to their individual witness (1979:670-71 ~ 1985: 10-11). 
According to Childs, it is the 'Enlightenment's discovery that the task of the 
67 Martens notes that the preoccupation with history as a dominant category is a peculiarly 
Western one. that is not shared by Asian and African biblical theologies (199": 3 38). It would be 
more accurate to say that it is characteristic of a certain prominent mode of eurocentric thought in 
which rcason alone defines truth and meaning. Childs's canonical approach can be understood as one 
in which this mode is wholly rejected, the 'reason' which undergirds modern historical criticism 
being subordinated to another. more 'truthful'-at least from Childs's perspective-mode of 
discourse. 
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responsible exegete is to hear each testament's own voice, and both recognise and 
pursue the nature of the Bible's diversity' which must be extended and developed by 
the discipline of biblical theology (1992a:8). But the further Enlightenment claim that 
the interpretive goal is only reached when the interpreter distances him or herself from 
theological concerns must be rejected. Thus, Childs's interpretations do not describe 
'what it meant' but rather what it means as a witness to the reality of Christ~ he does 
not see a great gap between the two as Wrede did. Each testament is to be seen as a 
witness to Christ now; the Old witnesses to a Christ then yet to come, and the New to 
a Christ who had come, neither of which can be given up for both contribute to a 
greater understanding of the one reality (1985:9-10; 1992a:73-79, 85-89). There 
remains, however, a continuing need for historical clitical knowledge to be used in 
preventing anachronistic interpretations of the final form by the community of faith (cf. 
also Murphy's emphasis on historical criticism's ability to prevent simplistic readings, 
1997:268). 
Although Childs considers that the recognition of diversity within the biblical 
texts is one of the great truths of the Enlightenment, he goes on to cite approvingly 
Calvin's view that each individual passage of the scriptures is able to bear truthful 
witness whilst retaining its discrete integrity (1992a:725). As Scobie writes, '[b ]iblical 
theology is canonical theology in that it seeks to deal with the full range of canonical 
materials. This means that it will be resolutely opposed to any form of 'canon within a 
canon" (1991a:56-his italics). This concept of all of the diverse passages bearing 
truthful witness is not an indicator of complete agreement between texts on the textual 
level; for example, Childs writes of the writer to the Hebrews who, whilst attributing 
'an anachronistic belief in the resurrection of the dead to Abraham, nevertheless 
correctly witnesses to the radical nature of his faith in that he look[ ed] to God rather 
than see in the empirical evidence only the contradiction of death' (1992a:334). 
Rather, Childs sees the texts as 'dissident voices' united into 'a harmonious whole' 
when they are heard 'in relation to the divine reality to which they point in such diverse 
ways' (1992a:85). Implicit in Childs's formulations are both Moberly's contention 
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that theological reality may on occasions be rendered only by the use of 'contradictory' 
or 'paradoxical' formulations (1983:33-4), and B.O. Long's recognition that the 
canonical shape may at times generate a plurality of interpretations which the canonical 
reader must hold together simultaneously (1988: 166). 
D.F. Hartzfeld notes how his use of Calvin places Childs at odds with the 
Lutheran tradition (1989: 19, 210). Although Childs is appreciative of the work of 
Luther himself (1992a:43-47), he regards Luther's law and gospel hermeneutic as only 
one of a number of over-arching principles which connect the two testaments 
(1992a:74). Thus Childs can only reject the work of scholars such as E. Kasemann 
who regard the New Testament as a 'mixture of true and false witness to the gospel', 
and are therefore committed to 'recovering the genuine gospel apart from its 
widespread falsification already within the New Testament itself by means of a 
Sachkritik' (1992a:215). 
Childs's own position builds upon that of Barth who has, he believes, caught 
the 'true insight of the Reformers', that all Scripture is to be seen as totally time 
conditioned and thus tainted with all the fragility that entails (1992a:215~ cf also e.g., 
1980a: 201~ 1980b:55~ 1985:13-14). Alongside the time bound text stands Childs's 
recognition that the reader is also time-conditioned (1985: 14). This twin recognition 
leads Childs to reject any attempt to sift the biblical text for eternal truths~ one must 
return to the final form, and not to any construction which stands in its place (e.g., 
1970:101, 131, 134; 1974:xii, 396, 438, 496; 1979:73, 76, 671~ 1992a:369). Yet, he 
claims, it is just through such a vehicle that God communicates with his eagerly 
expectant people through the continuing work of the Holy Spirit (e.g., 1964:443~ 
1974:xiii; 1977c:359; 1985:12; 1992a:215). As Childs has put it when discussing the 
New Testament, 'it is not dead document waiting to be purified but a living voice 
waiting to be heard' (1992a:215). 
W. Brueggemann, however, thinks that Childs falls short of his claim to do 
justice to the diversity of the canonical text, suggesting rather that his project is 
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massively reductionistic (1997:92-3). Childs's biblical theology IS categorised by 
Brueggemann as 'hegemonic' because, in the words ofD.T. Olsen 
it limits the reading of the Old Testament text to what is useful for 
Christian Theology, disregards the playfulness and ambiguity of the 
biblical text, and denies the text its own say. Childs' program of putting 
the biblical text in conversation with the doctrinal tradition of the Church 
"means that the text is now subject to a set of interpretive categories that 
come from elsewhere" [Brueggemann, 1997:92]. To force the Bible into 
such Christian theological categories involves a "programmatic 
misreading" whose outcomes are "in line with the classical consensus of 
Protestantism" or "consensus Calvinism" (1998: 166). 
According to Brueggemann, his own approach to biblical theology is especially 
concerned with this playfulness and ambiguity of the biblical text. He believes that the 
Old Testament 'refuses to generalise or to systematise. It ... is not at all vexed about 
juxtaposing texts that explicitly contradict each other. More often, the editorial process 
seems to exhibit no great need to overcome such contradictions' (1997:82). Because 
the very openness of the text itself denies closure to biblical theology, Brueggemann 
concludes that more than one construal of the whole is available. This' openness' , 
however, does not result in paralysis, and Brueggemann advocates his own construal 
of the text under the controlling metaphor of the courtroom as being highly suitable for 
a Christian biblical theology~ it is testimony and counter-testimony to the nature of the 
biblical God that make up the contents of his Bible. 
But, as Olsen points out, Brueggemann's attempt to differentiate between his 
own openness and Childs closedness is highly questionable because he both understates 
his own systematising of the texts (as the many pauses to summarise in his Theology 
show, e.g., 303-13,400-403, 553-64, 712-20; cf Olsen, 1998:166, footnote 15) and 
exaggerates Childs's reductionism (Olsen notes Childs's extensive discussion with a 
wide range of theologians, 1998:167-70). The systematising about which 
Brueggemann complains is actually unavoidable when dealing with a text as extensive 
and as diverse as the Old Testament, never mind the whole Christian canon. With the 
correction of these two faults, the two biblical theologies are actually 'quite 
comparable' (so Olsen, 1999: 167).68 
Olsen goes further and asks why should reductionism be considered such a bad 
thing. Invoking Bakhtin's concept of 'provisional monologisation' (e.g., 1981 :259-
422~ cf. Olsen, 1998: 172-75) to describe biblical theologies such as those of both 
Childs and Brueggemann, Olsen characterises the results of both as temporary and 
necessarily reductionistic offerings, made within a continuing dialogue about the 
contents of biblical theology (1998: 175-80). In one sense, accepting Olsen's position 
involves the acknowledgement that any biblical theology produced by Childs is 
virtually certain to fail to do justice to the canonical text and must, by implication, use 
a(n unacknowledged) canon within the canon. But since Childs has also written of the 
fallibility of the interpreter and the frailty of the task at hand, such an admission is 
hardly earth shattering. Perhaps the most appropriate conclusion to draw is that a 
biblical theology should ideally do justice to the unity and diversity of the canon, and 
work towards that goal regardless of its almost impossible attainability in praxis. 
I. The 'Scope' of the Canon: Jesus Christ, Lord of the Church 
Despite Childs's rejection of the Lutheran sachkritik, that which 'shows 
Christ', it is evident from his own work that he does in some way envisage the 
Scriptures as all witnessing truthfully to the Lord of the Church, Jesus Christ. The 
obvious difference between Childs and Luther is that the former would consider faulty 
any attempt to see the texts as witnesses to Christ which entailed the rejection of parts 
of the canon. It is therefore obviously important to investigate how Childs's 
conception of the Christ operates within his canonical approach. 
68 This is a \'iew that I haw held e\,er since I heard Brueggemann-in-person attacking Childs 
for doing what I could only see as being "irtually identical to his own project. However. Barr. while 
noting the similarities. is still more interested in the differences (l999:5..JS-57). though a number of 
these can be traced to either confused rhetoric or misguided polemic on the part of either Childs or 
Brueggemann (e.g .. the use of the term 'ideology' by Childs. 5..J9). 
One must begin by noting that Childs actually has two figures of Jesus 
operating within his canonical approach, and it is important not to confuse Childs's 
language about each of these 'Christs'. The first 'Jesus Christ' operates as a 
hermeneutical constraint which can best be thought of as analogous to the regula fidei, 
the rule of faith, of Irenaeus and the early church (so Childs, 1984a:27-33). Perhaps 
ironically it is no easier defining the exact nature and content of Childs's regula fidei 
than it was to define that of Irenaeus (see pages 9-10). Whatever its detail, it is clear 
that this Jesus is a very bare figure who is Lord of the Church and whose Father is the 
Creator God of Israel~ the purpose of this Jesus is to guard against gnostic-like 
interpretations by providing an interpretive context within which canonical 
interpretation can take place. Of course, the content of this rather sparse rule of faith 
is open to a certain degree of interpretation itself But with this proviso in mind, it is 
this hermeneutical constraint, Jesus Christ, and the sensus literalis of the canonical text 
which provide, within the community of faith, the proper context in which to do 
biblical theology. 
The second Jesus Christ within the canonical approach is that which emerges in 
detail from exegesis, the Jesus witnessed to by the scriptures as they are read by the 
community of faith. The Old Testament is read as a witness to Christ pre-Christ 
before looking at the New Testament (l985:9~ 1992a:91-2). This is a descriptive 
analysis which should not involve over-writing the sensus literalis with Christian 
concepts (l979:72~ 1985:17). The New Testament should then be read as a witness to 
Christ post-Christ. But it is then essential to look again at both Testaments in the light 
of the reality revealed by both Testaments (1992a:87) in order to penetrate deeper into 
the 'shared reality' which is, for Childs, the concern of both Testaments, extending 
through figuration a reality which has only been partially heard' (l992a:87, 344-46). 
In answer to Dunn's argument that the Old Testament had authority for the 
early church only in so far as it was interpreted by the Gospel (1977:81), Childs 
responds that: 
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although it is obviously true that the Old was interpreted in the light of 
the gospel, it is equally important to recognise that the New Testament 
tradition was fundamentally shaped from the side of the Old. The Old 
Testament was not simply a collage of texts to be manipulated but the 
Jewish scriptures were held as the authoritative voice of God, exerting a 
major coercion on the early church's understanding of Jesus' mission 
(1992a:225-6). 
This being the case, Childs argues that the New Testament does not correct the Old 
(1992a:76-77, 85, 591). In the case of law and gospel, for example, Childs argues that 
their polarisation into opposites is fundamentally misguided and that in terms of the 
substance of the Bible's witness, the point is rather to seek the 'nature of the one will 
of God revealed in the law as a vehicle of the gospel' (1992a:559). Part of Childs's 
attempt to deal with the law involves his argument that Deuteronomy is an example of 
Old Testament law as a new re-application of the old, demonstrating that the Torah is 
not a timeless set of principles but is rather an event, the Sinai covenant, here 
presented afresh in a new context. But he then goes on to argue that the New 
Testament's reasons for its rejection of the Law must be investigated alongside a 
search for 'structural and material analogies' between the Testament's views of the 
law. In all of this Childs, at no time, rejects any of the law as such, but he also does 
not see it (all, at least) as binding upon himself in his Christian context. In his 
discussion of Humanity: Old and New, he writes that 
the Old Testament serves as a faithful witness to the salvation of God 
which overcomes human alienation and renders a human being whole. 
The Old Testament is a continuous testimony to the encounter of Israel 
with this divine reality who transforms human life to reflect the virtues of 
humility, honesty and reverence for life (Gen. 50: 15ft). The Christian 
church reads the Old Testament's depiction of both divine and human 
reality as a true witness to its faith, but also in relation to the full 
revelation of true humanity in Jesus Christ. It is not that for the Christian 
the New Testament "corrects" the Old Testament, but rather that Jesus 
Christ, God's true man, who is testified to in both Testaments is the 
ultimate criterion of truth for both Testaments. His reality is the test of 
biblical witness, while conversely the reality is encountered only through 
the witness (1992a: 591). 
In truth, it remains very difficult to describe in fine detail just how Childs sees 
both Testaments as witnessing fully and truthfully to Christ. Questions remain: Must 
Childs, for example, affirm all details of the canonical text including the bashing of 
babies against rocks (e.g., Ps. 137:9~ Nah. 3: 10)? Perhaps in a way this is so, since he 
seems perfectly happy to see all of the biblical texts as frail testimony, time-bound, and 
requiring of sifting and penetrating by the exegete. Since for reasons of time and space 
this thesis is not concerned with offering a New Testament reading or biblical 
theological reflection, this question of how both Testaments witness fully and truthfully 
to Christ must await further investigation. 
1. 'Illumination' 
The concept of illuminating the final form is very important to Childs; he has 
called it the aim of the whole process of biblical theology (1992a:369; cf. 1985:15-16). 
Similarly, he has written that the point of systematic theology is to illuminate the 
canonical text (1992a:369; cf. also the positive illumination of the text by 'a fully 
developed Christian theology', 1992a:88)~ its mediation of present day questions 
provides a way for modem concerns to encounter the biblical text (1976:201; 
1992a:89; the cultural-situatedness of interpreters also plays a significant role here, 
1992a:88). Another source of illumination is that provided by Christian tradition and 
the history of exegesis. This search for illumination is also expanded outside the 
Christian community of faith into the Jewish community of faith, and Childs sees 
Jewish exegesis as being both relevant and a challenge to Christian reading (1964:444-
49; 1992a:25-26). In fact, one could extend Childs's search further and define as useful 
any work from any source which reflects upon the final form of the text, measuring its 
usefulness against its compatibility with the sensus litera/is and the 'scope' of scripture 
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witnessed to by the community of faith. 69 The cultural relativity implied by this 
drawing of light from such diverse sources, however, needs to be balanced against the 
historical text and the need for some form of critical distancing: one must do justice to 
the texts as historical witnesses. 
At the heart of Childs's particular emphasis on the term 'illuminate' is his 
personal conviction that the biblical text is the sole source of the knowledge of God~ 
hence, the aim of his work and his appropriation of the insights of others is to shed 
light on just these texts (for a useful discussion of insider-outsider illumination, see the 
debate between Watson, 1996a:80-81;l996b:3-16)~ Marsh, 1996a:76-80~ 1996b~ 
1997:399-414; and Davies, 1995:17-55). But even if one cannot theologically follow 
Childs here (see pages 39-44), his emphasis upon the concept of illumination does alert 
us to many sources which have been woefully neglected, either because they were pre-
critical interpreters (like Origen, Aquinas or Rashi), dogmatic theologians (like Barth, 
Tillich or Moltmann), or just non-historical-critical critics (like populist users of the 
bible such as advertisers, comedians, films, and fiction-writers). This is not, of course, 
to say that illumination is an even phenomenon~ Childs himself has been criticised on 
the grounds that the history of exegesis sections in his Exodus tended either to include 
those interpreters closest to his own position or to include those sufficiently different 
that he was able to ignore them completely in his own commentary. But the humility 
involved in seeking illumination appears, to this interpreter at least, to be an important 
tool in the task of biblical theology. 
K. 'The Diachronic' 
Childs has also proposed using historical criticism to 'illuminate' the final form 
of the text (cf e.g., 'the depth dimension aids in understanding the interpreted text', 
69 In the light of Barth's influence on Childs, it is interesting to note that Berkouwer records 
an account of\"on Harnack's surprise at finding Barth reading early dogmatic writings, and commcnts 
that Barth sought 'illumination' eycrywhcrc (l977:.U). 
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1979: 76; cf also 1992a: 104-106). This can be considered in terms of two uses. 
First, historical information should be used to explain the text as it stands, preventing 
historical anachronisms (cf also Smend, 1980:47; Murphy, 1997:268). Since Childs 
sees the text as time conditioned, such a usage is essential, the only question being how 
much information should be incorporated and when (for further discussion of which, 
see conclusion, pages 299-302). Second, the results of historical criticism can be used 
to define a critical background for the growth of the text, enabling diachronic accounts 
of the text to be integrated into a reading of the final form. 
Childs gives four reasons for the importance of this latter usage (1992a: 104-6): 
First, understanding how the text was formed allows one a greater appreciation of the 
final form itself Second, the relationship between various sections can be better 
understood if it can be correlated with the historical growth of the text. Third, the 
nature of controversies within the text can be clarified by understanding the growth of 
the text against the background of controversies within the canonising communities. 
Fourth, the biblical texts, even in their canonical form, continue to reflect their 
historical background, and so the exegete must do justice both to the particularity of 
the texts, avoiding anachronistic interpretations, and their role as scripture. 
The emphasis which Childs places upon diachronic studies of the text has been 
questioned, however. Barr, for example, has criticised Childs because the amount of 
time he spends on historical critical matters means that he does not actually provide a 
canonical approach (1980:20): Where in the canon, after all, is Second-Isaiah? Provan 
has argued that the basic difficulty here is that Childs is too insistent on treating 
diachronic accounts as equal to the canonical reading (1997:25-30). He points out that 
two consequences of this tendency are that Childs often spends far too long 
considering historical-critical positions, even to the extent of barely considering the 
canonical shaping of the text and that Childs appears to have missed many of the recent 
literary approaches to the biblical text (though the latter is more probably the result of 
Childs's discovery that literary methods are actually as capable as any historical critical 
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methodology of stifling the kind of exegesis he wants, 1992a: 722-23; cf. also the 
parallel conclusion of Watson, 1996:213-14; and Barr, 1999:424-25). 
That Childs is a product of his training in historical criticism became clear when 
his attempts to justify the role of the canon in historical critical terms were discussed 
earlier (see pages 44-47), but Provan argues that this inability to let go of the detail of 
historical criticism also leads to problems in Childs's reading of the final form. Noting 
that the logic of Childs's position on the primacy of the final form actually suggests 
that diachronic studies should play a minor role, Provan suggests that there are two 
ways in which the illumination provide by the diachronic impinges upon Childs's 
readings: first, it has no visible effect on exegesis. Second, it results in a reading of the 
text which is skewed rather than illuminated. As an example of the latter, Provan takes 
Childs's reading of Jonah. 
Consider... the case of the book of Jonah, where Childs in his 
introduction begins by simply accepting without argument the view that 
the psalm in chapter 2 was inserted into the original by a redactor. As 
Landes has pointed out [1980:37-39], this clearly has an effect on the 
way Childs understands the whole book, for it leads him to under-
emphasise the theme of repentance therein-a theme which, as Landes 
has shown from a rhetorical-critical standpoint, is of central importance 
not merely throughout the book of Jonah but also in the wider canonical 
context. This is an excellent example of the way in which Childs, 
because of his starting point in historical critical theory, arrives at a 
canonical reading different from the one at which he would have arrived if 
he had begun with the text simply as canonical text. A more sensitive 
reading of the text as text in the first instance would have made it clear 
just how unnecessary the theory was as a starting point at all, and would 
have led to what is arguably a more satisfactory grasp of its canonical 
shape (1997:30). 
Childs's previous response to Landes is instructive: 'We differ somewhat in the 
history of the formation of the book ... But whether or not one accepts a one stage or a 
two stage growth of the book, does not the test of one's interpretation lie in the ability 
to do justice to the final stage of the canonical text? (1980: 59-60). Yet, according to 
Provan, Childs's actual use of diachronic studies proves problematic exactly because 
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he is often using it to illuminate the text in such a way as to distort the final form. 
This is obviously true in the case of Childs's reading of Jonah, but the question then 
arises as to whether proponents of a canonical approach really need to incorporate 
diachronic studies after all. Is their incorporation into Childs's canonical approach due 
simply to his reluctance to let go of the vast amounts of historical-critical work done 
over the last two hundred years? 
It is perhaps helpful to note that a spectrum of options exists here. On the one 
hand, n.M. Carr has suggested that a full diachronic study can contribute to a final 
form reading of Genesis and, despite his explicit claims to the contrary, his rhetoric 
seems to imply that one cannot read the final form 'correctly' unless its tradition 
history is uncovered and utilised to the full (l996a:12-15~ cf. Fretheim, 1998:120-21). 
On the other hand, Wall's suggestion that the canonical approach should be regarded 
as a "'post-critical method" which has as its goal the interpretation of the final form of 
the text and is based upon a 'religious epistemology that evaluates the Bible's 
normative role as canon, or rule of faith, as the foundation for the hermeneutical 
enterprise' may be understood as historical criticism free (1992a: 143~ Wall-and 
Lemcio-combine Childs's work with that of Sanders and so do use historical-critical 
work in their own version of the canonical approach). 
Although either may find some justification in Childs's work, that followed by 
Carr (and Childs on Jonah) seems unlikely to be able to do justice to the use of the 
canonical text in the community of faith for two reasons: first, the sheer complexity of 
developing a tradition history makes it unlikely as a common pre-requisite for bible 
reading, although granted Childs does supply a version in his Biblical Theology 
(1992a:95-322). Second, the likelihood of its rendering a final form which is essentially 
different from the final form encountered, being defined by the historical reconstruction 
used and not by the canonical shaping itself, are all too high. But the option offered by 
a historical-criticism-denying variant of Lemcio and Wall which simply dismisses 
diachronic readings out of hand may actually result in some loss for the canonical 
approach. In Provan's words: 
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The real value of past historical critical work... will lie, not in its 
provision of any so-called 'depth dimension,' but in alerting [canonical 
exegetes] to interesting puzzles in the text which must be taken into 
account in offering a final form reading. Thus, for example, the 
strangeness of the 'psalm' on the lips of Jonah ... , rightly noted by 
historical critics, will form part of the data which must be accounted for 
in the construal of the whole in its present form (1997:35). 
In this sense, then, the diachronic may illuminate the final form, although the resulting 
relationship between the diachronic analysis and the canonical reading is a good deal 
more oblique than had been previously thought. How oblique may be seen when I.E. 
Fretheim notes in a review of Carr's work that the tensions within the final form 
demonstrated by the application of a diachronic study 'do not seem to require the 
specific historical edifice Carr proposes' (1998: 120~ Murphy's description of Childs's 
use of Zimmerli is also pertinent here, 1980:42). The tensions are there anyway, and 
the role of the diachronic is simply to draw attention to them, 'discouraging readers 
from engaging in the overly harmonizing tendencies sometimes characteristic of 
synchronic analyses, and making more prominent the lively tensions within the present 
text' (Fretheim, 1998: 120). In the light of Moberly's contention that theological 
reality may on occasions be rendered only by the use of contradictory/paradoxical 
formulations (1983 :33-34), that is, through the use of tensions within the texts, the 
importance of recovering these tensions in canonical readings is obvious. 
Less obvious is the interplay between recovering tensions and legitimate 
harmonisation. In a canonical approach there is an obvious clash between tensions and 
canonical setting: the setting may either be the direct cause of the tension, being 
responsible for holding a tension together, or the cause of its loss as texts are realigned 
in ways which resolve the tensions between them. Presumably, in the case of the 
former, the tension should be highlighted and in the case of the latter, harmonised. 
Although decisions about whether to harmonise or highlight may be relatively easy to 
make, it remains to be seen how large a subjective element exists within each 
interpreter's decision to highlight or harmonise tensions. 
92 
L. Summary 
In conclusion, the canonical approach proposed by Childs clearly has 
considerable consequences for the interpretation of the biblical texts. The canon of 
texts is now defined as the 'arena' within which exegesis is carried out, as a structure 
of 'formal features' which-when recognised and acted upon-function by 
constraining the kinds of interpretation which can be actualised and be said to be 
canonical. In reading the text as canon, the exegete seeks to elicit the meaning (or 
meanings) communicated by its 'canonical intentionality', to read what Rendtorff has 
called the 'theological message' in its canonical shape (1993: 126) and encounter what 
Childs has described as the sole witness to the 'full history of revelation' (1979:76). 
The final form itself is reconstituted to take full account of the role of 'narrative 
presuppositions' in canonically later texts, the 'sensus literalis' rather than any textual 
layer behind or in front of the text, and a 'referentiality' which is defined through and 
by the layer which is the final form. Ideally, a biblical theology done in this mode 
would do justice to both 'unity and diversity' within and between the Old and New 
Testaments, seeking the witness of each to the one who is the true 'scope' of the 
Christian Bible, Jesus Christ, Lord of the Church. As an aid to the canonical 
interpreter, 'illumination' can be sought from wherever it may be found: from 
traditional disciplines, history of exegesis, systematics, pastoral theology, ethics, to 
non-traditional media such as films, fiction, advertising, and many more. In searching 
for the tensions within the text which are so important in rendering the sacred, a 
special place is set aside for the 'diachronic' studies of historical-criticism with their 
emphasis on recovering diverse voices in the final form. These are the features of 
Childs's approach which are most helpful in defining its implications for praxis. In the 
following chapter, I shall aim to define a sound hermeneutical basis from which to 
ground the assumptions of the canonical approach. 
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Chapter 3 
The Hermeneutics of the Canonical Approach Reconsidered 
I. 'Objectivity' and 'Perspectivity' in the Canonical Approach70 
A. Two Kinds of Language 
One aspect of the canonical approach which has virtually always been regarded 
as requiring reconstruction is that of the hermeneutics upon which it is built (e.g., 
Brett, Noble, Scalise). Childs himself gives the strong impression that he has no 
thoroughly worked out approach to this subject; his use of terms such as 'special 
reading' and 'fideism', for example, shows him to be attempting to defend himself 
against the charges made by liberals such as Barr on the basis of their presumed 
neutral ground rather than on that of the perspectival ground which his own approach 
most readily implies. But this lack of development to Childs's hermeneutics does not 
necessarily mean that his approach is thereby rendered indefensible or in need of severe 
reconstruction if it is to survive. The question is, can Childs's language and concerns 
be explained and justified by a particular hermeneutical approach without any 
substantive change in its self-conception or praxis? 
The biblical texts in Childs's canonical approach can best be described as 
having an 'autonomous objective status' within a 'community setting'. That these twin 
emphases are present is clearly implied by the fact that his work contains two distinct 
sets of terminology and argumentation. On the one hand, Childs utilises the 
70 Traditionally, of course, objectivity is paired with subjectivity as polar opposites. But 
accepting this opposition results in a skewed choice; rather a further option exist. Fish notes that 
'[ meanings] \\ill not be objective because they will always have been the product of a point of view 
rather than simply having been "read off'; and they will not be subjective because that point of \'iew 
will always be social or institutional' (cf. Fish 1980:335). For this reason, I have chosen to set the 
term 'perspectivity' over against 'objecti\'ity' on the twin grounds that it does not carry with it the 
negative connotations of 'subjectivity' as free unconstrained choice and that Childs uscs the tcrm on 
numerous occasions to describe his particular view on pluralistic interpretation (e.g., 1980a:208). 
94 
terminology of the objective, describing his approach to the Old Testament as 
providing an 'objective description' of the text (particularly prevalent in his 
Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture, e.g., 1979:72f) and using the loaded 
term, 'best text' (1 977b:92). His emphasis on 'illuminating the text' also belongs to 
this category (here called, set one). On the other hand, he also uses the language of 
perspective, offering numerous statements about the legitimacy of different viewpoints 
from which to read the text (set two). For example, 'no-one should contest the right 
of another to study the Hebrew Bible from a variety of different perspectives. The list 
would be quite inexhaustible' (l980a:208). This plurality is clearly implied when he 
writes that when Barr' seeks to establish as the sole criterion of exegesis "what the text 
actually says," his appeal rings unusually hollow in the light of the last two hundred 
years of critical exegesis. Is it not at last obvious that what "the text actually says" 
cannot be separated from the context from which it is read and into which it is 
directed?' (l984b:70). 
The use of these two sets of terms originates in Childs's attempt to justify his 
canonical approach over-against what he sees as the good and necessary pluralism of 
modern biblical studies. He writes: 
To assert that the Christian stands in a special relationship to these 
writings is not to disavow the legitimacy of numerous other approaches 
to the text, both within and without a stance of faith. Although the right 
to a pluralist handling of the Bible was first raised in the Enlightenment, it 
had fully established itself by the nineteenth century, at least within 
modern Western culture. The theological issue turns on the Christian 
church's claim for the integrity of a special reading which interprets the 
Bible within an established theological context and toward a particular 
end, namely, the discerning of the will of God, which is constitutive of the 
hermeneutical function of canon (1984a: 3 7) 
Since Childs is only talking of one reading amongst a plurality, the language of 
perspectivity is clearly applicable. But a problem exists with this rather idealistic 
scenario and it is flagged by the fact that Childs is having to argue for his reading 
strategy when a 'good' pluralism should guarantee the existence of that strategy with 
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no questions asked; the pluralism which he celebrates is also, at least presently, 
somewhat mythical. For Childs, the philosophy underlying the historical-critical 
method has made pluralism into a game in which only those who conform to its rules 
may justifiably take the field of play. In his often polemical attempts to justify his 
community-specific reading strategy over-against historical criticism, however, Childs 
has not chosen to fully and consistently reject the historical-critical playing field, but 
rather has simply assumed the validity of its rules and cloaked his own work in its 
terminology, especially those related to 'objectivity': for example, 'description', 'best 
text', 'illuminating the text', and 'special reading' (an objectivist term because it 
necessarily assumes the existence of an 'ordinary reading'). This move is probably 
motivated by any number of factors, but certainly includes Childs's desire to avoid 
charges offideism (e.g., 1984a:37). 
Childs himself has offered no resolution of the inconsistency which occurs 
because of his use of these two sets of terms; he seems more inclined to merely assert 
that both are simply correct, using them as and when he needs them. But that even he 
has difficulty with handling these two sets becomes apparent when, for example, 
having already said that other viewpoints are fully legitimate (1980a:208; using set two 
terms), he then disagrees with D.A. Knight on the right of every layer of the text to its 
own integrity because neither the 'editors of the biblical material' nor the 'subsequent 
Jewish or Christian communities of faith' saw it that way (invoking set one, 
1980a:210). Of course, these last two groups, the Christians and the Jews, do then 
offer diverse perspectives from which a reader can approach the text (back to set two 
again, 1992a:335). Equally, Childs's implication that the text is objectively present 
leads to the question of why one then needs to define a particular perspective from 
which to read it. His own writings and claims concerning the need for a community 
approach call into question the status of such a self-authenticating text: how can an 
objective text be theologically marginalised by historical criticism as Childs claims 
( 1964:437 -38) if it is able to speak for itself? This tension between the objectivist and 
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the perspectival languages has also caused confusion among scholars (e.g., Barr, 
1983: 132-33). 
The problematic use of terms of objectivity and perspectivity runs throughout 
Childs's work on the canonical approach, and any attempt to reformulate or even 
simply to defend its hermeneutics must offer a resolution to this rather unsatisfactory 
situation. Of the attempts which have been made to do so, some have tried to remove 
one set of terms altogether: Noble, for example, removes the perspectival language 
(1991, 1995) whereas Scalise removes the language of objectivity (1994a). If, 
however, we are to attempt to apply Childs's canonical approach rather than making a 
fresh start elsewhere, his usage of both sets of terminology must be accounted for in 
such a way as to leave the essential contours of Childs's work intact. In section II an 
attempt to provide an account of the canonical approach using objectivist categories, 
that of Noble, will be examined (HA) before a critique is offered (Ill). My own 
suggestion for defending Childs approach, appropriating the 'perspectival' 
hermeneutics of S .E. Fish, will follow in section III. Thiselton' s criticisms of Fish will 
then be examined (HIB) and a 'fishian' response offered by way of concluding this 
chapter (HIC). 
II. A Reconstruction Favouring 'Objectivity' 
A. Paul R. Noble's The Canonical Hermeneutics of Brevard Childs: A Critical 
Reconstnlction 
The presence of what can be called foundational elements ('objectivity') and 
non-foundational elements ('perspectivity') in Childs's work has already been noted by 
P.R. Noble in his Cambridge Ph.D. dissertation on the canonical approach (1991 ~ 
subsequently published in 1995).71 Noble argues that the non-foundational 
71 Noble seems to believe that Childs has consciously aligned himself with Reception Theory 
(1991: 128-29), a conclusion for which I can see no c,idence (cf. e.g., Childs's comments on reader 
rcsJX)nsc criticism, 1992a:722-23). It seems more likely that Childs has simply noted what seem to 
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elements-which he terms 'anti-intentionalist'-should be rejected and that a view of 
the text be accepted which is based upon the text having a foundationalist and 
determinate meaning-termed 'intentionalist': namely, that which its author intended, a 
meaning which can be objectively discovered through critical testing (1991: 134,216). 
He writes: 
Although there are both Intentionalist and Anti-intentionalist strands in 
Childs's programme, [I have] argued that he should drop the latter-he 
cannot consistently have both, and the Anti-intentionalist elements are 
highly dubious. Fortunately, his main emphasis is upon the final form 
having been shaped through the religious community's use of the 
traditions in their life and worship and this can be explicated in 
predominantly Intentionalist terms (1991: 135). 
According to Noble, it would be misguided for anyone to 'try to provide theoretical 
underpinning for Childs's programme through appealing to an anti-objectivist 
conception of textual meaning' (1991:216). Such an option leads, according to Noble, 
to relativism and fideism. 
Noble begins his defence of objectivism by noting the importance of 'intention' 
In objectivist accounts of interpretation, but especially of interest to him is the 
existence of a tendency amongst such accounts to weaken definitions of 'intention' to 
the point of losing the argument by default. He writes: 
The fundamental problem, then, which the pro-intentionalist has to 
resolve is to show that there is a relationship between meaning and 
intention which, on the one hand, avoids those versions of intentionalism 
that are now generally recognised to be fallacious, and yet, on the other 
hand, does not achieve this by giving such a 'thin' account of intentions 
as to become anti-intentionalist in all but name (1995a: 193). 
Noble offers two examples of what he terms the 'dependence of meaning upon 
context', only one of which he will subsequently affirm as correct. The first is that of 
him to be ob\"ious facts about biblical interpretation (i.e. how one interprets the Bible relates to why 
one interprets it cf. also Moberly. 1992b: 147), and has presented these facts without a fully thought-
oul theoretical basis for his assertions. 
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Caiaphas's statement in John 11 :50, that 'it is expedient for you that one man should 
die for the people, and that the whole nation should not perish'. But Noble notes that 
new meaning is given to the words by their Christian setting and concludes-at least 
initially-that Caiaphas could not prevent it from acquiring new meaning. His second 
example is that of T.S. Kuhn's account of his reading of Aristotle's Physics (l970:xi-
xii).72 Having first understood Aristotle's work not as simply dated but as absurd, 
Kuhn found a key to understanding Aristotle's work when he recognised that one of 
the concepts involved, motion, was not being defined as motion as such but as change 
of state in general. In Kuhn's re-reading of Aristotle, absurdity receded and the work 
became more intelligible. This latter example illustrates for Noble what happens when 
a text is read in a different context to that which its author intended. He asserts: 
Linguistic communication is only possible if author and reader have 
shared conventions about the meaning of words and how they may be 
combined. When Aristotle made his customarily-astute observations on 
change-of-state in general he was able to write a book that accurately 
expressed his thoughts by choosing words with the correct semantic 
values, arranging them in grammatically correct sequences etc.; and since 
his contemporaries were familiar with these same linguistic conventions 
they were able to understand him correctly, and therefore recognised his 
PhYSics as a serious contribution to the subject (1995a: 196-his italics). 
If this is not taken into account, argues Noble, the text's meaning becomes degraded, 
'with insights reduced to absurdities' (1995: 196). With this in mind, he reconsiders his 
first example and argues that the anti-intentionalist reading of the words of Caiaphas 
will not hold because it was John, the author of the Gospel, who took those words and 
placed them in an appropriate context, intending that the words should have a 
legitimate second meaning. Noble concludes: 
72 This is an ironic choice given Kuhn's own falling into non-foundationalism in the first 
edition of his Structures of SCienTific Revolutions. Despite his subsequent attempt to argue that his 
position does not entail a necessary acceptance of non-foundationalism (in the 2nd edition. and much 
quoted by Thiseiton, c.g .. 1992:5~2). he has been judged. by Chalmers at least. to have failed to prove 
his case (19X2:107-109). 
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What I am arguing is that the author's intention is a 'Regulative Principle' 
for correct interpretation. A text is an instantiation of some particular 
language-system, with reference to which the author made certain choices 
in producing his or her text-the author selects from among the options 
that are available in that language, arranging its components in such a 
way as to express the desired meaning. It will therefore be through 
interpreting a text in relation to the milieu of its production that the most 
worthwhile meanings will be found in it-alternative contexts are 
inherently inferior because they will yield inferior meanings (1995a: 197). 
Noble carefully delineates his 'regulative principle' over against intentionalist accounts 
which insist on recreating an 'author's inner life or thought processes'; nor is he 
claiming that the meaning of a text is decided by appealing to what may 
be known about the author's intentions from sources outside the text. 
Both these... positions are forms of what might be called the 
(auto )biographical fallacy in that they misconstrue the relationship 
between (auto )biographical information about the author's intentions as 
they stand apart from the text and the intentions that come to expression 
in the text (1995a: 198). 
Clearly 'authorial intent' for Noble is not the same as the definition that is rejected by 
Wimsatt and Beardsley's 'intentional fallacy' (1972). He is not claiming access to the 
interior motivations of an individual, but rather he is simply assuming that what the text 
says is the intention of the author, a claim which may have surprising results when 
considering actual biblical texts and their interpreters (see Brown on page 70 above, 
for example). 
Noble's next move is to consider and reject the alternative to his approach, that 
of reader-oriented hermeneutics, initially as exemplified in the work of Fish. This 
assault on the anti-intentionalist position is then extended into the field of philosophical 
hermeneutics where Noble spends considerable time rebutting the work of Gadamer in 
favour ofa view of objectivism developed from F. Schleiermacher (1995a:219-53); the 
hermeneutical circle is rejected in favour of a hermeneutical spiral. But Noble's 
arguments against Gadamer add little to his overall stance and since he concludes-in 
my opinion, correctly-that Fish represents the 'anti-intentionalist' position more 
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consistently than Gadamer (1995a: 289),73 I shall concentrate upon answering Noble's 
questions from Fish's perspective.74 At this point, it should be noted that Noble 
consistently argues from a position within interpretation; he does not at any point 
attempt to provide philosophical arguments for the objective nature of his text in terms 
of its external reference. (This type of argument will be considered in assessing the 
criticisms ofFish generated by Thiselton in section lIm) 
In fact Noble spends a considerable amount of energy 10 both his (now-
published) thesis (1991, 1995a) and two articles (1994, 1995b) attempting to show 
that Fish's account of textual meaning is untenable, a process which usually takes its 
lead from Fish's example ofa list of names on a blackboard which his students are then 
asked to read as a poem (1980:322-337). In short, it is not too far from the truth to 
say that Noble's own positive proposal is to a large degree dependent upon accepting 
his resounding rejection of the (apparently) only available alternative, the hermeneutics 
of Fish (as understood by Noble). My reason for highlighting the importance of 
73 The element of inconsistency in Gadamer's approach to non-foundationalism forms one of 
the two principal reasons why I have rejected Scalise's use of Gadamer and Wittgenstein to defend the 
canonical approach (though I am obviously appreciative of many of the views of the only other 
significant developer of Childs's hermeneutics in non-foundationalist terms). My second reason for 
not taking up Scalise's work more positively is its sheer complexity. Even though he is already using 
two of the most significant (and disputed) thinkers of the twentieth-century in Gadamer and 
Wittgenstein to reconstruct Childs, he is forced to introduce yet another-Ricoeur-in order to 
account for canonical intentionality (1994a:68-74). Given Scalise's rhetorical aim-getting 
thoughtful evangelicals to accept this view of the text (1994a:xi-xii)-the density of each of these 
three must count against the likelihood of their (and others') acceptance of such a view of Childs. 
In contrast, Fish's work is both sufficiently comprehensive to be able to account for the 
canonical approach with very little addition and he is, without doubt, one of the most readable 
theorists presently available. The biggest problem in using his work is likely to be as a result of often 
uncritical use of badly skewed descriptions of Fish by such as Thiselton (particularly in his New 
Horizons in Hermeneutics). It is the combination of Fish's total commitment to the non-
foundationalist position, his comprehensiveness and his accessibility which leads me to think that 
Childs's approach may be best served by a reconstruction based on a 'fishian' hermeneutic. 
74 It should be noted, however, that Fish would reject Noble's categorisation of his work as 
'anti-intentionalisf. According to Fish, '[w]ords are intelligible only within the assumption of some 
context of intentional production, some already-in-place predecision as to what kind of person. with 
what kind of purposes, in relation to what specific goals in a particular situation, is speaking or 
writing' (1989 :295). Thus. when Fish consistently implies that all human beings ascribe an intention. 
a purposefulness. to every communication, always constructing for themselves an author or speaker 
who has uttered or written that text, it should be clear that for Fish, all interpretation is 
'intentionalisf (1989:99-100, 294-95: 1995: 14). 
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Noble's negative arguments here is that the positive side of his own proposal is put 
forward with very little argumentation. His presentation of the two examples of 
Caiaphas and Kuhn and his ensuing discussion of a 'regulative principle' are both 
unsupported by detailed empirical or theoretical evidence. They appear, in fact, to be 
generated by a logical argument derived from his a priori conviction that his 
description of what is happening in these two examples is basically correct. In a very 
real sense, Noble proceeds principally on the basis that if Fish is wrong, then he must 
be right. 
B. A Critique of an Objectivist Canonical Approach 
In the discussion of his intentionalist programme, Noble states that to follow up 
the relationship between meaning and intention in detail would involve many diverse 
aspects of literary theory and linguistics, a project for which he has insufficient space in 
his thesislbook-he will therefore cover, he claims, only the essentials that impinge 
upon Childs work (1995a: 194). In practice, this appears to mean that he justifies his 
own proposal by importing, uncritically and wholly without acknowledgement, a 
number of assumptions from the discipline of linguistics (1995: 194-99~ Noble does not 
refer to any linguistic theorists in any of his work on this topic). His description of 
Aristotle using shared conventions to encode his meaning through his choice of 
semantic units and their grammatical order (see above) invokes several aspects of 
linguistic theory,75 though it is difficult to know if Noble has a particular theory or 
75 He also adds in a footnote the comment that: 
Semantics and grammar, of course, are not the only means through which a text can 
communicate. A full account would also hayc to reckon with the contributions made 
by genre, rhythm, figures of speech etc.: but this is unnecessary for my present 
purposes since the added complications would not introduce any new principles 
(1995: 196). 
But what is the basis of this assertion? 
102 
theorist in mind. Nevertheless, it can be asked if a linguistic theory based upon these 
points is both sound and available to provide support for the 'intentionalist' canonical 
approach which Noble requires. If the answer is no, then is there an alternative within 
linguistics to which he can appeal? 
According to M.L. Apte, the study of language has a long history, stretching 
back into the study of rhetoric and philosophy in classical antiquity. But in the 
nineteenth century, the discipline began to use the comparative method to study 
languages, finding links between the likes of Greek and Sanskrit and developing 
grammars based upon the resulting Indo-European model of language. Around the 
beginning of this century, a concentration upon the actual structure of language itself 
arose with the work of de Saussure, and language was increasingly seen as a 'system 
with a structure. The objective of linguistics became not only the writing of structural 
descriptions of as many languages as possible, but also the developing of a universal 
conceptual and theoretical framework which could be the foundation of language 
specific grammars' (1994:2000). De Saussure coined the terms langue and parole: the 
former denoting the structure underlying a language and the latter denoting the 
language in use (1974). Although basically empirical in nature, this discipline became 
increasingly concerned with the study of langue, of language in isolation, a process 
which was not altered by Chomsky's subsequent development of generative-
transformational theory (Apte, 1994: 2000). Language study was, for a while, focused 
on ideal speaker-listeners, and everyday usage was-with rare exceptions-essentially 
ignored. 
With the development of sociolinguistics in the 1960' s, however, the study of 
language in practice began to grow. Concerned to account for the variation, function, 
and use of language as used by average people in everyday cultural contexts, socio-
linguistics became the other side of the linguistic coin to the theorists concerned with 
the ideal structures of language, and, for some, almost a competitor to them. In 1968, 
John Lyons noted the tendency to set these two approaches over against one another, 
and concluded that the two were actually a unity~ they were not competitors because 
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both were supposed to account for the same feature, language in use (50-51) Lyons's 
claim points out the distinction between the inner and outer approaches to language, 
and leads to the conclusion that the two can only be unified when the practical features 
of language uncovered by sociolinguists can be accounted for by the internal 
theoretical approaches, thus achieving Lyons's goal of a unified 'scientific' linguistics 
(1968:51).76 
Perhaps the most important addition to linguistics as a whole resulting from the 
emergence of sociolinguistics has been the rediscovery of the effects of 'context' upon 
interpretation (cf Quasthof, 1994: 731). The tendency of the theoretical approaches 
towards idealisation had led to a certain a-situational element within their descriptions 
of language. It was often assumed that the production of a sentence would involve the 
encoding of a speaker or writer's intended meaning into an entity consisting of a group 
of semantic units placed in a particular syntactic structure which would then be 
decoded by the ideal hearer or reader. Such a 'formalist' encoding approach to 
76 As well as defining theories in terms of their emphasis upon either an inner and outer 
orientation towards language, a further taxonomy has been suggested. Morris has argued that 
linguistics consists of three fields (1938): syntactics, semantics (which grew out of syntactics), and 
pragmatics (which has grown out of semantics). In such a taxonomy, semantics is viewed as moving 
beyond earlier studies on syntax in order to account for 'meaning' in terms of the lexical meaning of 
words and the objects to which those words refer, that is in terms of reference. In contrast, 
pragmatics is viewed as being concerned with the uncovering of the sense of the utterance in the 
context in which it occurs. 
Leech defines the difference between semantics and pragmatics as being the difference 
between these two sentences (1983 :6): 
semantics would say-What does X mean? 
pragmatics would say-What did you mean by X? 
A pragmatic theorist would suggest that the question asked by the semantic theorist should already be 
undcrstood as being set in a context-semantic description of the communication as dyadic, as 
betwcen thc words and an ideal reader ignores the fact that interpretation of the scntence is always 
triadic. involving words, reader, and context. 
The oftcn polemical use of Morris's definition to designate semantics as wholly 'formalist'. 
howc\·cr. has often served to disguise the fact that considerable overlap does exists between thesc three 
areas. a fact especially noticeable when considering the extent to which semantic theories build on 
outer and pragmatic theories build on inner orientations to the linguistic data. While it is right to 
reject thc formalism of failed approaches, the positive contributions of both semantics and pragmatics 
must be acknowledged. Until such time as one theory-whether pragmatic or semantic in origin-
accounts for all language, it seems advisable to hold lightly to whichever theory seems best suited to 
account for the cvidence in any particular context. But an answer may still be sought to the qucstion 
being asked here, that of whether or not linguistics can--{)r will be able to in the future-supply 
viable thcoretical support for Noble's intcntionalist project. 
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language, however, is now recognised as incomplete precisely because it has what 
U.M. Quasthof terms 'a very reductive treatment of context' (1994:731 ~ cf. also 
Levinson, 1983:5-35, esp. 22-23~ Sperber and Wilson, 1995:3-28~ Blakemore, 
1992:18-22). Although this description has strong echoes in Noble's description of his 
'intentionalist' programme, his mention of the 'shared conventions' of language 
users-features which are contingent and relate to parole-shows that his view of 
linguistics is somewhat more sophisticated. 
The adoption of' conventions' as part of the description of language use is one 
way in which certain theorists have attempted to come to terms with the contextuality 
of parole. D. Davidson lists three ways in which the concept of convention has been 
added to descriptions of linguistic practice with the explicit intention of formally 
demonstrating how meaning is produced: 
First, there are theories that claim that there is a convention connecting 
sentences in one or another grammatical mood (or containing an explicit 
performative phrase) with illocutionary intentions, or some broader 
purpose~ second, there are theories that look to a conventional use for 
each sentence~ and third, there are theories to the effect that there is a 
convention that ties individual words to an extension or intension. These 
are not competing theories. Depending upon the details, all combinations 
of these theories are possible (1984: 266). 
The claim is that an utterance such as an assertion must, by shared convention, be 
understood as literal, as a valid assertion. Invoking the example of an actor in a theatre 
who asserts that 'there is a fire', however, Davidson points out that no convention can 
dictate that these words must always mean that there is a real fire, because 'there 
cannot be a convention that signals sincerity': such a signal would obviously be used 
by the insincere. 77 Davidson argues that it is the necessary invocation of a 'standard 
situation' in which these conventions can operate-for example, one in which the 
77 Davidson notes Frege's recognition that language lacks a sign to signify 'sincerity' and his 
attempt to provide such a sign, 1- (1984:269-70). Davidson. suggests. howcver. that Frcgc should 
have asked himself why such a sign did not exist. the obvious answer being that since its presence in a 
text cannot guarantee truthfulness. it is basically unusablc. 
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utterance of an imperative is an order-which demonstrates that shared conventions 
capable of accounting for interpretation always and everywhere simply do not exist 
(1984:274-76). This is not to say that those involved in mutual communication share 
no commonality-communication after all happens-but rather that it is not able to 
constrain meaning as these linguists (and Noble) require. 
In Noble's case, 'shared conventions' which are claimed to settle the question 
of meaning include his invocation of the author's intention as a 'regulative principle' 
and his positing of 'definitional constraints' under which all readers must place 
themselves when offering interpretations (1994:423). But in the light of Davidson's 
critique, it can be asked how Noble knows that all interpreters must accept these two 
conventions? When Noble writes that 'a text which is plainly about David should not 
be arbitrarily taken as referring to Josiah or Jesus' (I995:205), who or what defines 
'plainly' or 'arbitrarily' here? It is difficult to see how the New Testament authors can 
avoid being found guilty of violating both of Noble's conventions, of ignoring the 
'regulative principle' and of reading 'arbitrarily'. Most significantly of all, given 
Noble's project, is the unavoidable conclusion that Childs's canonical approach, with 
its focus on a 'canonical intentionality' capable of generating meanings unimagined by 
its authors redactors or canonisers, is also culpable (cf Childs, 1979:79, 259, 66 C 
1985:49). Noble's 'shared conventions' cannot account for the behaviour of these 
communicators and his utilisation of terms such as 'degraded' to describe their 
readings must therefore be rejected. 
A more realistic linguistic option arises from a consideration of Davidson's 
response to D. Lewis's suggestion that a convention of regularity is shared by 
communicators (1969). He states: 
it is very difficult to say exactly how speaker's and hearer's theories for 
interpreting the speaker's words must coincide. They must, of course, 
coincide after an utterance has been made, or communication is impaired. 
But unless they coincide in advance, the concepts of regularity and 
convention have no definite purchase. Yet agreement on what a speaker 
means by what he says can surely be achieved even though speaker and 
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hearer have different advance theories as to how to interpret the speaker. 
The reason for this is that the speaker may well provide adequate clues, in 
what he says and how he says it, to allow a hearer to arrive at a correct 
interpretation. Of course the speaker must have some idea how the 
hearer is apt to make use of the relevant clues~ and the hearer must know 
a great deal about what to expect. But such general knowledge is hard to 
reduce to rules, much less conventions or practices (1984:278). 
Clearly, any such account of communication would be incapable of supporting Noble's 
claim to have provided an intentionalist account of the canonical approach. Rather any 
theory of linguistics which fulfils Davidson's requirements-and which may eventually 
provide the basis for a unified linguistics-will move towards a definition of 
communication as local, contingent, inherently risky, and a far cry from Noble's stable 
text. Linguistics, therefore, may well give more succour to Noble's opponents, the 
anti-intentionalists, than to his own needs. 
If it is accepted that Noble's 'linguistic' formulations are unable to provide the 
intentionalist stance he requires, then it can be acknowledged that what he is actually 
offering is a rather less than adequate description of the communication process in 
terms of 'authorial intent' while arguing strongly that the alternative is highly suspect 
and unworkable. Two questions can then be asked: first, is Noble's attack on Fish 
well-founded or has he either misunderstood or misrepresented his non-foundationalist 
opponent? Second, is Fish's account of communication able to explain what is 
occurring more comprehensively than Noble's 'intentionalist' programme? In section 
III, an answer will be provided to both of these questions. 
III Taking the Route of 'Perspectivity' 
A. The Hermeneutics of Stanley E. Fish 
In many ways Noble's formulation of 'authorial intention' is reminiscent of 
New Criticism's view of the text as autonomous and self contained, insulated against 
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the author and the reader by the 'intentionalist' and 'affective fallacies' (cf. \\Timsatt 
and Beardsley, 1954, 19). Noble is not really interested in an author or his intentions 
as such, but rather believes the text itself is the sole and correct bearer of an (author's) 
encoded intention. This parallel between Noble and the New Critics is particularly 
intriguing, because of the latter's fate at the hands of Noble's own enemies, the 'anti-
intentionalists' and their reader-oriented criticism. As J.P. Tompkins puts it: 
[According to] Wimsatt and Beardsley, 'the Affective fallacy is a 
confusion between the poem and its results .... It begins by trying to 
derive the standard of criticism from the psychological effects of a poem 
and ends in impressionism and relativism' [1972:345]. Reader response 
critics would argue that a poem cannot be understood apart from its 
results. Its 'effects,' psychological and otherwise, are essential to any 
accurate description of its meaning, since that meaning has no effective 
existence outside of its realisation in the mind of a reader (l980:ix). 
Reader response criticism has thoroughly destroyed the credibility of the 'Affective 
fallacy', one of the mainstays of New Criticism. Do Noble's criticisms of the anti-
intentionalists enable him to fare any better?78 
In reader-response theory there are two principal options that one can take~ the 
first is a semi-formal approach in which the text has an 'objective influence' on the 
reader (as in, for example, the work of Iser~ e.g., 1974, 1978),79 and the second is a 
more radical approach in which it is argued that the text does not objectively influence 
the reader at all~ its very 'existence' being a product of the reader (cf. Tompkins, 
1980:xvi).80 Noble, in his attempt to designate anti-intentionalist approaches to the 
text as dubious, has focused upon the latter in the form of Fish, arguing that such an 
78 Brett argues that Childs needs a 'formalist' approach to his texts rather than an 
intentionalist one (1991 :25-26). Ultimately. though, it is not clear whether he wishes to build this 
'formalism' on the work of either or any of Popper, Jauss, Gadamer or Hirsch. 
79 Examples of the application of Iser's theory within Biblical Studies can be found in Darr 
(1992). Staley (1986) and many others. 
80 Fish's work has been applied within the discipline by Adams (l990b), Lyons (1998). and 
Burnett (1990). In this thesis, the work of Fish "ill be considered over that of Iser for two reasons 
First. because Fish's own criticisms of Iser appear cogent (1989:7~-86): and second. because of the 
various parallels between the work of Childs and Fish. as also noted by Noble above. by Scobie 
(199Ia:-t7) and. more recently, bv Barton (1996:213). 
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approach can provide no support to the canonical approach, being fundamentally 
flawed. In contrast to Noble, however, my own background in hermeneutics is rather 
different; as S.E. Fowl once wrote, '[i]t is no secret that what counts as meaning in 
Sheffield most certainly does not count as meaning in Cambridge' (1988:69). I do not 
consider Noble to be correct in his assertions, and will argue that Childs's approach is 
best understood in Fishian terms. 81 
Fish is an American literary critic whose work can be divided into two distinct 
periods (commonly called the 'early' and 'later' Fish.) His early work on 'Affective 
Stylistics' involved a close reading technique which slowed down the reading process 
so that one could see how the reader was responding to the text (1980:21-67). This 
approach was a semi-formalist one, however, the text existing independently of and 
constraining the reader. The 'later' Fish came to see such an approach as 
fundamentally incorrect, arguing that in his earlier work he had done, 
what critics always do: I 'saw' what my interpretive principles permitted 
or directed me to see and then I turned around and attributed what I had 
seen to a text and an intention. What my principles direct me to see are 
readers performing acts; the points at which I find (or to be more precise, 
declare) those acts to have been performed become (by a sleight of hand) 
demarcations in the text; those demarcations are then available for the 
designation 'formal features' and as formal features they can be 
(illegitimately) assigned the responsibility for producing the interpretation 
which in fact produced them (1980: 12-13-his italics). 
Fish's change of mind can be summed up as an acceptance of the view that 
every human sense perception is 'interpreted', and every human experience the product 
of 'interpretation'; as he puts it, 'interpretation is the only game in town' (1980:355).82 
To argue in this way is not to state that there is no raw data beyond this interpreted 
perception but to argue that there is no way for humans to see this raw data outside of 
81 For my reasons for choosing Fish over the rather complicated non-foundationalist 
reconstruction of Scalise (using Wittgenstein. Gadamer, and Ricoeur), see page 10 1. footnote 73. 
82 Gill (1983:53) and Thiselton (1992:537) both credit Fish with having pursued this basic 
insight to its fullest extent (among the disciplines in which Fish has worked are law, critical theory, 
cultural studies. literary theory, and many more). 
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that interpretation or for them ever to encounter it directly (cf. Fish, 1980: 165)83 
From this position, Fish set out to explain the following conundrum: 
What is the source of interpretive authority: the text or the reader? 
Those who answered 'the text' were embarrassed by the fact of 
disagreement. Why, if the text contains its own meaning and constrains 
its own interpretation, do so many interpreters disagree about that 
meaning? Those who answered 'the reader' were embarrassed by the 
fact of agreement. Why if the meaning is created by the individual reader 
from the perspective of his own experience and interpretive desires, is 
there so much that interpreters agree about? What was required was an 
explanation that could account for both agreement and disagreement 
(1989:141). 
For Fish that explanation was found m the concept of an interpretive 
community, 
not so much a group of individuals who shared a point of view, but a 
point of view or way of organising experience that shared individuals in 
the sense that its assumed distinctions, categories of understanding, and 
stipulations of relevance and irrelevance were the content of the 
consciousness of community members who were therefore no longer 
individuals, but, insofar as they were embedded in the community's 
enterprise, community property (1989:141; cf. 1995:14). 
According to Fish, each individual human being is constantly a member of many 
different interpretive communities (1989:30-2), some of which are unchanging (e.g., 
race) and some of which can change rapidly (e.g., religious conviction). It is important 
to note, however, that Fish's definition of an 'interpretive community' is somewhat 
ambiguous. Despite his statement (quoted above) that they are 'not so much a group 
of individuals who shared a point of view, but a point of view or way of organising 
experience that shared individuals', it is clear that he does use the term to indicate 
both; for example, Fish writes that 'as a fully situated member of an interpretive 
community, be it literary or legal', one naturally looks at the 'objects of the 
83 Norris argues that reality eventually breaks into our constructions of the world (1990: 144-
82). An obvious response from Fish would be that whatever it is that breaks in to our constructions of 
reality. is still itself only a part of that constructed reality~ it can never be an extrinsic 'reality' apart 
from all construing. 
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community's concerns with eyes already informed by community imperatives, 
urgencies, and goals' (1989:303). 
The text, then, does not exist as a separate, free entity which can be appealed 
to in order to demonstrate the correctness of one's interpretations (cf. Fish, 1980: 3 3 9-
40, 354). As Fish puts it in his book Is There a Text in this Class?: 
The answer this book gives to its title question is 'there is and there isn't'. 
There isn't a text in this or any other class if one means by text what E.D. 
Hirsch and others mean by it, 'an entity which always remains the same 
from one moment to the next' [1967:46]; but there is a text in this and 
every class if one means by text the structure of meanings that is obvious 
and inescapable from the perspective of whatever interpretive 
assumptions happen to be in force. [1980:vii]. ... What I am suggesting is 
that an interpreting entity, endowed with purposes and concerns, is, by 
virtue of its very operation, determining what counts as the facts to be 
observed (I980:8). 
When 1. Culler faults Fish for the immediate fe-appearance of the text in Fish's 
interpretations after its supposed demise, he is clearly confusing these two types of 
texts (1983: 71-72). It is the Hirschian text which disappears, and it is the Fishian text 
which now appears in its place and forms the 'object' of criticism. It is in this sense 
that Fish is arguing that there is no longer a text in the class. 
If one cannot demonstrate that an interpretation is correct by an appeal to the 
text then, according to Fish, one must attempt to persuade other readers to discard 
their own assumptions and accept the assumptions which will lead them to see the text 
in the same way (I980:356-71). This process takes place despite Fish's clear 
implication that many of these assumptions are hidden (though it is always possible 
that they may be drawn to the surface by subsequent events). Agreement will take 
place when two readers share 'community specific' reading strategies which enable 
them to see as evidence features which appear only as a result of those strategies. 
But this does not mean that one can sit back and choose how to interpret a 
particular utterance. Fish argues that utterances occur only in context and that they 
are understood immediately as heard in that context~ there is no gap between hearing 
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and interpreting (1980:307,310,313,317-18). Moreover, in context they generally 
have an obvious meaning. But that meaning is always context dependent, and there 
may be other ways of understanding the same utterance depending upon the context in 
which it is heard or read. In a discussion about Austin and Derrida, two conceptions 
of 'context' are contrasted by Fish: 
Traditionally, a context has been defined as a collection of features and 
therefore as something that can be identified by any clear-eyed observer; 
but Derrida thinks of a context as a structure of assumptions, and it is 
only by those who hold those assumptions or are held by them that the 
features in question can first be picked out and then identified as 
belonging to a context. It is the difference between thinking of a context 
as something in the world and thinking of a context as a construction of 
the world, a context that is in itself performed under contextualised 
conditions (1989:53). 
This emphasis on the constructed context of the reader and the way in which the 
reader is 'grasped' by the interpretive strategy of his or her community/ies 
demonstrates that Fish does not see an individual or a community as radically free, and 
able to make the text say anything they want (1980:332). But then, it would be a 
mistake to see this, with E. Freund, as resulting in an individual's imprisonment within 
an oppressive community (1987: 110-11). The community constraints operative are 
not only limiting but also actualising; without them, the interpreter can do nothing at 
all. Although a set of constraints must always be in place, the exact contents of the set 
are not set in stone; they will change over time (in answer to criticism of Is There a 
Text ill This Class?, Fish defined interpretive communities as 'engines of change', 
1989: 150-52, 156). Nevertheless, at any given point in time, it is these constraints 
which are responsible for limiting interpretation. As my supervisor, R.B. Matlock, 
once put it, 'for Fish it is never the case that "anything goes" but rather that only what 
goes goes'. 
It is this emphasis on the limiting of interpretations by non-textual constraints 
which is completely missed by Noble, rendering his portrayal and subsequent critique 
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of Fish wholly inadequate on two counts: first, Noble believes that a fishian 
interpretive community can make its text mean anything it wants. Second, he therefore 
incorrectly assumes that Fish believes that all interpretations are possible without 
limitation. Noble's critique is therefore aimed at a complete-and rather caricatured-
relativist. 
Noble's view ofFish as a theorist who asserts that a community may twist its 
text into any shape is based on an admittedly common mis-reading of Fish's famous-
or, perhaps, infamous-example of a 'list' of names on a blackboard which his 
students are asked to read as a 'poem' (1980:322-337). Although this may be read as 
asserting that readers can always make texts mean what they want, in the context of 
Fish's argument it is actually a rhetorical exercise--and therefore not a theoretical 
proof-which is simply supposed to show the existence and strength of the schemas 
which people are always using to define and classify texts as they are encountered. 
The rest of the chapter in which the list/poem occurs and in which this becomes clear 
is, it seems, rarely read (cf e.g., 331-7 on the lack of a free standing reader and 
especially the statement that a 'text cannot be overwhelmed by an irresponsible 
reader', 336). Nevertheless it should perhaps be acknowledged that, given the large 
number of misunderstandings generated (e.g., Blakemore, 1992: 172; Pilkington, 
1989: 121), the list/poem has often served to confuse rather than clarify the issues. 
The extent of Noble's misreading ofFish is clearly seen when he writes that 
Fish's hermeneutics entails that there is no question that a sufficiently 
ingenious interpretive community could not get a set text to answer, 
because as Fish himself explains, 'while there are always mechanisms for 
ruling out readings, their source is not the text, but the presently 
recognised interpretive strategies for producing the text. It follows then 
that no reading, however outlandish it might appear, is inherently an 
impossible one' [quoting 1980:347] (1995:239). 
Yet this completely ignores Fish's argument that there is 'a text in this and every class 
if one means by text the structure of meanings that is obviolls and ine ..... capable from 
Ihe pen,peclil'e of whatever interpretive asslImptions happen to be ill force' 
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(1980:vii-my italics). Rather, it is the case that a particular reading can arise only 
where a community with the necessary interpretive assumptions is in existence, and it 
is then encountered as a solid object, not as a malleable entity. When Noble argues in 
one example that while a pipe may be seen as a telescope by Galileo, no-one sees it as 
a 'steamroller or a killer whale' (l995b:7), he merely demonstrates the absurdity of his 
own misunderstanding-nothing in Fish's hermeneutics even begins to suggest that a 
pipe will necessarily be seen as a killer whale. The quotation ofFish (mis)used here by 
Noble does not imply an infinite relativism in which all interpretations can be chosen 
and are therefore possible, but rather implies a view in which the infinite-that is, the 
open-ended-number of contexts and communities which may occur in the future 
means that no readings can be rejected a priori-even one as absurd as the pipe as a 
killer whale; the number of interpretations can never be said to be complete. 84 Even if 
it seems certain that a pipe may never be seen as a killer whale, it cannot be said that 
this is so because of the 'thing in itself since Fish has argued that any such access is 
impossible. This can only be asserted-and even then, not proven-on the grounds 
that the existence of a context or community in which such an interpretation could be 
the case is virtually impossible to imagine; Noble's killer whale is actually a red 
herring. 
On hearing a communication the listener does not simply read off the meaning 
passively and attribute it to no-one. According to Fish, '[ w lords are intelligible only 
within the assumption of some context of intentional production, some already-in-place 
84 Readers of Noble's type may also apply this particular confusion to Moore's discussion of 
'bottomless interpretation' (1986:716). and to Gill's use of the term 'indefinite' (1983:53). The 
solution to this problem of definition can easily be exemplified by a consideration of anyone of these 
words or phrases. For example, there are two Ycry common definitions of the word 'infinity'. On the 
one hand. it can be used to indicate a situation in which interpretation has no hermeneutical 
constraints at all and so an infinite number of readings are available in the sense that all readings are 
equally possible. On the other hand, it may also define the 'number' of readings ayailable when some 
hermeneutical constraints are operative.· In this latter case, there exists a space within those 
constraints in which multiple readings can arise. Since there is no way of exhausting the interpretive 
possibilities of this space. the number of interpretations available in this situation can also properly be 
described as infinite or bottomless or indefinite. It is this confusion in particular which is the cause 
of the (unwarranted) fear with which some theologically minded hermeneuticians regard the work of 
Fish. 
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predecision as to what kind of person, with what kind of purposes, in relation to what 
specific goals in a particular situation, is speaking or writing' (1989:295). In other 
words, Fish consistently implies that all human beings ascribe an intention, a 
purposefulness or directedness, to every communication, always constructing for 
themselves an author or speaker who has uttered or written that text (1989:99-100, 
294-5; 1995:14).85 It is useful at this point to reconsider one of Noble's examples, that 
of Kuhn's reading of Aristotle, and attempt to redescribe it in these terms. Noble 
makes much of a reader re-reading a text with increasingly accurate results (his 
'hermeneutical spiral'). But it can be argued that Kuhn's initial reading of Aristotle 
was problematic only because the Aristotle who appeared to have authored the work 
was not the Aristotle whom Kuhn had expected. He became, in effect, absurd, even a-
historical and the dissonance generated by this constructed author was such that Kuhn 
was forced to reconsider the text. The second Aristotle he constructed was, however, 
much more coherent, and Kuhn, now satisfied with this reading, had found' Aristotle'. 
But the feeling of satisfaction involved, the feeling of nearness to the author, results 
not so much from the greater accuracy of the second reading-though we all might 
agree, as members of a historical critical interpretive community, that it is more 
accurate-as from its closer relationship to Kuhn's expected author. 
Despite his claim to be a localist (1994:282), Fish does actually assume certain 
universals with regard to human communication. Membership of interpretive 
communities is clearly not optional but is rather to be considered universal, and so is 
the existence of a universal approach to understanding communication, whether 
85 Brett has argued against Fish that a distinction must be made between motives and 
communicative intentions: 'the whole point of a lie, for example, is that a speaker's deeper intent is 
detachable from his or her linguistic meaning' (1993:28). But Brett's point requires refinement on 
two counts: first. intentionality for Fish does not reside in the mind of a writer but rather in the way in 
which readers encounter texts as purposeful, as intentional. It is therefore a moot point whether any 
given statement is a lie or not. But, second, viewing any text as intentional with Fish does not 
necessarily mean accepting said statement as true or accurate because-with the possible exception of 
self-contained formulations like tautologies-such verification is always judged in reference to the 
extra-textual. The difference between a true statement and a lie is simply that the same assumption-
that of truthfulness-is being used to categorise the intent of each when different assumptions should 
be applied to the latter; i.e .. the originator of the former is untrustworthy. 
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spoken or written, as 'purposeful' or 'intentional'. 86 Although this latter claim 
implicitly underpins Fish's work on hermeneutics and arises from his philosophical and 
literary critical work, he has not been concerned to discern its source or, more 
importantly here, to describe its implications for the process of interpretation. In what 
follows, a theory which has been specifically developed around this point will be 
introduced, not necessarily in order to provide a theoretical foundation for Fish's claim 
about intentionality-its own theoretical claims about the origins of this tendency still 
require much work-but rather to demonstrate in more detail the effects of such a 
claim upon interpretation. 87 Ironically, given Noble's own attempted justification of 
intentionality through linguistics, the theory is one currently arousing much interest 
within that discipline-that of Relevance. 
B. Relevance Theory and Constructions of the Author 
The theory of relevance, as developed and articulated by D. Sperber and D. 
Wilson, originates in the groundbreaking work of the philosopher H.P. Grice. Grice 
86 The mode of argumentation used here shows that this does not form some new foundation 
upon which to base interpretation-Fish is too canny to fall for that. That his position is a foundation 
is true-he notes that one always operates from foundations-but it is a foundation that is essentially 
the current result of an argument on the status of 'foundations' in general, and not a foundation in the 
sense used by foundationalists; it cannot be conclusively proven but is always open to refutation 
( 1989:29-30). 
87 Taylor, in his book Mutual Aiisunderstanding, describes the approaches of both Relevance 
theorists and Fish to communication (along with a number of other theories), his aim being to avoid 
what he terms the transcendental claim that they are correct because understanding takes place. The 
former he describes as 'naturalism with a twist', a reference to its theoretical grounding in cognitive 
theory. The claim is that if cognition works in accordance with the search for relevance then we can 
understand each other because of this mutually shared mechanism (1991: 133-36). Fish, however, is 
described in terms of the tendency of human beings to believe that they understand, to be satisfied 
with what they know if further communication does not suggest misunderstanding (1991: 167-8~). 
It is significant. however, that Taylor largely misses the importance of Fish's claim that 
hearers ascribe intentionalit)· to the words of a speaker. Similarly, if one considers the risk elements 
of Rele"ance theory, then links can also be made in terms of understanding as achieving satisfaction. 
Despite the differences on a theoretical level (and to which future research may suggest a resolution), 
there arc very close links between the actual ways in which Relevance and Fish account for meaning 
and communication, and these suggest that-for the moment-the two can usefully be set side-by-side 
as mutually illuminating. 
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argued that human communication was governed by 'reasonable' norms based In 
human cognitive processes: 
Our talk exchanges ... are characteristically, to some degree at least, co-
operative efforts~ and each participant recognises in them, to some extent, 
a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted 
direction ... We might then formulate a rough general principle which 
participants will be expected ... to observe, namely: Make your 
conversational contribution such as required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in 
which you are engaged (1989:26) 
This Grice designated the 'co-operative principle', and he broke it down into a series 
of 'maxims', summarised here by D. Blakemore (1992:26): 
Maxims of Quantity 
1) Make your contribution as informative as required 
2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required 
Maxims of Quality 
1) Do not say what you believe to be false 
2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence 
Maxims of Relation 
1) Be relevant 
Maxims of Manner 
1) Avoid obscurity of expression 
2) Avoid ambiguity 
3) Be brief 
4) Be orderly 
The Theory of Relevance as articulated by Sperber and Wilson (from 1986 
onwards) is developed from Grice's co-operative principle and involves the assertion 
that one of his maxims, that of relation or of' relevance', can be used to account for all 
human communication. 88 All of the other maxims, whether of manner, quality, or 
88 Although Sperber and Wilson hayc concentrated primarily on spoken communication. 
subsequent theorists have shown great interest in a 'literary pragmatics' (cf. e.g .. the yolume of essays 
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quantity, are, they suggest, types of 'being relevant'. Although some have attempted 
to ground Gricean communication models in areas such as the nature of society or 
culture (e.g., Leech, 1983), Sperber and Wilson have followed Grice's lead and have 
argued that Relevance should be understood as being grounded in a theory of 
cognition, signifying a property of human mental processes. Cognition is, for Sperber 
and Wilson, modular, consisting of a set of independent but linked systems which 
convert sense data into information that may be either stored or further processed. 
Language is seen, following J. Fodor (1983), as a system which allows the processing 
of visual and audio information into representations with a logical form (1995: 71-7 5, 
257-58); Blakemore gives as examples, 'David isn't here' and 'Barbara's in town' 
(1992: 149). These 'represent' thoughts but are inevitably incomplete, the gap between 
thought and communication being crossed through inference. 'Inference' is the name 
for the deductive process in which interpreters make sense out of what they hear or 
read by attributing a context to a semantic sentence such as 'David isn't here' in order 
for it to be interpreted as an utterance, as a contextualised communication. Meanings 
are not, therefore, simply encoded into words and then decoded but are rather offered 
into a contextualised space in which the intended hearers ( or readers) 'infer' the 
meaning of the communication from both what they hear and whatever specific 
contextual information they have been presupposed by the communicator to possess. 
But how does each recipient know which contextual information to apply to any given 
utterance?89 
Sperber and Wilson explain the principle of Relevance as containing two 
postulates: 
!,iterary Pragmatics, edited by SelL 1991: Sell's article on 'Literary Pragmatics' in the Dictionary of 
Languages and Linguistics. 1994; and the work of Pilkington, 1989. 1991: and Tanaka, 199.t). 
89 This emphasis on the contextuality of the communication already shows some strong 
connections between Fish's account of literature and Relevance's accounts of communication. Fish's 
discussion of Hirsch's contextless phrase, 'the air is crisp', in which he shows that Hirsch is simply 
Ignoring the context in which its reception takes place (1980: 309-10), could sen'e equally well in the 
work of Sperber and Wilson as an example of the fail ings of older formalist approaches to linguistics. 
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(1) that human cognition tends90 to be geared to the maximisation of 
relevance, and 
(2) that every act of ostensive communication communicates a 
presumption of its own optimal relevance (1995:260). 
Because a cognitive theory of relevance must by definition be innate, Sperber and 
Wilson are clearly implying that it cannot not be practised by any human being 
(1995 :261-66). In interaction, both speaker and hearer are always entitled to assume 
that what is being said to them is maximally relevant to them. The originator of the 
communication must make assumptions as to how much information the recipient 
requires when formulating a propositional representation of the thought to be 
communicated. The propositional form, in limited instances, may resemble the 
speaker's thought completely (although not literally). More frequently, the 
resemblance is an approximation of the thought because the speaker 'aims for optimal 
relevance and not at literal truth' (1995:233), their choice depending upon the 
contextual cues they deem best suited for that act of communication. That 
representation when uttered carries with it a number of explicatures and implicatures 
which may be realised by the recipient. Both explicatures and implicatures are 
contextual assumptions or implications that are communicated to hearers/readers in the 
course of being relevant in communication, the communicator risking that the audience 
will infer meaning from them and fill the interpretative gaps. In Blakemore's account 
of Relevance, a hard distinction is made between these two with an explicature being 
that (or part of that) which is communicated explicitly by the semantic content of the 
utterance~ it is a blueprint which merely requires expansion and does not go beyond the 
words themselves (1992: 59). F or Sperber and Wilson, however, this gives the 
impression that an explicature is a dyadic semantic unit such as one finds in a formalist 
code model, involving no inference. Instead they argue that the distinction between 
explicatures and implicatures is not one of kind but one of degree; both involve 
90 The occurrence of the word 'tends' here is not meant to imply that the mind has a choice 
of maximising relevance or not, but rather to allow for the failure of human cognitive systems through 
IIIcfficlencyor limitations (Sperber and Wilson 1995:262-63). 
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inference, but the former reqUlres less that the latter~ a range of assumptions is 
communicated with differing degrees of inferential processing requirements and those 
at one end are defined as explicatures and those at the other as implicatures 
(1995: 182). 
The recipient assumes that the 'intended' meaning of the communication is that 
which is produced when they have processed the utterance to a certain degree; a 
degree which they can assume will be that which requires the least work from them. 
Hearers search for relevance and not literal truth when interpreting communication and 
they infer as much context as needed to achieve a satisfactory meaning (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995 :46-50). In other words, the search for relevance is not open-ended but is 
limited by notions of sufficiency and efficiency. Many readings could be relevant, but 
in practice a-more or less-limited number of readings apply because it is not 
necessary for the hearer or reader to process the utterance further than the intersection 
at which the presumption of relevance encounters the limitations of economy. (As an 
aside, it is worth noting that the notion of deconstructing a text, concerned as it is with 
demonstrating the ultimate lack of solidity to any text, can only be viewed from a 
relevance theory perspective as technically 'irrelevant'.) 
There are certain points which remain troubling about the relevance account of 
communication. On the one hand, the theory has been on the scene for fifteen or so 
years and has proved itself a useful tool in explicating communication (cf e.g., Tanaka 
on advertising, 1994). It appears that certain aspects of the theory are probably 
correct, especially with regard to the role of inference and contextuality in meaning 
production and to its account of the empirical data (which essentially mirrors Fish's 
conclusions). On the other hand, its theoretical account of why relevance should be 
accepted as the innate basis of all 'human' communication is at a relatively early stage 
of development and requires further exploration. Such innatism, for example, serves to 
draw attention to examples of human communication which do not proceed by the 
principle of relevance; autistic children, for example, do not appear to have an innate 
tendency towards relevance in communication, but are they less human for that? 
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Nevertheless, the claim put forward by Sperber and Wilson (and by Fish), that human 
beings in general do attribute intention to communications they encounter, has both a 
strong evidential base and is based on the present state of the study of cognition. 
Therefore, their account of the mechanics of how communication occurs and the 
implications of its nature can be cautiously accepted and used here in order to explain 
further the limitations of communication and the resultant state of the biblical 'text'. 
In linking Relevance theory to the work of Fish, I am suggesting that Sperber 
and Wilson's hearer of an oral communication is in exactly the same position as Fish's 
reader of a text (cf. the attempt to develop a 'literary pragmatics' in Sell, 1991). The 
hearer/reader of the oral communication/text assumes certain things about the 
utterance being heard/read. These may include assuming that it is a direct one-to-one 
communication highly relevant to that individual. Or that the utterance may be part of 
someone else's letter, the reading of which by subsequent readers involves the 
assumption that they are not the person( s) at whom the communication was originally 
aimed. Or perhaps, as R. Bauckham has recently argued with the Gospels, that these 
communications were intended for an indefinite audience rather than a specific one 
(1998:44-46), and therefore one perhaps including even them. Whatever construction 
of the intent of the communication is ultimately accepted, the recipient understands it 
in terms of its optimal relevance to them, and the author they construct is dependent 
upon the textual and contextual material available to them as they read. 
In Fish's essay 'With the Complements of the Author', an example of how this 
process works is unintentionally provided (1989:37-67). Fish-according to his true 
account/fictitious story (?)-is preparing to teach 1. Derrida's book OjGrammatology, 
and out of his copy falls a slip on which is typed, 'With the Compliments of the 
Author'. Fish then tries to understand this phrase in a manner which exemplifies the 
relationship between the principle of relevance and constructions of the author. He 
first asks who sent him the book. Was it Derrida, whom he had briefly met? Or G. 
SpiVak the translator, whom he knew? Was it the John Hopkins Press, of whose 
editorial board he was a member? He does not know. So, Fish asks, does this failure 
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demonstrate the superiority of face to face communication over that mediated by the 
words on the slip of paper in his hands? Does this result in a hierarch\' of 
utterances/texts ranging from the most to the least, to quote Culler (1975: 133), 
'orphaned'? 
Fish's answer is that all texts are orphaned, but differently. He proceeds to 
imagine a context in which he knows that the slip of paper came from Derrida, and 
then asks if his position is now different to the one that he had previously occupied. 
Obviously, in one sense the answer is yes~ he is no longer asking if the' author' of the 
'text' was Spivak or the John Hopkins Press. But what is the significance of this 
difference? Fish is still left with the problem of interpreting a message from Derrida, 
and must ask what 'he' intended by the words. Perhaps Fish is simply on a list and 
Derrida would answer, 'Who is Stanley Fish?' when asked. Perhaps in the light of 
Derrida's work, irony is intended. Of course, Fish could ask Derrida to his face and 
demonstrate the superiority of face to face communication by hearing Derrida's own 
explanation. Or could he? Fish notes that even this case is open to further 
questioning. Does Derrida mean what he writes and then says? Fish's conclusion is 
that he can never be 'certain' what the phrase means even when Derrida tells him what 
it means face to face. Insecurity may lead to Fish doubting Derrida's word, regardless. 
No matter how immediate, all communication is mediated and its interpretation is 
always dependent upon extra-textual features. But this does not mean that Fish is 
forever condemned to uncertainty but rather that certainty and uncertainty are not 
determined by either a lack of proximity or the loss of objective proof but rather by the 
acceptance and incorporation of contextual evidence. In other words, when the reader 
is 'satisfied' with his/her interpretation (Fish, 1989:42), optimal relevance has been 
achieved. Good communication is about satisfaction and not about clarity and 
objective evidence. 
All texts are read in context and their meamng is related to that setting. 
Equally, their authors are constructed as much when face-to-face as when mediated by 
an approximately two thousand year old biblical text. The application of the principle 
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of relevance in each case involves the use of extra-textual information to make 
decisions as to the text's meaning and the meaning is decided when the reader is 
satisfied that he/she has done justice to the text. Returning to the notion of 'canonical 
intertextuality' suggested by Childs, it can be seen that the 'author' of the biblical text 
is a multi-layered entity which the canonical reader constructs as he/she reads a 
disparate group of collected texts, each of which has been formed into a whole to a 
greater or lesser degree. In Fish's sense, there is an 'author/intention' of the whole, 
but such an author/intention is derived from a synthetic reading of a large number of 
other 'authors/intentions' ~ a reading which is the product of a balancing act between 
the different forces at work in Childs's canonical approach. 
C. A Critique of a Perspectival Approach: Anthony C. Thiselton 
Fish's 'perspectival' approach has not gone unchallenged in his own field, 
though none has, as yet, decisively refuted his position (cf e.g., the criticisms of 
Culler, 1983~ Freund, 1987~ Spikes, 1990~ Worthen, 1991~ and Norris, 1990~ a number 
of these criticisms have been already been broached in section IIIC earlier). But, in the 
light of my own experience of the most common criticisms of Fish within theological 
circles, I have decided that it would be more fruitful to concentrate on what is easily 
the most important and influential critique of Fish in terms of biblical hermeneutics and 
Christian theology, that of A.C. Thiselton. 91 
91 Other substantial critiques have come from Jeanrond and Vanhoozer. Both, however, are 
clearly influenced by the same interests which inform Thiselton's work, and may be offered the same 
response (for which, see below). Jeanrond, for example, insists that these texts demand a theological 
reading, and regards other readings as partial at best (1993 :95). But this simply begs the question, 
'What is a full reading?' If a reading can be offered which takes account of all the textual data which 
is apparent from its perspective. on what basis can that reading be criticised as being less than full (cf. 
e.g .. Reese's close reading of Jude with little theological content, 1995). Clearly, his definition of the 
text as theological is drawn from his own prior reading of the texts and it follows that any reading 
which is less than full is simply one which is in disagreement with his 'full' tex1. 
Described specifically by one reviewer, Blomberg, as 'readable' (1999:85). it may be that 
Vanhoozer's book Is There a .\leaning in This Text? (1998) will replace Thiselton as the standard 
'foundationalist' response to such as Fish. However. when Blomberg on that basis continues. 'until 
one has attended carefully to something other than oneself and has allowed for the possibilit)· of a text 
to transform us (possibilities that are logica/~v incompatible with pure~v reader-oriented theories of 
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According to Thiselton, the key issue in hermeneutics concerns the ability of a 
text to reform a group from outside (1992:537).92 In order for this to take place, he 
believes that the text must be defined as a relatively objective non-changing entity 
which every group must encounter as it stands. Thus, Thiselton believes that Fish's 
approach would be disastrous for Christian theology if it were true because Fish sees 
the text as constituted by the interpretive practices of the community and not as a free 
standing entity.93 Rather fortunately for Christian theology, then, Thiselton also 
believes Fish's position to be fatally flawed (1992: 541). The error which he believes 
Fish has committed is that of believing that one has a choice only between formalism or 
what he terms 'radical pragmatic anti-formalism'. This betrays a 
fundamental philosophical weakness... [ which] lies in failure to come to 
terms with the major transcendental questions which stem from Kant, in 
which very careful and rigorous attention is given to the working 
distinction between how the knowing human subject or agent conditions 
raw data and what this subject or agent constructs independently of raw 
data. Do social contexts condition or do they construct social realities, 
including texts? (1992:541-2-his italics). 
interpretation) one has not read responsibly' (1999:86-my italics), it becomes apparent that the same 
error which afflicts Thiselton's work-a caricaturing of Fish-also appears in Vanhoozer's. Its 
readability may therefore simply mean that those errors will be even more widely disseminated! 
92 Jeanrond also echoes this basic need for the hermeneutical project (1988: 112-5). Though 
both Jeanrond and Thiselton sometimes seem more driven by historical or theological necessity than 
by the desire to simply offer a valid hermeneutical account of plain ex-perience, we might nevertheless 
agree with their basic point. Cross community readings do seem to happen and it is therefore 
incumbent upon any hermeneutical account to explain that feature of experience. This section will 
seek to answer the two questions which then arise: first, is Thiselton's account-I have already 
problematised Jeanrond's position above-capable of explaining this feature while remaining 
theoretically sound? Second, does Fish's account fail to account for this feature? If it is found that the 
answer to both these questions is no, then it may be asked how Thiselton succeeds in filling any real 
lack in Fish. 
93 In a review of Thiselton's book, New Horizon's in Hermeneutics (1992), Morgan echoes 
this sentiment: 'Most theologians will agree with [Thiselton] that the kind of textual indeterminacy 
advocated by Stanley Fish would rapidly dissolve the Christian tradition' (1993: 187). Watson has 
also accepted such a view of Fish (1994: 124-36). 
Certainly some of those with whom I have personally discussed Fish's work have taken this 
view. Vanhoozer. for example, told me in 1995 that he could not do theology if Fish was right (the 
depth of Vanhoozer's feelings against Fish is demonstrated by his recent publication of a volume 
entitled Is Tha(' a ,\/eaning in this Text?). Others, however, have seemed less convinced by 
Thiselton's reading of Fish, and this present work owes much to their published efforts and, in some 
casco their personal encouragement. 
124 
Fish, according to Thiselton, is guilty of ignoring the constraining influence of raw data 
upon the interpretations of human subjects and communities, being a relativist who 
argues that social realities are subject to an infinite range of whatever an infinite 
number of interpretive communities makes of them. Thiselton suggests that a truer 
picture would be gained by an appropriation of L. Wittgenstein. 
When he looked at language, Wittgenstein observed that some language 
games could be thought of in entirely context-relative terms, but for the 
most part 'we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and 
criss-crossing'. In other words, although social practices of given 
communities do indeed provide a background which contextually shapes 
concepts and meanings, overlapping and interpenetration also offer 
certain criss-crossings which constitute trans-contextual bridges. 
Sufficient bridging can occur for Wittgenstein to suggest that in many 
cases a trans-contextual frame of reference for meanings can be found in 
'the common behaviour of mankind'. It is not the case, as Fish suggests 
it is, that we must choose between the sharply-bounded crystalline purity 
of formalist concepts and the unstable concepts of contextual 
pragmatism. Concepts may function with a measure of operational 
stability, but with 'blurred edges'. Difference of social context and 
practice may push or pull them into relatively different shapes but do not 
necessarily change their stable identity. For Wittgenstein ... 'concepts 
with blurred edges' are situated on middle ground along the road from 
formalism to pragmatism (1992:541-my italics). 
It is these trans-contextual bridges which give Thiselton the solid Bible he needs in 
order to confront all humanity with the 'word of God' . 
D. A 'Fishian' Response to ThiseIton 
There are difficulties with ThiseIton's position, however. His discussion of 
'raw data' and its role in generating hermeneutical constraints is problematic: How can 
one make sense of Thiselton's notion of 'raw data'? What can it either do or mean? 
Fish claims that there is no way to move from such data to the human subject without 
interpretation, and Thiselton does not explicitly deny this. There is no essential 
difference, it seems to me, between Thiselton's being conditioned by raw data and 
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Fish's having to interpret raw data~ one still does not have access to raw data itself. 
Thiselton may perhaps choose to argue that common human experience indicates that 
consistent raw data exists but since he is already using the latter to justify the former 
such an argument would be circular~ one could also just as easily argue that common 
human experience indicates a common human interpretative capacity for ordering 
disorganised raw data. Thus one can claim that raw data exists but one cannot 
demonstrate it outside of conditioning or interpretation; it cannot be made to do any 
real work in constraining interpretation. As R. Rorty puts it, 'to say that we must 
have respect for unmediated causal forces [that is, raw data] is pointless' (1985 :4). If 
we cannot access 'raw data', this Reality with a capital R, then raw data can supply no 
foundation upon which to build a theory of hermeneutical commonality and we have 
no epistemological grounds on which to argue that Thiselton is right. Clearly, his 
suggested answer to the problem of communication between communities, 'raw data', 
cannot provide commonality to the constraints operative on any given community; its 
very inaccessibility means that it can never be invoked to deny an interpretation, no 
matter how 'ludicrous'. 
But a further problem arises with Thiselton's argument that Fish's work entails 
the construction of social realities 'independently of raw data', leaving fishian 
interpretive communities completely unconstrained and able to exist in an infinite 
number of forms, offering infinite numbers of unchallengeable interpretations of any 
text. This seems to me to be a fundamental mis-reading of Fish, however, which is 
virtually identical to that of Noble. If Fish could be shown to be indicating that every 
perspective was indifferently available to every community, then one could, with 
Thiselton, say that such interpretive communities were totally unconstrained. But this 
is not the case. Fish's point is not that interpretive communities are unconstrained but 
rather that any constraints are themselves either internal to the community or the 
products of interpretation. In fact all communities are constrained by their interpretive 
strategies, and are unable to choose interpretations as and when they choose-their 
texts are solid from where they read. 
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Since communication does appear possible, it is necessary to ask how the Fish 
described here (rather than Thiselton's misrepresentation) would account for 
interpretation as it occurs across community boundaries. In his view of hermeneutics, 
there are two factors which may provide an answer to this question; here designated, 
'universal commonality' and 'hermeneutical growth' or perhaps better, 'hermeneutical 
change'. The first of these indicates that interpreted reality which may be rendered by 
humanity's universal interpretive strategies, through a 'reality' with a small 'r'. Such a 
view of commonality avoids the need to argue for the influence of raw data. If a 
universal commonality does exist, it would appear that some interpretive communities 
are wide enough to embrace all of humanity. That such universal interpretive strategies 
do exist in Fish's work is demonstrated by his insistence on the way that all human 
beings reading texts ascribe an intention to that text (1989:99-100; 1995: 14), but, of 
course, defining which facts are universal facts is likely to be virtually impossible (cf 
this is the core ofFish's argument with Iser, e.g., 1989:74-86). 
The second factor can be seen at work in some of Fish's examples of how 
communication takes place. In his essay Is there a Text in this Class? Fish utilises as 
an example the comment of one of his students to one of his colleagues, 'Is there a text 
in this class?' (1980:303-21; but cf also 1980:329-39). The colleague's immediate 
reaction was to say yes and name the text, The Norton Anthology of Literature 
(1980:305). However, the student did not mean this but was rather asking does a text 
exist as an objective entity? In his discussion of this example, Fish argues that in order 
to hear the comment as it was intended to be heard the hearer must either already be in 
a position to hear or must move into a position from which the comment can be 
understood (1980:314-6). In this case, this can happen because Fish's colleague is 
aware of a number of 'rubrics' within which the sense of the comment can be 
examined, and eventually the professor arrives at, 'Ab, there's one of Fish's victims' 
(1980:313-4), a victim who can ask if the text exists objectively by using the phrase, 
'Is there a text in this class?' If these rubrics had not been available, however, Fish 
writes that there would have been a need for the speaker to 'make a new start, 
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although she would not have to start from scratch (indeed starting from scratch is 
never a possibility); but she would have to back up to some point at which there was a 
shared agreement as to what was reasonable to say so that a new and wider basis for 
agreement could be fashioned' (1980:315). The move which enables one to 
understand an utterance through the acquisition of these 'rubrics' through common 
roots indicates that at a certain level Fish's approach does allow the possibility of what 
Thiselton calls trans-contextual meaning through hermeneutical growth; the acquiring 
of a position from which to hear an utterance as intended by its speaker. 
The question then arises as to the relationship between a possible universal 
commonality and a community's context-specific interpretation. Although Thiselton's 
use of Wittgenstein' s stable but fuzzy-edged concepts may be understood in fishian 
terms-indeed this may actually be what was intended by Wittgenstein himself94-it is 
clear that this stability is not true of a hundred percent of all concepts as my italicising 
of words such as some, for the most part. certain, in many cases, may, measure, and 
necessarily in the quotation of Thiselton on page 125 shows; thus one cannot say that 
all concepts are stable with fuzzy edges, although many may be. At this point, 
Wittgenstein's comments about context-specific language games become significant, 
and it must be concluded that they play a larger part in interpretation than Thiselton 
would allow. This is not to say that such games are self-contained and have no 
relationship to a possible universal commonality. But concepts may be interpreted 
differently or not at all depending upon one's context or experience of interpreted 
reality. For example, one problem in rendering the New Testament to the Dogon 
people of Mali in West Africa is the difficulty of translating the concept 'kiss'; the 
Dogon do not, it seems, kiss, and the New Testament word which was previously 
94 There is considerable and continuing disagreement between interpreters of Wittgenstein as 
to whether or not his later work in the Philosophical Investigations is a continuation or a rejection of 
his earlier work in the Tractatus (cf. e.g .. Thiselton. 1980:)57-62: Pears. 1971: 13). Wittgenstein 
himself. therefore. does not provide wholly unambiguous support for ThiseIton's position. something 
further demonstrated by those who see strong links between Wittgenstein and Fish (cf. e.g .. Fish. 
1994: 293-94). Also noteworthy is Scalise' s attempt to reconstruct Childs using the hermeneutics of a 
'non-foundational' Wittgenstein as support (1994a: 17-41). 
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rendered as 'mouth-sucking' in early translations has now been rendered by a general 
term for embrace.95 This problem brings us back to Fish's interpretive communities; 
there may be universal concepts involved (though Fish has shown no great interest in 
this except perhaps implicitly by his refutation of Iser's concept of a semi-solid text, 
describing himself as a localist, 1994:282), but these are mixed with context specific 
concepts which may only be rendered to others through hermeneutical change. 
This last point addresses Thiselton's main concern and the reason for his 
attacks on Fish, once again the caricatured relativist; namely, that a group cannot be 
reformed from the outside or, in Christian terms, a group may be unable to hear the 
gospel-something no Christian theologian would easily concede! It seems to me that 
Fish's position does not deny the possibility of a group being reformed from outside, 
but rather only the foundation from which such a reform would take place. With 
patience, the gospel-or in Thiselton' s terms, the Bible-can probably be rendered 
intelligibly to all; not because there is an objective biblical text, but because a critique 
of community assumptions can be offered from the non-foundational position taken up 
by the proclaiming Church and its Bible which would be understood both through 
commonality and the hermeneutical growth of the community being evangelised. To 
say 'probably' here indicates the wearing of two hats; in terms of hermeneutics one 
cannot say with absolute certainty that this is possible (although it does seem likely) 
but in terms of Christian theology one can be certain that God would have left no-one 
unable to hear the gospel. This tension is unresolvable in theory and one can only 
work towards a resolution in praxis. 
For Thiseiton, seeing the Bible as the product of a community's reading 
strategy means that 'notions such as grace or revelation must be .. .illusory.... The 
message of the cross remains a linguistic construct ofa tradition' (1992:549). But this 
ignores the role of the Church or 'community of faith' as the setting of the text. On 
95 Similarly. major problems haye been encountered \\lth translating New Testament 
language about sheep and lambs for people who do not keep sheep: difficulties abound in trying to 
relate these concepts to animals such as pigs. I am grateful to my fellow student. Sharon Gray. for 
thcse cxamples drawn from her experiences in West Africa as a Bible translator. 
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the basis of its shared understanding of God, the scriptures, and its tradition, the 
concern of the Church has been to preach the gospel of Christ crucified, not as a 
linguistic construct plucked out of the air as Thiselton seems to believe, but as a true 
witness to a 'Reality' which exists beyond interpretation but is encountered and known 
only by faith and not because of an epistemologically solid text (see my earlier 
discussion of Childs on 'referentiality', pages 77-80). It is not necessary to understand 
the non-foundationalist approach to be indicating that nothing exists beyond 
interpretation but a Nietzschean void. Since 'non-foundationalism' (and its sometimes 
co-terms 'anti-realism' and 'post-modernism') has given up its claim to be able to talk 
about such 'Reality' at all, denying that we can reach out beyond interpretation, it has 
nothing to say to a Christian theology of revelation which asserts that God has spoken 
to us, entering into our reality from the outside. Perhaps the most graphic illustration 
of the ramifications of this understanding of non-foundationalism is that whereas 
Thiselton and Noble might see D. Cupitt's projectionist 'Sea of Faith' theology as 
representative of non-foundationalist theology (1988), I would see the theology of 
Barth as representative of a more accurate understanding of the claims of non-
foundationalism upon Christian theology (On Barth's relationship with Fish, see Saye, 
1997~ also noteworthy is Jenson's comment: 'If there is indeed such a thing as "post-
modernism", Barth may be its only major theological representative so far', 1989:25). 
Since Thiselton's concerns about the wider theological picture seem to be unfounded 
and his own suggestion fundamentally flawed, I can see no hermeneutical reason why 
Christian theology cannot be done with a 'fishian' text, namely, the Bible as the 
canonical scriptures of the Christian Church. Indeed, it seems to me that, to judge 
from the history of exegesis, it has always been so. And until the foundation required 
by philosophical foundationalism is discovered, it will remain so. 
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IV. The 'Community of Faith' and the 'Interpretative Community': Preliminary 
Consequences of Adopting a Fishian Hermeneutic 
A. The 'Community of Faith' as 'Interpretative Community' 
How, then, does this relate to Childs's approach to the biblical texts? Clearly, 
his community of faith is an interpretive community which shares a specific task and in 
which what counts as evidence for theology is defined by community assumptions. 
Although recent interpretations of Wittgenstein have suggested that he thought of a 
language game as a small task in a particular localised context rather than as the larger 
task of a community (so Thiselton, 1992:540), it seems useful to conclude that 
Childs's community is engaged in a context specific task with some roots in the larger 
universal context, and that this task be conceived of as a language game~ it is 
interesting to note at this point that Childs himself has referred to his approach as, to 
use 'Wittgenstein's expression, a language game' (1980b:52).96 
In his non-foundationalist reconstruction of the canonical approach, Scalise 
takes the view of Childs's work as a language game further by suggesting that the 
interaction between the language games of particular church communities and their 
scriptures be seen in terms of Gadamerian tradition, the growth of a dialogue over time 
in which the 'text is a living tradition that "speaks" to the experience of the interpreter 
in both positive and negative fashion' (1994a:26). Although I have chosen to base my 
own non-foundationalist reconstruction of the canonical approach on Fish rather than 
Scalise's complex mixture of Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Ricoeur (see page 101, 
footnote 73), the phrasing of his comment here does raise two interesting points for a 
canonical approach in a non-foundationalist mode: first, as already noted, the very 
96 Scobie has also explicitly suggested that the production of a canonical biblical theology is 
the task of a fishian interpreti\,e community (1991a:47). In his second edition of Reading the Old 
Testament. published in 1996. Barton notes the similarities between the language used by Childs and 
Fish (2 n). He cautions that there is no evidence that Childs has been influenced by Fish-a point 
with which I agree (cf. Childs on reader response. 1993::\'yi-xyii)-but notes that 'the parallel is still 
an interesting onc'. 
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mention of Stanley Fish's name produces in some people's minds images of 
interpreters who are capable of making texts mean whatever they want. If that were 
the case, then the question of how the 'text' can act as a normative-or even as a 
descriptive-partner in a dialogue with the interpretive community which produced it 
would be a valid one.97 But the notion that readers are free to make a text mean 
anything does not originate with Fish. In fact, the question of whether a text derived 
from community assumptions can be a dialogue partner is only problematic when 
considered abstractly. In practice, the community's assumptions will allow the text to 
speak as a two thousand year old witness to Jesus Christ, the Lord of the Church. Of 
course, sometimes community assumptions may over-ride the text-what Fowl and 
L.G. Jones, citing D. Bonhoeffer, call reading the text 'for oneself rather than reading 
the text 'over against oneself (1991:42)-but Childs's view of the texts as Scripture 
subject to the close attention of Old and New Testament specialists should help reduce 
the dangers of reading the text irresponsibly, 'irresponsible' being defined according to 
community assumptions. 
The second point is that Scalise is clearly envlsagmg different interpretive 
communities with slightly different language games. In contrast, Childs, perhaps 
influenced by Barth, has consistently talked of the Church, the community of faith. 
However, his view that multiple readings are to be expected and old readings 
consigned to the history of interpretation clearly indicates that he can view the 
community as changing over time. But he does not explicitly consider the effect of 
different contextual settings on particular communities,98 Brett characterising Childs as 
paying 'lip service' to the contextuality of interpreters (1994:283). One could, for 
97 This seems to be Noble's understanding of a non-foundationalist canonical approach. He 
concludes that the implications of Fish's position 'would be disastrous for Childs's belief in a 
normative Bible which bears witness to Jesus Christ as an independent reality. On Fish's theory. the 
Church is necessarily its own ultimate authority, whatever doctrine of biblical authority it may 
profess-the Bible can only mean what the Church interprets it to mean. and it does indeed have that 
mC;tning through the church interpreting it that w;ty' (l995a:211). 
98 Interestingly. Fowl and Jones also accept changing interprctations over a period of time 
but fail to consider the diffcring interpretations of two churches co-cxisting tempor;tlly in very 
different societal and cultural contexts (1991). 
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example, have two churches temporally side by side who, because of a contextual 
combination of different social, political or ecclesiastical factors, are interpreting the 
texts differently. Childs could respond to this challenge by seeing this variation as a 
consequence of the limited nature of both humanity and the task of biblical theology 
itself (perhaps echoing the rosy view of Patte who argues in his Discipleship 
According to the Sermon on the Mount: Four Legitimate Readings, FOllr Plallsible 
Views of Discipleship and their Relative Values [1996] that the four 'androcritical' 
readings he is using may prove mutually enriching), but prior to the exegetical 
component of this thesis, it can only be concluded here that it remains to be seen how 
large a problem will arise from seeing Childs's work as context dependent. 
If Childs's community/ies of faith can be redescribed in terms of Fish's 
interpretive communities, then it may be asked what implications arise for his approach 
and its praxis. First, there are no consequences for the praxis of the approach; second, 
the claim to be reading Sola Scriptura, understood as using an essentialist 'hard' text, 
must be rejected; third, apologetic against the polemic of liberal foundationalists such 
as Barr becomes unnecessary; fourth, there needs to be a recognition of the 
autobiographical nature of the canonical approach and the canonical 'text'. Finally, 
'objectivist' terminology must be translated into the language of the 'perspectival'. 
B. The 'No Consequences' Argument 
In line with Fish's own conclusion that no consequences for praxis follow from 
his theory (1989:315-41), it is possible to assert that such a view of Childs does not 
have consequences for the actual praxis of the canonical approach. Fish's henneneutic 
claims to provide a description of what is always happening when people read a text-
to have rhetoricised criticism-but it does not claim to be able to tell any interpreter 
how to interpret (or even how to argue). If a historian and an exponent of the 
canonical approach both attempt to read the same text, Fish cannot tell them which of 
them is right or provide means by which their readings can be independently validated. 
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Because Fish still tends to read texts in the style of the slowed down manner of his 
early work on 'affective stylistics' (cf. Moore, 1986: 712-13), the impression can be 
gained that this is the only way to read. But this would be incorrect; it is only the 
assumptions of a specific community which can define the right way to read and if a 
reading strategy does justice to those assumptions then it can continue in use 
regardless of its nature. (It IS interesting to note that while the method of 
'deconstruction' is, in terms of the theory of relevance, technically 'irrelevant', it is 
nevertheless practised by many.) In a sense then, it is the canonical approach which 
fully provides the way to read the biblical texts with only the hermeneutical justification 
for that style of reading being provided by the work of Fish. 
C. Loss of Sola Scriptura 
The second consequence is to call into question the slogan of the Reformers, 
Sola Scriptura, scripture alone. If the text speaks only in a community setting, then 
this slogan-and the objectivist hermeneutic which has undergirded its modern use-
can only be understood rhetorically as ideologically motivated, as hiding its own 
situatedness~ the slogan must therefore be dropped or at least modified. S. Hauerwas 
and S. Long have used Fish's work to demonstrate the importance of the community 
of the Church in interpretation, arguing that 'Fish and the Roman Catholic Church [and 
the Orthodox Church, cf. 138] agree that a text cannot exist outside of an interpretive 
community. It is never read apart from a normative stance' (1989: 136). But in their 
discussion of the Reformation, they write: 
Wasn't it about making Scripture primary in the Church? The answer is 
yes and no. The Reformers were rightly concerned that Scripture act as a 
judge on the Church. Calvin argued that Scripture has authority from 
God and not the Church. Yet the truth of Scripture is only known 
through the Spirit, who, as Calvin says 'must penetrate into our hearts 
and persuade us that the Scriptures faithfully command what has been 
divinely commanded'. But Protestantism has tended to think that 'the 
spirit' could be identified with the text apart from the transformed heart. 
Andrew Louth ... argues that the Sola Scriptura principle gives rise to the 
notion of 'the objective meaning of Scripture' (1989: 139). 
Strangely, Hauerwas and Long then state that 'the doctrine of Sola Scriptllra is a 
heresy which is the seed bed of fundamentalism' (1989: 139). I say 'strangely' because 
it is the later development of the doctrine of Sola Scriptura into the doctrine of the 
objective text which they seemed to see as the heresy, rather than the doctrine as used 
by Luther and Calvin. This use of Fish, however, does allow one to see the difficulties 
of those who choose to absolutise the slogan~ in contrast to the openly fishian 
Orthodox and Catholic Churches, who recognise the place of the community in 
interpretation, stands those such as D.A. Brueggemann who argues that 'the consistent 
message of Scripture is that it is God's own authority that demands their adoption. 
The text is a given because God himself has given it' (1989:326). But we must ask 
Brueggemann, 'if it is not the reading of an interpretive community of faith, whose 
understanding of the consistent message is thisT Clearly, any attempt to absolutise the 
text in this way is highly questionable in the light of the present state of the 
foundationalist/non-foundationalist debate in philosophical hermeneutics. 
However, Hauerwas and Long's discussion of the role of interpretive 
communities is somewhat disingenuous. Childs writes about Barth: 'He was always 
against verbal inspiration. It was a misunderstanding of the function of the Bible. It 
made the Holy Spirit superfluous, [and] separated the Bible from the people of God, to 
whom it was given' (1969b:32). This is, it seems to me, Hauerwas and Long's 
position on developments from the doctrine of Sola Scriptura. But Childs adds: 'Barth 
always opposed the Roman Catholic view of the teaching magisterium, because it 
cramped the Spirit and its work, ... one didn't confront doctrine but the Living God' 
(I969b:32). It seems likely that Childs's interpretive communities would have as their 
validating principles only the Sensus Literalis of the canonical scriptures, the scope of 
the text, Jesus Christ, Lord of the Church, and the Holy Spirit who actualises the text 
to its readers, and not the objectivity of the text or the magisterium. Thus, W. Kaiser's 
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complaint that Childs's approach leads back to Rome to authenticate the canon misses 
the point entirely (1981 : 81)! 
D. Apologetic in a Fishian mode 
The third consequence of Fish's approach is in the area of apologetics. Childs 
has constantly been accused of fideism by historical critical scholars~ the debate 
between Childs and Barr has been described by Rendtorff as resembling a 'religious 
war' (1993:171,195~ cf. also Sheppard, 1983). According to Barr, the word 'canon' 
effectively means 'Childs is right' (1980: 15-16~ 1983: 147), with Childs handling 
historical criticism as a matter of appropriateness, and not of truth. Unfortunately for 
Barr, it is equally clear in the light of Fish's work that he can also be accused of 
fideism on exactly the same grounds. His continued insistence on using historical 
criticism must be translated as 'Barr is right', a point which Childs noted as long ago as 
1972 when he wrote of the 'dogmatism' of historical criticism (l972a:713). 
What both participants in this 'dialogue' need is to recognise and fully accept 
the contextual and ultimately dogmatic nature of their own positions (on the basis of 
their published works, Childs should find accomplishing this the slightly easier of the 
two). As Topping has pointed out, what is at stake here is a choice between two 
principles (1992:248-51). Barr is arguing for-or, more often, assuming-the 
foundational role of the Enlightenment tradition of free critical 'reason', and this 
supposedly supplies a flat ground upon which all must base their work. It is especially 
noteworthy that when Barr continually says of Rendtorff that he gives no reason for 
using the canonical text theologically (1999 :441-47), he appears to give no great 
thought as to how he himself would answer this question presumably because he 
regards his own position as obvious. In contrast to Barr, Childs is arguing for the 
reformation principle of the primacy of scripture over reason. Fowl's characterisation 
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of discussion between Childs and Barr as 'two people talking round each other' IS 
fully-and ironically-accurate (1985:176, footnote 13).99 
But for Fish, Barr's 'obvious' is not obvious at all. Barr's flat ground does not 
exist, and thus Childs cannot be censored for not working according to Barr's rules. 
Given the loss of a rationalistic ground upon which all discourses (including 
ecclesiastical ones) must be based, the language of fideism is clearly not applicable to 
the Barr-Childs debate, and is probably not applicable to theology in a general sense at 
all (rhetorically, though, it remains a powerful tool). A more constructive debate 
between these two scholars would recognise that the use of equally monistic language 
in advocating both historical criticism and the canonical approach cannot be based 
upon an intrinsic 'text' or on an obvious philosophical foundation. The competing 
truth claims of both approaches must be understood as theological in nature and 
argument begun there. Whether a possible synthesis lies at the end of such a road is, 
however, far beyond the scope of this thesis. For now, it is sufficient to note that 
Barr's own position means that his attacks on the canonical approach are often largely 
misguided and need not be considered damaging. 
E. Autobiography and the Canonical Reader 
Given this re-description of Childs's project and indeed his canonical text as the 
product of an interpretive community, the identity and ideology of that community is 
obviously relevant to the construction of the text under study. In the case of this 
thesis, it is clearly of some significance in evaluating the application of the canonical 
approach to know who this canonical reader/interpretative community is. 
Autobiographical criticism is becoming rather fashionable in biblical studies at present 
(cf e.g., Staley, 1995), but it should be understood that there are some dangers in the 
practice. First, although a person may honestly claim that he or she is about to tell you 
99 It is noteworthy that each has accused the other of almost totally misunderstanding their 
position (Childs, 1984b; and Barr. 1999:-t28-29). 
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who they are, such description is suspect on a number of grounds. How does anyone 
actually know who they are? How do anyone know what it is that is significant for 
you-the reader-to know about them? Such questions problematise the seemingly 
easy task of recounting a person's story because of their inability to either describe 
themselves in a neutral way or to know in advance what aspects of their self and the 
text it constructs will result in an interpretation which demands an accounting from a 
reader. Second, there is a possibility that the speaker may in fact be prevaricating, and 
the reader will be led to read the speaker's exegesis with a skewed picture in mind as 
to what person is behind the text and the uses to which the text may be put. Third, 
there is a sense in which the beliefs of a person or a community may only be uncovered 
by what they do. Ideological criticism may well be the best avenue into the interests 
and aims of the community reading the canonical text. But, despite these problems, it 
seems useful to place a description of the canonical reader, my 'self, here. The 
interpretive community/ies I represent and the text that they construct, read, and apply 
should both be open to criticism. Here is a beginning to that process. 
In his introduction to Doing What Comes Naturally, Fish includes a list of 
words which illustrate some of the interpretive communities of which he is part 
(1989:30)~ what follows is a version of that list with myself as subject. I am a male, a 
husband, a son (eldest of two), a father (to one daughter), a brother, an uncle, a friend. 
I am white, English, a British subject, thirty-two years old, over-weight, short-sighted, 
middle class (I guess), a student in a secular department of Biblical Studies, a house-
owner, a neighbour, a car owner, a city-dweller, (relatively) well-travelled, a trained 
photographer, an Anglican, a charismatic, an evangelical, a convert, and many more. 
But perhaps the most significant aspect of autobiography for my attempt to carry out a 
canonical approach to the biblical texts relates to the somewhat artificial position in 
which a student becomes a 'worshipping scriptural community' in himself in order to 
read the canonical texts, while attempting to preserve, if only in order to write my 
conclusion, the critical distance required by the rules of my Ph.D. I can say 
immediately that I want this approach to succeed, to be the rebuilding of the texts 
which three years of undergraduate de(con)struction seem to have left as rubble. 
Certain aspects of the approach resonate strongly with my own Christian experience 
and, it has to be said, certain aspects of the positions of Childs's opponents jar very 
deeply with my personal philosophy. But my acceptance of Childs's approach is not 
at any price. I want to see the approach work and work well. In that sense then I am 
still standing back from a full acceptance of the approach. But it is in that sense that I 
also believe that I can critique the approach from--to a certain degree-within. 
It remains to be seen how relevant the above exercise is to the conclusion of 
this thesis. However, such information is an essential part of what gives the following 
reading its shape, and is also responsible-at least in part-for the use to which that 
reading is or is not put. 
F. Translating 'Objectivist' Terminology (Set One) into the 'Perspectival' (Set 
Two) 
The final consequence of accepting a Fishian hermeneutic for the canonical 
approach is that Childs's set one terminology-that relating to 'objectivity'-must be 
recast in terms sensible to the kind of language which can be used to describe a 
consistent set two formulation of the canonical approach, to dress the canonical 
approach in 'perspectival' clothes. 'Text,' 'best text,' and 'illumination' are all terms 
which are problematic as they stand and require redefinition. Although it is possible at 
this point to predict some of the required terminological changes (the solid text 
becomes the fishian text), it seems more advisable to await the fuller discussion made 
possible by the exegetical component of this thesis. 
G. Summary 
It now seems clear that Childs's canonical approach with its two terminologies 
can be understood hermeneutically in such a way as to leave it essentially unchanged. 
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An objectivist reconstruction seems untenable in the current philosophical climate and 
so the redescription carried out here has been in terms of perspectivity; any objectivist 
terminology must therefore be understood as referring to the 'object' of a specific 
community, the Christian church. 
In practice, the canonical approach is the ongoing exegetical project of a group 
of Church communities, each of which accepts the final form of the text as part of its 
normative constitution. The apologetics of the canonical approach need only be 
formulated in terms of its fidelity to the traditions of such a church and its ability to 
account for present experience of the world (cf Tracey, 1975:23). Though the 
identity of each of these communities is inevitably reflected in their constructions of the 
canonical texts which forms their dialogue partner, this does not really matter because 
they are also encountering and reading the Old and New Testaments as two 'solid' 
historically grounded texts. If they insist on reading them to suit themselves, no-one 
can actually stop them, but there are limits-community specific ones, of course-
about what the wider collection of Christian communities will accept as orthodox. In 
Hauerwas's A Community a/Character, he notes how, in R. Adams's book Watership 
Down, the founding mythical stories of the Prince Rabbit used to tell the rabbits who 
and what they are as rabbits are either radically re-interpreted or left unread in 
communities which are no longer true to the traditional definitions of 'rabbithood' 
(1981:9-35). If a Christian community no longer tells the story in a way consonant 
with the-highly varied-tradition(s) of Christianity, then it will no longer be regarded 
as orthodox. 
What remains to be seen are the effects of this view of the canonical approach 
on exegesis. Since good examples of the canonical approach are few in number, the 
remaining exegetical chapters of this thesis have a twofold purpose: first, to investigate 
the realities of carrying out a canonical exegesis per se. But, second, to be aware of 
the effect of contextual factors upon exegetical decisions. Am' I' reading this text to 
suit myself? 
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Chapter 4 
Preliminaries to a Canonical Exegesis of the 'Sodom Narrative' 
(Genesis 18-19) 
I. The' Sodom Narrative' 
A. Defining the 'Sodom Narrative' 
In chapter 2, two arguments were put forward which reqUlre preliminary 
consideration before turning to actual exegesis: the first concerned the essential role of 
narrative presuppositions, and the second, the useful role of diachronic studies of the 
text in shedding light upon the final form. With regard to the former, it was argued 
that a canonical exegesis of any given narrative text must always take account of its 
position within the largely sequential narratives contained within the Old Testament. 
It is necessary, therefore, to attempt to outline some of the presuppositions which 
underlie a canonically 'later' text such as Genesis 18-19. With regard to the latter, 
Childs's emphasis on reading the canonical text against a detailed critical tradition 
history was rejected in favour of Provan's view of diachronic studies as illuminating 
the text by bringing tensions within the text to light~ any such areas of the text would 
then merit careful consideration in any account of a canonical text. Laying out the 
result of diachronic study before beginning exegesis as has been done here is not as 
essential as a preliminary detailing of narrative presuppositions. After all, other 
sources of illumination do not merit such treatment, being dealt with in the exegetical 
commentary of chapters 5 and 6 as and when they prove useful. But because of the 
numbers of such diachronic studies and because the question of how useful such 
studies are as a source of illumination is of particular interest to this thesis, I have 
decided to use only a single, though highly significant, diachronic study-that of 
Gunkel's Genesis-as a 'partner' to the canonical exegesis offered here, as a test case. 
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An additional reason for placing the result of such a study on Genesis 18-19 in this 
preliminary section is its sheer complexity; if Gunkel's insights were to be raised on an 
ad hoc basis, a disproportionate amount of time would probably have to be spent 
explaining why these results arose. By providing an outline of Gunkel's work here, 
later references to the results of his diachronic study can be integrated into the 
commentary without such disruption. 
Before turning to these two tasks, it is necessary to first justify the actual 
parameters of the text under examination. On beginning this study, my intention was 
to study the concept of God as Judge in both Testaments. With this in mind, this part 
of Genesis was chosen as a core text because it seemed an eminently suitable text from 
which to begin to investigate this concept within biblical texts. Its importance is in part 
due to the baldness of Abraham's question in Gen. 18:25, 'Shall not the Judge of all 
the earth do justice?', but also significant is its relevance to the biblical picture of 
YHWH's judging of the later Israel descended from Abraham. It may also be added 
that this narrative is the first major text dealing explicitly with God's justice in the Old 
Testament. But after deciding on using this area of the text, the question arises as to 
how much text should be included in a detailed canonical study. 
F or most commentators, it is apparent that Abraham's question is located 
within a narrative unit extending from 18: 1 to 19:38, and linked by the presence of the 
three ('two' in Gen. 19: 1) visitors. Two points should be noted, however: first, W. 
Brueggemann has argued that Gen. 18: 1-15 is only loosely linked with the subsequent 
narrative about the fate of Sodom, preferring to see it as the close of a narrative unit 
beginning with 16: 1 (1982: 162). In one sense, Brueggemann's position shows how 
arbitrary some of these decisions about 'narrative units' are; Abraham is introduced in 
v. I as an unidentified 'he', is then named only in v.6, but is nevertheless clearly 
identified by the grammatical antecedent of the pronoun in Gen. 17:26. But as lA. 
Loader points out-and as my own exegesis will show-the current location of 18: l-
IS makes it of fundamental importance in interpreting the debate over Sodom and the 
subsequent destruction of the cities of the plain (1990: IS). Second, the concluding 
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story of Lot and his daughters in 19:30-38 takes place after the departure of the 
visitors, but is clearly both separate from the ensuing narrative of Abraham's sojourn in 
the Negev and dependent upon (and serving as closure for) the story of the destruction 
of Sodom itself. 
In conclusion, though Gen. 18:25 (and 23-33 around it) may be at the heart of 
this narrative unit, to offer an adequate understanding of Abraham's question, an 
exegesis of-at least-18: 1-19:38 proves necessary (so also e.g., Loader, 1990; 
Letellier, 1995; Rudin-O'Brasky, 1982; Wenham, 1994:32-65). Time and space 
limitations here mean that earlier material can only be dealt with in a preliminary and 
summarising fashion. Canonically, Gen. 18 :25 forms part of the patriarchal narratives 
(Genesis 12-50) and is preceded by the primeval history of Genesis 1-11. In what 
follows an attempt is made to describe some of the necessary presuppositions of what I 
shall term the' Sodom narrative' (Gen. 18: 1-19:39) as they are detailed in Genesis 1-
17.100 
II. Basic Readerly Presuppositions 
A. Areas of Knowledge Presupposed 
The knowledge presupposed and therefore necessary to make sense of this text 
canonically falls, I would suggest, into four areas: first, knowledge of YHWH's 
promise to Abraham of descendants, relationship, and land; second, the reason why 
100 It is a basic contention of this interpretation that the movement between the terms 
. Sodom', . Sodom and Gomorra', and 'Cities of the Plain' is basically irrelevant to the sense of the 
tc:xt. with the sole exception of the town of Zoar. This is made plain by the way in which Sodom's 
fate, as the city yisited by the two men/angels, is linked with the Cities of the Plain in Gen. 19:14-25, 
and by the way in which the Old Testament relates the paradigmatic wickedness and punishment of 
these cities to different combinations of names (e.g., Sodom only, lsa. 3:9: Lam ~:6: Sodom and 
Gomorra, Deut. 32:32: lsa. 1:9-10: 13:19; Jer. 23:14; 49:18; 50:40: Amos 4:11: Admah and Zeboiim, 
Hos. II :8: all four in Deut. 29:22: and finally, Sodom and her daughters, Ezek. 16:~8~9, 53, 56). 
With this in mind I shall generally use the term 'Sodom' to indicate the target of God's justice and 
any occurrence of each of these three terms may be taken to indicate all of them unless otherwise 
specified. 
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such a promise to Abraham was necessary in the first place~ third, the relationship 
between Abraham and his kinsman Lot~ and four, a general knowledge of later 
Yahwistic religion, including geographical and linguistic competency. The aim of what 
follows is to simply give content to these four areas of knowledge, with the exact role 
each plays in the interpretation of the Sodom narrative only becoming clear as detailed 
exegesis proceeds. A feature which is also of some significance in the interpretation of 
Genesis 18-19, the narrative aside in Genesis 13 of Sodom' s destruction (v. 10) and of 
its sinfulness (v. 13) just before Abraham meets the King of Sodom (Gen. 14:17-24), 
will also be examined. 
B. The Promise to Abraham 
The Sodom narrative includes references to events in the lives of Abraham 
(Abram until 17:5) and his wife Sarah (Sarai until 17: 15),101 and these should be 
understood in the light of the promise given to Abraham by YHWH, initially in Gen. 
12:1-3,7. 
Now YHWH said to Abram, 'Go from your country and your kindred lO2 
and your father's house to the land that I will show you. And I will make 
of you a great nation, and I will bless you, and make your name great. Be 
a blessing and I will bless those who bless you, and him who curses you I 
will curse~ and by you all the families of the earth shall bless 
themselves ... (12: 1-3)' . Then YHWH appeared to Abram, and said, 'To 
your descendants I will give this land' (12:7; 'Canaan', cf 12:5-6). 
101 For the sake of clarity. only the names Abraham and Sarah will be used. Since Genesis 
17 and their renaming plays a r~lativ~ly minor role in Genesis 18 and 19, this should result in no 
skewing of the canonical text. 
102 Hamilton suggests that '91D?"~t;)1 may be seen as a hendiadys with ,;r.n~;l and therefore 
translated as 'homeland' in the sense' ~f Abraham's native land (1990:369). But his two suggested 
parallels, 24:7 and 31: 13 differ in prefacing n,",o with l"K. and there seems little reason to regard 
this term as relating only to ~~~;l rather than to the following ~J~ n~:lOl The term 'kindred' is 
therefore preferable (cf. BOB 409b). 
Gen. 18: 19, which contains YHWH's thoughts on his choosing of Abraham, 
constitutes, according to D.J.A. Clines, an 'allusion' to this promise (1978:37).103 
For Clines, the promise to Abraham (and reiterated to the subsequent 
patriarchs) consists of three parts: the promise that Abraham would have 'descendants' 
and be a great nation,104 the promise of 'relationship' between the deity and Abraham 
and his descendants,105 and the promise of a 'land' to the nation descended from 
Abraham, the land of Canaan (1978:33-43; on the promises cf also Alexander, 
1982:28-32; Westermann, 1980).106 Clines argues that, although these three are 
implied within each other, it may be said that Genesis 12-50 is predominantly 
concerned with 'descendants' (especially in the form of the tension in Abram's 
relationship-or lack of one-with his 'heir'), Exodus and Leviticus with 
'relationship', and Numbers and Deuteronomy with the 'land' (1978:29; cf 45-60). 
From the imperatives which frame the initial promise, 'go (17) ... be a blessing (il~.~.~.; 
12:1-2)'107 and later similar formulations (17:1,18:19), it is apparent that these 
103 It is interesting to note that a second edition of Clines's Theme of the Pentateuch has now 
been published in which he suggests that he would no longer be able to suggest a single theme without 
seeking to deconstruct it (1997:127-41). In the light of the hermeneutical argument of Chapter 3, it 
should be clear that while expending the energy to carry out that project is Clines's prerogative, it 
does not mean that his work cannot be used as part of a canonical reading; as I noted earlier, 
deconstruction is secondary to interpretation and technically irrelevant in the constitution of meaning 
within any interpretive community (see page 134). 
104 Clines cites the following as direct references within the Pentateuch to the 'promise of 
descendants': Gen. 12:2,7; 13:15; 15:4f, 13, 16, 18; 16:10; 17:2,4-7, 16, 19f; 21:12f, 18; 22: 16ff, 
26:3f, 24; 28: 13f; 35: 11; 46:3 (1978:32-33). 
105 'Relationship': Gen. 12:2f; 17:1-11, 16, 17ff; 26:2, 24; 28:13. 15; 35:9f; 46:3; 48:21; Ex. 
3:6, 12, 15f; 4:5, 23; 5: 1; 6:6f; 7: 16; Lev. 26: 12. (1978:33-34) 
106 'Land': Gen. 12:1,7; 13:14f, 17; 15:7, 13, 16, 18; 17:8; 22:17; 26:2ff; 28:13,15; 35:12: 
46:3[; Exod. 3:8, 17; 6:6ff; 23:23-33; 34:24 (1978:36-37). Clines also lists around two hundred 
'allusions' to the promises throughout the Pentateuch. (1978:37-43). Davies suggests that 'at this 
stage there is no commitment to give Abraham the land he is going to' (1995:98). but there seems 
little difficulty is seeing the promise of 12: 1 as implicitly promising the land to Abraham. 
107 The rendering of the latter as an imperative by the MT has not. however, been universally 
accepted as correct. The 2nd person m.S. imperative form ;"I~tq is often repointed as a 3rd m.s. perfect 
(;"1';')1 as with the SP) and rendered as either a declarativ~' 'and it [your name (v 2c)] will be a 
bles~ing' (cf. Skinner 1910:244, Speiser. 1964:85-86) or as a consequence giving' ... so that it will be 
a blessing' (Yarchin, 1980: 166). A further alternative is supplied by Wolf who translates the 
imperative as 'so that you will effect blessing' (1966: 137. footnote 28: cf. also Westermann. 
1985: 144). 
Although some of these suggestions may havc merit. thc primary reason for their being 
offered-resolving the perceived problematic MT-is questionable. The use of such a combination of 
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promises are contingent from the very beginning upon the behaviour of Abraham and 
his descendants (contra Alter, 1990:150). The promise is not earned, being freely 
given, but its fulfilment is dependant upon a correct response from the patriarch.I08 
Clines sees the theme of the Pentateuchal narrative as a whole as illustrating the partial 
julfilment-and hence, the partial non-fulfilment-oj these promises to the patriarchs 
(1978:29).109 
imperative forms has parallels in Gen. 17: I (' Walk before me and be perfect') and Exod. 3: 10 (Come. 
I will send you to Pharaoh. Bring forth my people'), and the imperative form of ;";' occurs in Gen. 
17:1; Exod. 24:12; 34:2; Judg. 17:10; 18:9 (cf. Hamilton, 1990:369). But the probable main cause of 
emendation is undoubtedly the problematic (for some) question of contingency in the promise to 
Abraham in 12:1-2; Gunkel, for example, saw the promise in the final form of the tex1 as a once 
freely given promise tainted by an overlay of contingency placed there by later legalistic redactors. 
This type of approach may be able see 12:1-3 as free of this contingency, but when imported into a 
synchronic study such as that of Alter, it leads to the dubious conclusion that the appearance of 
contingency in Gen. 18: 19 can only mean that something new has been added to the covenant 
(1990: 150). 
In a canonical reading, however, the assumptions which undergird Gunkel's conclusion do 
not hold and it seems unproblematic to translate ;,~m. with the MT as an imperative and to see 
contingency as constitutive of the covenant from the very beginning (for other recent studies which 
translate the text in this way, see Turner, 1990a:54, footnote 5). 
108 As Hamilton puts it: 
[T]hese promises are absolute and not conditional. This emphasis shifts the promises 
away from the idea of a reward (something earned), to the idea of a gift (something 
unsolicited) ..... This is not to say that Abraham is absolved of all responsibility. He is 
'to walk before God and be blameless' (17:1). He must 'keep the covenant' (17:9). 
He is to do 'righteousness and justice; so that the LORD may bring to Abraham what 
he has promised him' (18:19). A causal nex"US between obedience and fulfilment is 
suggested by 'because you have done this ... I will indeed bless you... because you 
have obeyed my voice' (22:15-18) ..... My point is not that human responsibility is 
obliterated. After all, even in a unilateral covenant there must be some reciprocity. 
What if Abraham had not gone out as the Lord told him? What if he had not 
believed? What if he had consistently chosen not to walk before God and be 
blameless? These options must have been open to Abraham unless we are prepared to 
say that as the chosen of the lord (18: 19) God's grace was irresistible. My point is that 
human responsibility is repeatedly subordinated to God's word of promise. (1982:92-
93-his italics). 
109 In contrast, Blenkinsopp argues that the 'possession of the land of Canaan is the basic 
component in the theme of the ancestral history,' (1992: 111) the fulfilling of the promises being 
dependent upon Abraham's initial obeying of the command to leave his own country and go the land 
which God will show him. But this seems unnecessarily reductionistic; after all. what use is a land 
without descendants to populate it? What use is either of these things without the blessing of God? In 
Clines words, 'here in the Pentateuch the triple elements are unintelligible one without the other. 
never strongly differentiated from one another in their manifestation within the text. and each in their 
accumulative effect. with the implication of the others' (1978:31). But since the Pentateuch finishes 
on the edge of Canaan without the actual possession of the land, but after the grO\\th of descendants to 
a great number and the giving of the Law at Sinai. it seems that the principal part of the promise 
unfulfillt:d does indeed relate to the land. 
146 
C. The Reason(s) Why a Promise to Abraham is Necessary 
One aspect of the promise made by God to Abraham which is not mentioned bv 
the Sodom narrative is the reason(s) for it being given in the first place. This 
information is provided by the narratives of Genesis 1-11 in which the reason( s) for the 
promise can be found. Clines has argued that the theme of the early chapters of 
Genesis is actually a combination of two separate ones; the first involving the 
outworking of a 'spread of sin-spread of grace' theme and the second a 'creation-
uncreation-recreation' motif (1978:76-77). According to Clines, the spread of sin-
spread of grace can be seen in the mitigation which is freely offered by God in his 
judgement of each of the five instances of ever worsening sin which occur in Genesis 
1-11 (1978:73-76). Two further aspects of this series of judgements should also be 
noted. Firstly, as Westermann has noted, it appears to be in the character of God to 
act as a judge over humanity, seeking out and punishing evil-doers (1980:46-48). That 
God is also thought of as a judge between human beings is made plain by Sarah's 
invocation of the deity in her dispute with Abraham in Gen. 16: 5. The second aspect 
is, as Clines points out, that when God judges individuals, the punishment is 'highly 
personalised', whereas when punishing a community, differentiation mayor may not 
take place between the guilty and the innocent: the righteous Noah is rescued from the 
flood generation, but all humankind have their life span limited due to the sin of the 
sons of God (1978:63-64). 
The creation-uncreation-recreation theme is demonstrated, according to 
Clines, by the loss of relationships which begins with the Eden narrative, and 
eventually results in the return of chaos as the binary basis of creation (order as 
'separation and distinction') is completely undone (through 'the annihilation of 
distinctions') in the flood narrative (1978:74). The distinction between heavenly waters 
and the earth (Gen. 1:6-7) is erased as the 'windows of heaven' open (7: 11) and 
between the lower waters and the earth (1:9) as the 'fountains of the great deep' open 
(7: 11). Clines notes 1. Blenkinsopp's comment: 'The world in which order first arose 
147 
out of a primeval watery chaos is now reduced to the watery chaos out of which it 
arose-chaos come again' (1978:74~ citing Blenkinsopp, 1971 :46). Four elements 
mark Clines's 'recreation': the initial separation of the waters from the land (8:3, 7, 13~), 
the renewal of the order to be fruitful and multiply (8: 17), the binary structures of 
creation being guaranteed by the Deity (8:22~ cf 9:8-17), and the utterance of an 
altered version of the creation plan for humanity and the creation (9: 1-7). But even 
when re-creation takes place Clines concludes that the danger of uncreation remains 
because humanity itself remains unchanged (1978:76). 
When these two themes are combined, however, Clines notes that the reader is 
unable to determine the resulting theme of Genesis 1-11. When read as a complete 
unit and apart from any other text, the theme of Genesis 1-11 may be either negatively 
construed as the spread of ever-increasing sin leading to uncreation whatever God 
does or understood in positive terms as the ever-increasing spread of God's grace in 
response to the growing sin of humanity (1978:76-77). But when placed before the 
promises of the Patriarchal narratives (e.g., Gen. 12: 1-3) the positive reading is clearly 
preferable. Clines defines the theme of Genesis 1-11 when followed by Genesis 12-50 
in the following terms. 
No matter how drastic man's sin becomes, destroying what God has 
made good and bringing the world to the edge of uncreation, God's grace 
never fails to deliver man from the consequences of his sin. Even when 
man responds to a fresh start with the old pattern of sin, God's 
commitment to his world stands firm and sinful man experiences the 
favour of God as well as his righteous judgement (1978: 76). 
In Clines's view, the promise to Abraham 'functions as the "mitigation" element of the 
Babel story, and... demands to be read in conjunction with Genesis I-as a re-
affirmation of the divine intentions for man' (1978:78-79). Thus the promises to 
Abraham reassert the role of humanity in creation, albeit with the divine intentions 
working through one man and his descendants, with humanity receiving the over-spill 
(12:3). V.P. Hamilton writes: 
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The election of Abraham is not designed to isolate this family from the 
other families of the earth. On the contrary, this family is to become the 
vehicle by which all the families of the earth may be reconciled to God. 
In Abraham and in his descendants 'all the nations of the earth are to be 
blessed'. Thus the selection of Abraham's family is a means to an end in 
God's overall plans for his world. How will this blessing come about? 
Gen. 12: Iff makes it clear that reconciliation with God is possible only 
when there is reconciliation with Abraham, or at least the absence of 
strife. One cannot be reconciled with God and be at odds with Abraham. 
'I will bless/curse those that bless/curse you,' is the promise of ch. 12 and 
elsewhere. Abraham and his descendants are nothing less than a mediator 
and catalyst of God's promised blessing. Chs. 12-50 perhaps should not 
be read as 'Paradise Regained,' but they may be read as 'Reconciliation 
Regained' or 'Hope Regained'. Chs. 12-50 do not recapture chs. 1-2, but 
they do resolve the dilemma of chs. 3 -11, which is the problem of 
escalating trespass for which a lasting solution is needed (1990:52). 
Abraham and his descendant Israel are therefore of great importance in the mitigation 
of the sins of the past through God's grace and the return to recreation from the chaos 
of uncreation. 
D. The Relationship Between Abraham and Lot 
The absence of Lot from Genesis 18 and his sudden appearance in Genesis 19 
indicate that some knowledge is being assumed concerning Lot's relationship to both 
Abraham and YHWH's promise of descendants. Lot is first introduced in the 
genealogy of Abraham's father, Terah, as his grandson, the son of Abraham's brother, 
Haran (11 :27); a third brother is the then childless Nahor. Immediately, Haran's death 
is related (11:28) along with the information that Abraham is married to Sarah who is 
barren (11 :30). As N. Steinberg notes: 
the somewhat awkward manner in which Lot's name suddenly occurs in 
v. 27 and in which the genealogy mentions Sarai's barrenness in v. 30 
suggests that the future of the second generation [from Terah] will 
probably be secured through Lot; Lot will function as the heir that Abram 
will never father through his wife (1993 :48). 
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It is in this familial context that Lot, the sole grandson and eventual heir of Terah, is 
taken-along with his uncle Abraham-by his grandfather to the land of Canaan; 
Nahor, however, remains behind, lost to the narrative until he re-appears in Gen. 
22:20-24; 24 as the grandfather of Isaac's bride-to-be, Rebekah. The group only go so 
far as Haran (11 :31-2), however, and it is Abraham who now leaves his father and 
goes on to Canaan. It is at this point that what L. Silberman has termed 'the teasing 
motif of the presumed heir' enters the narrative in earnest (1983: 19). Upon being told 
to leave his kindred-presumably also including Lot-to go to Canaan, Abraham 
actually takes Lot with him, an action which is, as L.A. Turner notes, from a 'rigidly 
literal point of view... inherently contradictory' (1990a:62; cf also Davies's 'a 
generous interpretation of "leaving kindred"!', I995a:97).110 Turner is surely correct, 
however, when he then interprets Abraham's behaviour, not as a blameworthy 
contradiction of YHWH' s commands, but rather as indicating that Lot was considered 
by Abraham to be his heir at this point. And since the promise of descendants in 12: 1-
3 does not actually specify that the descendants will come from Abraham's own body, 
taking Lot with him as heir is the natural course of action for the patriarch. III 
During a brief sojourn in Egypt when a famine occurs in Canaan, Abraham 
protects himself and his heir, Lot, by offering his barren wife to the Pharaoh, gaining 
riches in return (12: 10-20).1 12 Steinberg suggests that Abraham is here actively trying 
to get rid of his barren wife so that he can re-marry (1993 :54), though the many 
multiple marriages in Genesis perhaps suggest that such a move is unnecessary. 
110 Turner notes that Coats 'fails to see the inherent contradiction in his statement, "Abram 
executed the instructions [of Gen. 12:1-3] as received and took Lot with him'" (1990b:86, footnote 2; 
citing Coats, 1983: 108). He is certainly not alone in this (cf. e.g., Alexander, 1982 :22). 
III Failure to recognise the presence of this motif leads to Alexander's conclusion that with 
'the exception of 18:1-16, the Lot episodes reveal no interest in the subject of Abraham's heir', 
because though 'Lot is the son of Abraham's brother Haran, he is apparently not reckoned to be 
Abraham's heir' (1982:22). In actual fact, the idea of Lot as heir is fundamentally important in 
understanding his relationship with Abraham, especially in its role in a proper characterisation of 
Lot's departure from Abraham and the promise of YHWH. 
112 At this point Sarah is not an essential part of the promise-since Lot is Abraham'S heir-
and so there is no necessity for the patriarch to worry that his offering of her to another man 
endangers its fulfilment. As Clines points out, the message of this story is that it is the ancestor who 
is presently in danger, and not Sarah (1990:69-72). 
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YHWH, however, has other ideas as to Sarah's rightful place and, after the discovery 
of the ruse, Abraham, Lot, and all their people are expelled from Egypt with all their 
belongings and return to Canaan. Following arguments among their respective 
workers, Abraham generously offers Lot the choice of part of the whole land (?J 
T 
fJt$;:r- in v. 9), the promised land of Canaan (cf. W.l~-fJ~ in v. 12), either to the left, 
. . .. 
the north, or to the right, the south (13:8-9~ cf. Helyer, 1983:79). This appears to 
confirm that Lot's status was that of heir. As Blenkinsopp puts it: 'By inviting Lot to 
occupy the land to the North or the South Abraham intended to share the land of 
Canaan with him as presumptive heir' (1992: 101). But Lot, upon seeing the Eden-like, 
well-watered lands of the Jordan valley, chooses instead to go eastward (t:J'J~~), to 
leave the land of Canaan and go to live amongst the cities of the plain (13: 12). In 
consequence, Lot has forsaken the land and is no longer an option as the heir of 
Abraham who will inherit Canaan (Helyer 1983:79-80,86~ cf. also Coats, 1985:127; 
Vawter, 1977: 184-85~ Steinmetz 1991:57).113 
Turner argues that the subsequent comment of YHWH that Abraham will 
possess all that he can see (13: 14) indicates that Sodom is now to be included in the 
Land of the promise, and that Lot, despite the choice he has made, may still be 
considered an option as heir by Abraham (1990a:67-68~ cf. also Alexander, 1982:39). 
But it is not necessary to see a contradiction between the land Abraham has already 
offered to Lot and all that he can now see including what Lot saw (i.e. Sodom)~ the 
former can be understood as modifying the latter and limiting it to the original land of 
the promise. This option is to be preferred because Turner's argument requires that 
the heir of Abraham in 15: 1-2 is still Lot (1990a:68-72). This reading he asserts by 
ignoring the problematic 1t.~"'?~ P~~::r K~;' "D"~ P~~-l~~ of 15: 2 and reading 1~ 
"D"~, 'son of my house', as a reference to Lot. But "D"~ l~ in its only other 
113 In later tradition. Lot's decision to choose Sodom was viewed with considerable 
suspicion. Rashi notes that Lot journeyed east. 'away from the Primal Being [a word play]. [Loti 
said, "Neither Abraham nor his God'" (Leibowitz. 1973: 175). But some exegetes also suspected that 
Lot was actively choosing to live in a wicked Sodom 'so that he might do as they did' (.\lic/r. Tanh. 
"a)ycf'll 12). 
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occurrence in the Old Testament indicates 'slaves' (Eccl. 2:7), and simply ignoring the 
rest of this verse is unlikely to gain Turner's interpretation acceptance. 
Turner could perhaps tum to Davies's alternative suggestion, that Abraham is 
here deliberately taunting the deity by talking, despite Lot still being his heir, of a slave 
captured during his excursion to the north of Damascus in Genesis 14 (1995a: 104). 
But it seems much simpler to conclude that Abraham is stating the truth rather than 
offering what would be a rather transparent lie; after all, for Turner, it is YHWH who 
widened the land of the promise to include Sodom in Gen. 13: 14: Should not the deity, 
therefore, know who is Abraham's heir? Davies's view of Eliezer's origins does not 
actually require that Lot still be Abraham's heir at all because the mention of 'Eliezer' 
could just as easily be seen-as it traditionally has been-as Abraham's complaint that 
he has no heir, but a captured slave. It is better to see Lot as having separated himself 
from the promise through his choice of Sodom as a place to dwell outside the land of 
Canaan. That this is a bad choice is emphasised by the narrator's comment about the 
sin and destruction of the cities of the plain (13: 10, 13). In Lot's absence, the promise 
of descendants is repeated to Abraham (13: 16), emphasising that the promise itself is 
not rendered null and void by Abraham's lack of a familial descendant. 
When Lot is captured by the four kings who ransack the cities of the plain, 
Abraham shows considerable concern and fights to get his kinsman back, defeating the 
kings and recovering all that they had plundered (14: 1-16). Although Turner sees this 
as evidence that Lot is still possibly Abraham's heir, such a conclusion begs the 
question, are only kinsmen who are heirs to be saved? Turner suggests that this is 
indeed the case, arguing that Abraham's decision to sacrifice Sarah in Genesis 12 
indicates that he would have been unlikely to risk his life for Lot in Genesis 14 
(1990a:68-69). But there is a world of difference between a straight fight between 
Abraham's armed men and the raiding kings and his time as a sojourner in Egypt; the 
former is a much stronger position for Abraham and he is therefore likely to fulfil his 
familial obligations. Later in Genesis 20, again under pressure but this time in the 
Negev, Abraham will repeat his earlier choice to forsake his wife Sarah and 110W the 
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promise ofa son through her (Gen. 17:17; 18:10-14), take comfort in the son he has 
gained in the meantime, Ishmael (Genesis 16), and leave her to her fate, regardless of 
YHWH's wishes. It is worth noting that Turner's position suffers from its 
consistently negative picture of Abraham; rather the patriarch's character IS 
inconsistent in these narratives, being praiseworthy in one scene (e.g., Genesis 13, 15, 
22) and blameworthy in another (e.g., Genesis 12, 17, 20). 
In Genesis 15 Abraham responds to a further re-affirmation of the promise by 
complaining that his heir is (now) a slave, a 'son of his house', whom I will follow the 
majority of commentators in designating as 'Eliezer of Damascus' (15 :2). In response, 
YHWH promises Abraham an heir from his own body, but does not yet reveal that the 
child will be born to Sarah. 1l4 In Genesis 16, Abraham, in the light of Sarah's 
barrenness, has a son, Ishmael, by his wife Sarah's servant, Hagar. Sarah's jealousy 
leads to Hagar being banished, but YHWH bids her return, and so Abraham continues 
to live with his wife but with Hagar's son, Ishmael, as his heir. Some thirteen years 
later, however, YHWH informs Abraham that the heir to the promise will not be 
Ishmael, but rather the son of Sarah (17: 16). Abraham, though, is happy with his son, 
Ishmael, and since he also knows of Sarah's life-long barrenness and her now advanced 
age, he responds first with disbelieving laughter (1 7: 1 7), 115 and then by seeking God's 
blessing for Ishmael (17: 18). Though this is granted, the announcement that the 
promise will be fulfilled through a son born to Sarah stands (17: 19-21). At the 
beginning of Genesis 18, Lot is in Sodom and Abraham is at the oaks of Mamre in 
114 Steinmetz plausibly suggests that it was 'Lot's departure [which] initiated Abraham's 
quest for a son' (1991 :69). 
11.5 Some have preferred to see this verse as indicating Abraham's joy at YHWH' s promise of 
a son to Sarah (e.g., Keil-Delitzsch, 1980:229; Calvin, 1965:459-60: Luther. 1961:153-5.t: Speiser. 
1964: 125). sometimes citing as support the lack of censure from YHWH at what would be words of 
disbelief compared with the deity's response to Sarah's laughter in 18:15 (Hamilton. 1990:.t77). 
But I shall argue that it is also possible to see the response of 18: 15 as being aimed at both 
Sarah and Abraham. and consider Abraham's subsequent words as more likely indicating the kind of 
disbelief which the patriarch will show in offering Sarah to Abimelech in Genesis 20 (following. e.g .. 
Jeansonne, 1990:21-22: Steinmetz. 1991:79; Westermann, 1985:268: Wenham. I994:25-2(11. Once it 
has been recognised that the patriarch is not a monolithic moral giant. such contrary behaviour is 
clearly the norm in his relationship with YHWH (compare high points like Genesis D. 15 and 22 
with lows like Genesis 12 and 20). 
15, 
Canaan with his present heir Ishmael, awaiting-though without any real 
expectation-Sarah's son. 
E. Presupposed Knowledge (Later Mosaic Religion, Hebrew, Geography, etc.) 
Moberly has argued that Genesis 12-50 contains stories of the Patriarchs as 
told from the perspective of what he terms 'Mosaic Yahwism', the post-Sinai religion 
of Israel, according to which YHWH was unknown by that name to the patriarchs 
(1992a:67-78). These chapters are bracketed by the thoroughly Yahwistic Genesis I-
II (so Moberly, 1992a:69, 167) and the ensuing Mosaic Pentateuchal story, and 
contain narrative features which can only be correctly interpreted by the canonical 
reader when read with some knowledge of the (canonically) later position of Mosaic 
Yahwism. The most obvious subsection of knowledge presupposed is that of a 
detailed knowledge of the biblical language, though this knowledge must be carefully 
balanced against the fact that many of the occurrences of particular words in such as 
Genesis 18-19 will be, canonically, the very first. Additional presupposed knowledge 
outlined by Moberly includes: 
1) the attribution of knowledge of the divine name, ;";'''1, to the 
Patriarchal era in direct contradiction of Exodus 3 and 6 (cf 15: 7, 
28: 13; but especially the explicit statement of 4:26 that 'people 
began to call upon the name ofYHWH', 1992a:38-39; cf 
1992a:70-78).116 
2) a reference to the keeping of the Law by Abraham (Gen. 26:5; 
1992a: 136; cf also 143-45). 
116 Seitz has recently argued, against Moberly, that the name YHWH was known to the 
patriarchs, but with the fullness of its meaning only being revealed to Moses in Exodus 3 and 6 
(1998:229-47). Although Seitz may. arguably, have offered a more 'canonical' solution to this 
problem than Moberly, it is noticeable that he has not chosen to argue that the place in Genesis 1 .. 
called Dan was actually called that at the time. Indeed, according to Judg. 18:27, it was called Laish 
until it was sacked and rebuilt by the Danites during the conquest. The tendency of the tex1 identified 
by Moberly seems real enough and his argument still seems cogent in terms of the origins of the tex1. 
But Seitz may have discovered the canonical meaning of the text in what is essentially a sidc-efTect of 
this particular way of updating the tcx1. 
IS .. 
3) the use of place names which have yet to be founded (e.g., Dan in 
14:14~ cf Judg. 18:29~ and Bethel in 12:8~ cf 28:19~ 35:6~ 
1992a:77-78). 
These textual features should be taken to indicate a clarification of the text for 
a later audience through the use of titles, concepts, and geographical locations 
contemporaneous with that audience: YHWH being used in Genesis 12-50 to 
emphasise the oneness of the Patriarchal and the Mosaic deities, the concept of 
keeping the law to give the author's judgement that Abraham had walked on the way 
of the LORD, and the location of geographical action to simply render the action clear 
on the stage of the land of Israel. This emphatically does not mean, however, that any 
differences between Patriarchal religion and Mosaic Yahwism should be ironed out, 
but rather that certain conclusions which might be gained from a sequential narrative 
reading must be seen as erroneous: Abraham did not actually know the 
tetragrammaton, keep the Mosaic Law fully, or ever go to Dan (only to the place 
where it would later be located). As the narrative progresses, the canonical reader 
needs to be sensitive to the role of Yahwism as part of the spectacles through which 
the Patriarchal narratives are interpreted. 
F. Narrative Asides and the Interpretation of Genesis 18-19 
There are two significant asides offered in Genesis 13: first, the reader is told 
that Lot is moving to Sodom before it had been destroyed by the Lord (v. 10). 
Second, the information that the men of Sodom were wicked and great sinners against 
the LORD is supplied (v. 13). With this knowledge in mind, the reader approaches the 
Sodom narrative knowing that YHWH destroys the city at some future point, 
presumably because of the evil of its people. But if the narrative is to be taken 
seriously as narrative, the reader cannot simply impose this information upon the 
characters within the narrative. Thus the deity and Abraham do not yet know that 
Sodom is to be destroyed and YHWH's stated intention to investigate is made in all 
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seriousness; it is common to find commentators assuming that YHWH has already 
decided to destroy Sodom before even speaking to Abraham on the subject (cf e.g., 
Westermann's 'God now communicates to Abraham [in vv 20-21] the decision that he 
has made to destroy [vv 17-19]', 1985 :289). Since Abraham has already met the King 
of Sodom (14: 21-4), however, the canonical reader is able to assume that he has 
already met the men of Sodom and is-at the very least-aware of their sin. This will 
prove significant in explaining Abraham's actions in Gen. 18:23-33. My brief sketch of 
narrative presuppositions complete, I now tum to the diachronic study of Genesis 18-
19. 
III. Diachronic Approaches to the Sodom Narrative: H. Gunkel's Genesis as 
Exemplar 
A. Diachronic Studies as a Preliminary to Exegesis 
It is tempting to suggest that in recent years diachronic studies have proved 
unfashionable, but this could only be offered as a very qualified conclusion; many are 
still working on these approaches to Genesis, the Pentateuch, the Deuteronomistic 
History, and indeed any part of the Old Testament. Nevertheless, partly as a result of 
the move towards holistic varieties of literary study and partly because of a loss of 
confidence in the conclusions of years of source, form and redaction-critical study, 
there has been a considerable move by scholars away from these methodologies. It is, 
therefore, certainly true to say that these approaches no longer hold the well-nigh 
undisputed sway over scholarship which they held around the second half of the 
nineteenth century. 
Nevertheless, to avoid the confusion of dealing with every diachronic study of 
Genesis 18-19-of which there remain a vast number, with no doubt still more in 
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production 117_1 have decided to explain in detail here the results of a single 
diachronic study with the intention of testing Provan's claim that tensions recovered in 
such a project may usefully illuminate the canonical text. The study in use is perhaps 
the culmination of the nineteenth century's interest in the diachronic, the highly 
influential commentary on Genesis by Gunkel, first published in 1901 (although other 
important interpretations of this text considered in Chapters 5 and 6 are also based 
upon diachronic studies, e.g., von Rad and Ben Zvi, their diachronic aspects will 
remain in the background and not be treated systematically). 
Often credited with being the father of the form critical method, Gunkel wrote 
his commentary against a background of source critical studies which had sought to 
divide the book of Genesis into a variety of written historical sources (1, E, D, and P 
being instantly familiar to even the most modern student of the Pentateuch). For 
Gunkel, however, Genesis had a much more complex and ancient tradition history. In 
the first chapter of his commentary, he outlines his overarching view of the text as 
'eine Sammlung von Sagen', and proceeds to examine each section of the narrative in 
this light, but always referring back to the claims of the source critics. The value of 
Gunkel's evidence varies considerably and certainly highlights the difficulties of form 
and source criticism methodologies. The point here, however, is to note which aspects 
of the text Gunkel found significant-that they may be questionable even by the rules 
of his own diachronic approach is not in itself of concern here. His division of Genesis 
18-19 into five sections-(a) 18: 1-16aa; (b) 18: 16ab-33; (c) 19: 1-28; (d) 19:30-38; (e) 
19:29-will be followed here. 
117 Recent diachronic studies which focus on these chapters include: Van Sctcrs, 1975; 
Schmidt. 1976~ Haag. 1981; Rudin-O'Brasky. 1982; Schweitzer, 1984: Westermann, 1985; Loader. 
1990. 
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B. 'The Visit to Abraham and the Gift of a Son' (18: 1-16aa) 
One of the most significant textual features for Gunkel's diachronic account of 
this section of the Sodom narrative (1997: 192-200) is the alternation which occurs 
between singular and plural verbs and suffixes in references to the three men in this 
opening section (but also in 18: 16b-19:28). Source critical scholars such as 
Kraetzschmar (1897) had attempted to deal with this feature of the text by dividing the 
narrative into two versions, a 'Yahwist' text (singular) and a 'three men' text (plural). 
Gunkel objects to this division on the grounds that the present story was a 'unified, 
well organised whole' ~ rather he describes the narrative using such terms as 'artful', 
'fine detail', 'wonderful', even 'superb'. He argues that the alternation between 
singular and plural is haphazard, rejecting all attempts to read the text as coherent on 
this point. Earlier scholars who had argued that one of the three men was their leader 
and the singular person addressed by Abraham in 18: 3 were incorrect, according to 
Gunkel~ if one was leader, why did all three accept the invitation in v. 5b? Equally, 
those who had argued that all three represented the deity were judged wrong because, 
for Gunkel, the ancient Israelites could not have held such a tripartite conception of the 
divine. Given these conclusions, Gunkel opts to see the text as a legend (Sage) which 
had been subsequently redacted, and is left with two options~ either the singular was 
the original and the plural the work of a redactor (as argued by Fripp, 1892) or the 
plural was the original with the singular as redaction. Because of his view of the 
history of religions as an evolutionary process, the latter is his preferred option; 
polytheism is seen as older than monotheism and so as the more likely background for 
the original version of the legend, the visit of three gods to test an individual who 
proves through his hospitality his worthiness to be given the gift of a son. 
Within this basic understanding of the text as a polytheistic legend subsequently 
redacted by monotheists, Gunkel utilises certain features of the text to define the pre-
and post-history of the legend. The antiquity of the basic layer of the originally 
polytheistic Israelite legend in which the three men/gods visit Abraham is demonstrated 
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by several textual features: first, the three gods are not yet omnipotent, having to ask 
Sarah's whereabouts. Second, the invitation to the men to lie down to eat is contrasted 
with the prophet Amos's comment that this style of eating was a new fashion in Israel 
(Amos 6:4), farmers previously having sat to eat (cf. Gen. 27: 19~ Judg. 19:6~ 1 Sam. 
20:5~ 1 Kgs 13:20). Third, the plural trees at Mamre in v. la (and in Gen. 13: 18 and 
14: 13) are contrasted with the single tree mentioned by Abraham in v. 4, Gunkel 
noting the existence of a late tradition of several trees and arguing that the pluralising 
is the result of later redaction. Indeed the superscription of v. 1 a as a whole is 
regarded as a late addition. 
Gunkel does not, however, see the legend as a creation of the Israelites 
themselves, but rather as a Hebrew appropriation of an 'ancient oriental narrative'. 
Primary evidence here is not textual, but the existence of a Greek parallel in which 
Zeus, Apollo, and Poseidon visit Hyrieus, an old Boeotian man, and grant him his wish 
of a son. Gunkel postulates an underlying legend of which the Greek and Hebrew are 
recensions. The origins of the Hebrew legend lay in the setting of the visit at Hebron, 
and are the result of a need to justify cultic sacrifice in that place~ since Abraham fed 
Israel's deity there, the sacrificial table should naturally be placed there. But this 
parallel leads Gunkel to the conclusion that the legend was unaware of any altar 
already built by Abraham at Hebron and, with his view that the text also shows no 
awareness of any previous promise of a son, contributes to his belief that the Israelite 
legend is independent of the Abraham narratives in Genesis 12-17. 
Two additional elements of the 'text' of the legend also impact upon its 
relationship to the following narratives: first, Gunkel sees no evidence in the text that 
Abraham had ever recognised his visitors, and this he contrasts sharply with Abraham 
being fully aware of YHWH's identity in w. 16ab-33. Second, he notes that the 
promise to return in w. 10a and 14 was not fulfilled in later chapters of Genesis 
(ignoring the return of YHWH to Sarah in Gen. 21: 1) and surmises that the legend had 
once continued with an account of the return of the men after Sarah had born a son in 
which Abraham did recognise their deity. Gunkel concludes that the Hebrew legend 
was once completely independent (and much longer). 
Later, however, this legend was absorbed into the Patriarchal narratives, and a 
number of redactions made. Already mentioned is the 'haphazard' addition of singular 
forms in relation to the three men, which appear to lead in the direction of a 
monotheistic view of the divine. The occurrence ofYHWH in the 'late' superscription 
in v. 1 a, and in vv. 13 and 14 lead Gunkel to characterise the final narrative of Genesis 
18: 1-16aa (and indeed virtually all of 18: 1-19:38) as largely the product of a redactor, 
J (the first 'Yahwist'). 
The final placement of Gen. 18: 16aa, however, must have taken place after the 
latest layers of the Pentateuchal narrative (which Gunkel designates P following the 
source critics) were written. (Gunkel argues that the Pentateuch reached its final form 
some time after Ezra but before the Samaritan schism.) P leaves the text of 18: 1-16aa 
largely untouched except for one notable gloss. In v. 6 Sarah is told to make food 
using flour (n~~), fine flour (n?'O). But Gunkel points out that the latter term does not 
occur in the oldest texts. Rather it occurs in P and in Chronicles as the flour used for 
sacrifice. He proposes that later readers of the text objected to Abraham only offering 
n~~ to his God, and emended the text so that Abraham would offer n?'o, fine flour, in 
line with their own practices. 
The main points of tension and ambiguity noted by Gunkel in 18: 1-16aa can be 
summarised as the following: 
1) Singular/plural verbs and suffixes and the three menIYHWH (also in 
next two sections on 18:16b-33 and 19:1-28) 
2) Plural trees (18: 1 a) and a single tree (18:4) 
3) Promised return of men (18: 10, 14) not fulfilled 
4) Lack of recognition of deity by Abraham contrasted with 
recognition in 18: 16b-33 
160 
C. 'Abraham-Hebron Legend to the Lot-Sodom Narrative' (18: 16ab-33) 
The remainder of Genesis 18 Gunkel sees as effecting a transition between the 
legend of the visit in 18:1-16aa and the legend of the destruction of a city, underlying 
Gen. 19: 1-28 (1997:200-205). This transition form therefore came about as the result 
of the work of the redactor J whom Gunkel believes to have created the Abraham 
cycle. But the transitional elements of 1's work do not include all of the text as it 
stands. Gunkel designates only vv. 16ab,b, 20-22a and 33b as original to J as they 
stand, being 1's adaptation of an earlier text through the addition of the singular (v. 21) 
and YHWH (v. 20). It is important to note that this transition does not assume that 
YHWH has already decided to destroy Sodom, but only that the deity intends to 
investigate the outcry against that city (the mention of Gomorra in v. 20 Gunkel 
dismisses as a later accretion). In this 'original' J link, YHWH is demonstrating his 
confidence in Abraham by revealing his plans to the patriarch. 
Following Wellhausen, Gunkel treats the remnants of this section of the Sodom 
narrative as two later insertions into 1's text. The first addition was the so-called 
divine soliloquy in vv. 17-19, six reasons being given for this conclusion: first, the 
diction of the passage is somewhat different, and recalls for Gunkel the generalities of 
the Deuteronomist. Second, in vv 17-19, the deity has already decided to destroy the 
city, according to Gunkel, contradicting vv. 20-21 and indicating that the interpolating 
hand had read the original only cursorily. Third, the general incompetence of the writer 
of vv. 17-19 is confirmed for Gunkel by YHWH's use of the third person when 
uttering a soliloquy in v. 19. Fourth, in contrast to the conditional nature of the 
promise in vv. 17-19, the older material reflects a period when the deity was the 
national deity without condition. Fifth, vv. 17-19 allude to the promise of Gen. 12: 1-3, 
a point which Gunkel describes here as being in contrast to the earlier Hebrew legend 
of 18: 1-16aa which does not know of any such promise. Sixth, in contrast to 1's 
account in which the deity is not recognised, these verses envisage YHWH talking 
openly to Abraham, and full recognition of the deity on the part of the patriarch. 
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The remainder of the text contains the dialogue between YHWH and Abraham 
(vv. 22b-33a), and is seen by Gunkel as a late insertion dealing with a specific abstract 
problem, that of how a minority of individuals may avert the fate of the godless. 
Evidence for this conclusion includes: first, there is considerable confusion between the 
men and YHWH: in v. 22a the three men leave, contradicting 22b where YHWH 
remains. Similarly, in v. 20 it is the three men who are to go to Sodom but in IS: 22b-
33 it is YHWH who is to go. But according to 19: 1, only the two angels go to 
Sodom, YHWH having stayed to talk with Abraham (v. 22b), after which the deity 
leaves (v. 33a), but not for Sodom (cf 19: 1 )-this therefore cannot be a unified text, 
according to Gunkel. Second, IS:22b-33 assumes the destruction of Sod om as IS:17-
19 but contra vv. 20-21. Third, in IS:22b-33 Abraham clearly recognises YHWH 
while in vv. 20-21 the deity remains unknown (as IS:I-16aa). Fourth, the concept of 
God involved is very different to that in IS: 1-16aa. There YHWH eats, but here he is 
judge of the whole world. Fifth, Gunkel thinks that the appeal for Sodom would have 
made no sense to an ancient mentality. Further indications of a late provenance include 
the prevalence of abstract thoughts over actions in this text. In fact, Gunkel sees this 
text as concerned with the concept of individualism, a type of thought which, in 
Gunkel's day, was seen as arising only in the post-exilic period, much later than 1. In 
conclusion, Gen. IS: 16ab-33 had three stages of growth: an original transitional 
section written by J, the incorporation of vv. 17-19 by a later, and careless, writer, and 
finally, the addition of the dialogue ofvv 22b-33a (Gunkel does not actually specify an 
author here, merely noting similarities with the thought of Jeremiah IS and Ezekiel 14 
and IS. But his belief that Lot is here saved for his own righteousness and his later 
designation of 19:29 as the product of a P who believed that Lot was saved for 
Abraham's sake alone indicates that the author of this section was thought to pre-date 
P). 
The main points of tension and ambiguity noted by Gunkel in 18: 16b-33 can be 
summarised as the following: 
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1) Men / YHWH confusion over staying / leaving and visiting Sodom / 
not visiting Sodom (as 18:1-16aa and 19:1-28) 
2) Investigation of Sodom (18 :20-21) / Destruction of Sodom (18: 17-
19, 22b-33) 
3) 3rd person used in soliloquy (18:17-19) 
4) Conditional promise (18: 17-19) / unconditional relationship with 
national deity (e.g., 18:1-16aa) 
5) Recognition ofYHWH (18:22b-33) / non-recognition (18:1-16aa, 
20-21) 
6) YHWH eats (18:8) / YHWHjudge of whole world (18:25) 
7) Abstract thoughts (18:22b-33) / action of narrative genre 
D. 'Sodom's Destruction and Lot's Deliverance' (19:1-28) 
The story of the destruction of Sodom and the salvation of Lot (seen here as 
righteous) has, according to Gunkel, suffered the same fate as the legend which 
underlies Gen. 18:1-16aa~ it now exists in an expanded and redacted form (1997:205-
15). The principal addition to the text as it once stood is the material relating to Zoar 
in vv. 17-22, seen as an 'outgrowth on the trunk of the old legend' (v. 23b which also 
mentions Zoar was also an late addition by this redactor). This passage is deemed 
secondary because it interrupts the cohesion of dawn in v. 15 and the sunrise in v. 23, 
because Lot's speech is considered too long to be part of the fast talking legend genre, 
and because Lot's motivation for eventually leaving Zoar is unclear. The theme of 
'don't look back' which dominates this passage also contributes to Gunkel's decision 
to see the story of Lot's wife as an addition, a decision which also notes the 
grammatical difficulties left by the unclear referent in 19:26 ('his wife'). 
The earlier material in 19: 1-16 also contained a number of features which draw 
Gunkel's attention. Overall, Gunkel considers the Hebrew legend (which he believes 
has grown out of some pre-Israelite legend of the destruction of a city) as a having a 
beautiful, clear structure. This artistic unity is important because once again the 
number and designation of the men who come to visit the city is of some importance. 
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Gunkel repeats his argument of Gen. 18: 1-16aa that the original legend contained three 
men (once deities), and that the text was subsequently amended by the later alteration 
of 'men' to 'angels' in vv. 1 and 15. Similarly, he sees the use of singular forms in \'V. 
17-22 as a problem ameliorated by their haphazard use ('no guiding principle'). These 
features lead him to again reject the two version theory resulting from the source 
criticism of Kraetzschmar (1897). A number of small glosses are also noted as 
additions to the legend material; 'men of Sodom' in v. 4; 'against Lot' in v. 9a; and 
most importantly 'and Gomorra', a feature which Gunkel sees as an attempt at 
harmonisation with a different tradition, but which obscures the fact that in the legend 
underlying vv. 1-16, only Sodom is in view; if Lot leaves the city he is safe, the idea of 
having to leave the valley being a later addition connected with the Zoar tradition of 
vv. 17-22. 
The story of Lot and Zoar in vv. 17-22 are seen by Gunkel as being quite 
ancient. The words, 'I am unable', Gunkel considers unlikely to have been written by 
the Yahwistic writer, and so these verses were added to the Sodom legend at an early 
date. Originally, they would have utilised plural forms for the men throughout. In 
considering the provenance of the Zoar legend, Gunkel assumes that following the 
natural disaster which had given rise to the Hebrew version of the destruction legend, 
Israel had seen a spot which had escaped destruction; the story of Zoar is thus a 
geological legend, with an etymological component explaining the origins of the name 
Zoar as small. The death of Lot's wife in v. 26 is designated a late geological legend 
which must have explained some phenomenon by the shores of the Dead Sea. 
In vv. 27-28, Abraham returns to the place where he had previously looked out 
over Sodom. These two verses Gunkel sees as largely originating from the hand of the 
'poet of the Abraham-Lot cycle', J, concluding the transitions between the Abraham-
Hebron and Lot-Sodom legends found in Gen. 18: 16ab, 20-22a, 33b. V. 27b, 
however, is a later addition because it assumes the existence of Gen. 18:22b-33a. Also 
attributed to the hand of J are the singular forms used in relation to the two men. 
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The main points of tension and ambiguity noted by Gunkel in 19: 1-28 can be 
summarised as the following: 
1) Tension between YHWH, two angels, three men (as 18: 1-16aa and 
18: 16ab-33) 
2) The extended gap between 'dawn' in 19: 15 and 'sunrise' in 19: 23 
3) The slowness of the speech in 19: 17-22, 23b (and dominating theme 
of 'don't look back') / fast action of 19:1-16. 
4) Lack of motivation for Lot's departure from Zoar (cf. 19:30) 
5) Leaving of city / leaving of valley (inclusion of gloss term 
'Gomorra' and Zoar narrative of 17-22, 23b) 
E. 'Lot's Daughters' (19:30-38) 
The fourth section of Gunkel's Sodom narrative contains an account of the 
origins of Moab and Ammon through the incestuous sexual relationships between Lot 
and his two daughters (1997:216-18). Gunkel describes the text as containing an artful 
account in epic style, and designated it an independent ethnological legend~ v. 30a 
belonged to the Zoar addition of 17-22, but v 30b belonged to the original account of 
vv. 31-38. He notes, however, that the naming of the sons in a fashion which 
proclaims their incestuous origin seems to indicate pride in the actions of the daughters 
rather than condemnation (though he seems also to think that Lot is being exonerated 
by the text). He therefore suggests that the legend was Moabite in origin, and had 
reached its present place largely unaltered at the hands of the compiler of the Abraham 
cycle. 
The main point of ambiguity noted by Gunkel in 19:30-38 can be summarised 
as the following: 
1) Is the dominant note of the story of incestuous relationship one of 
pride or shame? 
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F. YHWH's Remembrance of Abraham and the Salvation of Lot (19:29) 
The final section of Gunkel's diachronic account of the Sodom narrative 
contains a single verse, 19:29 (1997:258-59). For terminological reasons (notable 
,~~;:t "J~as a designation of Lot's dwelling place only here and in P's 13: 12ba), this 
verse is linked with 13:6, llb, 13a,ba under the heading of the salvation and 
deliverance of Lot and attributed to P, who believed that Lot was saved, not because 
of his own righteousness or Abraham's argument, but because of Abraham alone. 
The main point to note here is: 
1) ,~~;:t "J~ alongside the (usual) Sodom and (the later addition) 
Gomorra 
But since, as I have already noted, I will be considering the terms Sodom, Sodom and 
Gomorra, and the cities of the plain as essentially synonymous in narrative terms, 
Gunkel's position here can already be disregarded as unimportant. 
With the completion of the above discussions of relevant narrative 
presuppositions drawn from Genesis 1-17 and the insights of diachronic studies of the 
text of Genesis 18-19 itself, it is now time to tum to exegesis of the Sodom narrative 
itself. 
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Chapter 5 
A Canonical Exegesis of the 'Sodom Narrative', Part 1: Genesis 18 
I. The Reception and Recognition of the Visitor(s) to Abraham (18:1-8) 
A. Abraham's Encounter 
Genesis 18 begins with a threeway encounter between this canonical reader, 
YHWH, and an individual male designated first 'him', then 'he'. The niphal of ;,~, 
often indicates the deity's revealing of himself to humanity (cf. Gen. 12:7; 22: 14; 35: 1, 
9; 48:3; Exod. 3:2; 6:3; 16:10; Lev. 9:4,6,23; 16:2; Num. 14:10,14; 16:19; 17:7; 
20:6; Judg. 6: 13; 13: 3, 21; 1 Sam. 3 :21; 2 Sam. 22: 11; 1 Kgs 3 :5; 9:2; 11 :9; Isa. 60:2; 
Jer. 31 :3; 2 Chron. 1 :7; 3: 1), and here that revelation is both to the unknown 'him' and 
the reader. The identity of the one to whom YHWH appears in v. 1 is not specified 
until v. 6, but has its grammatical antecedent in the figure of Abraham in 17:26. This 
feature, along with YHWH's reference to there being roughly the same time period 
before the birth of Sarah's son in both 17:21 (n'JQ~iJ ;':l}t~.) and in 18:10, 14 
(;'1~r:r n¥.~), indicates a temporal proximity between these two narratives (contrast the 
thirteen years between Genesis 16 and 17). This proximity links the 'appearance' of 
YHWH in 18: 1 to the sealing of the covenant with Abraham through circumcision in 
17:24-27 (cf. Keil-Delitzsch's 'shortly afterwards', 1980:228). The reference to his 
'V·~ and its geographical location, ~J~~ "~."tt (cf. Gen. 13: 18), serves to position 
Abraham as the one who has, unlike his nephew Lot (13: 11), remained within the land 
of Canaan and received YHWH's covenant. The altar built by Abraham at Mamre 
long before (13: 8) is an indicator of the ongoing presence of YHWH with the 
patriarch, foreshadowing the role of the later tent of meeting (e.g., Numbers 27) and 
the Jerusalem Temple (e.g., 1 Kings 6-8) in the lives of his descendants (so Gossai, 
1995:39). 
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The reader finds Abraham seated in the entrance to his tent 'in the heat of the 
day' (or perhaps at 'noon'; cf 2 Sam. 4:5). H. Gossai notes that this was the time of 
the day for a pleasant stroll in the Garden of Eden (1995:67; citing Gen. 3:8), but 
Mamre is certainly not Eden. 1. Morgenstern, however, is at the opposite extreme 
when he describes the scene as taking place 'just at noon, when the sun is hottest and 
in Palestine, beats down cruelly upon the head of the venturesome traveller, and 
consumes his energy and vitality (1965:116). In the Judean mountains, noon is neither 
paradise nor inferno, but rather is typically Mediterranean with work beginning early 
and finishing late with a substantial break at midday. Abraham's morning is finished 
and he is taking his 'siesta' (Wenham, 1994:45) when he looks up and 'behold', he 
sees three men standing before him (18:2). 
B. Encountering the One and the Three 
Who exactly are these three 'men' and how are they to be related to the 
announced appearance of YHWH in v. I? While it is true that dealing with this tension 
occupied much of Gunkel's diachronic study, it is also true that the tension is one of 
the most obvious in Genesis 18-19. Gunkel's answer-to basically conclude that the 
use of the singular and plural in the final text is the result of no coherent rationale and 
therefore meaningless (cf also Skinner's acceptance throughout of the pluralising 
Samaritan tradition, 1910:300)-is not one which this reader can follow. In producing 
a truly canonical reading, the following textual features require consideration and must 
be accounted for (Gunkel's tensions led to splitting the text, but here they will 
probably lead to a reading which can result only from the contradictory placement of 
these details in their canonical form): 
1) Abraham's use of a singular verb and two second person singular 
suffixes (11:tll, "J~D, '9'~.~P.f) in 18: 3 before a change to plural 
forms in 18:4-9. 
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2) The pointing of the consonants '\J'~ in 18:3 (rendered as '\J;'~ by 
the MT). . 
3) The change from plural (18:9) to singular speech by the visitors 
(18:10). 
4) The presence ofYHWH in 18: 11 (and presumably in 18: 10). 
5) The departure of the men for Sodom (18: 16) and YHWH's 
continuing to stand with Abraham (18: 22). 
6) YHWH's stated intention to go down to Sodom to investigate 
personally (18 :21). 
7) The arrival of two men/angels in Sodom (19:1). 
8) Lot's plural address to the men in 19:2 (in contrast to Abraham in 
18:3). 
9) The angels's statement that they will destroy Sodom and that 
YHWH has sent them to destroy it (19: 13) but it is YHWH who 
carries out the destruction (19:24). 
10) The singular voice which speaks to Lot in 19: 17, 21, following the 
plural activities of the two angels in 19: 1-16. 
11) Lot's response to the individual voice by addressing God in 19: 18-
20. 
12) The MT's pointing indicating Lot's use of '\J;'~ in 19: 18 in contrast 
to "~,~ in 19:2. 
One possible way of reconciling the seemmg contradictions between these 
aspects of the text is that of interpreting them in such a way as to see a scrupulous 
separation between YHWH and the three men. In the mixture of Jewish traditions 
contained in L. Ginzberg's Legends of the Jews (1947), YHWH visits Abraham as he 
is recovering from his circumcision, but shortly afterwards three angels, Michael, 
Gabriel, and Raphael, appear. Seeing Abraham binding his wound, the angels depart 
but Abraham, after begging YHWH to stay, runs after them, believing them to be 
human travellers. He addresses the middle angel, Michael, who is the most important 
of the three and then invites them all to eat. The angels ask for Sarah before one of 
them, Michael, announces that she will bear a son. After Sarah laughs, it is YHWH 
who now speaks and asks if anything is too hard for him before rebuking her. The 
angels then depart, leaving YHWH to debate with Abraham-one, Michael, to heaven, 
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having completed his errand to Abraham (angels only have one task at a time), and two 
to Sodom, one to save Lot (Raphael) and one to destroy the city (Gabriel). It is 
Raphael who takes Lot from Sodom and then spares Zoar (1947:240-45). At no point 
is YHWH confused with the three men/angels, but intriguing as this interpretation is, it 
seems clear that the text is being used to demonstrate a relationship between God and 
the angels which already exists within the mind of the exegete and involves their 
complete separation; too much work is being done to tame the narrative for this 
canonical reader to accept this tradition, and it will be passed over as a serious option. 
An alternative reading is that offered by GJ . Wenham, who considers YHWH 
to either be or to be represented by only one of the three men (1994: 51; cf. also Bowie 
1952:616; Keil-Delitzsch, 1980:228; Speiser, 1964:129-31).118 For Wenham, 
Abraham's use of singular forms in v. 3 is understood as an initial address to the 
foremost of the three visitors-their 'leader'-followed by plural forms of address 
which refer to all three men (1994:46); the MT's ":J:'~ is repointed as ,,~.,~ by Wenham 
on the grounds that Abraham has not yet recognised the deity. But it is with his 
comments upon the departure of the men for Sodom in v. 22 that Wenham explains his 
overall conception of the relationship between the three men and YHWH; namely, that 
it is 'two' men who depart for Sodom leaving one man, who alone 'is or represents' 
YHWH, to converse with Abraham (1994:51; cf. also R. Davidson, 1979:69). Noting 
that some (e.g., Gunkel) have chosen to see this confusion as the result of different 
traditions Wenham prefers to see it as deliberate, as expressing 'the difficulty of human 
comprehension of the divine word' (1994: 51); a phrasing which echoes the sensibilities 
of the canonical approach itself. He also suggests that the visit of the two angels to 
Sodom in YHWH's place probably indicates the narrative's assumption that YHWH 
118 In this category can also be placed the traditional Christian readings of this text in which 
Christ is seen as one of the three men (cf. e.g., Novation, De. Trin. 18; Hilary of Poitiers, De Trin. 
4.27-29: Justin Martyr, Dial. c. Tryph., 55; Origen, Hom. Gen. 4.2). A second tradition concentrated 
more on the three as the trinity (cf. e.g., Origen Cant. 2; Cyril of Alexandria, Contr. Jul. 1, Tertullian, 
Spiro Sanct. 1.6: Augustine, De Trin. 2.lO-Il), a reading which reflects a \"iew on YHWH and the 
three which will be treated shortly (cf. Thunberg, 1966:560-70; Loader, 1990:136-7). Von Rad notes 
that these readings have been 'universally abandoned' by modem exegesis (1961:201), though the 
accuracy of this claim may well depend upon how one defines the term, 'modern exegesis'. 
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'could not endure the presence of such sin' (1994:51 ).119 Wenham completes his 
interpretation with the following explanation of Lot's address to YHWH in 19: 18: 
Only one of the angels issues the commands [19: 17], and it is to him that 
Lot speaks .... As pointed, '\J:'~ is the proper way to address God ... , and 
Lot's subsequent intercession is directed to God [here then Wenham 
implies that the MT has interpreted correctly.] Whether the narrative is 
suggesting that the Lord has now rejoined the angels outside the city, or 
whether Lot is just being very polite, is very obscure. Could he really 
know who he was talking to in the gloom before sunrise? The mystery is 
probably deliberate (1994:58). 
Wenham's reluctance to see the two angels of 19: 1 as representatives of 
YHWH is problematic, however, and results in his being unable to account for some of 
the tensions within the narrative. For example, YHWH's claimed inability to visit 
Sodom because of the presence of sin does not fit well with his stated intention to go 
there personally (Gen. 18:21) nor with his personal investigation of the tower of Babel 
incident (Gen. 11: 1-9) and his face-to-face conversation with Cain (Gen. 4:9-15). But 
the most significant difficulty with Wenham's position occurs with his viewing Dilly 
one of the men as YHWH or as a representative of YHWH. Because of this exegetical 
decision, Wenham is forced to account for the sudden arrival of YHWH in 19: 18 by 
either a descent into textual obscurity or the creation of a gap-filling reappearance by 
the deity. Is the 'mystery' seen here by Wenham genuine or is it simply the inevitable 
consequence of his reading? 
It is interesting to note the response ofC.F. Keil and F. Delitzsch (who also see 
YHWH as only one of the three visitors) to what is essentially Wenham's quandary, 
the inexplicable reappearance of the deity. They note that what seems to occur in Gen. 
19: 18 is 'a re-appearance for which there is no evidence'. They conclude that the 'only 
119 A different way in which Wenham's position here could be justified would be to accept 
Bowie's statement that the author does not represent YHWH 'as following the angels to Sodom. an 
omission which was doubtless due to his horror at the thought that the Lord should have been 
subjected to the shocking insult recorded in vss. -l-9' (1952:626). But this option is also open to the 
criticisms which will result in my rejection of Wenham's overall account of the three men and 
YHWH. and so would not help his case. 
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supposition that remams, therefore, is that Lot recognised in the two angels a 
manifestation of God, and so addressed them (v. 18) as Adonai (my Lord), and that the 
angel who spoke addressed him as the messenger of Jehovah in the name of God, 
without its following from this, that Jehovah was present in the two angels' 
(1980:234). But, of course, it is then no longer clear what the difference is between 
the one figure who supposedly is or represents YHWH in Genesis 18, as both Keil-
Delitzsch and Wenham argue, and the two figures whom Keil-Delitzsch now see as 
representing a 'a manifestation of God' in Genesis 19. The fact that the words spoken 
are not comparable in content ('promise-dialogue' in Genesis 18; 'instruction' in 
Genesis 19) is only indicative of their narrative setting, and not of the actual presence 
of the deity. Keil-Delitzsch take Wenham's position to its logical conclusion, but 
problems remain. 
For 1. H. Sailhammer, the three men are all to be seen as mediating the presence 
ofYHWH to Abraham (1992:161-65; cf Driver, 1909:192, 196,200). When 'they' 
speak in 18:9 and 'he' (YHWH) speaks in 18: 10, Sailhammer suggests that 'one has 
the impression within the narrative as a whole that this "he" has spoken on behalf of 
the men and consequently, the men spoke for "him.'" Yet the three men all remain 
distinct from the deity because YHWH is not limited to speaking through them, even 
within this narrative (1992:168). When the three men leave for Sodom but YHWH 
remains with Abraham, Sailhammer concludes that this demonstrates that the 'narrative 
teaches that the LORD can speak to Abraham with or without the men' (1992:164). 
The two men who visit Sodom in 19: 1 are thus still representative of the YHWH who 
said that he would go and investigate Sodom and Gomorra (Gen. 18:21). But the 
problem of the missing man (three left Abraham but only two arrived in Sodom) haunts 
Sailhammer's reading and he eventually proposes a rather cumbersome solution, 
suggesting that, since YHWH has said he will go and investigate both Sodom and 
Gomorra, the third man went to the latter and ensured the justness of YHWH by 
investigating there (1992: 169). 
1 ... ., I .. 
As with that of Wenham, Sailhammer's proposal involves the creation of a 
considerable gap-filler to make sense of the narrative (the investigation carried out by 
the 'third man'). His invocation of Gomorra as a place needing investigation in order 
to ensure the justice of God seems of little interest to a narrative in which the city of 
Sodom forms the focal point; the terms 'Sodom', 'Sodom and Gomorra', 'cities of the 
valley', and 'all the valley', all seem essentially interchangeable. Sailhammer's reading 
is problematic, not because he sees the men as representative but distinct from YHWH, 
but because he makes the further move of seeing all three men depart from Abraham in 
18:22a, two to go to Sodom and one to Gomorra, with YHWH left behind to speak to 
Abraham without any man present. 
By taking a slightly different position, however, a less cumbersome-and 
therefore more convincing-reading, based upon that proposed by A. Dillmann 
(1892:266), may be adopted. With Sailhammer, it should be accepted that Abraham's 
three visitors represent YHWH in the situations and people they encounter. (That the 
men actually embody YHWH is unlikely because Gen. 19: 1 makes clear their angelic 
nature; here I shall consider them only to be representatives, who mediate the presence 
of YHWH.) The guests ask for Sarah (18:9), before one of the men-designated in 
Hebrew only as 'he'-speaks as an individual representative of but also 'as' YHWH 
and promises a son to Sarah (18: 10). Following Sarah's laughter, YHWH, in the 
person of that one man, rebukes her. All three rise to go to Sodom (18: 16), and we 
hear the thoughts ofYHWH (18:17-9) and his announcement to Abraham (18:20-21). 
But it is with the departure of the men to Sodom that Sailhammer's problematic 'third 
man' is encountered. Here, however, it should be asserted that Abraham in preventing 
YHWH from departing also detains one of the men as Wenham suggests (cf 
Westermann, 1985:290). In the ensuing discussion, it is this man 'as' YHWH before 
whom Abraham stands, and not a man who a/one of the three mediates the presence of 
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YHWH as Wenham's reading suggests.120 Two men thus leave for Sodom and their 
actions are also to be seen as those of representatives of YHWH. In this sense, 
therefore, the deity does go to Sodom (19: 1; cf. 18: 21 and contra Wenham), 
investigates the outcry-or rather receives confirmation about it (cf. 19: 4-11 )--and 
destroys the 'cities of the plain' (19: 13, 24-26). Sailhammer's concept of the 
interchangeability of voices is thus taken up fully here: the three, (any) one-or two-
of the three, and YHWH are all interchangeable in voice, but they are addressed by 
Abraham in singular terms if his emphasis is upon addressing YHWH or in plural terms 
if he is addressing the needs of the three men. 
In suggesting a similar position, S.R. Driver adds a further nuance in order to 
deal with the angels's statement in Gen. 19: 13 that it is YHWH who has sent them to 
Sodom. Reading the MT's 'J;'~ ('Lord') in both 18:3 and 19:18 as '~,~ ('my lords'), 
he concludes that 'Jehovah is not so distinctly present in either of the two angels in ch. 
19 as He [sic] is in at least one of the three in ch. 18[:10-15], (1909:200). Preferable, 
however, is a recognition of the significance of the ignorance of both Lot and the men 
of Sodom about the real identity of the visitors (Abraham's ignorance or lack of it will 
be dealt with shortly). In Gen. 19: 1, the narrative identifies the visitors as angels, but 
they are called 'men' by Lot (19:8) and the men of Sodom (19:5). Lot initially 
addresses the men with plural forms because he does not recognise them as 
representatives of YHWH (as the MT' s '~,~ recognises), and it is only following their 
subsequent actions and pronouncements that he eventually identifies and addresses 
them 'as' 'J;'~, as 'YHWH' in 19: 18. In 19: 13, the angels therefore speak as the 
'men' whom they appear to be in Lot's eyes, and it may be concluded that it is only to 
avoid prematurely declaring their identity to the one who must eventually come to 
identify them 'as' YHWH that they speak as they do; Lot's distance from YHWH, a 
recurrent theme of Genesis 13-19, accounts for the appearance of difference between 
120 Sailhammer's point that YHWH can speak to Abraham with or without the men is. 
therefore. without foundation here, though of course it can be easily supported elsewhere in the 
Abraham narratives (e.g., Gen. 12:1. 7; D:l·k 15:1; 17:1;2l:12~22:1,2.1L 15). 
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the men 'as' YHWH of Genesis 18 and 19. That the three men all represent YH\VH 
fully in the type of reading suggested by Dillmann seems best to account for the 
anomalies of the present text~ Gunkel's dismissal of this reading because of his view 
that it is alien to the ancient Israelite mind should-even if correct on the latter point-
be in turn rejected as irrelevant to a canonical view of the text. 
C. Abraham's Recognition ofYHWH 
The details which necessitate such a construction of the relationship between 
YHWH and the three men also impinge upon a further puzzle: at what point is 
Abraham aware that it is YHWH who is appearing to him? For Gunkel it is apparent 
that in vv. 1-16aa Abraham never recognises YHWH, but in 22b-33 he obviously does 
so. It is clearly not possible for a canonical reading to settle for Gunkel's diachronic 
view here and so the choice arises between an immediate recognition in v. 1 or a 
gradual one during vv. 1-16 or even later. 121 Put differently, whom does Abraham 
believe the single figure he addresses in v. 3 to be? 
The most common interpretation is that Abraham is initially ignorant of his 
guest's identity (e.g., Bowie, 1952:616, 619~ Driver, 1909:192~ Skinner, 1910:298-
300~ Morgenstern, 1965:117~ Westermann, 1985:277~ Davidson, 1979:63; Wenham, 
1994:45; Speiser, 1964:129). Gossai's comment that 'there is no indication ... that 
Abraham is aware of the identity of the strangers' is typical (1995:49). For these 
readers, Abraham only becomes gradually aware of the presence of YHWH. There is, 
however, no consensus as to when full recognition takes place. Is it when his visitors 
demonstrate an apparently miraculous knowledge of Sarah's name (in v. 9; e.g., 
Wenham, 1994:47), when YHWH promises a son to Sarah (in vv. 10-14; e.g., Skinner, 
1910:300-301; Dillman, 1892:268), perhaps gradually through each of the following 
121 It is also logically possible that Abraham was unsure about the identity of his visitors but 
suspected the presence of YHWH. However. in the absence of an explicit statement of suspicion it is 
hard to imagine what would count as evidence for this interpretation. 
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events (e.g., Driver's 'vv. 10,13,17-22,' 1909:192), or at some point unknown (e.g., 
Gossai, 1995:67)? 
Among reasons given by interpreters for concluding that Abraham does not 
recognise YHWH are the following. First, W.R. Bowie's suggestion that, 'Abraham 
has no reason to believe they are anything other than ordinary men' (1952: 616). 
Second, Driver's claim that Abraham would 'scarcely have presumed to offer food and 
drink to one whom he recognised as Jehovah', citing as support the refusal of the angel 
of YHWH to eat in Judg. 13: 16b (cf also Tob. 12: 19 which accounts for angelic 
'eating' as the product of a vision); Driver also comments that the subsequent words of 
Abraham in v. 5, "'after that ye shall pass on", shew [sic] that he regarded the three 
men as ordinary travellers' (1909: 192). Third, J. Skinner's insistence that 'the interest 
of the story turns largely on [Abraham's] ignorance of the real identity of his guests' 
(1910:299). Fourth, the invocation of Old Testament parallels involving ignorance ofa 
guest's true identity (especially e.g., Judg. 6:12-22; 13:2-23; cf Driver, 1909:192), or 
the use of ancient so-called parallel stories in Ovid (e.g., R. Davidson, 1979:63), or 
Ancient Near Eastern texts and even folk tales (for which Gunkel himself can be cited, 
1997: 192-3). A further factor which may have led some to this conclusion is the-
possibly subconscious-influence of the comment of Heb. 13:2 that some have 
entertained angels unawares upon interpreters of Genesis 18 (but explicitly mentioned 
in e.g., Bowie, 1952:616; Westermann, 1985:277; Wenham, 1994:65)}22 
The pointing of "J1K as ".r1~ in v. 3 by the MT is problematic for all such 
interpretations, however. As Wenham notes, the MT clearly suggests that Abraham 
recognises YHWH (1994:36; cf Waltke and O'Connor's conclusion that every 
occurrence in the Old Testament of "J;1~ signifies the divine appellation, 1990: 124). If 
it is concluded that Abraham does not recognise YHWH in v. 3, then clearly either the 
MT's interpretation of the consonantal text or the usual understanding of the MT itself 
122 Certainly commentators on the book of Hebrews often mention Genesis 18 as a example 
of the situation being described in 13:2 (cf. e.g .. Bruce. 1964:390-91: Wilson 1987:238: and Hewitt. 
1960:205). 
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must be rejected. 123 One example of the latter is to suggest, with Rashi (1900:70; 
explicitly) and Gossai (1995 :42~ implicitly), that the MT here intends the term to have 
a 'profane' referent rather than a 'divine' one, effectively rejecting Wenham' s (and 
Waltke-O'Connor's) view of the MT's usage of 'J:'~. But the more usual decision 
taken by commentators is to reject the pointing of the MT as either simply a 'mistake' 
(e.g., Skinner 1910:299-300), as incorrect (e.g., Wenham's 'the context suggests 
[,\~.,~] is more apt', 1994:36), or as being due to the MT's theologising tendency (e.g., 
Westermann, 1985:278). The exegete then interprets (and repoints) 'J'K as either the 
plural '~,~, 'my lords', or as the singular '\~',~, 'my lord'. Westermann notes that if 
'InK is read as the plural '~,~ then the singular forms of v. 3 should also be changed 
to plural forms- following the SP, and the position taken by Skinner (1910:300)-but 
prefers himself to read '~',~, my lord (1985 :278~ cf. also Wenham, 1994:36; Driver, 
1909: 192). Despite Childs's argument that the pointing is not a late imposition 
(1979:98), it is not in itself problematic for a canonical reading, committed to a 
consonantal text dated to around 100 CE, to alter the pointing. The real question, 
however, is whether or not such repointing is the required response to the text here. 
It is rarely recognised that the claim that Abraham only gradually becomes 
aware of the presence of YHWH is as lacking in explicit foundations as the claim that 
Abraham recognises YHWH immediately-there is no explicit statement of Abraham's 
recognition of YHWH anywhere within the narrative. Furthermore, 1. van Seters has 
also described the implicit evidence upon which Abraham's 'gradual recognition' is 
based as 'very weak', concluding that the text 'does not explain at all how [Abraham] 
recognised the Deity. Yet in what follows [(18:22-33), he] is fully aware that it is 
Yahweh with whom he is speaking, a recognition that is not adequately accounted for' 
(1975 :211). As noted in Chapter 4, Gunkel even goes so far as to see the sharp move 
123 One could perhaps imagine an argument for keeping the pointing on the grounds that 
Abraham has been made to use a suitable address for the Deity by the Massoretes, even though he has 
not rccognised his visitor (somewhat along the lines of Moberly's arguments for the treatment of the 
patriarchal narratives by later Yahwistie writers). However, I have not seen this suggested or even 
considered by any inteq,reter of Genesis 18-19 who regards Abraham as not recognising YHWH. 
most preferring to simply change the vowel points. 
from ignorance in Gen. 18:1-16aa to awareness in Gen. 18:16b-33 as evidence of two 
separate textual traditions. There is no 'smoking gun' here~ both views are based on 
strictly circumstantial evidence. The assumption is baseless that a 'gradual 
recognition' stands on firmer foundations than an 'immediate recognition'. 
Similarly, other assumptions operating within the arguments for a gradual 
recognition seem faulty. For example, how significant is Bowie's claim that Abraham 
'has no reason to believe [his visitors] are anything other than ordinary men' 
(1952:616)? Does Abraham's recognition of the deity usually involve his being given a 
'reason' to believe? Must the men do something out of the ordinary before he can 
recognise the deity in them? It is surely significant that on no other occasion is 
Abraham seen to be in any doubt that it is YHWH with whom he is conversing (cf. 
Gen. 12:1,7~ 13:14~ 15:1; 17:1; 21:12; 22:1-2, II, 15). This includes two other 
occasions when YHWH 'appears' to Abraham (Gen. 12:7; 17:1), the second of which 
involved Abraham entering a covenant relationship with YHWH, an event which took 
place shortly before the arrival of the three men. Most significant, perhaps, is the 
passage in which he is told by YHWH to kill his own son, but does not even question 
the identity of the one who gives the command (Gen. 22: 1-19). Whenever the two 
meet elsewhere, Abraham is able to identify YHWH immediately; perhaps this is why 
Abraham never has to ask the name of his guests in Genesis 18, a point recorded by 
Morgenstern, but with no recognition of its real significance (1965: 117). The very 
closeness of Abraham's relationship with his God makes it unwise to cite parallels in 
Judges as determinative here. Abraham's history with his God is not the same as those 
who encounter YHWH in such passages and his situation must primarily be taken on 
its own merits. Rather his ability to recognise YHWH in every other relevant text 
should create a strong presumption towards just such a recognition here. 
The invocation of ANE parallels to explain this text is problematic because the 
present narrative is substantially different to those stories, a point usually recognised by 
the very scholars who have suggested the parallel (cf e.g., R. Davidson's, 'if the J 
narrator is using an ancient folk tale motif, he is adapting it to his own purposes', 
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1979:63). Neither is it sound practice to read uncritically the comment of Heb. 13:2 
that some have entertained angels unawares into the text of Genesis 18, especially 
since a less difficult Old Testament precedent can easily be found in Lot's actions in 
Gen. 19:2-3. Abraham is not necessarily one of the 'entertainers' to whom Hebrews 
refers, and even if he was in the mind of the writer to the Hebrews there is no good 
reason why that author should decide our exegesis here. Driver's claim that Abraham 
would not have knowingly offered food to YHWH is rendered problematic by his own 
conclusion that YHWH is present in the three angels who actually eat the food which 
Abraham puts before them (18:8), contra his own invocation of Judg. 13: 16 
(1909:200). It is not necessary to invoke the later Jewish traditions recorded in 
Ginzberg's Legends that what occurred was an illusion in which the heavenly visitors 
did not actually eat (1947:243; cf also Josephus, Ant. 1.197). A basic narrative 
assumption here is that YHWH, in the form of the three men, is capable of taking food 
(though Gen. 18:8 and 19:3 are 'the only cases in [the] OT where the Deity [sic] is 
represented as eating'; cf Skinner, 1910:300). If so, Abraham's offer of food cannot 
indicate that he has not recognised YHWH, and Keil-Delitzsch are right in concluding 
that the 'eating of material food on the part of these heavenly beings was not in 
appearance only, but was really eating; an act which may be attributed to the 
corporeality assumed... although the miracle still remams physiologically 
incomprehensible' (1980:228). The visitors, presumably weary in the heat of the day, 
do eat and drink. 
In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, it would seem more 
reasonable to assume that Abraham recognises YHWH immediately and that the need 
for YHWH to be represented by the three men here can be accounted for by his 
subsequently stated intention to investigate the outcry against Sodom in their guise. 
The real 'interest' of the narrative should therefore be discerned from this position and 
not from one which entails a presumption of Abraham's ignorance (contra Skinner, 
1910:299). 
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D. An Invitation Offered ... 
After looking up and seeing three men standing over him (l',?~), Abraham 
immediately recognises them as representing an unexpected appearance of YH\\'H~ 
Keil-Delitzsch describe their position as 'the oriental equivalent of knocking' at 
Abraham's door (1980:228; cf. also Westermann, 1985:277).124 The patriarch moves 
quickly despite the heat, running to greet them and bowing low before them (Gen. 
23:12; 37:9; 42:6). But the ironic resonances seen by Wenham as Abraham bows to 
his unrecognised visitors-il1n, 'to bow', indicating 'worship' when used of YHWH 
(1994 :46)-are lost in a reading which sees Abraham as knowingly greeting his deity 
in a manner both respectful and worshipful. The term ,.,'?~ can indicate a variety of 
degrees of proximity from mere feet away to a distant position overlooking a person. 
Though the former was taken up by the rabbinic tradition which saw a textual gap 
between the phrase 'standing over' and Abraham's action in 'running' to the men, and 
envisaged a picture of the angels as withdrawing after seeing Abraham binding the 
wounds of his circumcision, it seems more likely that the latter should be read here (cf 
Keil-Delitzsch's 'standing at some distance from him', 1980:228). l"7:J marks the 
beginning of a series of verbs which will emphasise Abraham's haste to offer and then 
provide hospitality to his guests, forming a stark contrast to the languid opening scene 
of midday heat (Westermann, 1985:277). He rushes up to them to greet them and 
bows low before he begins to speak. 
124 Their sudden appearance has occasioned comment, being seen by some as a miraculous 
appearance (von Rad, 1961:201; Wenham, 1994:46; and Skinner, 1910:299; whociteslosh. 518-19). 
Their common belief that Abraham does not then recognise YHWH despite this 'miracle' presumably 
leads them to adopt something like Skinner's rather weak suggestion that this miraculous event 
'makes no impression on Abraham at the time'. If one accepts that Abraham does recognise YHWH 
immediately, however, then this miraculous appearance may be cited as additional evidence for that 
interpretation. 
There is no pressing reason. however, why the travellers could not simply have walked up to 
Abraham without being noticed. They are, after aiL said to walk to Sodom (;"19"9 ':7~J) rather than 
transfer miraculously (though Wenham does actually argue that because the distance was too great to 
walk between lunch with Abraham and arriving at Sodom in the evening, they actually did the latter. 
1994 54). But if this view is accepted. it is not then necessary to suggest. as Wenham docs. that 
Abraham has dozed ofT (1994:46) 
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V.H. Matthews outlines a 'protocol of hospitality' (developed from a study of 
Judges 4, 1991) which may be said to underlie Abraham's actions: 
1) There is a sphere of hospitality which comprises a zone of 
obligation for both the individual and the village or town within 
which they have the responsibility to offer hospitality to strangers. 
The size of the zone is of course smaller for the individual than for 
the urban centre. 
2) The stranger must be transformed from potential threat to ally by 
the offer of hospitality. 
3) The invitation can only be offered by the male head of household or 
a male citizen of a town or village. 
4) The invitation may include a time span statement for the period of 
hospitality, but this can then be extended if agreeable to both 
parties, on the renewed invitation of the host. 
5) The stranger has the right of refusal but this could be considered an 
affront to the honour of the host and could be a cause for immediate 
hostilities or conflict. 
6) Once the invitation is accepted, the roles of the host and the guest 
are set by the rules of custom. (a) The guest must not ask for 
anything. (b) The host provides the best he has available-despite 
what may be modestly offered in the initial invitation of hospitality. 
(c) The guest is expected to reciprocate with news, predictions of 
good fortune, or gracious responses based on what he has been 
given. (d) The host must not ask personal questions of the guest. 
7) The guest remains under the protection of the host until he/she has 
left the zone of obligation of the host (1992: 11). 
The patriarch begins v. 3 with the conditional 'if I have found favour in your 
eyes' (cf e.g., Gen. 19: 19; 30:27; 32:6; 33 :8, 10, 15; 34: 11; 47:25, 29; 50:4), before 
respectfully requesting that '1J;'~, YHWH, should not pass through (":l~D) from before 
his servant, Abraham. His request is phrased in such a way as to be wholly non-
coercive, to be an open invitation which will allow the travellers to decide for 
themselves whether or not they should stay. These deferential words are interpreted 
by Westermann as being aimed at 'giving the one invited the ground for accepting the 
invitation'~ he offers the paraphrase 'if it is alright with you to accept my invitation' 
(1985:278). The parallel with Noah's finding favour with YHWH (Gen. 6:8), pointed 
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out-incorrectly-as ironic by Wenham (1994:46), rather shows that such a mode of 
address is appropriate when Abraham is inviting the deity to partake of his hospitality. 
Neither does the invitation to stay and not pass through indicate that Abraham only 
regarded the three men as travellers as Driver suggests (1909: 192), but rather that the 
travelling men and YHWH are connected in such a way that Abraham cannot address 
the deity in this context apart from those who represent him~ there is an irreducibility 
about the relationship between the three men and YHWH such that Abraham quite 
correctly treats YHWH as a weary traveller, inviting the deity to stay (v. 3) and 
offering the three men water and sustenance (vv. 4-5). By calling himself a servant, 
Abraham not only puts himself and his house at the service of his visitors, but also 
explicitly identifies himself as an i1~'~ '~~, a 'servant of YHWH' who, in the words of 
Gen. 17: I, intends-despite his recurrent failings-to 'walk before [YHWH] and be 
blameless' (as i1~'~ ,~~; Gen. 50: 17; 2 Kgs 9:7; 1 0:23~ Isa. 54: 17~ 56:6~ as ":r~~, 
['his' being YHWHJ; Deut. 32:36, 43~ Neh. 2:20~ Isa. 65: 15~ 66: 14; Ps. 34:23; 69:37; 
105:25; 135:154~ as 'J~P', voiced by YHWH~ Isa. 65:8-9,13-14). 
Abraham's direct singular address to YHWH (v. 3) ceases and he offers to 
attend to the physical needs of the three men in whom YHWH is represented (vv. 4-5). 
He is still not assured that his guest(s) will stay. He deferentially offers them water for 
their feet (cf Gen. 19:2; 24:32; 43:24; Judg. 19:21; 2 Sam. 11:8) before suggesting 
that they recline in the shade of a tree while he brings food for them to eat (Gen. 
27:19~ Judg. 19:6~ 1 Sam. 20:5,24~ 1 Kgs 13:20; cf Jon. 4:6). In contrast to Gunkel's 
view that a tension appears here between v. 1 (plural trees) and v. 4 (singular tree), it 
should rather be concluded that the tree mentioned is simply one of the KJ9t;J 'J'?K 
which mark his home. 
Despite Abraham's description of the food that he will bring as a mere 'morsel 
of bread' (Co':rn;J), the protocol of hospitality shows that this description should not 
be taken literally; it need not do justice to the amounts of food which he will actually 
provide for his guests. Gossai is undoubtedly correct in taking a more symbolic 
approach, suggesting that the term "'morsel of bread" points to all that is necessary for 
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daily sustenance' (1995:46). Both Westermann's suggestion that this is the 'language 
of politeness, ... meant to minimise the exhausting work of entertainment' (1985 :278) 
and Wenham's view that it is understatement intended to avoid making his guests feel 
like they were imposing (1994 :46) do not do justice to the protocol of hospitality 
operative here, reflecting more a certain Western delicacy. The guests are supposed 
'to impose' and Abraham is supposed to supply them to the best of his ability; both 
therefore know that the latter is offering to be a 'good host' and there is no cause for 
embarrassment on either side. 
Abraham continues speaking. He wishes his guests to partake of his hospitality 
so that each may 'strengthen' their 'heart' (e.g., Judg. 19:5~ Ps. 1 04: 15~ 1 Kgs 13 :7; cf. 
Driver's rendering 'support your heart,' 1909: 193~ and Skinner's description of bread 
as the 'staff' of life, citing Lev. 26:26; Isa. 3: 1; 1910:300). He then informs them that 
they can depart following the meal he has provided, carefully setting out the temporal 
extent of his offer of hospitality to avoid any impression of detaining them by 
obligation (Matthews, 1992:4)~ this self-imposed time limit may be the cause of 
Abraham's subsequent haste. In a final rhetorical flourish, Abraham identifies the 
reason for their visit as being the provision of an opportunity for him to be able to deal 
with their needs (C~~~lJ-"lJ CD~~~ P-"lJ-'\~)~ as Abraham puts it in Keil-Delitzsch's 
paraphrase, you have come 'to give me an opportunity to entertain you hospitably' 
(1980:228). Abraham's implementation of the protocol of hospitality has begun well. 
In Gossai's words: 'in his open and urgent attention to the visitors, [the patriarch] 
ensures that there are no barriers and removes whatever mutual suspicion there might 
be' (1995:45). 'They', the three menIYHWH, reply positively and Abraham has his 
wish; his hospitality has been accepted. 
E. . .. and Accepted 
Abraham, having presumably left his guests reclining in the cool shade of the 
tree, goes to prepare the meal. He does so quickly, his guest having agreed to stay 
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only on the proviso, suggested by Abraham, that they can leave following their meal; 
the patriarch does not wish to detain them unnecessarily, perhaps breaching the 
protocol of hospitality by default. Verbs in use here are fast and furious and indicators 
of direction are prevalent (cf. W. Brueggemann, 1982b:617). Abraham rushes ("~t;~D 
to the tent (i1lnr~;:r), to his wife Sarah (i1J~-?~) and tells her in a series of 
imperatives to hurry ('}Q~), to take three seahs of flour, fine flour (n7.t; as Gunkel has 
noted, used elsewhere only of cereal offerings and the bread of the presence [Lev. 
24:5]; cf. also Wenham, 1994:47), and to knead it ('~;~?) and make ('~~) 'cakes' (n"J~; 
cf. Exod. 12:39; Num. 11 :8; 1 Kgs 17: 13; 19:6; Ezek. 4: 12; Hos. 7:8). The actual 
amount of flour involved is unclear, but there is general agreement that a large amount 
is in view, perhaps 'one ephah' equivalent to a huge 'eight gallons' (Driver, 1909: 193; 
though Wenham suggest 'six gallons,' 1994:47) or a third of an ephah, thirteen litres 
(so Speiser, 1964:130) or the extraordinarily precise 3 x 374 cubic inches of Keil-
Delitzsch (1980:228). Driver suggests-at least, if it is accepted that three seahs do 
equal one ephah-that this is the usual amount of a daily baking, citing as evidence 
Gideon's baking of an ephah of flour for the angel of YHWH in Judg. 6: 19 
(1909:193). But it would say little for Abraham's (and Gideon's) hospitality, if they 
did no more than their normal daily amount of baking for their guests, and so an 
amount beyond the norm seems more likely. Leaving Sarah, Abraham runs (fJ; cf. 
also v. 2) to his cattle ("R~;:t-?~) and selects a perfect calf, fine and tender, and gives 
it to a servant (''In;:T-?~) to prepare. This the servant rushes ("v~~n to do. A 
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considerable amount of food-well described by Driver as a 'sumptuous repast' 
(1909: I 92)-is thus being quickly prepared for the visitors. 
When ready, Abraham takes the food which he-as head of the household-
has 'prepared' and sets it before his guests along with 'fresh milk (J'?r:O to quench their 
thirst and sour milk (i1~91J) to refresh them' (Westermann, 1985 :279). As they eat 
under the tree, he stands over them in attendance to see to their needs (cf. Judg. 3: 19). 
The effect of Abraham's initial understatement, his rush to both greet his guests and 
prepare their food, and the lavish amounts of food involved combine to make 
Abraham's 'typical' implementation of the 'protocol of hospitality' exemplary (so 
Wenham's 'just the proper way to entertain visitors', 1994: 4 7). 
II. The Announcement of a Son to Sarah (18: 9-15) 
A. A Question and an Announcement 
Following the arrival of YHWH in Abraham's camp at the Oaks of Mamre in 
the shape of the three travellers, the patriarch invites him/them to partake of his 
hospitality. His wish is granted and a large meal is prepared and eaten. At some point 
during or just after the meal, the guests begin to speak. But rather than talk of the 
outside world or offer expressions of gratitude for their sustenance as might be 
expected, they instead ask Abraham the whereabouts of his wife Sarah (v. 9). Since 
Abraham is already aware of the presence of YHWH, this knowledge is not to be taken 
as the miraculous sign which first alerts Abraham to the identity of his visitors. Neither 
is it pertinent to ask why knowledge of Sarah's name is available to YHWH but not 
knowledge of her whereabouts, since to do so would be to ignore the way in which the 
book of Genesis often portrays the deity relating to humanity. In the Garden of Eden 
YHWH calls to Adam, 'where are you?' (3 :9) and, after the death of Abel, the 
question, 'where is your brother?' is directed towards Cain (4:9).125 These questions 
are all meant to be answered and here Abraham responds that Sarah is nearby, in the 
tent. 
One of the men then speaks126 and tells Abraham that 'I'-YHWH, Abraham 
will no doubt assume-'will come back to you next year (;,~r:r np'~) and that by then 
125 Also noteworthy is the question of the Angel of YHWH to Hagar in Gen. 16:8: 'Hagar. 
maid of Sarai. where have you come from and where are you going?' (so Westermann. 1985:279). 
126 Rashkow suggests that the 'he' who speaks in v. 10 is not one of the men as is usually 
thought. but is rather Abraham remembering aloud the statement of promise given to him in Genesis 
17 by YHWH (who is therefore now the 'he' of v. 10). The narrator then recounts Sarah's 
overhearing of his words and the interruption caused by her laughter (1993 :98-99). If it is assumed 
that Abraham does not recognise YHWH here. this reading is perhaps possible. but even so questions 
arisc as to why Abraham should now begin to tcll his guests of his meeting with 'YHWH and why he 
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Sarah will have a son'. The term, ;"'l~O n¥~, is rare in Biblical Hebrew (only here and 2 
Kgs 4: 16,17; used by Elisha to describe the timing of a son to the ageing Shunamite 
woman); it is rendered as 'at this time, when it lives again', meaning 'next year' 
according to Keil-Delitzsch (1980:229; cf also Westermann, 1985:280; Wenham, 
1994:48; Driver, 1909: 194); 127 Wenham further suggests that the statement that the 
visitor will come back to Abraham refers not to a simple return visit but rather to 
'God's gracious intervention' in giving Sarah a son (1994:48; citing as support Zech. 
1:3; Ps. 80:14[ET 15]; Gen. 21:1 records that YHWH visited ['i?~] Sarah as promised 
contra Gunkel, whose view seem to be based on the lack of a return scene). Gossai 
notes that the promise of a son next year leaves the deity vulnerable to failure because 
it is effectively reliant upon the response of the aged couple (1995: 50), but, as will 
become clear, it is a major concern of YHWH' s present visit to confront the responses 
of Abraham and Sarah to the promise, resulting in a subsequent-though not, total-
reduction in the extent ofYHWH's vulnerability. 
The information that Sarah will have a son is not news to Abraham, of course, 
nor is its timing in being less than a year away. The announcement serves simply to 
repeat what Abraham has already heard before and laughed at in disbelief (Gen. 17: 16, 
21; contra Gossai who strangely states: 'Neither Abraham or Sarah had any reason to 
expect an heir given their age situation and the barrenness of Sarah,' 1995:48). But 
significantly, the narrative notes that, 1'J[J~ K~;"'l1 ';:'J'K;:J nIJ~ 
. .. . 
nl1t~'w ;"'l1Wl, 'and Sarah 
- - T T : 
was standing at the entrance to the tent and it [the entrance] was behind him [the 
speaker]', that is very close nearby. Since the guests have already ascertained that 
himself leaves the 'he' of v. 10 unspecified as YHWH (how are his guests supposed to know who 'he' 
is?). But if it is assumed that Abraham has already recognised YHWH-as argued on pages 175-79-
Abraham clearly cannot be referring to an absent 'he' in v. 10 and Rashkow's ingenious reading must 
be rejected. 
127 Skinner's suggestion-on the basis of Mishnaic Hebrew's use of ;,'n to indicate a 
pregnant women-that there may be a reference to pregnancy here is possible (1903: 301: cf. also 
Speiser, 196-t: 130). but the only other occurrence of this phrase in the biblical te:ds. 2 Kgs -t: 16-17. 
places it alongside ;"'lET '¥i~,?, 'at this appointed time'. indicating a yearly cycle. Skinner is 
reduced to aQ,'lling that the later text involves a misunderstanding of this passage in Genesis. but such 
arguments seem unnecessarily complicated. and a simple indication to 'in a year's time' will suffice. 
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Sarah was in the nearby tent, the repetition of the promise appears to be primarily 
intended for her over-hearing (cf Wenham, 1994:46~ who initially sees the visit as 
being for Abraham's benefit before stating: 'The promise is for Sarah alone here'). As 
Sarah's response will make plain though, what is being promised is news to her; 
clearly, Abraham has not informed his wife of the clarification of the promise (i.e., that 
his heir is not to be Ishmael but rather a son born to Sarah) recently given to him in 
Genesis 17. 
From her position by the entrance of the tent behind the speaker Sarah has 
overheard the announcement. A less than subtle characterisation of Sarah as the 
proverbially curious woman now appears in some commentators at this point (e.g., 
especially Skinner's 'with true feminine curiosity', 1910:301; cf also Morgenstern, 
1965:121~ Wenham, 1994:48; Speiser, 1964:131). But Sarah is not censured for 
being at the entrance of the tent. In fact it was perhaps where she was supposed to be, 
awaiting further instructions from Abraham; this conclusion would again emphasise 
that the message was intended for her, the guests asking her whereabouts merely as 
confirmation that she was where she was supposed to be. As Westermann notes, 
Abraham now recedes into the background, and it is Sarah's subsequent response to 
the words which she has overheard which form the focus of the narrative from v. 11 to 
v. 15 (1985:279, 281); YHWH moves from a direct address to Abraham to an indirect 
address to Sarah (through Abraham) before addressing her directly (so Gossai, 
1995:48). That the announcement is primarily aimed at Sarah indicates that it should 
not be understood as a reward of some kind for Abraham's hospitality ( cf 
Morgenstern's 'Isaac was God's reward for Abraham's hospitality,' 1965: 122; also 
Skinner, 1910:298). Such a view also ignores the relationship between the promise of 
a son already given (11:30; 15:2-4; 16:11; 17:15, 16, 19,21) and its contingent nature 
(12:3); Abraham's hospitality can only be seen as a correct response to the promise, 
rather than that which earns it (cf von Rad, 1961:204). 
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B. Sarah's Knowledge 
The question now anses as to Sarah's awareness of the identity of her 
husband's guests. No explicit narration provides an answer; it must be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence. The most common interpretation is that she is unaware of 
their identity until perhaps v. 14 or even v. 15, when their supernatural knowledge 
gradually reveals their identity to her (cf e.g., Speiser's '[t]or all Sarah knew, the 
promise of a child was a gesture made by meddlesome travellers', 1964: 131). This 
lack of knowledge in Sarah is also often coupled with Abraham's own ignorance of the 
identity of his guests. I have already argued, however, that such theories of gradual 
revelation are based upon very slim evidence and-in the case of Abraham at least-
that they should be discarded. But even if Abraham is aware of their identity, is Sarah? 
The size of the meal Abraham has prepared is probably not significant here 
since it seems likely that Abraham as the exemplary host would show such favour to all 
whom he entertains (cf Wenham, 1994:47). Neither does it seem likely that Sarah has 
been introduced to the guests, hence their question in v. 9 as to her whereabouts (cf 
Skinner 1910:301). Perhaps the strongest evidence that Sarah is ignorant ofYHWH's 
identity is that her comments directly contradict the divine words, a situation which, if 
her piety is assumed and she is aware of who has spoken them, has proved difficult for 
some commentators to imagine (cf e.g., Gunkel's 'a grievous sacrilege', 1997: 198). 
If a view of her as unknowing is accepted, Sarah has presumably still not realised the 
guests's identity when she denies that she has laughed. She only does so when she is 
rebuked for her denial (though of course she may still be unaware even there; this 
seems the implication of Westermann's insistence that 'an unveiling without any 
reaction from the interlocutor is excluded', 1985 :281. Gunkel, of course, believes that 
neither Abraham or Sarah ever recognise YHWH in 18: 1-16aa). 
But the assumption of matriarchal piety on such grounds is rendered 
questionable by Abraham's own actions, which clearly demonstrate that he has no 
difficulty in expressing his own response of disbelief to YHWH's words. Significantly, 
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Abraham heard the first announcement of a son to Sarah in Gen. 17: 16, 21, and his 
response was one of disbelieving laughter, matching that of Sarah (17: 17; contra Keil-
Delitzsch, 1980:229~ Calvin, 1965:459-60~ Luther, 1961: 153-54~ Speiser, 1964: 125). 
Sarah's contradicting of YHWH does not, therefore, mean that she is unaware of the 
deity's presence. It seems more likely that Sarah's response here to YHWH in the 
form of the guests and Abraham's response to YHWH in Gen. 17: 17 should be viewed 
as parallel, with YHWH's subsequent words here forming the divine response to the 
ongoing disbelief of both husband and wife (contra Wenham who sees Abraham's 
silence here as already implying acceptance, 1994:47). If this is so, then Sarah must be 
aware of the guests's identity from the outset, and her subsequent response of denial is 
simply a panic response, and not the response of one ignorant of the powers of the 
guests. Sarah knows who they are by v. 9, though whether she has been informed of 
the fact by Abraham or has recognised YHWH herself is left unclear. 
C. 'Old and Well Stricken With Age ... ' 
A narrative aside (v. 11) provides the context for Sarah's response to what she 
has heard: both she and her husband are old and 'well stricken in age' (so Driver, citing 
Gen. 24:1, 1909:194), and she is no longer experiencing 'the way of women', 
presumably menstruation (cf. Gen. 31:35). Wenham sees this emphasis as significant, 
arguing that references to Sarah's age-ninety according to Gen. 17: 1 7-must be set 
against references to her sexual desirability (12: 11,20~ also implied in Gen. 20: 1-2) and 
the earlier statement that Noah became a father at five hundred years of age (Gen. 
5:32). He concludes that it may not have been apparent to readers that Sarah was 
beyond childbirth and the shape of the present text is designed to leave readers in no 
doubt as to the impossibility of her bearing a son (1994:48). But Wenham's invocation 
of Noah's great age is problematic because the age of humanity was limited to one 
hundred and twenty years by YHWH in response to the sins of the Sons of God (cf. 
Gen. 6:3). Equally, although Sarah's sexual desirability seems to be confirmed by the 
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events of Genesis 20, this implies only that she remained physically desirable and says 
nothing about her ability to bear children. Sarah could not therefore be expected to 
have children at ninety years of age (contra Wenham), the reference to menstruation 
only serving to emphasise her physical state. She is no longer a barren woman-
'barren' simply indicating that she is childless and has not yet conceived over a long 
period-but is rather a woman who is well past the age of childbearing; her giving 
birth to a son is now a complete physical impossibility (also Wenham's eventual 
conclusion as to the meaning of the text, 1994:48). 
D. Sarah's Disbelieving Laughter 
Sarah's response to the announcement is to laugh (PlJtI;1J) in 'incredulity' 
(Driver, 1909:194). Her self-description as 'D"'t, 'worn out', a term used of 'clothing' 
falling to pieces in Deut. 8:4, 29:4 (cf. also Josh. 9:13; Ps. 32:3; Ps. 102:27; Isa. 1 :9; 
51 :6), her perhaps amused consideration of i1~~~, 'sexual pleasure', at her age, and her 
reference to the great age of her husband clearly cast her laughter as that of disbelief. 
It is at this point that the twin motifs of a son to Abraham (15 :2-4; 16: 11 ; 
17:15,16,19,21) and Sarah's inability to bear a child whether through barrenness or 
age (11: 3 0; 16: 1) come into focus, and centre upon the hopelessness of Sarah herself. 
Despite AA McIntosh's attempt to render i1~~~ as 'conception' following 
Pseudo-Jonathan (1974:329), Westermann's suggestion that the hapax legomenon 
i1~~~ should be translated as 'sexual pleasure' is to be preferred (1985:281; cf. also 
Skinner's 'sensuous enjoyment', 1910:302). But he does not draw out any 
implications of this word for Abraham's own attitude to the promise of a son being 
born to Sarah already given to him in 17: 17. Turner, however, argues that since i1~~~ 
presumably denotes sexual intercourse, Sarah's response indicates that she and 
Abraham are no longer sexually active. He concludes that this demonstrates the 
completeness of Abraham's disbelief in the promise of a son to Sarah; as he-
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somewhat tendentiously-puts it, '[ u ]nless they expect an immaculate conception, 
their sexual abstinence shows that they simply do not believe the promise' (1990a:79). 
But since there is no evidence that Abraham has actually told his wife of the 
announcement that YHWH had made to him-in itself a further demonstration of his 
lack of faith in the outcome of the promise--Turner is incorrect; sexual abstinence is 
only a measure of Abraham's disbelief Until she overhears the words of Gen. 18: 10, 
Sarah is wholly unaware of the promise that the heir of the promise is to be her son; 
her lack of sexual activity should only be taken-at most-as an indicator that her 
hopes for a child are now over (as her actions in Genesis 16 already seem to indicate). 
Her response of disbelieving laughter is a natural one given her age and state, made to 
a deity whom she clearly does not believe can fulfil the promise that she will bear a 
son. Her response thus mirrors that of her ninety-nine year old husband when he first 
heard that she would have a son (17: 17). In what follows, Sarah may well be in the 
foreground, but when YHWH responds to her laughter, that response is also being 
made to the disbelieving Abraham. In this encounter, the disbelief of the old couple in 
the promise of a son to Sarah is the issue which must be resolved; if they will not 
believe and resume sexual relations, YHWH's promise will not happen (cf Gossai's 
vulnerability of the deity, 1995: 50). 
Sarah laughed in disbelief to herself (;:t~~P.f). Westermann cites B. Jacob's 
conclusion that 'laughter is not something internal-there is no such laughter' 
(1974:443), and states that the verb pn~ describes an external expression (1985:281); 
Sarah's laughter was, therefore, not silent. But there is a logical problem with an 
argument in which an example of pn~ with a modifier such as ;:t~ ~P.f which perhaps 
indicates internal laughter is disallowed on the grounds that the verb must describe an 
external expression. It is also surely significant that for some commentators, as was 
noted earlier, knowledge of Sarah's laughter is an indicator of divine insight (e.g., 
Bowie, 1952:619; Skinner 1910:302; Morgenstern, 1965:121). Sarah's laughter (and 
speech) is silent or at least unheard by those outside the tent. It is only when a 
paraphrase of them is spoken back at her that she begins to realise that Abraham's 
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guest YHWH has come visiting with the intention of openly addressing the very 
disbelief expressed in her laughter and that of her husband. 
E. YHWH Interprets Sarah's Response 
YHWH asks Abraham why Sarah is laughing and paraphrases her words as, 
'am I really to bear a child now that I am old'. YHWH's replaying of Sarah's words 
differs significantly from her 'original', a difference which some explain as YHWH' s 
softening of her words, either as a 'kindly' act (Wenham, 1994:48), to prevent 
resentment of her by Abraham at the comment that he was too old (Hershon, 
1885: 100), or for reasons of social decorum (cf. e.g., Westermann's 'more reserved'; 
1985 :281). Alternatively, R.I. Letellier simply sees this a literary feature, enriching the 
narrative through a transmutation of Sarah's 'image of decay and conjugal pleasure to 
a more prosaic matter of childbearing in old age' (1995:99). A more (explicitly) 
ideologically driven version of Letellier's view is that suggested by Sailhammer. He 
regard the differences as the result of a re-interpretation of Sarah's words by YHWH 
which does not soften but rather serves to define her real concerns (cf. also Jeansonne, 
1990:24): 
Firstly, the Lord [sic] restated Sarah's somewhat ambiguous statement 
(' After I am worn out will I now have pleasure?') as simply, 'Will I really 
have a child?' Then he took Sarah's statement about her husband ('My 
husband is old') and reshaped it into a statement about herself ('I am 
old'). Finally, he went beyond her actual words to the intent of those 
words: 'Is anything impossible with the LORD?' By means of these 
questions to Abraham, the underlying issue in the narrative is put before 
the reader, that is, the physical impossibility of the fulfilment of the 
promise through Sarah (1992: 166).128 
128 Wenham records Sarah's response as 
showing the basis of her doubts. She laughed not out of cocky arrogance, but because 
a long life of disappointment had taught her not to clutch at straws. Hopelessness, not 
pride, underlay her unbelief. Her self-restraint in not openly expressing her doubts 
and the sadness behind them go far to explain the gentleness of the di,ine rebuke' 
(1 99.f:48). 
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Sailhammer's claim that this re-interpretation encapsulates Sarah's real mearung, 
however, may be considered problematic given the content of her secret comments. 
What is undoubtedly correct, however, is that this meaning is the only one to which 
YHWH intends to respond; Sarah's other concerns are left unaddressed by the deity. 
F. Is Anything Beyond YHWH? 
With YHWH's rhetorical question, "~'J ;,~,~~ K?~~Q, in v. 14a, the highpoint 
of this section of the narrative is reached (contra Westermann, 1985:282). The niphal 
of K'nJ 'refers to things unusual, distinguished, singular, beyond human capabilities, 
and hence astonishing, wonderful, miraculous' (Letellier, 1995: 100). Letellier notes 
two primary meanings: that of 'hard, difficult' (Deut. 17:8; 30: 11; 2 Sam. 13:2; Job 
42:3) and that of a 'rapturous quality ... , wonderfulness' (Exod. 3 :20; 2 Sam. 1 :26; Ps. 
118:23; 139: 14; Provo 30: 18; Zeph. 8:6). Letellier, however, argues that Gen. 18: 14a 
contains nuances of both, that 'there is [in this verse] a mixture of the difficult and the 
miraculous, the limitations of the humanly possible and the marvellousness of God's 
power' (1995: 101) This nuanced combination of the 'difficult' and the 'wonderful' 
can also be seen in the response of Jeremiah to the creative powers of YHWH: 'Ah 
Lord GOD! It is you who made the heavens and the earth by your great power and by 
your outstretched arm! Nothing is too hard for you'('9rp~ K'?~~-K'?; Jer. 32: 17; 
NRSV). Also noteworthy is the question's open-ended nature. As Letellier puts it: 
'The strength of this terse statement has an absoluteness which takes it beyond the 
immediate narrative context. It speaks of an eternal truth about the nature of YHWH 
and his omnipotence' (1995: 100; as von Rad puts it: 'This word reposes in the story 
like a precious stone in a righteous setting, and its significance surpasses the cosy 
As Gossai further points out, Sarah's laughter does not indicate that she is unwilling to bear a son 
because any decision about willingness is totally precluded by her complete disbelief that it could 
happen (1995: 51). If a thing is viewed as impossible. then no decision about personal involvement is 
required. 
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patriarchal milieu of the narrative~ it is a heuristic witness to God's omnipotent saving 
will', 1961 :202). But T.E. Fretheim notes that the self-imposed constraints under 
which YHWH generally operates within the Creation mean that this statement cannot 
be simply invoked in all contexts, as if YHWH will do anything, anytime, anywhere 
(1994:465). Nevertheless, the point of its use here is to show Abraham and Sarah (and 
the reader) that such self-limitation by the deity is not to be invoked lightly either: 
when time and place so please, it should always be remembered that 'nothing' is 
beyond the capabilities of YHWH. 
The giving of a son to Sarah, a woman beyond the age at which childbearing 
can be expected, is just the sort of wondrous and difficult event of which YHWH is 
said to be capable. By way of emphasis, the promise of a son is repeated in v. 14b but 
the addition of 'V.i~,?, 'at the appointed time', recalls Gen. 17:21 and the original 
announcement to Abraham. The reactions of both Abraham and Sarah to the 
announcement of a son have thus been placed in direct confrontation with the deity's 
claim-to go on in disbelief as before, they must say yes to the question, 'is 'anything' 
beyond YHWH', and deny both the power and truthfulness of their God. As Turner 
points out, this is exactly what Abraham will implicitly do in Genesis 20 when he, 
because of his own fear, hands Sarah over to Abimelech (l990a:82-85), but in the 
present narrative Abraham and Sarah have little choice but to accept the words of 
YHWH, an acceptance which necessarily results in a transformation of their view of 
the future. The section concludes when Sarah, in panic at the open expression of her 
deep disbelief in the promise, denies her laughter but is rebuked, though in a rather 
gentle fashion, by YHWH (v. 15; Hershon suggests that it is Abraham who rebukes 
Sarah here [1885: 101], but the patriarch's own lack of belief in the promise clearly 
indicates that the rebuke is aimed-by YHWH-at both Abraham and Sarah). 
III. Events On the Way to Sodom (18:16-21) 
A. Departing From Mamre towards Sodom 
The men decide to depart and walk to a point overlooking Sodom and the lush 
productive valley in which it lay (t:f'9 '~.~-,?I)~ cf e.g., Gen. 19:28~ Num. 21 :20; 
23 :28). Abraham accompanies them, presumably to see them on their way out of his 
zone of obligation (Matthews, 1992: 11 ~ cf Gen. 12:20). With the re-introduction of 
Sodom, the reader of the canonical text is reminded of the narrative asides of Genesis 
13. 
Lot looked about him, and saw that the plain of the Jordan was well 
watered everywhere like the garden of the LORD, like the land of Egypt, 
in the direction of Zoar~ this was before the LORD had destroyed Sodom 
and Gomorra (13: 10) .... Now the people of Sodom were wicked, great 
sinners against the LORD (13: 13~ NRSV). 
As far as the interpretation of Genesis 18-19 is concerned, however, it is very 
important to note that this knowledge of Sodom' s eventual destruction is limited by 
the narrative to the reader, who even so, in narrative terms, cannot be sure that the 
destruction comes here. YHWH has not yet decided to punish the cities of the plain, 
but intends to investigate their actions. Abraham has already met the King of Sodom 
(Gen. 14: 17, 21-24) and is presumably aware of the wickedness of the 'men of 
Sodom,' but even so he does not know for certain what the outcome of what follows 
will be. 
B. 'Shall I Hide from Abraham That Which I Do ... ' 
Without warning YHWH begins to 'speak' what has become known as the 
'divine soliloquy,' one of several found in the book of Genesis (Gen. 2: 18; 3 :22; 6:3, 7; 
8:21-22; 11:6-7; 18:20-21; cf Mackenzie, 1955; he omits 18: 17-19 from consideration 
19:' 
as secondary, 159, a factor which is relatively unimportant here). The Hebrew ,~ 
.... 
often renders 'thought' (Gen. 20:11; 26:9; 44:28; Exod. 2:14; Num. 24:11; Judg. 152; 
1 Sam. 20:26; 2 Sam. 3:6; 12:2; 2 Kgs 5: 11; Isa. 20:26; 39:8; Jer. 37:8; Lam. 3: 18; 
Zeph. 3:7; Mal. 1:7; Ps. 82:6; Job 29: 19; Ruth 4:4) and the contents of YHWH's 
words make it clear that-at least initially-Abraham is not being addressed. Rather 
the deity is mulling over the pros and cons of the situation and begins: 'Shall I hide 
from Abraham that which I do ... ' . 
Two contrasting interpretations of the content of the 'soliloquy' have been 
proposed. The more common reading sees these verses as related to the cities of the 
plain. But Blenkinsopp has also suggested that these verses could as easily relate to 
the 'destiny of Abraham's descendants,' with vv. 20-21 then signifying a decisive tum 
towards Sodom (1982: 120; cf also Hamilton's noting of this possibility, 1995: 17). 
That which YHWH describes as hidden would, therefore, be the turning of the one 
man Abraham into a great nation. In this reading, YHWH presumably answers this 
question with 'yes' because in subsequent verses he does not tell Abraham the content 
of what is hidden, his future status. But this view is initially problematic in that it does 
little justice to the readerly links which exist between Gen. 13: 10,13 and the mention of 
Sodom in v. 16 or to the shift of scene between Abraham's camp and the view 
overlooking the cities of the plain. But more significantly, it must be asked what is 
contained in vv. 18-19, understood as relating to Abraham's descendants, that the 
patriarch does not already know. That YHWH will make Abraham a great nation, that 
all nations will be blessed in him, that he is chosen by God, and that he must teach his 
descendants the way of YHWH, these are not exactly new to Abraham, each being 
explicit or at least clearly implied in the words of promise YHWH has already spoken 
to Abraham (e.g., Gen. 12:1-3; 17:1). It seems more likely that Blenkinsopp's view 
that vv. 17-19 are related to Abraham's descendants is incorrect, and that both vv. 17-
19 and vv. 20-21 should be understood as relating to Sodom. 
In Gunkel's diachronic study, the claim is made that YHWH knows that 
Sodom is to be destroyed in vv. 17-19 whereas in vv. 20-21 the deity is only going to 
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investigate the outcry. But the first part of YHWH's three-part soliloquy-v. ITs 
'shall I hide from Abraham that which I do ... ' (;'~':1 ':J~ ,~~ t:l;:r'J~~~ '~~ :l~~t;0)-
. ." 
is actually ambiguous because what YHWH is 'doing' is not immediately specified. 
Gunkel's assumption that in v. 17 YHWH already knows the Sodom will be destroyed 
is actually supplied by his view of the text as being written by a specific author for a 
particular audience, both of whom knew of the destruction (cf. also Westermann, 
1985:289). In this canonical reading at least, such a move can only be viewed as a 
skewing of the final form rather than as its illumination; Gunkel's tension is, in this 
case, really an apparition. 
The second part of the three-part soliloquy involves a description of what 
Abraham will surely become, 'a great and powerful nation (t:l~~~1 ,?,.,~ '1'J7) and all 
the nations of the earth will be blessed in him' ("::1 YJ~;:r ,~;~ ,?'~ ~:l~1~1), echoing the 
earlier pronouncements of the promise by YHWH to Abraham (cf. Clines, 1978: 3 2-
53). The construction of t:l~~~1 '?,.,~ '1'J7 ;,~p~ "';:r t:l;:r'J1~1 signifies both an 
emphasis-by way of the infinitive absolute-on what Abraham will become and-by 
way of the 1 form-the adversative nature of this clause to v. 17 (v. 18 forms a 
'circumstantial appendage [which] involves an antithesis', GK, 142d; cf. also Gen. 4:2, 
4; 24:56; 26:27; 29: 17; Isa. 29: 13; Jer. 14: 15; Ps. 50: 17; Job 21:22): 'Shall I hide from 
Abraham that which I do? Yet Abraham will surely become a great and powerful 
nation ... ' . 
In the third part, which continues the adversative thought, the deity says that 
Abraham has been 'chosen' so that the patriarch will command his sons and his house 
after him (1'')Qtt in';ll-n~l ":J.~ -n~ ;'l~~) that they should keep the way of YHWH 
(;'b'~ iJTJ), the meaning of which is defined by what follows, they are to do 
righteousness (;'i?:r;O and justice (~~rr'~). They must do so because only then will 
YHWH be able to carry out the promise ('~:t-'re~ ntt t:l;:r'Jttt- '?~ ;'J;'~ K'~;:r WQ7 
"7~) described in v. 18. 129 
129 The insertion ofa 'no' between v. 18 and Y. 19 by von Rad (1961:204), RSV and NRSV 
is presumably not intended to suggest a contrast between these two verses, as if the promise of a great 
future in v. 18 somehow supplies a reason as to why YHWH should hide what is being done (e.g., 
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Many interpreters see YHWH as revealing what is to be done primarily because 
ofv. 18's view of Abraham's future status. As Westermann, for example, puts it, 'the 
promise ... raises Abraham to a level of importance and honour that he is deemed 
worthy to share in God's plan' (1985:288,290; cf also Hershon, 1885: 103; Roshwald, 
1989:146). Some, citing Amos 3:7, also see Abraham's status as being linked to the 
role of the prophet (e.g., R. Davidson, 1979:68; Gossai, 1995:55; Wenham, 1994:50; 
Westermann, 1985:290). Others see Abraham as the eventual possessor of Sodom, 
with YHWH seeking his permission to destroy it (so Gen. R. 49:2, a position 
disallowed by my earlier conclusion that Sodom is outside the land of the promise, see 
pages 151-52). In such interpretations, v. 19 simply extends the description of v. 18 
without significant addition with regard to the 'no' which is the eventual answer to 
YHWH's self reflexive question; 130 it is Abraham's status in a bright future which 
means that what is about to happen should not be hid from him. 
The principal problem with these readings is that they do not account for the 
fact that v. 19 introduces a very specific reason as to why Abraham's status is being 
considered; namely, the way in which the doing of justice and righteousness by the 
patriarch and his descendants is fundamental to the contingent nature of the promise 
itself YHWH defines Abraham as the 'chosen one' of God (,for I have chosen him so 
that ... " W~7 '''r;1¥J~ "~). 131 The deity has chosen the patriarch so that Abraham will 
command his sons and his house after him that they should keep the way of YHWH, 
doing righteousness (;-Yi?'J~) and justice (~~~~). Only then will YHWH be able to carry 
out the promise described in v. 18. Clearly, the greatness of Abraham is not absolutely 
'since Abraham will be a great people anyway, why bother telling him what is going on') Such a 
reading hardly does justice to the dynamic of the soliloquy. Rather, the eventual revealing to 
Abraham of what is being done assumes an implicit 'no' to the question of \'. 17 at some point, either 
between v. 18 and v. 19 or at the conclusion ofv. 19~ there is no difference in meaning. 
130 Wenham sees the soliloquy as part of a discussion between YHWH and the two angels 
WIth him (1994:50). But since Abraham is with them but does not hear and since I have argued here 
that YHWH is rather 'present' in all three men (see pages 168-75), it is preferable to see the words of 
w. 17-19 as purely self-reflexive. 
131 'Chosen' is rendered by Driver as 'noticed, regarded, cared for' in a practical sense 
(1909:195; cf. Exod. 33:12, 17: Deut. 34:10~ 2 Sam. 7:20~ Ps. 37:18; Amos 3:2: Hos. 13:5). 
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guaranteed~ it is not so much 'will surely become' as 'will surely become, if. This 
verse repeats the contingent connection between the behaviour of Abraham and the 
fulfilment of the promise which occurred within its original utterance in Gen. 12: 1-3 
(see pages 144-46, and in such later passages as Gen. 22:15-18~ 26:5~ contra Alter, 
1990:150~ Westermann, 1985:289~ and of course, Gunkel). Abraham will become and 
remain a great nation that will be a source of blessing for the nations only if he and-
through his command, example, and teaching-his descendants follow the way of 
YHWH, doing righteousness and justice (cf. Driver's, 'Abraham's ... "commanding his 
children and household after him" is the condition of Jehovah's fulfilling the promises 
given to him', 1909: 195). A strong emphasis on teaching the way of YHWH will 
form part of the later Sinaitic law (e.g., Exod. 12:25-27~ Deut. 6:1-3,6-7,20-25) and 
the wisdom tradition (Prov.l :7, 13: 1 ~ cf. Wenham, 1994:50). 
In the light of what will eventually be revealed about the justice situation in 
Sodom, it seems somewhat unlikely that the point of Abraham being told what is to 
happen is simply the imparting of a bit of knowledge because he is a prophet or is 
worthy of being close to YHWH. Rather v. 19 introduces into the soliloquy the idea 
that revealing to Abraham what is to happen is highly relevant to Abraham's own task 
of commanding his descendants to do righteousness and justice. It is, therefore, the 
content of v. 19-the contingent nature of the promise-rather than that of v. 18-
Abraham's future status-which primarily results in YHWH's decision not to hide 
from the patriarch what he is about to do. 
C. 'Keep the Way ofYHWH, ... ' 
The requirement of YHWH that Abraham and his descendants must keep the 
'way of YHWH, doing righteousness and justice', occurring together only here in 
Genesis (W. Brueggemann, 1982: 169), functions as an expansion of Gen. 17: 1. There 
Abraham is told to 'walk before YHWH and be blameless' (C'~D ~~.~~. '~~'? i1';:t~:}). 
Each of these three terms, 'way of YHWH', 'righteousness', and 'justice', concerns 
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the relationship between YHWH and Abraham-the chosen one of YHWH-and the 
outworking of the promise. The use of irrJ to indicate the path on which one walks, 
that is, as a metaphor of one's conduct or morality, is common within the Old 
Testament, and much of that usage echoes and, in canonical terms, develops from this 
verse. V.R. Gordon notes that although the explicit language of the two ways is 
lacking in the Old Testament (1988:1032), the idea of an oppositional structure 
between the way of the righteous and the way of wicked is clearly implied in many 
passages (Deut. 11:26-28; 30:15-19; Ps. 1; 119; 139:24; Provo 4:18-19; 12:28; 14:2; 
15: 19). Jer. 21 :8, for example, records YHWH as setting before Judah a way of life 
and a way of death, the former involving obedience to YHWH's command to submit 
to the Babylonians and the latter the disobedience of defiance. Also implied within the 
solitary 'way' are the many 'ways' of a person. 
These terms, 'way' and 'ways', have a number of possible meanings when used 
ofYHWH. They may refer to YHWH's saving deeds (e.g., PS. 145: 17), especially the 
events of the Exodus (e.g., Deut. 8:2). But often, as here, the 'way of YHWH' 
indicates 'something that is practised by human beings,... something that is almost 
synonymous with God's will as it is revealed in his commandments' (Gordon, 
1988: 1032). In fact for much of the Old Testament, the way of YHWH indicates the 
keeping of the Torah given at Sinai. The Israelites are commanded to walk in or keep 
the way(s) ofYHWH (e.g., Deut. 5:33; 8:6; 10:12; 11:22; 19:9; 26:16-19; 28:9; 30:16; 
1 Kgs 11 :38; Jer. 7:23). Occasionally, they respond that they have kept to the way of 
YHWH (e.g., PS. 18:22; 44:18) or request that they be taught the way ofYHWH by 
their deity (e.g., PS. 25:4; 27:11; 86:11; 119:33; 143:8). This later identification of 
walking on the way of YHWH as keeping the Torah is, of course, of significance for 
interpretations of Genesis 18-19. In Gen. 26: 5 it is said of Abraham by YHWH "~~J 
'Q"'n1 'Dip~ 'D"t~ 'r;1~~~a comment which clearly renders Abraham's faithfulness 
in walking inion the way of YHWH into terms more suitable for those later readers 
who regarded the Torah as constituting that way, but which does not indicate that 
Abraham himself kept the Torah given at Sinai (Moberly, 1992a: 143-\ on Patriarchal 
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and Mosaic religions, cf. e.g., Alt, 1966:1-66, Pagolu, 1998~ Wenham, 1980:157-88; 
1994:xxx-xxxv~ Westermann, 1985:105-121). It is rather Abraham's commanding of 
his descendants to do the 'way of YHWH' which eventually becomes identified with 
carrying out the observance of the Torah from Sinai, and it is only Abraham's 
descendants, the Israelites, who will do the way of YHWH by observing the Torah of 
Moses~ clearly Abraham is not responsible for teaching absolutely everything which 
will come to be called the way of YHWH. 
D. ' ... Doing Righteousness and Justice' 
Von Rad begins his discussion of i1i?Jt, righteousness, with the following: 
There is absolutely no concept in the Old Testament with so central a 
significance for all the relationships of human life as that of i1i?Jt. It is 
the standard not only for man's relationship to God but also for his 
relationships to his fellows, reaching right down to the most petty 
wranglings-indeed it is even the standard for man's relationship to the 
animals and to his natural environment. i1i?Jt can be described without 
more ado as the highest value in life, upon which all life rests when it is 
properly ordered (1975:370). 
Von Rad argues, following H. Cremer (1893, 1901), that i1i?Jt does not involve the 
comparison of 'a man's proper conduct against an absolute ethical norm' (contra 
Rodd, 1972, 1994; and Barton, 1979; both of whom see such a norm as implied in 
Genesis 18). Cremer argued that Israel did not understand righteousness in terms of 
something external but rather saw the doing of i1i?Jt as the fulfilling of the claims 
made upon those within specific relationships: 'The way in which it is used shows that 
"P'~ is an out and out term denoting relationship, and that it does this in the sense of 
referring to a real relationship between two parties ... and not to the relationship of an 
object to an idea'" (1893:273-75; cf. von Rad, 1975:371; this position is affirmed by 
Childs, 1985 :208; and Bovati, 1994: 19). 
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Such a definition obviously means that a multitude of nuances may be found to 
i1P'Jt, depending upon the overall construction of a particular relationship; globalised 
notions cannot be invoked in order to define the meaning of every occurrence of the 
three letters ~, , and p (cf. Scullion, 1992:724). In Gen. 18:19, the key to 
understanding ;"1i?'Jt is its pairing with ~~~~. Although sometimes used of forensic 
justice alongside the synonymous but more common term for legal judgement, 1',}, 
t!l~~~ is also used more widely. As with ;"1i?'Jt a number of possible meanings can be 
discerned in its usage; Mafico lists the following: 'justice, judgement, rights, 
vindication, deliverance, custom, and norm', as possible meanings (1992: 1127).132 
But when used with ;"1i?'Jt, as here, P. Bovati notes a dominant meaning of 
'uprightness in behaviour', (1994: 188; though he also points out that the pairing has 
procedural force in some texts, e.g., the Queen of Sheba to Solomon: 'Because the 
LORD loved Israel forever, he has made you king to execute justice and righteousness' 
1 Kgs 10:9; NRSV). 
For Abraham, doing ;"1i?'Jt and tQ~o/~ involves fulfilling the covenant 
requirements YHWH has laid upon him and the more general requirements which the 
deity has laid upon humanity in general. F or his descendants this will eventually 
include the keeping of the Torah given at Sinai. In later more troubled times for Israel, 
i1i?'Jt and ~~O/~ will be 'used to summarise the teaching of the prophets' (W. 
Brueggemann, 1982: 169; cf. Isa. 5:7; Amos 5:7, 24). For Rendtorff, they are used in 
Isaiah 1-39 to indicate 'the righteousness which has to be kept and done' (1993: 183). 
In Isa. 56: 1 this is made clear: 'Thus says the LORD: Maintain justice (~~o/~), and do 
what is right (;"1i?'Jt), for soon my salvation ("DI]~rd~) will come, and my deliverance 
('DP~~P be revealed' (NRSV). The reason that Abraham and his descendants should 
act this way is not because it is simply an arbitrary requirement for the promise to be 
132 Booth lists eleven meanings of f!l~1!J'~: 'manner or custom. rightful due, judicial decision. 
case for decision, command of man, command ~f God, that which should be, administration of law by 
man, proper administration of law by man, administration of law by God, and litigation'. 
Unfortunately individual texts are not specified but only strands of tradition such as 1. E. etc. 
(1942: 106). 
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fulfilled, but because, as Ps. 33: 5 puts it, '[YHWH] loves righteousness and justice' 
(cf. also Provo 21:3). 
E. An Investigation of the Outcry Against Sodom 
Having considered the contingent relationship between the prOmIse of 
Abraham's future status and the way ofYHWH on which he and his descendants must 
walk in order for the promise to be fulfilled, YHWH decides that Abraham should be 
told what the deity is doing~ he speaks aloud (;'~1~ -'~K·l\n in the presence of Abraham 
in VV. 20-21 and the reader learns of that which has been hidden. Sodom and Gomorra 
are the subject of YHWH' s speech, specifically an outcry (n~~t) against them (literally 
an 'outcry of Sodom and Gomorra') which, having come to the hearing of the deity, 
now requires divine investigation (cf. Gen. 4:9-11a~ Exod. 2:23~ 3:7-9~ Judg. 3:9, 15~ 1 
Sam. 9:16). The roots used here for 'outcry', pIn and pl1~, are virtually 
interchangeable (SP reads pl1~ in both verses), and are considered by von Rad to 
represent a 'technical legal term ... [which] designates the cry for help which one who 
suffers a great injustice screams' (1961:206~ cf. Provo 21:13). He even suggests that 
we know the content of the cry, Ot~r:r, 'violence', citing as support Hab. 1 :2: '0 LORD, 
how long shall I cry for help, and you will not listen? Or cry to you 'Violence!' (O~r:r) 
and you will not save?' (NRSV). 
It is notable, however, that the content of the outcry against Sodom and 
Gomorra is left unspecified and is not recorded as simply 'violence'. Rather it is this 
broad and non-specific use of the term that must be kept in mind (contra von Rad), a 
usage which W. Brueggemann helpfully characterises as a 'general abuse of justice' 
(1982: 164). Gossai supplies three examples which are useful in defining the 'breadth' 
of the outcry against the cities: 
First the anguished cry of those kept in bondage under an oppressive 
regime is heard by God (Exod. 3: 7) and consequently God acts on their 
behalf. ... We find a second contrasting example in Exod. 22 :21-23 In 
the midst of several social laws, the people are warned that the 
oppression of the weak in their midst will lead to action by Yahweh. The 
possibility of oppressing family members is sounded here and the actions 
of God on their behalf will be no less devastating than that of the 
punishment meted out against the Egyptians, Third in Genesis 4: 10, after 
Abel is murdered, Cain is satisfied that the evidence is gone: no one will 
discover his crime. Answering God, Cain snaps at God saying that he is 
not responsible for his brother. What is stunning about the use of Pl1T 
and pl1~ in [Gen.] 4: lOis the fact that it is not uttered by a person. 
Rather, the cry comes through the dramatic image of the very blood of 
the innocent. In the matter of oppression which leads to an outcry, no 
part of creation will be able to hide the signs alerting Yahweh (1995 :89). 
Gossai also cites Isaiah 5:7 (ET 5:8): ;'i?~t ;'~.i}1 ;'i?'Jt7 n~~~ ;'~.i}1 m~~~? ,g~J. 
There, ili?~~ (the 'outcry') is what YHWH discovers in place of 'righteousness' 
(ili?'Jt) in a context in which 'justice' (~~~j~) has been exchanged for 'bloodshed' 
(n~~~). The outcry against Sodom and Gomorra appears, therefore, to be the result 
of a great but unspecified injustice. 133 
YHWH ('I') intends to 'go down' (tq-il'JJ~) to Sodom and Gomorra and 'see' 
(KJ~l; cf. Gen. 6: 5, 11: 5-7; Exod. 3: 7). Once there the deity will be able to see if the 
outcry which has come to him is accurate or not. Are the sins of the men of Sodom 
"K~ il'Jt~? Are they guilty in full (to 'completeness', ;'7~; cf. also J er. 4: 27; N ah. 
1:8,9)? YHWH's words end with 'if not, I will know' (il~'J~ K"?-t:J~l), raising the 
possibility that the outcry may be unjustified and indicating that as yet no guilty verdict 
has been handed down. 'That which I am is doing' in v. 17 is not then, as Gunkel 
believes, destroying the men of Sodom (cf. also Westermann, 1985:289-90; Driver, 
1909: 194; R. Davidson, 1979:68)-a view based primarily on the presumption that the 
actually non-specific v. 17 must contain a decision to destruction (Gunn also notes the 
angel's words in 19: 13 [1993: 181], but neither of these should be understood as 
133 The language from this point onwards consistently relates to innocence ('righteous') and 
guilt ('wicked') of the events which lead to the outcry. It is then rather bizarre to note the attempt of 
Levin to ascribe the wickedness of Sodom to their sickness due to bromide poisoning (he even 
corresponds personally with the Dead Sea Bromide Co. Ltd, Beersheba, Israel): 'there must have been 
something about the behaviour of the people of Sodom and Gomorrah which made them recognisable 
to others as coming from a dubious region. Perhaps they were recognisably lazy. tired, and little 
given to assist fellow citizens, hence their evil reputation for social concern' (1986:282-83). Indeed! 
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indicating YHWH's prior decision to destroy)-but rather the carrying out of the 
investigation of the outcry against them. After all, if Sodom is vindicated rather than 
destroyed, Abraham will still be learning his 'lesson'. 
In consideration of the need for Abraham to teach righteousness and justice to 
his descendants in order for the promise to be fulfilled, YHWH has decided to educate 
Abraham as to the true meaning of subsequent events in Sodom. On one level, 
Abraham is simply being informed that what is to happen is solely the doing of 
YHWH, the deity assuming that Abraham is aware both of what such an investigation 
might find and of YHWH's willingness to inflict punishment (Gunn, 1993: 181). For 
the one upon whose righteousness, justice-and teaching ability(!)-the promise of 
blessing depends, however, the implied message is clear. Sodom and Gomorra-
whatever happens to them-are to function as an example to the patriarch and his 
descendants of the justice of YHWH. As Keil-Delitzsch put it (with the benefit of 
hindsight concerning the results of the investigation), 
God ... disclosed to Abraham what he [sic.] was about to do to Sodom 
and Gomorra... because Jehovah had chosen him to be the father of the 
people of God, in order that by instructing his descendants in the fear of 
God, he might lead them in the paths of righteousness, so that they might 
become partakers of the promised salvation, and not be overtaken by 
judgement. The destruction of Sodom and the surrounding cities was to 
be a permanent memorial of the punitive righteousness of God, and to 
keep the fate of the ungodly constantly before the mind of Israel 
(1980:230). 
F. Sodom as Exemplar to Israel 
The ability of Sodom to serve as an example to Israel about its own behaviour 
implies a number of similarities between the cities of the plain and the descendants of 
Abraham. The possible existence of CP.":T~ in Sodom is accepted by both Abraham and 
YHWH and indicates that it is possible for those outside the covenant between 
Abraham and YHWH to be considered 'righteous' by the investigating deity. Both 
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Abraham and Sodom, and indeed all of humankind, are still subject to the judgement of 
YHWH who, as in the time before Abraham (Genesis 3 -1 1), remains willi ng to seek 
out injustice and punish those who are guilty. What exactly the people of Sodom must 
do to be considered righteous is not explained, but it may be inferred from the 'justice' 
and 'righteousness' required of Abraham and the term 'outcry' that it is necessary for 
them to do justice and righteousness in their relationships with each other, with their 
neighbours, and with the Creator God in order for them to be pronounced righteous; it 
is against the 'divine expectation' ofili?Jt and t!l~o/~, that 'man's behaviour on earth is 
measured' (Mafico, 1983: 11; cf. 13). In effect then the people of Sodom have their 
own version of the 'way of YHWH', a version which does not contain the claims made 
upon Abraham by the covenantal relationship which he enjoys with YHWH or those 
which will be laid upon his descendants on Sinai, but which nevertheless insists that the 
cities of the plain do righteousness and justice before YHWH. Given the non-specific 
nature of the outcry in vv. 20-21, it seems clear that the basis on which the cities of the 
plain are being judged is whether or not they too are keeping the way of YHWH, and 
not on the basis of one particular crime. 134 
But if Sodom can be pronounced righteous, then Sodom' s exemplar status 
requires that Abraham and Israel can also be pronounced unrighteous; this example is 
a double-edged sword. And it is certainly noteworthy that, when the opportunity 
arises for such an example to be placed before Abraham, it is taken, being deemed 
necessary by the deity. Following the deity's explanation of what these events mean, 
Abraham and his descendants will know that the divine response to an outcry is to 
investigate the actions of those involved and to punish those found guilty. Therefore 
they must do righteousness and justice lest they be the cause of such an outcry, 
incurring punishment and perhaps jeopardising the fulfilment of the contingent 
promise; they must walk the way of YHWH. In Alter's words: 
1 J4 On the problematic relationship between wickedness and the role of the Law pre- and 
post- Sinai. see Anderson (1998). 
Sodom, firmly lodged between the enunciation of the covenantal promise 
and its fulfilment, becomes the great monitary model, the myth of a 
terrible collective destiny antithetical to Israel's. The biblical writers will 
rarely lose sight of the ghastly possibility that Israel can turn itself into 
Sodom (1990: 158). 
It is Abraham as the paradigmatic teacher of the way to Israel who needs to be told 
what YHWH is doing here and not Abraham the prophet. 
YHWH's promise to Abraham that the patriarch would be a source of blessing 
to all the nations of the earth, first made in Gen. 12:3 and reiterated here (v. 18), is 
thus placed alongside the deity's ongoing judgement of those nations, here Sodom 
(listed with the nations in Gen. 10:19). Abraham's success in both walking on the way 
of YHWH and in his teaching of it to his descendants are thus intimately bound up 
with divine judgement as it relates to his own people and to the nations (cf. 
Westermann, 1985:308-309). If he fails to walk on the way, judgement will overtake 
him and his own, removing any chance of the giving of the blessing which the nations 
would have gained through him. If he succeeds, however, blessing will come to all 
through him, and judgement will pass over Abraham and, presumably, those blessed in 
him. YHWH's decision here to educate Abraham as to what really happens at Sodom 
is thus of great significance for the future judgement of Israel and the world. The 
decision to reveal what YHWH is doing is made on the basis of a long term view of the 
promise of Gen. 12: 1-3 in which Abraham and his descendants would become a 
blessing to the nations partly because they had been 'encouraged' by the example of 
Sodom to walk on the way of YHWH. It is not taken on the basis of a short-term 
view of the promise which would see Sodom itself being blessed in Abraham in the 
present. 
Announcement complete, YHWH is ready to leave for Sodom; his initial 
quandary of v. 17 is resolved, and Abraham has been made aware of what is to happen. 
Because Abraham was being addressed only as the future teacher of Israel and not as a 
prophet or as an intercessor, no further exchange of words is necessary; YHWH's 
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intent is not to test Abraham by seeking a response to his announcement (contra e.g., 
Roshwald, 1989: 160). 
IV. Abraham's Challenge to YHWH (18:22-33) 
A. An Uninvited Intervention 
In v. 22b a well known but contested Tiqqun Sopherim occurs.135 Here, it is 
claimed, the ancient version ran as follows, t:I;"J~ 'J!l' '~11 ,J,,11 ;";"', a reading in 
which YHWH remains standing before Abraham in a manner which seems to suggest 
an invitation to Abraham to respond to what the deity has revealed. The MT, 
however, reads, ;";" 'J!l' '~11 ,J,,11 t:I;"J~', and it is Abraham who now stands 
before YHWH. Many commentators, however, tend to read as though the invitation 
to speak implied in the Tiqqun can also be found in the MT (e.g., Wenham, 1994:50-
51), ignoring the difference which the (change of) word-order makes to the sense of 
the passage. Instead of YHWH inviting a response from Abraham by standing before 
him (e.g., Jacob, 1974:449; Wenham, 1994:50; cf also Roshwald's 'testing of 
Abraham's moral fibre', 1989: 160)-or perhaps awaiting instruction from his 
theological teacher, Abraham, as W. Brueggemann would have it (1982: 168)-it is 
now Abraham who stands before YHWH. In doing so he detains one of the men 
(whose companions leave for Sodom) and offers a response which has not been invited 
by the deity and is not required by 18: 17-21; after all, a reader may leap from 18:22a to 
19: 1 with no difficulty at all (as Gunkel, with other source critics, notes). Abraham, 
addressed in 18:20-21 only as the teacher of Israel, clearly has other ideas and offers 
the response of a prophetic intercessor to YHWH's declaration of intent. What are the 
implications of this reading? 
135 McCarthy has disputed the \'alidity of the tiqqun on the basis of 19:27 which read 'and 
Abraham returned to the place where he had stood before YHWff. If the tiqqun did indicate the 
changing of an originally ancient text, then surely this verse should also be identically marked 
(1981:7:1.76; cf. also the discussion of Hamilton, 1995:23-24). 
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Abraham's standing before YHWH now functions to show an intervention by 
the patriarch (cf Jer. 15: 1), but three questions are thereby raised: first, why does 
Abraham consider it necessary to speak at all? Second, what is his goal in speaking? 
Third, what is he actually asking YHWH to do? No direct answers to these questions 
are given, no narratorial insight offered, and Abraham's reasoning and aims can only be 
discerned through a consideration of what he actually says. This being the case, a 
consideration of the dialogue between YHWH and Abraham must proceed, as it were, 
backwards. The narrative can only begin by revealing the answer to the third question 
(what is Abraham actually asking YHWH to do?), and from this, the answer to the 
question (2 above) of Abraham's aims must be inferred. Knowing what Abraham 
wants and why will then enable a reason to be given for his intervention and allow 
conclusions to be drawn both about Abraham's own understanding of the judgement of 
YHWH and about that eventually promulgated by the canonical text itself. 
B. What is Abraham Actually Asking YHWH to Do? 
Abraham begins what W. Brueggemann has well described as his 'bold and 
tentative' intervention (1982: 167; cf also Roshwald's 'what might be described today 
as the archetypal manifestation of hutspah', 1989: 148) with a question to the one 
manIYHWH who remains standing before him: 'will you sweep away the righteous 
(P':r~) with the wicked (l1r9J)?' The righteous and the wicked are, in the context of 
YHWH's investigation of the outcry, those innocent or guilty of the unspecified 
injustice that has occasioned the outcry (vv. 20-21), and therefore those who are or are 
not walking on the way of YHWH.136 Significantly, Abraham introduces in v. 23 a 
136 Speiser argues that these terms should be translated as 'innocent' and 'guilty' and not as 
'righteous' and '"icked' (1964: 134). There is no doubt that these terms are supposed to relate only 
to those innocent or guilty of the actions which have led to the outcry, but in terms of the larger 
narrative setting. these groups are being characterised as those walking of the way of YHWH or on a 
different way: that is. as 'righteous' and 'wicked'. Speiser's sharp distinction between innocent and 
righteous s~cms to owe much to Paul's arguments in Romans regarding everyone's lack of 
righteousness. a "iew contained in some Old Testament texts (e.g., Ps. 143:2). but it is misplaced 
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distinction between the righteous and the wicked with regard to their joint destruction 
because of the wrongdoing of the wicked alone. It would be wrong, he implies, to 
destroy the righteous along with the wicked. But this should not be taken to indicate 
an argument that it would also be wrong to destroy the wicked alone; Abraham 
appears to have no qualms about this at all; as Westermann puts it: 'This is not to 
contest God's right to destroy' (1985:291; cf. Gossai, 1995:58). Rather he is asking 
for YHWH to distinguish between the fates of these two groups, implicitly requesting 
that the righteous be saved and the wicked punished. No criticism of YHWH's right 
to judge is voiced. Neither, as Hamilton notes, 'does Abraham challenge God's 
evaluation of Sodom's moral turpitude. That judgement is not up for debate. Nor 
does he at any point turn to Sodom to urge repentance' (1995 :25). In v. 23 only the 
salvation of the righteous is in view. Abraham is in effect invoking-or better, bringing 
to the surface of the discourse-one of the principle tenets of an individualistic 
judgement; each group being solely responsible for their own fate and punished only 
for their own wrongdoing. 137 
Von Rad has argued that such an understanding ofv. 23 is incorrect, a mistake 
made as a result of ignoring the surrounding context. He suggests that the verse 
functions not as an argument for saving the righteous alone, but rather as a premise for 
saving the whole rather than destroying it (1961 :208). Von Rad thus provides a 
thoroughly corporate reading developed from what he sees as the real meaning of v. 
23: 'What determines God's judgement on Sodom, the wickedness of the many or the 
innocence of the few?' 138 
This reading, however, reqUires either an assumption that a corporate 
judgement is what Abraham is seeking from the very beginning or a willingness to see 
here. People can be righteous in Sodom with regard to their innocence of this unspecified crime 
because such innocence implies they are actually walking on Sodom's 'way ofYHWH' 
U7 The recent tendency to regard terms such as 'individualistic' as ncgative should be 
resisted hcre since it is not yet clear what cvaluation. if any. is being placed upon this model by the 
canonical text itself. 
138 Again. 'corporate'-likc 'individualistic' above-is intended to be vicwed neutrally here. 
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v. 23 as initially ambiguous before being resolved by the corporate v. 24 and v. 25. 
Von Rad takes the former line, his own assumption that this text is wholly corporate 
being supplied by his historical-critical reconstruction of the growth of corporate and 
individualistic ideas within the traditions of Israel; Abraham, as a character in that 
history, is basically incapable of requesting an individualistic judgement because it is 
not available to him as an option (cf also Daube, 1947: 154-60; other historical critics, 
however, argue exactly the opposite, e.g., Ben Zvi, 1992). But recent study of the 
relationship between corporate and individualistic ideas in Israelite history and religion 
has shown that such evolutionary pictures are highly questionable. A truer picture of 
the situation is that a complex intermingling of corporate and individual ideas existed 
side by side (cf Kaminsky, 1995:116-38). In the texts which form the canonical 
background to this act of judgement-the narratives of Genesis 1-11-N oah is saved 
alone because of his personal righteousness (6:8-9, 7: 1; though his family are saved 
with him, 6:18, 7:1,7,13; 8:16,18) but the sins of the Sons of God brings a corporate 
punishment on all humanity (6: 1-3). Von Rad's need to reinterpret 'individualistic' 
notions in corporate terms may also demonstrate that this 'intermingling' occurs within 
Gen. 18:23-5 itself with his historically-oriented exegesis therefore resulting in a 
flattening of the diversity of the canonical text. In the following exegesis, von Rad's 
historical-critical assumption is discarded and it will be assumed that both models of 
judgement are options available to Abraham. Viewing either as a decisive background 
for this text in its canonical form before even beginning to read the Sodom narrative 
appears-to this reader at least-unnecessary in a canonical reading. 
Equally problematic would be to offer corporate readings of vv. 23-25 in which 
v. 23 is seen as initially ambiguous before being resolved by the 'corporate' v. 24. 
Such a reading implicitly assumes that v. 24 offers the real core of this text, that it 
redefines what to first sight at least appears to be an individualistic v. 23, that it is 
explicitly supported by v. 25ab, and thus gives Abraham's argument a consistent 
corporate slant. But this attempt to impose a coherence of mind upon Abraham is both 
fundamentally flawed and contextually dubious. With regard to the former, v. 25ab 
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does not In fact support a corporate reading but rather contradicts it. The 
individualistic premise of v 25b-the profanity of removing the distinction between the 
righteous and the wicked, making them the same-can only be inconsistently applied 
by a 'corporate' Abraham. It is called justice when no distinction is made when 
reprieving the wicked, but the application of the identical mechanism in a situation 
involving the punishment of the righteous is called profanity. With regard to the latter, 
a cool, calm, consistency of mind is most unlikely to be found in the patriarch given the 
sudden announcement of the impending investigation-and possible destruction-of 
Sodom~ Abraham's context is not that of the systematic theologian at his or her desk! 
He is rather on 'unknown territory,' performing an intercessory task of which he has 
no previous experience (Gossai, 1995:62). It should be expected that he is rattled and 
under intense pressure here, a view borne out by his subsequent claims during his 
successive interventions (e.g. v. 27' s '~~l ,~~ "~'J~l~ if my overall view of Abraham 
is accepted, then Turner's view of Abraham as a calculating schemer must be 
discarded, 1990a:79-82, 1990b:89-90~ cf also Davies, 1995 :95-113). If the essential 
primacy of corporate notions on historical grounds is discarded and no attempt is made 
to enforce a retrospective coherence on Abraham's argument, it can be argued that in 
v. 23 Abraham is interested in saving only the righteous from destruction, in an 
individualistic judgement. 
In contrast to the individualism of v. 23, Abraham's next words takes a 
somewhat different tack. Instead of a general question, a specific but indefinite request 
is made: 'suppose there are fifty righteous ones in the midst of the city, will you sweep 
away (;'~9r:t ~tt;:t) and not forgive (~~IT~"'P the place because of the fifty righteous 
who are in it' (v. 24). It is not clear why Abraham begins at fifty~ Jacob's suggestion 
that a small town could field a hundred fighting men (cf Amos 5: 3) implies that 
Abraham begins by asking what happens if half the men of the town are righteous and 
halfare wicked (1974:451; cf Wenham 1994:52). Abraham is once again talking about 
the righteous and the wicked, but is now focused on the concrete setting of those 
within the city. However, rather than argue for the punishment of the wicked half and 
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the reprieve of the righteous half-that is, for an 'individualistic' distinction being 
made between the two sections of the city-he asks YHWH to forgive the wicked-
and thus forego their punishment-for the sake of the righteous ( cf. Wenham, 
1994:52-3). These two equal groups are to be collapsed into one undifferentiated 
mass when reprieved; this time it is the notions which make up a corporate judgement 
which undergird Abraham's request; Mafico is incorrect when he claims that Abraham 
has simply 'repeated the question' of v. 23 (1983: 13). That such a merciful 
deliverance of the wicked from destruction can take place is, for Abraham, completely 
dependent upon the presence of the righteous. There is still no suggestion that the 
wicked can be reprieved on any other basis, destruction is still their lot in the absence 
of the righteous. 
C. Judgements-Corporate and Individualistic 
Care must be taken when interpreting the significance of these corporate and 
individualistic strands of thought. 139 Two corporate judgements are possible - that the 
innocent become as the guilty and the punishment of the whole takes place (context A) 
or that the guilty become as the innocent and the whole is reprieved (context B), both 
occurring without any regard for the proportions of each. Though a judge rendering a 
corporate judgement may make individualistic distinctions as to the guilt or innocence 
of those under investigation, these are not carried through into the act of punishment. 
However, in an individualistic judgement, there is a strict attempt to ensure that any 
differentiation exposed in the act of judging the status of the innocent and the guilty is 
carried through into punishment with the end result that the righteous are vindicated 
(context C). It is the applying of individualistic notions to the punishment of the guilty 
that separates corporate and individualistic forms of judgement. 
139 The nature of the corporate aspects of Israel's religion and society has engendered 
considerable interest this century and has fomled the subject of a still ongoing debate (cf. c.g .. 
Wheeler-Robinson. 1980; Porter. 1965: Rogerson, 1970; Joyce. 1982: Kaminsky, 1995. 1997). 
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Despite the degrees of overlap, it should be recognised that when the concepts 
which make up individualistic and corporate judgements are extrapolated into the 
different 'models' of judgement which underlie these practices, they are in such a 
degree of tension as to be almost totally incompatible-it is only possible for them to 
agree on a particular judgement when that judgement involves either a group of 
innocent (context D) or a group of guilty people (context E) or an individual (context 
F). Both models would punish the guilty and vindicate the innocent in the same way in 
such circumstances. In all other cases, the verdict reached would be fundamentally and 
intractably different. For example, the punishing of the innocent with the wicked, 
while unjust in an individualistic model, is still an act of justice in a corporate model. 
In a very real sense then, Abraham's opening request for the saving of the righteous 
and his subsequent expansion to the saving of the whole city are in stark but 
unconscious contradiction. Given this state of affairs, the reader awaits with some 
confusion as Abraham continues with his-at least to his own eyes-' consistent' 
words. 
D. Abraham's Intervention as 'Incoherent' 
Hamilton recognises that v. 24 is asking for something rather different to v. 23, 
but suggests that Abraham's concern is two-fold~ after an initial request for the 
righteous alone, he simply expands his concern to save the whole city (1995:24-25; 
van Seters also acknowledges Abraham's interest in both options, 1975:214). But 
such an easy solution must be discarded after careful consideration of Abraham's next 
words. In v. 25 Abraham 'appears' to present the premise which underlies his request 
to YHWH in v. 24. He states that it is wrong for YHWH to do this 'thing', a thing 
quickly explained as being 'to kill the righteous with the wicked'. The use of n'\~;:t,? 
(the hiphil infinitive construct of m~) here does not simply imply killing, but has 
overtones of judicial execution (Lev. 20:4~ Num. 35: 19, 21 ~ Wenham, 1994:52). 
Abraham then emphasises why this is so unacceptable, I1~'J~ p'\:t~ ;'~:11, . and the 
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righteous will be as the wicked' or, as Wenham puts it, because YHWH will then 'treat 
the righteous and the wicked the same' (1994:34). Of this important phrase, Jotion 
writes: 
it is not exactly being said that the first thing is like the second nor that 
the second thing is like the first, but rather that the first thing is like the 
second and the second is like the first.... In other words, the two terms 
are declared identical in some regard .... [in] Gen. 18:25 the just and the 
sinner will have the same fate (1996:644-my italics}. 140 
These words are framed by two extremely strong exclamations which emphasise the 
profanity of YHWH breaching the premise (17 ~7?1J··· '97 ~7?1J), classically rendered 
in Latin by Dillman's profanum tibi sit (1892:270~ cf also e.g., Gen. 44:7; Josh. 22:29~ 
1 Sam. 14:45; 24:7; 26: II). Here the problem for Abraham is that the killing of the 
righteous with the wicked is profane and unjust because it removes the distinction 
between them. He cannot therefore be simply providing a premise which will justify 
his corporate request in v. 24 because in that particular case their joint reprieve would 
once again result in the distinction between them being removed, the very opposite of 
what v. 25ab is aiming to achieve. Rather he is once again arguing that these two 
groups should be considered on the basis of their own individualistic merit, voicing 
explicitly in v. 25ab what was clearly implied in v. 23. 
In contrast to Hamilton's two stage speech which sees a linear expansion from 
saving the righteous in v. 23 to saving the city in v. 24, the textual result of Abraham's 
combination of arguments is rather more complicated. In the words of Solomon 
Dubnow (1738-1813): 
'First Abraham prayed that God should not slay the righteous together 
with the wicked whereas in the succeeding verse he besought God to 
deliver the wicked along with the righteous, even before his first prayer 
has been answered. In the next verse Abraham then reverted to his first 
140 In Gen. -t-t: 18, the still incognito Joseph's status in Egypt is summarised by his brother Judah 
with the words 'for you are like Pharaoh himself (;'1i':;l~ '9""~~; NRSV). 
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plea to save only the righteous (Biur to Genesis~ cf Leibowitz, 
1973:183). 
Abraham's opening words can be divided into two discrete groups on the basis of 
whether or not there is an insistence that YHWH should differentiate when punishing 
between the righteous and the wicked; Abraham's individualistic premise is thereby 
placed over against his corporate specific request, the contents ofv. 25ab (and v. 23) 
over against the contents of v. 24. In the former, Abraham argues that it would be a 
profane thing for YHWH's justice to remove the distinction between righteous and 
wicked in punishment. In the latter, however, Abraham is actually requesting that 
YHWH not differentiate between righteous and wicked-that YHWH commit an act 
defined as profane by the premise of v. 25b. It is perhaps as well that, pace W. 
Brueggemann (1982:168), Abraham is not YHWH's theological instructorP41 
Interpreters touching upon the tension created by Abraham's incoherence have 
generally disguised it in some way, usually by enforcing a highly consistent mind-set 
upon the patriarch and his words. One option, already seen, is that of von Rad' s 
corporate reading; the tension is resolved by the consistent re-interpretation of 
individualistic notions and the assertion that Abraham's only aim is to save the whole 
city. The obvious alternative-an individualistic reading-has been supplied by such 
as E. Ben Zvi, the 'corporate' request for Sodom to be saved being seen by him as 
resulting from an implicit limitation in the power of the divine; YHWH not being 
capable of rescuing ten people from the city (1992:41). 
On other occasions it is simply implied that, rather than inconsistency resulting 
from the invocation of two modes of judgement, there are-or appear to be-two very 
different things going on (as with Hamilton above). For example, Jewish interpreters, 
while occasionally recognising the difficulties as Dubnow does above, prefer to keep 
loll It is instructive to consider Loader's arguments on this aspect of the text. He suggests 
that Genesis 18-19 demonstrates both the saving corporate function of the righteous-in that a few 
righteous will save the whole city and the wicked within it-and the concept of individual 
rctribution-because a righteous Lot" is saved (l990:33-3~). But he fails to recognise that the former 
is in direct contradiction to the latter. If the wicked are not given their due punishment. then the 
concept of retribution is actually being denied by Abraham. 
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Abraham as coherent by seeing him as asking two consecutive questions of YHWH 
here, one relating to what Morgenstern calls a 'strict and absolute justice' (1965: 125) 
with the other relating to mercy as an almost unrelated category altogether.142 
Hershon, for example, writes: 
Peradventure there be fifty righteous in the five cities, ... wilt thou then 
destroy them and wilt thou not spare them for the sake of the righteous 
which are among them? And if thou wilt not deliver the wicked for the 
sake of the righteous, deliver at least the righteous for his own sake 
(1885 : 104). 
He thus makes the salvation of the righteous alone a secondary or fall back position. 
But all such interpretations implicitly reflect the problem made obvious by Kaminsky's 
comments that' Abraham appears to appeal to God's sense of justice (v. 25), but ... in 
fact is arguing for mercy' (1995: 186~ 1997:326). The relationship between the 
language of what Abraham is only appearing to do (or, in the case of the Jewish 
exegetes, is doing in invoking an individualistic justice) and what he is actually doing 
(in also arguing for a corporate mercy) is never explained. Why does Abraham speak 
so strongly of an individualistic 'strict' justice at all if what would appear to be a 
profane and contradictory corporate mercy is his aim? Ultimately, however, such 
interpretations must be rejected as too simplistic; they cannot do justice to a canonical 
text in which it is not the case that two separate questions are being asked 
consecutively but rather that a complex speech mixes these notions together. 
The net effect of this complex is to render Abraham's final words in his 
opening speech-the rhetorical question, 'shall not the Judge of all the earth do justice' 
(ro~rp'~ ;"l~~~ ~'" rJ~;:r-'~ ro;l~Q) deeply ambiguous. Obviously, YHWH is that 
judge (cf vv. 20-21) and it is, so Abraham believes, unthinkable that he should act 
unjustly. But it is not clear what Abraham now considers justice to be. Is it an 
142 In a variation of this solution, Landy sees the deity as being concerned to act according to 
a strict justice (cf. yv. 20-21) whereas Abraham believes in 'sparing the eyil to preserve the good' 
(1990: 109). 
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(individualistic) differentiation that marks the justice of YHWH for Abraham, the 
separation of the righteous and the wicked? Obviously, yes. But doesn't he also want 
YHWH's justice to result in the corporate non-punishment of the people of Sodom? 
Again, yes. Abraham's call for the 'Judge of all the earth to do justice' is marked by a 
profound and unrecognised contradiction, the result of which is to leave unanswered 
the question of what YHWH must do in order to be just. 
E. Two Models of Judgement or Four? 
At this point, it is also necessary to consider the gender of the 'righteous' of 
whom Abraham is speaking~ a point which most commentators seem to ignore, simply 
discussing the residents of Sodom as though no gender issues are involved (e.g., 
Gossai's 'righteous people', 1995:59~ Wenham, 1994:52,55,63~ note also the use of 
gender-neutral terms in translations such as NRSV). But in his opening question ofv. 
23 and in his premise in v. 25ab, Abraham is using the term P':t~ and its opposite IHtJ, 
both masculine singular adjectives which should perhaps be translated as 'righteous 
man' and 'evil man' .143 In vv. 24, 26-33, however, Abraham uses the masculine plural 
143 The form P'~~ twice explicitly occurs as male only when it is used in an adjectival 
construction with rth~: Noah was 'a righteous man' (P'~~ W·,~; Gen. 6:9) and the slain Ishbaal, son of 
Saul, is described by David as 'a righteous man' (P'~~-w·'~-n~; 2 Sam. ~: 11). 
In older English translations of such as Ps 112: 1b-6, the use of P'~~ alone with associated 
masculine singular verbs and suffixes usually led to talk of a righteous man: 
Blessed is the man who fears YHWH who greatly delights in his commandments. 
His descendants will be mighty in the land; the generation of the upright (masc. pI.) 
will be blessed. 
Wealth and riches are in his house, and his righteousness endures forever. 
He arises in the darkness as a light for the upright (masc. pl.); He is gracious, 
merciful. and righteous. 
It is well with a man who deals generously and lends, who conduct his affairs with 
justice. 
For he will never be moved: the righteous man will be remembered forever (Ps. 
112: Ib-6). 
But even here, however. it is not immediately apparent that a woman' s use of this text is being 
precluded. Much Anglican liturgy of recent years is cast in male terms (e.g .. the Alternative Sen·ice 
Book of 1980). but is still being used by women (though not happily by some). 
But in more recent years translations such as the NRSV have been more gender-inclusive, 
thus: 
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form Op":t~ which could be used to indicate either men only or both men and women, 
regardless of the meaning assigned to P':t~. Biblical Hebrew contains no female form 
ofP':t~ (though a feminine form of the verb P'~ is used with regard to Tamar in Gen. 
38:26),144 but in Mishnaic Hebrew, the feminine form n~1~ appears and is used of 
Esther (b. Meg. lOb), Sarah (Gen. R. 48), and Rebekah (Gen R. 63). The plural form 
n·,p':t~ appears in Canticles Rabbah with Op":t~ (I, 4~ all cf Jastrow, 1992: 1262). It 
is not clear what exact significance can be attached to this omission in Biblical 
Hebrew-at its most extreme, it can even be asked if there are any righteous women in 
the whole of the Old Testament?145-but the question asked here is a simple one: are 
the 'righteous' and the 'wicked' of whom Abraham speaks to be understood as only 
those who are male or as being of both genders? If it is the former, this will have 
implications for the constructions of both models of judgement invoked by Abraham 
and further increase the complexity of the patriarch's requests. 
Happy are those who fear the LORD, who greatly delight in his commandments. 
Their descendants will be mighty in the land; the generation of the upright will be 
blessed. 
Wealth and riches are in their houses, and their righteousness endures forever. 
They rise in the darkness as a light for the upright; they are gracious, merciful, and 
righteous. 
It is well with those who deal generously and lend, who conduct their affairs with 
justice. 
For the righteous will never be moved; they will be remembered forever (ps. 112: Ib-
6). 
Similarly, Kraus, in his Theology of the Psalms, talks of the righteousness of men and women without 
ever discussing the problem inherent in assuming the gender-neutrality of P'~~ (1992: 15-l-162). 
Originally. these psalms may have had a mixed group in mind or be applicable to any member of the 
worshipping community, but they could also have been aimed solely at male worshippers (in the 
Temple courts, after all, women did not have the same access as men); gender-neutral translations 
such as the NRSV can easily appear presumptuous in their apparent whitewashing of what may 
simply be the gender-specific language of a patriarchal society. At best, P'~~ itself can only be called 
presently ambiguous with regard to the gender of its referent. 
144 'Judah ... said, "She [Tamar] is more righteous than I ('~~~ ;"Tp'~~), since I did not give 
her to my son Shelah." And he did not lie with her again' (Gen. 38:26). Of a total of four occurrences 
of female forms of the verb P'~, only this one actually relates to a woman, \\ith the other three 
relating to that 'female whore', Israel (Jer. 3: 11: Ezek. 16:51,52). 
145 A woman may not ha\'e been considered eligible to be a P'~~ because she was \irtually 
always under the control of a male figure. Even the daughters of Zelophehad who possessed their 
father's inheritance were forced to remarry into their father's family so that the inheritance would not 
be lost to their father's kin if they happened to marry someone from outside (Num. 27:1-7: cf. 36:1-
12). 
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Two interpretive options anse from the gender ambiguity of p'l:t~, one 
favouring a male-only interpretation and the other, a gender-neutral interpretation. In 
the former, Abraham considers only the 'men of Sodom' to be the righteous who 
should be saved or on whose behalf the city could be saved, with the women and 
children of Sodom being wholly subordinate to the men who have control over them. 
In favour of this position is the now-recognised patriarchal bias of much Old 
Testament language and society; it is noteworthy that Jacob's suggestion that the 
number fifty arises because a small town could field a hundred fighting men implies 
that the P':t~ are male alone (1974:451; cf. Jeansonne's 'righteous men', 1990:40). 
In the latter, however, Abraham may be simply using either the masculine singular 
form in his abstract argument with YHWH (w. 23 and 25) or the singular as a non-
gender-specific collective term, before returning in both cases to the plural form which 
may indicate that both male and female can be considered righteous when considering 
the concrete situation of Sodom itself (w. 24, 26-32). Although no woman is 
specifically called p'l:t~ in the Old Testament, adding to the weight of evidence for 
women as potentially being righteous on their own merit are texts which indicate the 
need for impartiality in judging legal cases which could have concerned righteous 
women (e.g. Exod. 23:7-8; Deut. 16:19; 25:1), possible general references to the 
righteousness of 'all the people' (CI]O-'~; e.g., 2 Kgs 10:9: 'Jehu stood and said to all 
the people, "You are innocent [CP.':t~]''') although the same phrase in Neh. 5: 1 
indicates only 'men' ('the people and their wives'; cf. Gunn, 1993:189), and finally, 
perhaps, the existence of significant women like Deborah (Judg. 4:4-5:31), Huldah (2 
Kgs 22: 14-20), and the three called n~~~ by the later rabbinic traditions, Esther, 
Sarah, and Rebekah. 
In a canonical approach, however, both readings appear quite possible, 
suggesting that there is probably no 'right' answer here; whatever Abraham intends, 
his view of the actual gender of the P':t~ and the CP.':t~ is ambiguous to his hearers, to 
both YHWH and the canonical reader, leaving its actual effect as far as Sodom is 
concerned as open to YHWH's interpretation and response as the rest of his request in 
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vv. 23-25. (As will become apparent, the reading suggested here does not require that 
YHWH see into Abraham's mind and discern his 'true intentions'). But this openness 
has consequences for the models of individualistic and corporate judgement being 
discussed here; the possibility that women are not being counted as righteous 
individuals in the debate over Sodom means that four rather than two models must be 
considered. In an individualistic model in which women and children do not count , 
such a model is not 'individualistic' in the modern sense implied by gender equality, but 
is rather to be considered individualistic within a patriarchal setting. In the same way, 
a corporate model in which a woman cannot be counted as righteous may also be 
termed a patriarchal model of corporate judgement. YHWH is now confronted by 
four possible models-two individualistic and two corporate or two patriarchal and 
two gender-neutral-as Abraham awaits his response. Moreover, each of these 
models is in tension with and implicitly criticises the other three (for example, a 
'patriarchal individualistic' judgement which involved the punishment of women and 
children would be judged wanting by a more egalitarian individualism). But for now, 
having outlined the content of what Abraham is-or rather appears to be-saying, the 
canonical reader can return to a consideration of the second question with which 
exegesis of this passage began. 
F. What is Abraham's Goal in Speaking? 
A consideration of possible aims may elucidate Abraham's words further and 
ultimately allow an explanation of the whole narrative. The following possibilities are 
considered in tum below. 
1) Abraham is interested in saving the righteous of Sodom. 
2) Abraham is interested in saving Sodom itself 
3) Abraham is interested in saving Lot. 
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It is important to note that each of the three options above may overlap with elements 
of one or more of the other three. Nevertheless, readings can generally be grouped as 
to their primary conception of Abraham's aim. 
G. Saving Only the Righteous of Sodom 
For some, Abraham's aim is understood solely in terms of saving the righteous 
(e.g., Ben Zvi, 1992:34-45; Westermann, 1985:291; Driver, 1909:196; Keil-Delitzsch, 
1980:231; Roshwald, 1989: 153). 146 Ben Zvi, for example, justifies this position by 
singling out for detailed examination two premises which he believes to have been 
invoked by Abraham. The first is that to destroy the righteous of Sodom with the 
wicked is behaviour unworthy of the Judge of all the earth (1992:34). The sole 
problem for the patriarch then is that YHWH might destroy the righteous with the 
wicked thereby failing to enact an individualistic justice; as Driver puts it: 'The 
patriarch's keen sense of justice recoils at the thought of the innocent perishing with 
the guilty and this by the decree of an all-righteous judge' (1909: 196). Abraham's 
kinsman Lot, currently a long-term resident of Sodom (cf. at least the thirteen years 
between Gen. 16: 15 and 17: 1), is not considered relevant except in his status as one of 
the righteous of Sodom (e.g., Ben Zvi, 1992:42). Since Abraham is not questioning 
the punishment of the wicked, neither is the eventual fate of Sodom itself in question. 
The occurrence of corporate language in v. 24 is accounted for by Ben Zvi's 
second premise, 'that the possibility of destroying the city and sparing the righteous, 
no matter what their number, is beyond the horizon' (1992:34). Accordingly, the 
request for the whole in v. 24 has to be made because YHWH is implicitly viewed as 
being unable to save more than nine individuals from out of the city; as he puts it, 'the 
claim is that God is, at least functionally, not omnipotent' (1992:41); a position 
146 Wenham states both that Abraham is interceding for Sodom and that he wants to save 
only the righteous, but is only able to do so by not supplying any resolution of the language problem 
(1994: 52-53). 
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mentioned as possible by Roshwald (1989:153) and implied in the work of such as 
Keil-Delitzsch (1980:231), L. Schmidt (1976:154-55), and Westermann (1985'292). 
Alternatively, Daube has suggested a variant in which Abraham is unable to shake off 
some kind of communal thinking and can only ask for the righteous to be saved by 
asking for the whole city (1947: 157). In the former, it is primarily YHWH's limitation 
which is in view but in the latter, primarily Abraham's (though YHWH does not then 
'correct' the patriarch's 'error'). But for both, judgement must be rendered on the 
basis of an individual's merit or guilt~ the righteous must go free and the wicked must 
be punished for YHWH to have done what the' Judge of all the earth' must do. 
These readings are, however, rendered problematic by the words of YHWH in 
18:14a, 'is anything beyond YHWH'. Abraham has just been confronted with this 
rhetorical question and, at least for the present, can only believe that it means just what 
it says. If Abraham believes-for now anyway-that nothing is too hard for YHWH, 
then it seems difficult to accept the necessary limitation on the divine power seen 
within Ben Zvi's reading of the text. Equally, if YHWH believes the statement of 
18: 14a, then Daube's reading is rendered difficult, though not impossible, since it relies 
on YHWH accepting Abraham's consistent but faulty-at least according to Daube's 
own individualistic preference-reasoning as a basis for divine justice, thus failing to 
act in accordance with the mode of justice agreed upon with the patriarch. More 
problematic is the fact that Daube's proposal is driven by the historical-critical 
assumption that Abraham sits between an era when communal thinking is the norm and 
an era when it is considered deficient when compared to individualistic judgement~ 
Abraham grasps after individualistic judgement for the righteous but is unable to ask 
for them alone. But if this evolutionary assumption is removed and the concept of a 
limited YHWH dismissed because of Gen. 18: 14a, the view that the whole text is 
solely interested in saving the righteous alone must be rejected. 
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H. Saving the Whole City of Sodom 
A second option for discerning Abraham's aim is that Abraham is actually 
interested in saving the whole city of Sodom rather than it being a necessary event for 
the salvation of the righteous-the line of interpretation taken by von Rad (1961:208; 
cf. also Skinner, 1910:305; Schmidt, 1976: 141-151; R. Davidson, 1979: 70; 
Brueggemann, 1982: 169; Mafico 1983: 15). For von Rad, the text is an exploration of 
a particular problem: 'What will happen if the result of the judicial investigation is not 
quite unambiguous, in that a majority of guilty men are nevertheless confronted by a 
minority of innocent men' (1961 :207). He argues that 'Abraham is not concerned with 
either the release from the city of the guiltless nor with their special preservation. [The 
patriarch] is concerned with something quite different and much greater, namely from 
beginning to end, with Sodom as a whole' (1961:208). For von Rad, therefore, the 
text is actually a critique of an old type of collectivism by a new one. In the past the 
righteous minority were punished for the sins of the majority. Now, however, they are 
to be the cause of the salvation of the wicked. Nevertheless, if the righteous are 
missing, the city is still lost. The mercy in view is conditional, being an integral 
element of the 'new' collectivism underlying Abraham's request. In this reading, 
YHWH must render a collective judgement and save Sodom, erring on the side of 
saving the righteous few rather than punishing the guilty many. 
A sub-set of this type of approach denies that Abraham's primary concern is 
with saving Sodom as such, and sees him as being mainly concerned with how 
YHWH's judicial investigation will reflect upon both the deity and divine justice itself. 
Skinner, for example, describes Abraham as investigating the principle that 'there is 
more injustice in the death of a few innocent persons than in the sparing of a great 
multitude' (1910:305; cf. R. Davidson, 1979:70). Mafico quotes Skinner approvingly, 
and adds that' Abraham is not pleading for Sodom nor for Lot and his household [or, it 
might be added, the righteous]. If this were the case he would have mentioned them 
by name to get an assurance of their safety' (1983:15). However, Abraham's narrative 
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context is one of a surpnse announcement of an investigation involving potential 
judgement upon a great number of people, and it seems strange that Abraham is 
neither watching and learning as YHWH expected nor interceding to save anybody but 
is debating the abstract mechanics of judgement. Given his lack of interest in the 
people involved such an Abraham should perhaps be considerably cooler and calmer 
that the Abraham whose confused arguments in vv. 23-25 are more suggestive of hasty 
formulation; it is also significant that the reduction in numbers in vv. 27-32 does not 
flow out of a coherent argument in vv. 23-25, it is only YHWH's lead in v. 26 which 
sends Abraham off in this direction. Equally, Mafico's secondary argument does not 
do justice to YHWH's announcement of his judicial investigation in vv. 20-21 ~ to have 
asked for a group would have been to say to the deity, 'regardless of your 
investigation, will you just save these people?' 
A second sub-set of this type of reading may see Abraham as desiring to save 
the wicked. W. Brueggemann, for example, views Abraham's vocation as outlined in 
w. 18-19 as involving notions of 'righteousness and justice' which do not simply 
signify moral obedience but also a 'passion for the ones who have violated God' 
( 1982: 169; cf also the grace-orientated 'Lutheranism' of Keil-Delitzsch 's approach, 
1980:230-1 and Morgenstern's hope that the righteous will, if left alone, eventually 
convert the wicked, 1965:124-25). But even this last view should not go so far as to 
see Sodom being saved if there are no righteous people there (but cf W. 
Brueggemann's attitude to Genesis 19; 1982: 163-67). Ultimately, all of these 
proposals tend towards a reading in which Abraham's aim is to have the city as a 
whole saved-for whatever reason-on the basis of the righteous ones who live in it. 
Yet the claim that any of this group of readings can account for the whole of 
this text is difficult to reconcile with Abraham's emphasis on the need to differentiate 
between the righteous and the wicked (18:23, 25), indeed on the profanity of failing to 
do so. As was noted with von Rad' s reading earlier (see ages 210-12), this reading 
assumes that a corporate judgement is what Abraham is seeking, and requires the 
consistent reinterpretation of 'individualistic' notions in corporate terms. But, of 
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course, the required degree of consistency in Abraham's mind is illusory since the 
premise of v 25b-making the righteous as the wicked-is being applied inconsistently 
in these arguments; it is called justice when no differentiation is made in reprieve but it 
is called profanity when the identical mechanism is applied in a situation incurring 
punishment. Given these problems, the view that Abraham is solely interested in 
saving the city cannot stand. 
I. Saving Only Lot 
Turner has noted the inconclusive nature of the debate between proponents of 
each of these two alternatives and proposed a different option. He suggests that 
Abraham has only Lot in mind when he bargains with YHWH over the fate of Sodom 
(1990a:79; cf. also e.g., Alexander, 1982:51-52; 1985:291; Lundbom, 1998:141-43~ 
Gunn, 1993: 181). Turner's primary reasoning concerns what he sees as the still-
possible role of Lot as Abraham's heir. Abraham does not yet believe YHWH's 
promise of a son to Sarah even following YHWH's statement in 18: 14a-Turner citing 
as evidence his willingness to give her to another man in Genesis 20-and persists in 
seeing Lot as one of the two half chances he has for an heir; the other being Ishmael 
(1990a:79-80). Abraham is obviously aware that Lot lives in Sodom and has been 
there for a considerable time (at least thirteen years; cf. Gen. 16: 15; 17: 1), a factor 
which should be remembered despite Genesis 18' s silence as to Lot's whereabouts. 
F or Turner then, Abraham's mode of argument is designed to save his kinsman even 
though, as he subsequently argues, Lot may not himself be righteous. Although the 
mechanism used by Abraham in Turner's reading is that of von Rad' s argument to save 
the whole of Sodom (cf. also Coats, 1985:124), there seems no reason why the 
alternative-saving only the righteous-could not also be the case provided the reader 
posits that Abraham regards Lot as righteous (Turner does not; Alexander, however, 
does regard Abraham's arguments as requiring Lot's righteousness because he believes 
that the patriarch tries to save his nephew on that basis rather than that of kinship, 
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1985:291). Following the destruction of the cities and the apparent saving of Lot 
regardless of Abraham's dialogue with YHWH, Turner wonders whether Abraham 
would have bothered to argue had he known that Lot would be saved anyway. 
Problems exist with seeing the salvation of Lot as the sole aim of Abraham in 
Gen. 18:23-25, however. Turner's arguments for Lot still being a possible heir to 
Abraham have already been discussed and rejected (see pages 151-53~ Turner's 
supplementary argument, that Abraham does not accept Gen. 18: 14a here because of 
his behaviour in Genesis 20, is unwarranted~ it is not necessary to assumes a constancy 
of character for the patriarch, and his later behaviour need not signify that he is 
similarly disbelieving here). Of course, it remains probable that Lot's fate would have 
been of considerable interest to the patriarch, who has already acted to save his 
kinsman in Genesis 14, but it seems rather strange that Abraham would jury-rig a 
mechanism of justice to save Lot rather than simply appeal to YHWH for the salvation 
of his nephew. This results in Turner suggesting a rather cumbersome mode of 
argumentation in which Lot will only be saved if some righteous person( s) exist( s) 
within Sodom, and if YHWH will then relent from punishing the city on their account. 
Even if YHWH agrees to relent on their account, Lot's salvation remains subject to 
their presence. Alexander's assumption of Lot's righteousness makes his own 
proposal that Abraham is seeking only the righteous more certain in outcome, but it 
would still seem considerably easier to appeal to YHWH to save Lot alone than to ask 
YHWH to refrain from punishing a whole city (so Keil-Delitzsch, 1980:230). Since 
Turner and Alexander's positions are parasitic on the two options already considered, 
they also have the strengths and weaknesses of those interpretations. This implies that 
their readings cannot stand if they are based on the need to accept either option alone, 
and that the view that Abraham's aim in speaking is to save Lot alone must be rejected. 
1. A Fragmented and Inconsistent Aim 
Given the conclusions already reached about the contradictions contained 
within that for which Abraham is asking, it should come as no surprise that no one of 
these interpretations can stand alone as explaining the aim of Abraham's words in 
18:23-25. Rather each option matches a strand of the fragmented and inconsistent aim 
contained in Abraham's opening comments. Those who accept that Abraham is 
arguing only for the righteous build on the strands which insist on strict differentiation 
(vv. 23, 25ab); they then have to account for his attempt to argue for the saving of the 
city in terms of Abraham's limited understanding (Daube, 1947: 157) or the inability of 
YHWH to save more than nine from a city (Ben Zvi, 1992:41-45; cf. also Roshwald, 
1989: 153). Those who argue for the saving of the city as Abraham's prime 
motivation build on the strand dealing with Abraham's attempt to save the city on 
account of the righteous people within it; they must either ignore the individualistic 
justice language altogether (cf. e.g., Kaminsky, 1995: 186; 1997:326), perhaps 
separating the two types of language into consecutive questions, showing Abraham 
moving from an individualistic justice to a corporate mercy (cf. e.g., Leibowitz, 
1973: 183) or re-interpret it as corporate language (cf. e.g., von Rad, 1961:208). And 
finally, although the form of Abraham's argument make it unlikely that he is solely 
interested in saving Lot, it seems equally unlikely that he is wholly indifferent to his 
nephew's situation. 
It is perhaps no wonder that such a maelstrom of concerns results in a complex 
and contradictory discourse. Each of these three options must somehow find a 
legitimate space in an account of w. 23-25. For the present it may be said that 
Abraham is concerned with all three options, with the differentiated individualistic 
justice of YHWH and the fate of the righteous, with the application of a corporate 
notion of mercy with the aim of saving the city as a whole, and-perhaps to a slightly 
lesser degree-with saving Lot (so also van Seters, 1975: 214). But he (and van 
Seters) is totally unaware of how disparate and contradictory his statements and 
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requests actually are. Such a conclusion means that Abraham's requests for justice 
cannot be ranked by the reader, since it is not clear exactly what he wants himself. 
Presumably, if Abraham could be asked in tum whom he wanted to save-Lot the , 
righteous or the city-he would answer yes to all by reprising the relevant strand of 
argument. In the light of Abraham's confusion, it is actually left to YHWH alone to 
decide how to respond and only the dialogue which follows that response can explain 
which of (or how much of) Abraham's aim(s) is(are) achieved. After all, the 
possibility remains that YHWH may simply call Abraham's attention to the confused 
nature of his request and either ask for clarification or offer resolution in some other 
direction. 
K. Could Lot Be One of the Righteous of Sodom? 
A point which merits further consideration here is the implication of the reading 
proposed here for our understanding of the role of Lot (and his daughters) in 
Abraham's argument(s). I have argued that Abraham is unclear as to his aim because 
he does not explicitly say what he wants, his words being contradictory. But I have 
also suggested that part of that aim must involve saving his kinsman Lot (and 
presumably any further kin in Sodom), and it must be assumed that Abraham thinks 
that his request will either do this or at least allow it as a strong possibility. But do his 
contradictions result in Lot's necessary destruction? It would seem unlikely, but then 
it is of the nature of contradictory discourse to have unintended consequences. Since 
Lot is male, the difference between gender-neutral and patriarchal models can be 
placed on one side-in both he would be in exactly the same positionl 47-while an 
147 His daughters, however, would not. In a patriarchal model of judgement, they would be 
wholly reliant upon the righteousness of either Lot (if the model is individualistic and if he. a "~., is 
able to count as righteous) or the righteous men of Sodom (in a corporate model or, again if he is able 
to count as righteous. Lot). The point to note here is that if Abraham does manage to save Lot-
surely his primary aim as far as saYing his kin are concerned-by any of his arguments. then they too 
will be saved. 
But in a patriarchal individualistic judgement. any female kin will also be lost. Perhaps. 
given Abraham' s attitude to Sarah in Gen. 12: 10-20, this is of no great concern to the patriarch: they 
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answer is sought to the following question: What does the application of either an 
individualistic or a corporate justice do for Lot? 
In order to deal with this question, the status of Lot within Sodom must be 
considered. Matico, for example, has argued that as a 'rl Lot does not count as one of 
the people of Sodom and that his personal righteousness is therefore irrelevant when 
YHWH searches for the righteous of Sodom (1983: 16). Lot then would indeed be as 
1. Skinner sees him, in a 'solitary and defenceless position' (1910:307). If this is the 
case then, the corporate saving of the city would result in Lot's salvation, but 
Abraham's contradictory insistence on saving the righteous alone would leave Lot with 
no explicit means of survival; any subsequent salvation of Lot (not to mention any 
other c'')a) would have to take place despite Abraham's words in Gen. 18:23-25. 
F.A. Spina has suggested the word 'immigrant' as the best English option when 
translating'a (1983:325), but this has been disputed by C. van Houton who in tum 
argues for the term 'alien'. She notes that while immigrant 'captures the connotations 
of social and political upheaval which are part of the origins of the 'a, and clearly 
distinguishes him from the pastoralist who moves from place to place as part of his 
occupation ... , an immigrant is someone who comes from elsewhere and is now settled, 
whereas an alien may be settled or may still be on the move' (1991:19). Both 
Abraham and Lot had left their homeland as commanded and gone to Canaan, to the 
land that YHWH had promised (Gen. 12:1-3). During an ensuing famine, they had 
travelled down to Egypt to be 'aliens' there (12: 10). Although both are, in some 
sense, aliens in Canaan, the fact that this is the land which was promised provides a 
nuance of permanence not found in their (temporary) visit to Egypt to survive the 
famine; Abraham is in effect a settled immigrant in Canaan. This distinction is 
important in considering Lot's status in Sodom. He has chosen to leave Canaan, to go 
to dwell in Sodom (and has now been there for more than thirteen years; cf. 16: 15; 
are, after aU, unable to inherit the promise of YHWH (cf. the experi~ of the da~ters of 
Zelophchad, Num. 27:1-7; d. 36:1-12). On the other hand, this may sunply be an UDlDteDdcd 
couequenc:e of Abraham's incoherence. 
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17: 1). He is, therefore, also an immigrant, but is settled in a different land to Abraham 
and one outside the promise of YHWH. Spina's definition of the 'immigrant' is 
therefore a useful starting point: 
ger in the Hebrew Bible refers to people who are no longer directly 
related to their original social setting and who have therefore entered into 
dependent relationships with various groups or officials in a new social 
setting. The ger was of another tribe, city, district or country who was 
without customary social protection or privilege and of necessity had to 
place himself under the jurisdiction of someone else (1983 :323-24). 
Is Lot then, as Mafico suggests, outside the reckoning of anyone dealing with the 
people of a city like Sodom? 
A canonical view of the .,~ is dependent to some degree upon the legal corpus 
of the Israelites relating to their treatment. Although one must be careful not to 
attribute a quasi-Israelite religion to the men of Sodom, the use of the term in Gen. 
19:9 inevitably invokes some sense of resemblance to the place of the .,~ in Israel. 
W. W. Fields defines the place of the .,~ in Israel-whether male or female (cf his 
1997:31-2)-under the following four points: 
1) A .,~ has some of the rights of an Israelite (Exod. 12:49). (a) Ifhe 
is circumcised he may eat the passover the same as a citizen (Exod. 
12:48), and must observe the Israelite regulations concerning it 
Exod. 12: 19~ Num. 9: 14)~ (b) he has the right to flee to one of the 
cties of refuge (Num. 35:15~ Josh. 20:9)~ (c) he has the right to a 
air trial (Deut. 1: 16)~ (d) he has the right to be paid at the end of 
ach day like any workman (Deut. 24: 14-15)~ and (e) he has the right 
o be instructed in the Torah in the sabbatical year during Succoth 
Deut. 31: 12). 
2) A .,~ has some of the responsibilities of an Israelite. These 
responsibilities include (a) circumcision (Exod. 12:48)~ (b) 
observance ofShabbat (Exod. 20:10~ 23:12; Deut. 5:14); c) 
observance of the prohibition against eating blood (Lev. 17: 1 0-16)~ 
(d) observance of Yom Kippur (Lev. 16:29); (e) observance of 
regulations concerning a burnt offering (Lev. 17:8-9; 22: 18-19; 
Num. 15:14,26-29); (f) reverence for the God of Israel (Lev. 
24:26,22); (g) recognition of the right of redemption ofa slave 
(Lev. 25:47-48); (h) eschewal of sacrifice to Molech on pain of 
death (Lev. 20: 2; cf Ezek. 14: 7); (i) avoidance of intentional sin 
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(Num. 15:30); (j) observance oflaws concerning sexual conduct 
(Lev. 18:26); (k) rejoicing at the offering of the firstfruits (Deut. 
26: 11); (I) suffering of the same penalties as an Israelite for 
blasphemy, murder or killing an animal (Lev. 24:15-22); (m) 
observance of the regulations concerning the ashes of the heifer 
(Num. 19:10); and (n) observance of terms of the covenant (Deut. 
29: 10). 
3) A ,~ has certain special rights and is free of some prohibitions. (a) 
He may glean leftovers in the fields which the owners were not 
allowed to take (Lev. 19: 10; 23 :22); (b) he may eat an animal found 
dead (which is forbidden to an Israelite, Deut. 14:21; cf Lev. 
11:39); (c) he shares in the tithes of the produce of every third year 
along with the Levites, the fatherless and the widows (Deut. 14:29); 
and (d) he is to be supported by Israelites just like the poor (Lev. 
25:35). 
4) A ,~ has a right to legal protection. Because Israel was a sojourner 
in Egypt, Israelites should be sympathetic to the sojourners in their 
midst (Exod. 22:21; 23:9; Lev. 19:33-34; Deut. 10:19; 23:8). This 
principle is repeatedly stated as the rationale behinds the legal status 
of the ,J (1997:33-34). 
Sodom has no such rationale and is probably not to be imagined as being quite so 
sympathetic to a 'a as Israel (the need for the Israelites to be encouraged to be caring, 
however, no doubt indicates that the opposite was often the norm even for 'the chosen 
people'). It is clear from Fields's work, however, that a ,~ was not reckoned a non-
person as Mafico suggests, even in texts in which their difference is emphasised (e.g., 
Deut. 14:21). Whether a temporary 'alien' or a settled 'immigrant,' the ,~ was not 
without rights. Two elements of the narrative which support this view are Lot's seat 
within the city gate, indicating a degree of stature within the city (cf perhaps also the 
betrothal of his daughters to 'locals') and the fact that when the men of Sodom come 
to mistreat the two 'alien visitors' and the 'alien immigrant' Lot in Gen. 19:4-11, the 
sense of divine and human outrage generated within the text is intelligible only if it is 
assumed that the 'rights' of real people have been violated. 
Lot then does count as a person in Sodom as far as YHWH and Abraham are 
concerned. He is an immigrant who is assumed to have rights (of some kind) and his 
righteousness is an issue here (contra Mafico). When Abraham argues to save the 
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righteous for their own sake, a righteous Lot will be one of those saved (and his 
daughters with him). When he argues that Sodom should survive because of the 
righteous, Lot may count as a righteous person whose presence will save the whole 
city. Abraham has not contradicted himself on this point at least. 
L. Why Does Abraham Speak At All? 
Having defined-to a limited degree-what Abraham was asking for and the 
aim(s) he wished to achieve, it is now appropriate to return to the first question with 
which this section began: Why does Abraham feel the need to speak at all? The elusive 
nature of the answers given here to the first two questions-that Abraham, in a 
confused speech, asks for contradictory forms of justice with relatively unclear goals-
means that a definitive answer is not available. Abraham's words are not a clear, 
calculated request calmly made; he is not a systematician offering a fully worked out 
argument. On hearing of the potential destruction of Sodom, the patriarch reacts to an 
event which he considers likely with almost every argument he could muster; at stake 
is the fate of his kinsman Lot, the righteous of Sodom, the wicked of Sodom, the city 
of Sodom, and perhaps the future of 'justice' itself 
Abraham demonstrates in his intervention his clear conviction that 'sweeping 
away', that is destroying (;'~9~), the city is obviously a live option for YHWH (cf e.g., 
Num. 16:26). This understanding results from a knowledge of the people of Sodom 
(though perhaps not as detailed as Morgenstern suggests: 'Abraham knew full well the 
wickedness of the people of Sodom and Gomorra', 1965:125), a knowledge of the 
justice of YHWH which the deity has assumed to be in Abraham's possession in w. 
17 -21, and a knowledge that YHWH's justice extends to the nations (cf e.g., Gen. 6-
10). It is also clear that, for Abraham, there is no question but that the guilty must be 
punished if they stand alone; there is no suggestion here that they can expect mercy 
without the presence of the innocent in their midst. 
Less clearly, it may be concluded that Abraham's impression of the justice of 
his God is not only that it must be transparently just, but also that he believes that his 
words are necessary for that justice to take place~ he is in some way protesting 'against 
the thought of an indiscriminate judgement' (Skinner, 1910:305). But since what he is 
asking for and what he wants are both unclear, it is impossible to be exact about what 
such a judgement is. On the one hand, it could be said that Abraham believes that 
YHWH might destroy the righteous with the wicked, 'flouting his usual principles' 
(recorded by Ps. 146:8-9 as 'the Lord loves the righteous .... but the way of the wicked 
he brings to ruin', Wenham, 1994:52). But because of the nature of Abraham's 
speech, it also remains an irrefutable possibility that Abraham is already expecting 
YHWH to offer an individualistic judgement and is intervening only to ask for a 
corporate judgement (so Landy, 1990: 109). It is further possible, though unlikely, that 
Abraham has the gender issue in mind here, wanting to reform YHWH's 'patriarchal' 
Of 'egalitarian' form of judgement into its opposite. In the exegesis offered here, 
however, that ambiguity will only be considered as a powerful side-effect rather than as 
a direct 'intended' assault. Ultimately, however, the exact cause of Abraham's 
intervention is beyond reach, and I can only conclude that Abraham's confusion also 
extends to this point. The patriarch speaks up but does not have a cogent reason for 
doing so~ more likely the shock of YHWH's pronouncement brings on a flurry of 
thoughts and prompts an intervention which might be described not only as 'bold and 
tentative' but also as 'incoherent' in aim and content. 148 
148 This is the principal problem with Rodd's use of this text to define a 'norm' against 
which Abraham is measuring the behaviour of the deity (1972: 138; 1994:211-12). Rodd's careful 
logical treatment of the alternatives misses completely the sheer illogicality of Abraham's request, 
flattening the text completely. Even the 'inescapable' conclusion that Abraham deliberately sets up 
an external standard is rendered questionable by the possibility that Abraham is seeking more than an 
individual 'justice'. 
Even if it is allowed that a 'norm' is being used by Abraham in some strands of his speech, 
this need not indicate that justice is being raised over YHWH by Abraham or by the tex1; Abraham's 
lack of anything resembling systematic thinking precludes the view that he sees YHWH as necessarily 
having to submit to a higher law (though it may be 'seen' here) and, as will soon become clear, 
YHWH's refusal to clarify Abraham's words leaves the process of education open-ended and results. 
for the present, in the tex1's opacity. An examination of the place of this text in such rarefied 
philosophical, theological, and ethical debate must await an examination of the whole of the biblical 
witnesses. a task obviously far beyond this thesis. 
In conclusion, Abraham asks for YHWH to act justly but unknowingly sets up 
two self-contradictory premises which must be followed, one involving a individualistic 
justice which differentiates between righteous and wicked, the other involving a non-
differentiated corporate justice. (He also unintentionally introduces an ambiguity into 
the discussion with regard to the gender of the righteous.) His aim( s) is( are) therefore 
a complex bundle which includes his wish to save the city, to see a differentiated 
justice to save the righteous, and to save his kinsman Lot. With the possible exception 
of the saving of Lot, the assigning of rank to them is beyond the interpreter. 
Abraham's intervention arises from undefinable motives. It may be said that 
Abraham's view of his God is that he should be just, but what that ultimately entails is 
lost in the twists and turns of his argument. He does not, however, suggest at any 
point that the wicked be reprieved for their own sake. In the ensuing dialogue, the 
interplay between Abraham's beliefs and aims and the response of YHWH may shed 
some light on the implications of Abraham's opening challenge in vv. 23-25. 
M. The Response of YHWH 
Within the exegetical history of Gen. 18:23-32, YHWH's response to 
Abraham's opening words has virtually always been understood as an affirmation of 
the patriarch's argument. This has been the case regardless of whether an exegete sees 
the aim of the argument as an individualistic ( cf Westermann's 'God assents to 
Abraham's request,' 1985:292) or a corporate justice (cf von Rad's 'as Yahweh's 
grace is willing', 1961 :208). But if that pattern is followed here, YHWH will only be 
affirming the patriarch in his contradiction. Is this what happens when YHWH 
responds in my reading? Or will the deity simply call Abraham on the confused nature 
of his request, and offer resolution in some other direction? Will the contradiction be 
resolved in some unforeseen way? Will we finally get to learn what the judge of all the 
earth must do exactly? 
YHWH responds to Abraham's complex speech by taking up Abraham's 
request that the city be saved if it contains fifty righteous people and acceding to its 
contents, making the indefinite request of v. 24 definite (Schweizer, 1983; cf. also 
Gossai's ' Yahweh ... makes the move from probability to concreteness', 1995: 60). 
YHWH has not investigated Sodom and does not yet know how many righteous he 
will find there, but if the fifty are found, the city will be saved. However, YHWH does 
not respond-positively or negatively-to Abraham's individualistic differentiation 
between the righteous and the wicked in punishment or to his question as to whether 
the judge of the Earth will do justice. Neither does the deity refer to Lot. Nor is any 
response to the gender issue offered-YHWH always using the ambiguous term 
Cp''I:r~-though the deity's actions in Genesis 19 may yet provide clarification on this 
point. In effect YHWH only offers a clear response to the strand of Abraham's words 
in which no distinction is made between the righteous and the wicked in judgement, 
only taking up the corporate notion of judgement. But why? 
Two possible reasons occur to this reader. The first is that perhaps I should 
apologise to Brueggemann for my earlier dismissal of his characterisation of Abraham 
as YHWH's teacher (see page 216). Perhaps YHWH simply does not understand the 
contradictions any better than Abraham does~ the bad teacher Abraham has an even 
worse pupil. Perhaps YHWH's lack of response indicates folly and not wisdom. But 
given this narrative's placement within the context of the divine education of Abraham, 
the one who will command the chosen people to follow the way of YHWH and be its 
first great teacher, it seems more likely that YHWH's silence is supposed to form a 
part of that process. YHWH affirms one strand of Abraham's argument, but does not 
point out the contradictions in his requests or reject-either explicitly or implicitly-
any the alternatives presented. Most significantly of all, YHWH never defines what the 
judge of all the earth must do in order to be just. Although Abraham, having received 
an affirmative reply to the corporate strand of his argument, continues in a manner 
which involves pursuing that strand to the exclusion of all others, this does not 
necessarily mean that he is entitled to assume that he now knows what the Judge of all 
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the earth must do. The process of education begun in Gen. 18: 17 -21 will not be so 
easily completed. It is only within the later history of Israel (and beyond) that the 
numerous tensions in Abraham's words will be brought to the surface again, and the 
process of education as to the nature of YHWH' s justice continued. 
In responding to the deity's acceptance of the corporate strand of his opening 
speech, Abraham begins v. 27 with a declaration of his own unworthiness to speak to 
YHWH: 'Let me take it upon myself to speak to the Lord, I who am but dust ("~l!) 
and (.,~~) ashes' (cf for this alliterative pairing, Job 30: 19; 42:6; Sir. 10:9; 17:32; 
40:3). He then repeats his request but proceeds to ask what will occur if the fifty 
righteous (plural) are less five (v. 28ab); that is if less than half the city are righteous. 
YHWH again agrees that he will spare the city on their account (v. 28c). Abraham 
repeats the process a further four times, lowering the required number by five to forty, 
and then by ten each time until the figure of ten righteous is reached. Each of these 
exchanges moves from the indefinite question 'if. .. will you destroy?' to the definite 
response, 'I will not', based, of course, on the presence of that number of the 
righteous. But there is also a consistent use of terms by Abraham indicating his fearful 
attitude to what he is doing: 'Oh do not let the Lord be angry if I speak' (v. 30); 'Let 
me take it upon myself to speak to the Lord' (v. 31, mirroring v 27a). Finally, 
Abraham in fear and trembling asks for the last time: 'Oh do not let the Lord be angry 
if I speak just once more. Suppose ten are found there'. With YHWH's agreement 
that ten will suffice to save the city, Abraham ceases his requests and returns to his 
own place (at Mamre, cf 18: 1). YHWH also departs. 
This process of reducing the number of righteous required for saving the city 
gives some further insight into Abraham. Westermann argues that because Abraham 
already knows the outcome of the investigation, the traditional view of these verses as 
exhibiting 'bargaining, beating down, haggling with God' on behalf of Sodom is 
incorrect (1985:291). Westermann, however, views Abraham as having the knowledge 
of a post-exilic reader who already knows of the destruction, in effect denying the 
character his own narrative existence (cf. also Lundblom, 1998: 141-43); this is 
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unacceptable in a canonical reading (if it is acceptable in any other!). Having 
originally expressed his desires incoherently in w. 23-25 and subsequently seen the 
corporate strand of his words taken up by YHWH, Abraham now pushes that strand to 
its limit. If a certain number will save the city, what is that number? If-with Jacob-
it is half the (men of the) city, will less than half suffice? Is this about numbers at all? 
Abraham here pursues what has now become his primary interest in saving the city 
(following YHWH' s response), but betrays a secondary interest in the limits of the 
justice of YHWH in that salvation. Having been pointed in this particular direction by 
YHWH's response to his initial statement, Abraham doggedly-and consistently-
pursues this strand of argument to a conclusion (of sorts). 
N. The Ten Righteous 
Much comment has been occasioned by Abraham's ceasing at the figure of ten 
righteous people and his implied refusal to proceed down to a solitary righteous 
individual. Although for some, YHWH is the one who is responsible for this 'failing', 
his demeanour causing Abraham to stop (e.g., Wenham, 1994:53), nothing that the 
deity says or does actually gives any indication that this is so~ it is only Abraham's 
repeated statements of unworthiness and entreaties for YHWH not to be angry which 
may give this impression and these are more naturally interpreted as indications of 
Abraham's fraught state of mind. But does Abraham 'fail' to go further or has he got 
what he wanted? 
Sometimes the problems attached to the figure ten are simply glossed over (and 
Abraham is usually let off the hook of being a 'failure'). Wenham notes that the 
process is stopped at ten but then simply says that there was not even one righteous in 
Sodom, effectively leaving a 'hole in the text' as to what would have happened to less 
than ten found in this situation (1994:53; cf also Matico, 1983:15-16; R. Davidson, 
1979:70; Ben Zvi, 1992:35-36, footnote 2; Coats, 1985:120).149 Another way of 
avoiding the issue is for the interpreter to be mysterious, even opaque, as with 
Skinner's comment that the reduction continues 'till the limit of human charity is 
reached' (1910:306; mistakenly attributed to Keil-Delitzsch by Mafico, 1983: 15); this 
implies that the city should not be saved on behalf of nine righteous people but gives 
no comprehensible rationale for this decision (cf. also Clements, 1985 :22). Similarly, 
von Rad' s view that the decision to stop at ten safeguards the uniqueness of the future 
messianic one leaves this narrative in a judicial limbo (1961:209). 
Others attribute the ceasing to Abraham's having 'achieved' his aim to save 
only Lot. 1. Lundblom, for example, argues that the number of the members of Lot's 
family explains why Abraham ceases at the number ten rather than go down to five or 
below (1998: 141-43; a view echoed by some Jewish exegetes; cf. e.g., Ginzberg, 
1947:252, Gen. R. 49: 13). His case is rendered problematic, however, because he 
assumes that Abraham already knows of the destruction of Sodom (cf. Westermann's 
flaw!) and so does not go below ten because he knows that to do so would leave Lot's 
escape unexplained. 
Abraham's self-description in 'fear' terms has led to the ceasing at ten being 
ascribed to Abraham's inadequacies. Gossai suggests that Abraham's ceasing at ten 
both demonstrates his 'lack of imagination' as to the potentialities of YHWH's justice 
and betrays his fear and mistrust of the deity (1995:64-65; cf. also one of Roshwald 
possibilities, 1989:155). Taken in the light of Gossai's view of Abraham as seeking a 
consistent goal in 22b-32, this is problematic because it assumes that YHWH is 
prepared to act unjustly on the basis of his dialogue partner's inadequacies (1947: 157), 
a position which would take YHWH's silence about the contradictions in Abraham's 
words to unreasonable extremes; it is one thing for YHWH to accede to one view of 
justice rather than another, but quite another thing for YHWH to fail to carry out a 
149 A variant suggested by Landy involves recognising this 'hole' as creative: followi~g 
Abraham's 'Socratic' questioning of the deity. his failure to pursue his line of reasoning to Its 
conclusion (so \'cry unlike Socratcs!) results in a 'final joke: our expectations are simply abandoned. 
momentarily bamed' (1990: 110). 
particular form of justice correctly simply because Abraham is either too frightened or 
too stupid to ask for less than ten to save the city. 
Alternatively, an implicit narrative assumption, 'uncovered' by some of those 
who have taken the view that Abraham is only interested in saving the righteous (Ben 
Zvi, 1992:41-45; Roshwald, 1989:153), has been invoked to explain the significance of 
the number ten; it is argued that due to the deity's non-omnipotence, YHWH cannot 
save more than that number from out of the city. This limitation is also implicit in the 
positions of those who argue from the importance of the number ten in the Ancient 
Near East; Schmidt, for example, suggests that fifty equals an extended family with ten 
equalling the smallest group (1976: 151-56). On this view, less than ten righteous 
people do not constitute a group at all. Because they are individuals who can 
therefore be removed from the city, Abraham does not need to ask for the city in order 
for them to be saved (so Westermann, 1985:292; Loader, 1990:30-31). But 
Westermann's comment that 'if there are 50 just in the city, then God has 10 spare il 
so as not to destroy them with the wicked' makes explicit the non-omnipotence of 
YHWH underlying these attempts to account for the number ten (1985:291-my 
italics; also noted by Ben Zvi, 1992:40-41, footnote 2). Obviously, having already 
rejected the view that YHWH cannot remove more than nine from the city as 
incompatible with Abraham's-at least temporary-acceptance of Gen. 18: 14a, this 
option is less than convincing to a canonical reader. 
In the light of such difficulty in explaining a ceasing at ten, the views of those 
who argue that the number ten has little or no significance prove more convincing to 
this canonical reader. Sailhammer suggests that since the next reduction from ten by 
ten is zero, the patriarch's conclusion may be considered appropriate and indicates that 
any righteous element in the city will suffice, Abraham and YHWH having established 
the general principle that any righteous element may be considered sufficient reason by 
YHWH not to destroy the city (1992:170). As Brueggemann puts it: 'The numbers 
are incidental. The principle is established ... By the new mathematics of 18:22-
33 ... one is enough to save' (1982:172-73; also listed as a possibility by Roshwald, 
1989: 155). Gossai, having blamed the ceasing on Abraham's weakness, nevertheless 
also concludes: 
One might very well ask, how would Yahweh respond had Abraham 
asked: 'and if one righteous person is found? What then Lord, will you 
destroy Sodom?' for the sake of one. Indeed we are surprised that 
Abraham does not pursue this any further, given the fact that he was 
aware that Lot was in Sodom. Though one may only speculate here, the 
reader has ample basis to believe that God would have saved the city 
(1995:64). 
Ultimately, the biggest argument in favour of the 'meaninglessness' of the number ten 
is the sheer difficulty of otherwise explaining its significance as a point of ceasing. 
At the conclusion of the dialogue between YHWH and Abraham, they have 
agreed that the issue that will be foregrounded here is the salvation of the city of 
Sodom on the basis of the existence of the righteous within it, almost certainly even 
down to a single figure. It is still not apparent, however, if women (or children) will be 
taken as counting as righteous or not. If YHWH finds a righteous figure (required 
gender presently unclear), the city will be spared, with God's non-punishment of the 
wicked in this act of (corporate) justice being for the sake of others-the righteous-
and not for the sake of the wicked. YHWH does not answer Abraham's other 
statements at all, but chooses in his education of the patriarch to grant one request that 
denies aspects of another and not to call Abraham's attention to the contradiction. In 
this setting, corporate notions are chosen by YHWH over individualistic ones-non-
differentiation over differentiation. The subsequent Sodom narrative will not therefore 
decide what YHWH must always do to be just, it will not define the criteria demanded 
by Gen. 18:25, but it will form the first educative example of YHWH the judge in 
action. Of course, two possible outcomes would cohere with the judgements of the 
individualistic model~ if all are innocent or if all are wicked, then the outcome is 
identical in both models of judgement. But if the wicked gain salvation for the sake of 
the righteous few, then the exemplar of divine judgement set by YHWH before the 
face of Israel will be an act already described by Abraham as 'profane'. 
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Chapter 6 
A Canonical Exegesis of the Sodom Narrative, Part 2: Genesis 19 
I. The Arrival of Two Visitors in Sodom (19: 1-3) 
A. Arrival at Sodom 
Genesis 19 opens with the arrival of the two 'outcry investigators' at the gate 
of Sodom in the evening (one of the three visitors of Gen. 18:2 remaining to dialogue 
with Abraham in 18:23-32, but not as or as sale representative ofYHWH as Wenham 
argues, 1994:54). They are now openly designated as angelic figures by the narrator, a 
designation which will be used to contrast their real identities with the identities 'seen' 
by the inhabitants of Sodom. It is not necessary to emend the text here to 'men' in 
agreement with vv. 12, 16 as BHS suggests because it is the dual aspect of the 
men/angels which is of interest here; the 'angels' are referred to as 'men' by the men of 
Sodom (19:5) and by Lot (19:8), with neither recognising the presence of YHWH 
through his angelic representatives. 
The 'men' arrive in the evening and encounter Lot 'sitting in the gate of 
Sodom' (C·'9--Ul~f J~""). According to Matthews, 'the fact that Lot has won a place 
in the gate suggests he has won a measure of acceptance from the citizens of Sodom 
since this is a place reserved for business and legal transactions' (1992:4; cf. e.g., Gen. 
23:10, 18; Deut. 21:19-21; Ruth 4:1-12; 2 Sam. 18:24; 2 Kgs 7:1; Job 5:4; 29:7; Ps. 
127:5; Provo 31:23; Isa. 29:21; Amos 5:10,12,15). The prospective marriages of his 
two daughters to men who are either men of the city or C'}~ so closely assimilated as 
to be indistinguishable from the men of Sodom (19: 14) also implies that although he 
remains a 1~, Lot is also being assimilated into the city's life.l~o Wenham, however, 
150 Some rabbinic sources go so far as to argue that Lot has been appointed as a judge (cf. 
Hershon. 1885:206) or c\'en as chief justice (e.g., Gen. R. 50:3) in Sodom. 
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suggests that there is a strange contrast between the implication that Lot is a 
'respected member of the community,' and his apparent isolation in the gate itself: 
does 'Lot's sitting by himself indicate his estrangement from the men of Sodom' 
(1994: 54)? Or is it perhaps an early indication of the dissolution of the men of Sodom 
themselves, with them actually present with Lot but wholly disinterested in 'appearing' 
to greet the visitors themselves? 
B. An Invitation ... and Acceptance 
Lot sees (tQi'-~~~J) and arises to meet the two (CQ~'JP:'? C~:J) before bowing 
his face to the ground before them (;-r~~~ C~;I~ ~nI3~~J). He then addresses them as 
'my lords,' '~,~, and consistently uses plural forms (~J''?l C~;rtll n'~ -,~ ~~ nm 
C~f~'J( C~i?;;tJ C~~~~;:tl C~'?~J ~~rr:q) In contrast to Abraham, Lot does not 
recognise his visitors as representatives of YHWH. He requests that they tum aside 
and come to the house 'of your (pI.) servant (C~;rtll),' stay (for the night), and wash 
their feet (l9:2~ cf Gen. 18:4-5). Lot's use of servant here resonates ironically with 
that of Abraham because of his lack of recognition of the men as representing YHWH~ 
Abraham puts himself forward as the servant of YHWH, but Lot claims no such thing. 
In the light of the protocol of hospitality (see page 181), it is clear that Lot's 
invitation is actually out of place~ as Matthews puts it, 'he is a resident alien ... and 
therefore cannot represent the city in this matter' (1992:4). It is not explained why Lot 
chooses to act in this way, but the impression given is that either no Sodomite was 
present in the gate (so Wenham above, with Lot's position there indicating his 
estrangement from the community) or that none wished to offer hospitality to the two 
visitors (Lot's position then being a sign of his acceptance by the community~ Driver's 
view that Lot wished to claim the privilege for himself fails to recognise how 
inappropriate such a motive would be, 1909: 198). Given that the men of Sodom are 
well aware of the visitors later and the general unlikelihood of Lot being alone in the 
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busiest part of the city, it is most likely the latter which is in view here; the obligation 
to offer hospitality to travellers is not being fulfilled in Sodom, and this despite the lush 
land in which the city is set (cf. Gen. 13:10).151 Lot's invitation is therefore similar to 
that of the old man from Ephraim who, though dwelling in Gibeah away from his own 
place, invites the visiting Levite to stay with him; both are invitations to those spumed 
by the responsible local populace (Judg. 19: 16-21). His desire to offer hospitality may 
then be strengthened by an awareness that there is no hospitality to be had in the city 
(Matthews, 1992:4); indeed, there may only be danger to visitors in the streets and Lot 
is here demonstrating his desire to keep the men safe (cf. Skinner, 1910:307). If 
Fields's description of the 'night as danger' motif is accepted, the' dark' terminology in 
this passage also contributes to a general atmosphere of menace (1992: 17-32; 
1997: 103-15). But by acting contrary to his fellow community members, Lot is 
already giving his watching neighbours a reason to turn on him. 
The angels properly refuse Lot's invitation as the conventions of hospitality 
dictate (Matthews, 1992:4). They may fear for Lot's safety if they accept (so 
Wenham, 1994: 54-5), but it is also possible that they simply wish to stay in the J"n~ 
to investigate the outcry (so Keil-Delitzsch, 1980:232; Hershon's suggestion that they 
wished the townsfolk to see their judges and repent [1885: 107] is highly unlikely 
because no opportunity for repentance is explicitly offered by the men, Lot's sons-in-
law excepted). The J"n~ was not simply any street but the main 'square' of the town 
(cf. e.g., Judg. 19:15, 17,20; 2 Sam. 21:12; Isa. 15:3; 59:14; Jer. 5:1; 9:2C Amos 
5:16; Ezra 10:9; Neh. 8:1). Lot took no offence at their refusal, however, and 'pressed 
lSI Bechtel's analysis of hospitality in Sodom is skewed by her unfortunate categorisation of 
outsiders as wholly 'dangerous' (1998: 112-15; here, characterising the two visitors as potential spies 
from foreign kings) and her subsequent failure to recognise that the aim of the code of hospitality is 
the transformation of the stranger from potential threat to ally by the offer of hospitality. The men of 
Sodom, as a corporate group in Bechtel's sense, havc it "ithin their own power to negate the threat 
posed by the visitors. But the invitation which negates the danger can only properly be offcred by the 
male head of household or a male citizen of a to\\n or \'illage. It is not the case, as Bechtel argues, 
that Lot as both insider and outsider is more open to those outside (1998: 115), Rather Lot's im'itation 
to the men is an improper one, being, at best, an attempt to deal with the failure of the men of Sodom 
to carry out their obligations and, at worst. a prevention of their offering hospitality which may put 
them in some danger. 
them strongly' (,.~~ c~-"~~~l) to accept his invitation (Gen. 33:11; Judg. 19:7; 2 Kgs 
2:17~ 5:16~ cf. 1 Kgs. 13:14-19). But this comes perilously close to a coercive 
imprisonment, with Gossai noting the negative effect of the occurrence of "~!l in Gen. 
19:9 and Judg. 19:22 (1995:77). This impression is mitigated somewhat, however, by 
Lot's prior provision of a time-scale for their stay with him in v. 2 (Matthews, 1992:4), 
and the men acquiesce and tum aside to his house, their business in the square 
evidently proving not too pressing an engagement. 
C. A Meal for Lot's Guests 
Having brought the guests within the (relative) safety of his doorway, Lot 
prepares food for them, i1~~~, 'a feast' perhaps approaching that prepared for the 
weaning of Isaac (Gen. 21:8), for a wedding (Gen. 29:22; Judg. 14: 10), or for royal 
entertaining (Gen. 40:20~ 1 Kgs 3:15~ Wenham, 1994:54). 
He-or, as with Abraham (18:6-8), more likely his female family (contra 
Gossai who seems to think Lot should be faulted for not involving his family in 
preparing the meal, 1995: 80-81), subsequently discovered to be a wife and two 
daughters-hurriedly bakes unleavened bread, 'n"~~' (cf. Exod. 12:39~ Judg. 6: 19-21; 
I Sam. 28:24), and then his guests eat (v. 3). Lot's actions here demonstrate his 
righteous fulfilment of part of the protocol of hospitality (cf. Keil-Delitzsch' s 'Lot was 
entertaining his guests with the greatest hospitality,' 1980:232). However, his 
presence among those who fail to care for the travellers as they should means that his 
own offer of hospitality inevitable reflects their hostility. He is stepping into the gap 
and that is good, but the fact that he has chosen to live among the men of Sodom is 
emphasised by both his and his guests having to step outside the norms of the protocol 
of hospitality. That he does not thereby necessarily sin is the clear implication of the 
assumption-shared by both YHWH and Abraham-that righteous people may exist 
amongst the wicked (cf. Gen. 18:23-32); Lot cannot be made necessarily wicked by 
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his dwelling in Sodom. It is rather his decision to adopt the values of his inhospitable 
neighbours which will eventually call Lot's behaviour into question. 
D. Contrasting Lot with Abraham 
R.C. Culley lists the following similarities and contrasts which exist between 
Genesis 18: 1-8 and 19: 1-3, with italics indicating verbatim agreement (1976: 54-55; 
adapted slightly to fit my reading of 18:3-see underlined): 
Genesis 18: 1-8 
Abraham was sitting at door of tent 
He looked up, saw three men standing 
He saw, ran to meet .... 
bowed to the ground 
Offered hospitality (He said: My Lord ... 
Wash your feet ... ): rest and food 
They accepted 
Abraham prepared food 
They ate 
Genesis 19:1-3 
Two men come to Sodom 
Lot was sitting at gate of Sodom 
Lot saw, rose to meet, 
bowed... to the ground 
Offered hospitality (He said: My lords ... 
Wash your feet .. .): to spend the night 
They refused but Lot urged 
They accepted 
Lot prepared food 
They ate 
Fields regards it as obvious that the two narratives as a whole are 'complementary' 
with 'Abraham's hospitality ... the prototype for Lot's' (1997:39). Alongside these 
parallels, the differences between the two narratives have also been emphasised; Fields, 
for example, comments upon what he sees as a 'night as danger' motif, with a contrast 
being drawn between Abraham's day-time visitation and Lot's night-time visitation 
246 
(1997:103-14).152 When Gossai writes that although 'Lot cannot be faulted for this 
temporal setting, we have an immediate though subtle indication that this act of 
hospitality will be different from that of Abraham' (1995 :76), he illustrates the most 
significant use of these similarities and contrasts, their employment in various attempts 
to compare and contrast the characterisation of Lot with Abraham, usually in order to 
suggest that Lot is either righteous (e.g., Skinner, 1910:307; Morgenstern, 1965: 126; 
Schmidt, 1976:141; Vawter, 1977:235-36; Alexander, 1985:289-91; Clements, 
1985:20; Ben Zvi, 1992:42; Matthews, 1992:6; Wenham, 1994:55-56; Rashkow, 
1998:106-107) or unrighteous (e.g., Keil-Delitzsch, 1980:233; Coats, 1983:141,143; 
Jeansonne, 1988:123-29; Turner, 1990b:94-95; Gossai, 1995:76-81). 
E. Lot the Righteous 
It is perhaps the interpretation of T.D. Alexander which most emphasises Lot 
as a righteous man, taking his lead from 2 Pet. 2:7-8 (cf. also Driver, 1909: 196): 
F or if God did not spare the angels when they sinned, but cast them into 
hell and committed them to chains of deepest darkness to be kept until 
the judgement; and if he did not spare the ancient world, even though he 
saved Noah, a herald of righteousness, with seven others, when he 
brought a flood on a world of the ungodly; and if by turning the cities of 
Sodom and Gomorra to ashes he condemned them to extinction and 
made them an example of what is coming to the ungodly; and if he 
rescued Lot, a righteous man greatly distressed by the licentiousness of 
the lawless (for that righteous man, living among them day after day, 
was tormented in his righteous soul by their lawless deeds that he saw 
and heard), then the Lord knows how to rescue the godly from trial, and 
to keep the unrighteous under punishment until the day of judgement-
especially those who indulge their flesh in depraved lust, and who despise 
authority (2:4-10; NRSV-my italics). 
AJexander argues that the parallel structural details between 18: 1-8 and 19: 1-3 indicate 
that Lot is 'being carefully compared with Abraham'. He continues: 'by caring for the 
152 This is also echoed by the title of Letellier's book on Genesis 18-19. Day in .\/amre, Night 
in Sodom (1995). 
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needs of others he resembles Abraham, and since Abraham is commended for his 
generosity Lot is also therefore to be viewed in a favourable light. Lot's hospitality is 
a mark of his righteousness' (1985:290). Alexander defends Lot against a charge of 
drunkenness in 19:30-38 through a comparison with Noah (Gen. 6:9). He concludes 
by looking at Lot's offer of his virgin daughters to the men of Sodom, and attempts to 
avoid a characterisation of it as an act of wickedness. He writes: 
Concerning the events in Sodom we should not judge too harshly a man 
placed in an extremely dangerous and apparently impossible situation. 
Faced with the demands of the crowd Lot had few options. How easy it 
would have been for him to let the mob have its way. Yet rather than 
yield to their wishes he is prepared to protect his guests at the cost of 
dishonouring his own daughters. Lot's predicament calls for a 
sympathetic understanding rather than a harsh condemnation (1985:291). 
Others have argued that cultural factors are involved and have implicitly accepted 
those values as reasonable in order to portray Lot as righteous. B. Vawter, for 
example, writes that '[t]he spectacle of a father offering his virgin daughters to the will 
and pleasure of a mob that was seeking to despoil his household would not have 
seemed as shocking to the ancient sense of proprieties as it may seem to us' 
(1977:235-36~ but cf Wenham's opposite conclusion, 1994:55). Indeed, some go 
further in seeing this episode as being pro-Lot, Skinner even stating that the event 'is 
recorded to [Lot's] credit' (1910:307). Wenham writes that Lot is 'shown to be a man 
of no mean courage. True to the cardinal principle of oriental hospitality that 
protecting your guest is a sacred duty, he bravely goes out to face the mob alone', 
before making his 'unfortunate offer' (1994:55-56~ but cf his subsequent quotation 
[57] of Procksch's description of an indecisive and anxious Lot, 1924: 129). Jacobs 
suggests that Lot knew that the men of Sodom would not accept his offer (1974:455). 
Matthews, however, argues that when Lot tries to protect his guests through the offer 
of his two virgin daughters, it is not unfortunate, but is rather a sign of hospitable 
'extravagance' in which 'an asset...in terms of the bride price they could command and 
of the children they could produce' is being sacrificed (1992:6).153 
F. Lot the Wicked 
S.P. Jeansonne takes the alternative position, that Lot is unrighteous, and 
argues that if one examines the Abraham narratives as a whole 'the reader sees Lot fall 
from his noble beginnings as one accompanying Abraham to a corrupt existence in 
Sodom where his characterisation as one of the righteous is in serious doubt' 
(1988: 124),154 this process beginning when Lot and Abraham separate (Gen. 13 :8-12). 
Jeansonne denies that the similarities between the texts prove Lot's righteousness, and 
summarises the contrasts drawn between Abraham and Lot in Genesis 18: 1-8 and 
19:1-3: 
When Abraham caught a glimpse of the messengers, he 'ran to meet 
them' (Gen. 18:2), Lot simply 'rose to meet them' (Gen. 19: 1) displaying 
no effort to go in haste. Abraham knows that any service he might wish 
to render to the messengers must first find their acceptance. He asks 'if I 
have found favour in your eyes do not pass by your servant' (18: 3). Lot 
asks that the men come to his house without any humbling statement or 
qualifier (19:2). Abraham's direct address to the men offers rest and food 
(18:4-5), whereas the speech of Lot offers them rest alone (19:2), 
although the narrative later reveals in indirect discourse that a meal was 
prepared (19:3). The meals themselves are to be contrasted as well. 
Both have the meal prepared in haste, but the meal which is provided at 
Abraham's house is much more elaborately fashioned that the one at 
Lot's residence. Abraham tells Sarah to take 'fine meal' and to knead it 
153 Recent scholarship has trawled the commentaries ex1ensively for pro-Lot arguments. 
attempting to justify his behaviour here. Turner notes the excuses made for Lot by von Rad 
(1961:218; 'a compromise') and Coats (1985:121; 'less than heroic'). Gunn offers, but then rejects. 
the possibility that Lot's offer 'is an attempt to shock the assailants into a realisation of the enormity 
of their demand ("do not do evil") so that they desist altogether' (1993: 182). 
Rashkow provides her own list of apologists (1998: 100-10 I), including Vawter. Skinner 
(both mentioned above): Sarna (1989:135). Speiser (1964:123). and Leibowitz (1973:176); all of 
whom see the sacred duty of hospitality as sufficient reason to sacrifice the daughters. The latter is 
offered by Rashkow as an example of a female apologist for Lot. 
1 ~4 Landy is presumably thinking of this type of reader when he writes concerning 'Hum~ur 
as a Tool for Biblical Exegesis' (1990): 'We are far more likely to laugh at someone we ... despise 
(e.g., Lot) than at a character to whom we are committed' (104). 
249 
whereas Lot bakes unleavened bread (19:3) recalling the bread made in 
the dire circumstances in Egypt and surprisingly asks neither his wife nor 
his daughters to prepare anything. The account at Abraham's residence 
also tells the reader the care with which the tender calf was prepared and 
how curds and milk where brought along with it (18:7-8). In contrast the 
description of the meal Lot has prepared is glanced over in haste 
(1988: 126).ISS 
But for Jeansonne, the contrast between the righteous Abraham and the wicked Lot is 
strongest when the latter offers his daughters up to the men of Sodom in a shameful 
act ofwickedness. ls6 
G. Lot as Outsider to the Promise, Abraham as the Recipient of the Promise 
Each of these two interpretations is alike in seeing Lot as wholly one or the 
other; he is either a righteous man (Alexander) or an unrighteous-that is wicked-
man (Jeansonne). But there are difficulties with each position which lead to a less 
black and white conclusion. The principle flaw with viewing Lot as a wholly righteous 
man is that it does not deal with the increasingly negative characterisation of Lot in the 
preceding narratives (pointed out by Jeansonne) and in his subsequent actions 
concerning his daughters (19:30-38). In each of these texts Lot is portrayed as selfish 
and as increasingly absent from the promise made by YHWH to Abraham-he takes 
the good land around Sodom outside the land of the promise, Canaan. To suddenly 
ISS Gossai's attempt to further show that the bread Lot is offering is of comparatively poor 
quality and that therefore the feast was also poor is not particularly convincing (1995:78-80). 
156 Coats also understands the portrayal of Lot here in negative terms. But, in contrast to 
Jeansonne, his description of Lot has less to do with the contrast between righteous and wicked and 
more to do with the contrast between hero and buffoon (1983:144). Lot is 'unheroic', a 'foppish fool', 
'. jester', 'someone to be ignored' (1985:122-23). Nevertheless this view does reflect the 
rightcous/wicked divide in that while it is general passivity of Lot-he is • 'helpless object' 
(1983:144)-which leads to his characterisation as the fool, when he actually does ~e action ~ 
ofFering his daughters, it is an act of wickedness (though Coats himself merely clescnbes It as ~ 
8Dd unsucc:essful, 198':122). Similarly, Coats implicitly equates the 'hero Abraham' With the 
'righteous Abraham' (1983: 144-4') 
see him now as a paragon of virtue is suspicious to say the least. On the progression of 
Lot from dutiful heir to distant foreigner, Jeansonne's interpretation is to be preferred. 
Nevertheless, her reading does require careful nuancing. Turner has noted that 
most of her contrasts between Lot and Abraham are 'nothing more than the kind of 
slight differences one would expect in a sophisticated narrative that wanted to portray 
similarity without recourse to verbatim repetition'. Others are accounted for by Turner 
as being due to temporal factors or misinterpretation: for example, while the late 
arrival of the angels does leave little time for preparation of food, the 'feast' that Lot 
prepares is not necessarily a poor offering (1990b:91; cf. Esth. 5:6; Dan. 1 :5; Jer. 16:8; 
Job 1:5; Gen. 21:8); as Driver puts it, '[Lot] was not, it seems, less liberal in his 
hospitality than his uncle' (1909: 198). Jeansonne's desire to demonstrate the 
differences between Abraham and Lot makes a little too much of the evidence; Lot is 
not as black as Jeansonne paints him. 
That there are similarities and contrasts between Abraham and Lot is not in 
question. But at least as far as the initial comparisons of hospitality are concerned, Lot 
is as righteous as Abraham, and to that extent Alexander's comments can be echoed 
(so Turner, 1990b:93; after, all, as Morgenstern states, 'Lot had learnt the lesson of 
hospitality from Abraham' (1965: 126). But the act of sacrificing his daughters is 
more than a 'mistake' (Driver, 1909: 199); to this reader it can only be regarded as an 
act of wickedness (with e.g., Turner, 1990b:94-95; Jeansonne, 1988: 126, Keil-
Delitzsch, 1980:233) which should not be excused (contra e.g., Matthews, 1992:6; 
Vawter, 1977:235-36; Skinner, 1910:307). Matthew's attempt to see this as an 
extravagant gesture of hospitality is problematic because of his characterisation of a 
virtually identical action by the guest in Judg. 19:25 as 'callous' (1992: 10).157 
157 Lasine. however. states that: 
there is a world of difference between Lot' s offer and the analogous offer of the 
resident alien host in Gibeah. It is one thing to offer one' s daughters to a mob in order 
to fulfil one's duties as a host. and another to offer one's virgin daughter and the 
concubine of one's guest! The words and actions of the old host are almost identical 
to those of Lot at this point. but their effect is to invert Lot's overblown hospitality into 
inhospitality (1984:39). 
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Westermann's description of Lot's action as 'a desperate offer that knows no way out' 
(1985:302) is also problematic because Lot does have other options available; he could 
sacrifice himself (so Turner, 1990b:94; Gunn, 1993: 182) or reprove the men for their 
behaviour (so Hamilton, 1995 :35). But, of course, Lot does neither, preferring rather 
to sacrifice his daughters to the mob (cf. Tapp, 1989). 
Lot's characterisation then reflects a wavering between both righteous and 
unrighteous aspects. But when Leibowitz characterises Lot as 'an example of the 
average man, a study in mediocrity faithfully following in the steps of his master 
Abraham' (1973: 175), she has failed to realise that such 'wavering' between righteous 
and unrighteous behaviour is also a good description of the ethical behaviour of 
Abraham. Though many have followed Driver in seeing Abraham as 'attractively 
depicted, ... [as] dignified, courteous, high minded, generous, a man whom... God 
deems worthy of His confidence, visiting him as one friend visits another, bestowing on 
him promises, and disclosing to him his purposes' (1909: 191; e.g., Coats, 1983: 144-
45; Roshwald, 1989: 146), it is more accurate to note that the patriarch is also 
portrayed unattractively in previous narratives. While some have seen Lot as learning 
hospitality from a virtuous Abraham (e.g., Josephus, Ant. 1:200; PRE, 25), it is also 
very tempting to see Abraham's sacrifice of his wife in Gen. 12:10-20, with Turner, as 
offering a parallel to Lot's sacrifice of his daughters in Genesis 19 and to conclude that 
Lot may have learned a lot more from Abraham than how to treat visitors properly 
(1990b:95; cf. also Gunn, 1993: 191)! 
But Turner's own portrait of Abraham as consistently negative must also be 
rejected (along with that of Davies, 1995) because it does not do justice to the positive 
aspects of Abraham's characterisation; indeed, any contrast drawn between Lot and a 
consistent construction of Abraham as either a righteous or an unrighteous man is 
inevitably skewed. Lot's ethical behaviour in and of itself does not distinguish him 
I fail to sec, however, why one act is 'callous' and the other not. Evcn though there is a significant 
difference between these accounts, it is still the case that Lot acts without considcration of 
altcrnatiycs. his first choice of action being to sacrifice his daughters. 
from Abraham as Jeansonne believes. In fact the behaviour of the patriarchs as a 
whole has long been recognised as ethically problematic. In Childs's words: 
How can one ever use the response of the Patriarchs as an ethical norm 
when their conduct is filled with flagrant immorality? Abraham lied and 
traded his wife for personal gain. Sarah was ruthless with Hagar her 
rival. Jacob was a cheat and Moses a murderer (1985:212~ cf. also 
Hamilton, 1990:45-47). 
This has led both Childs (1985:218-21) and Hamilton (1990:47) to claim that the 
patriarchal narratives are actually concerned to show YHWH's faithfulness and not 
Abraham's (or Isaac's or Jacob's) fidelity to the deity. 
If Abraham is understood as a character wavering between righteous and 
unrighteous behaviour, then clearly the contrast between the patriarch and Lot cannot 
be a contrast on the basis of ethical behaviour at all. What truly contrasts Lot with 
Abraham is that the latter is still in the land of Canaan-and is therefore within the 
promise--whereas the former had decided to depart and go to Sodom. This is 
strongly emphasised when Abraham recognises YHWH (18: 1-3), but Lot initially 
remains ignorant (19:2), an indication of the distance which Lot has travelled away 
from his role as Abraham's heir~ he is 'wavering' on the edge as far as his ability to 
recognise YHWH is concerned (contra Skinner, who denies 'that Lot's spiritual vision 
was less clear than Abraham's, 1910:306; Coats also points out the inevitable element 
of comparison between Abraham's call on the name of YHWH in 13: 4 and Lot's 
choice of the wicked men of Sodom in 13: 10, 12b-13; 1985: 117). In what follows, it 
will be clearly demonstrated just how far Lot has departed from the promise. 
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Surrounding the House (19:4-11) 
A. The 'Men of the Sodom' 
As Lot's household prepares to sleep (~J~o/~ Oj~; cf Josh. 2:8; Judg. 19:22), 
the house is surrounded by the men of the city. E.A. Speiser, attempting to render the 
menace implicit in the niphal of J~~ with Oj~, suggests that the men of city 'closed in 
on the house' (1964:139; Hamilton offers the men of the city 'circled the house,' 
1995:33). The designation of those outside is fulsome and highly significant. Those 
outside are i1~~~ O~iJ-'~ li?t-'111 111~~ 0"9 "~~~ 1"IliJ "W~~, 'the men of the city, 
men of Sodom, from the youngest to the oldest, all the people to the very last' (for 
;,~~~ as 'one and all'; cf Gen. 47:21, Exod. 26:28; Deut. 13 :8; Isa. 56: 11; Jer. 51:31; 
Ezek. 25:9). Although often regarded as a gloss, 0"9 "~~~ links this description with 
that of the men of Sod om as 'wicked', as 'great sinners' against YHWH in Gen. 13:10, 
13; because of this link Rashi suggested that 0"9 "~~~ should actually be understood 
as 'evil men' (1900:77). According to Matthews, when the crowd later prove their 
iniquity, these 'carefully drawn legal phrases ... leave no room for question that every 
man in the city of Sodom (young and old, 'to the last man') is outside Lot's house, 
there can be no question that there are no righteous men, much less ten, within that 
city' (1992:5; cf also Skinner 1910:307; Westermann, 1985:301). Driver also notes 
that the encompassing description indicates the brazen nature of the men of Sodom 
who act wickedly in the open (cf his citation of Isa. 3:9 where of those accused, none 
hid their sin, 1909: 198). 
With the designation of those around the house as 'the men of Sodom' and as 
'the people', the question of the gender of the righteous and the wicked again surfaces. 
Clearly, for the commentators mentioned above, the 'men' of Sodom are just that, 
men; no women are in sight here. Though the occurrence of C~iJ-'~ may be held to 
suggest otherwise, it does seem likely that those outside the house are only the men of 
Sodom (following 'the people and their wives', OQ"~~~ O~iJ, in Neh. 5: I; cf. Gunn, 
25~ 
1993: 189) and that it is their behaviour which will occupy the narrative now. But if 
the 'men of Sodom' all prove wicked, will YHWH's investigation seek out the women 
who are absent and insist on an egalitarian judgement or will it be satisfied with a 
strictly patriarchal justice? 
Even if those outside-whether male alone in v. 4 or female in some later part 
of the investigation-eventually prove wicked, however, the question arises as the 
whether or not there is either a righteous man in the city in Lot or a righteous figure in 
Lot or any of the female members of his family? If so, the city-this reader, at least, is 
convinced-would be saved because of that one righteous man or figure. Although it 
is tempting to read the term 'men of Sodom' in v. 4 as an indication that Lot is outside 
of Sodom for the purposes of the arguments in Abraham's dialogue with YHWH, I 
have already argued that-in contrast to Speiser's partially true but very misleading 
definition of the 1a, as one lacking 'the privileges and protections enjoyed by the 
citizens,' (1964: 139)-it is possible for a 1a to be outside the designation for a people 
but still to have some rights and responsibilities within that people; for example, as 
being 'in Israel' but not being 'an Israelite' (see pages 229-33). Somewhat artificially, 
no other c"~a seem to be envisaged by the narrative as being in Sodom at this time 
(unless perhaps they are C"~a who are already so totally identified with the crowd that 
they can be termed 'men of Sodom'). Here, those living in Sodom (= Sodom and 
Gomorra = the cities of the plain) are effectively reduced to two entities: those outside 
the house (either the men of the city or, perhaps, all the people of the city) and those 
inside (either Lot or, perhaps, Lot and his female family). And it is the question of the 
righteousness or wickedness of these groups which is now in view. 
Those outside know that the angels are in the house of Lot, but of course do 
not know their true nature as representatives of YHWH. Neither does Lot and in what 
follows both Lot and the men of Sodom will refer to the angels as 'men'. On 
surrounding the house, the men of Sodom call to Lot (who is in the house) to 'bring 
them (the men/angels) out to us that we may know (;'~~~) them'. 
2:'5 
B. 'That We May Know Them' 
The meaning of this initial response of the men of Sodom to the presence of the 
two men in Lot's house is variously interpreted. For many, the word ;,~~~ has an 
obvious (homo)sexual connotation and the men of Sodom's desire for the two men is 
simply due to their sexual depravity.ls8 According to Skinner, the men of Sodom wish 
to carry out the act which 'derived its name from the incident', that is, to sodomise the 
two angels (which he presumably understands to involve penetrative anal intercourse), 
an act which he describes as an 'unnatural vice' (1910:307; cf also Wright, 1989; 
Wenham, 1991; White, 1995). But because of an increasing acceptance of-at least-
male homosexuality at the end of the twentieth century, an interest in the exact nature 
of the implied sexual act has arisen, exegetes no longer being content to assume the 
'obvious' depravity of homosexuals, not least because Lot's offer of females clearly 
implies that the men of Sod om were not simply 'homosexuals' (cf Gossai, 1995:83). 
Some, for example, have attempted to draw a distinction between 
homosexuality and homosexual rape, arguing that rape itself-regardless of who is 
being assaulted-is the crime involved (e.g., Gossai, 1995: 83; Carden, 1999). 
Hamilton notes in response four problems 
with the view that the prohibition here is only on homosexual rape. First, 
nowhere in the OT does the verb 111' have the nuance of abuse or violate. 
Second, the OT uses unmistakable language to relate rape incidents. Thus 
the Shechemites 'seized' and 'lay with' and 'humbled' Dinah (Gen. 34:2). 
Amnon 'forced' and 'lay with' his half-sister Tamar (2 Sam. 13: 14). 
Similarly, the biblical laws about rape also use these terms 'seize', 'lie 
with' (Deut. 22:25-27). Third, this interpretation forces one meaning on 
'know' in v. 5 (i.e. 'abuse') but a different meaning in 'know' three 
verses later (i.e. 'have intercourse with') for it is unlikely that Lot is 
saying: 'I have two daughters who have never been abused'. Fourth, such 
an interpretation forces these incredible words in Lot's mouth: 'Do not 
rape my visitors. Here are my daughters, both virgins-rape them!' 
I S8 Although R. Davidson assumes that the angels appeared to be young and physically 
attractive (1979:72). this is not essential; after all. the men of Sodom may even be 'depraved' enough 
to desire sexually the old and the ugly! 
Clearly, then the incident frowns on homosexual relations for whatever 
reason (1995:35). 
Hamilton's logic requires that the men of Sodom do not wish to rape the visitors but 
only to have sex with them: that is, if l'" in v. 8 indicates that Lot's daughters have 
not known a man, that they have not yet had consenting sexual intercourse, then it also 
must have no connotations of force in v. 5. This lack of force is seen as a feature of 
all sexual uses of l"\ and the lack of any other terms indicating force clinches 
Hamilton's view that the men of Sodom wish for voluntary homosexual sex with the 
men, but are offered voluntary heterosexual sex with the daughters. 
Dissatisfaction with Hamilton's account is initially raised, however, because if 
those outside are only interested in consenting sex, it becomes difficult to understand 
the response which follows Lot's offer of his daughters. If they are going to do a 
greater evil to Lot than they were planning to do to his guests (CiJ~ '97 l'J~ i1~l}), the 
element of comparison surely implies that the visitors were themselves to suffer 
something worse than merely consensual sex, a point which Hamilton misses. On 
detailed investigation of Hamilton's arguments, this dissatisfaction will lead to 
rejection. 
Hamilton's claim that l'" never has a connotation of force in the Old 
Testament is incorrect. In Judg. 19:25 l'" is placed alongside the verb ??l' (~l'~~J 
i17'~iJ-?~ fl~-~?~l}~:J flQiK). Although ??l' may mean simply 'busy, divert oneself 
with' here, Hamilton's own recognition that the offer being made in Judg. 19:24 is an 
invitation to 'sexually mistreat' (13l}1), that is to rape, those who are sent out 
(1995:35), indicates that it must have the stronger meaning of 'deal wantonly with,' of 
abuse. The Levite's concubine is sent out to the men and 'they knew her and they 
abused her'. It is inconceivable that l'" here does not denote rape, and two of 
Hamilton's four points fall; after all, if l'" itself can mean 'to rape,' it is obviously no 
longer necessary to have specific rape terminology! 
Furthermore, in linguistic terms, there is no difficulty in seeing l'" as having 
one (sexual) meaning when the men of Sodom want 'to abuse' the visitors and another 
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(sexual) mearung when, three verses later and in a different context, Lot rather 
technically describes the virginal state of his daughters: they 'have not had sexual 
intercourse with a man'. Hebrew, like all languages, tends to use the same word for a 
number of functions, and its exact semantic content is only apparent when it is used in 
context~ if the word 'bank' occurred twice but three sentences apart, a competent 
reader of English would have no difficulty in accepting that one occurrence denoted a 
(money) bank and the other a (river) bank. 
If rape is a semantic possibility then, it may be asked if Hamilton is correct in 
believing that the words which are therefore put in Lot's mouth are 'incredible'. In 
fact Hamilton's paraphrase seems eminently suited to describing what Lot proceeds to 
offer those outside. There is no suggestion that his daughters are any more willing to 
have voluntary sexual intercourse with the men than the angels are, and that raises the 
question of what one actually terms intercourse performed by a crowd surrounding a 
house on two unwilling guests or two unwilling virginal daughters. 
Hamilton's argument that the sexual acts in this scene are consensual is clearly 
misguided~ the offence of the men of Sodom does include an element of violent sexual 
abuse. But this is not necessarily to say that the homosexual aspect of the activities of 
the men of Sodom does not form part of their offence. In my opinion, this text cannot 
be used to answer the questions of whether a male homosexual act is itself 'wicked', 
cannot be used to state definitively that the offence outside the house does involve 
homosexuality as well as rape. There seems little doubt that homosexuality was to 
play no part in Israel's eventual 'way ofYHWH' (cf Lev. 18:22~ 20:13). But part of 
the point of this very narrative is that the Sinaitic Torah which condemns male 
homosexuality in Israel is not wholly applicable to the men of Sodom~ they can be 
considered righteous without the Torah by avoiding 'violence' through (the doing of) 
'righteousness' and 'justice'. The view that they are being punished essentially for the 
crime of not being Israel is refuted by YHWH and Abraham's joint belief that there 
may be righteous people in Sodom and, as Wenham notes, it seems likely that the 
nations around Israel allowed sexual relations between men, but prohibited 
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homosexual gang rape (1994:55). It may be that prohibitions against homosexuality 
per se were actually a purely Israelite concern. 
C. Rape as Punishment or Perversity 
That the proposed rape is solely the result of the perversity of the men of 
Sodom has also been challenged. Matthews explains what he sees as their otherwise 
'inexplicable' action (despite its usual explanation as 'perversity') as possibly a 
response of punishment to the visitors's improper acceptance of Lot's hospitality. In 
such a reading, the men of Sodom' s instruction to Lot to turn his guests over (19: 5) is 
effectively giving him a chance to redeem himself in their eyes (1992:5). For 
Matthews, the men of Sodom are innocent of sexual perversion, but guilty of being 
inhospitable alone, first to the two visitors in not offering them shelter (19: 1-3) and 
then to the resident alien Lot (19:9a); it is this inhospitability which leads to their 
eventual destruction. Their behaviour is otherwise consistently cast as reasonable, 
Matthews invoking an ancient Near Eastern parallel (The Middle Assyrian Law Code 
#20) to justify what may be seen by a modern reader as the rather extreme punishment 
of sexual violation for an acceptance of an illegitimate offer of hospitality. 159 
159 Matthews does not appear to be content with his own justification of the intended sexual 
acts as legitimate, however, and he introduces the work of R. Wright on this issue. She proposes that 
when Lot responds to the call of the Sodomites, he has misunderstood their intentions. The 
Sodomites wish to examine the men, to test them, so that 'we may get acquainted with them, that we 
may see for ourselves that they pose no threat to our city, that we may take their measure' (1989: 177; 
a position also found in the 'apologetic' work of Bailey, 1955:1-28). On this view, it is Lot alone 
who introduces a sexual aspect to the situation when, perhaps because he is a foreigner, he misreads 
their use of i1I1iJ . 
.. : .. 
The problem with Wright's proposal is not that it is demonstrably wrong; Hamilton's 
description of this type of reading as 'wild and fanciful' is far too strong (1995:3.t) because Wright 
supplies a perfectly valid reading of i1~'}~. Wenham's argument that i1~'}.~ cannot have a non-sexual 
meaning because the Sodomites already know who the men are, having 'been present when they had 
arrived, is hardly conclusive since Gen. 19: 1-3 contain no explicit statements of identity by the 
visitors (1994:55). Equally, Gossai's comment that the gathering of the men of Sodom around the 
hOllse hardly constitutes a welcoming party (1995:82) is not problematic for Wright's reading since 
the crowd is seen as being incensed by Lot's 'illegitimate' performance of a protocol of hospitality 
Neither does Wenham's statement that Lot's response, with its implication of a sexual 'knowing.' 
settle the issue in 'inescapable' fashion (1994:55), Wright having argued that Lot has misunderstood. 
The difficulty is that there is actually no textual way to decide between these two readings. 
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The choice then is of either seemg the attempted rape as a reasonable 
punishment of the guests or accepting that the action is in itself reprehensible, either as 
an unjust sexual punishment or as simply as perverse sexual act. But a justification of 
the punishment as reasonable can only come from the assumption that Sodom correctly 
enacts the code of hospitality; if Lot has done wrong by an accepted code, then 
punishment can, perhaps, be justified. Given that no Sodomites apparently wished to 
offer hospitality to the two visitors at the gate as the code demands, however, it must 
be concluded that they either do not keep the protocol at all (and are simply sexually 
perverse) or are hypocritically using it to attack Lot for not sticking to norms which 
they themselves have not kept (resulting in an unjust sexual punishment). If it is the 
latter, the punishment can only be seen as self-serving, as an abuse of power, as sexual 
violation, as rape; the very conclusion which Matthews wishes to avoid (1992:6). 
Given the prevalence of the protocol of hospitality in the world of the patriarchs, it 
seems unlikely that a perverse lust for forced sex with travellers can alone account for 
this particular narrative; it seems more likely that the men of Sodom are issuing a 
hypocritical 'invitation' to Lot to correct his 'incorrect' hospitality by giving up his 
visitors and attempting to administer an unwarranted sexual punishment on specious 
'legal' grounds. The world-view of the men of Sodom is completely inverted with the 
result that the charges against the city must include violence, sexual abuse, and 
hypocrisy, a conclusion supported by the original outcry against unspecified but 
significant acts of violence in Sodom (cf 18:20-21). 
But this is not to say that they must be left standing side by side because both are acceptable. 
One way of differentiating between the two is simply on grounds of the ex1ent to which the exegete is 
being made to work in order to read the texiS in each way. It becomes obvious that Wright's proposal 
is more cumbersome because it introduces an extra element into the exegesis. that Lot has 
misunderstood the Sodomites when he responds. It is simpler to argue that he has understood them 
all too well. but that his response draws their ire for reasons other than misunderstanding :1:;}~ By 
emplo~'ing Occam's razor. the latter is shown to be preferable. 
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D. Lot Goes Outside 
Lot responds to the hypocritical call of the men of Sodom to redeem himself in 
their eyes by going out to them, putting himself beyond the-normally safe-door of 
his own house. He closes the door behind him, keeping intact the separation between 
his guests on the inside and the mob on the outside (cf Fields, 1997:97-99). 
Jeansonne's claim that he is embarrassed by what he is about to do in offering his 
daughters is unlikely (I 988: 127) since, if the men of Sodom accept his proposal, he 
will have to carry out the offer he is about to make in view of his guests anyway. Lot 
address the men of Sodom politely (~q-;',~;:l) as 'my brothers' ('10~), and exhorts them 
not to do this evil (~17J~ ... Kr'~). He then offers them his two daughters to do with as 
they please, as seems 'good in their eyes' (C~'1~'1V.f :l"~:;;l; cf Judg. 19:24). The two 
women he describes to the mob as 'virgins' (rth~ ~17~:-K"?). But he adds a condition to 
his offer, pleading that his visitors should be left alone, that they should not be sexually 
abused because they are his guests ('1DJ'P '~f ~K~ 1~-'1l-'1~). Seen by many as an 
act of hospitality-albeit by some with unease (cf Wenham's 'unfortunate offer', 
1994:55; R. Davidson, 1979:72)-Lot's attempt to safeguard his visitors, while 
fulfilling the code of hospitality, is rather an improper act of wickedness (see pages 
249-53). Ironically, Lot asks those outside not to do an evil thing, but in tum offers to 
do an evil thing himself As Raskow further points out, the evil nature of Lot's offer is 
compounded by the fact that 'since the daughters are betrothed (19: 14), and since the 
rape of a betrothed woman is a crime punishable by death (Deut. 22:23-27), Lot's 
actions could have implicated him as an accomplice' (1998:99)! At no time, however, 
does Lot recognise the irony or the links that exist between his own behaviour and that 
of those outside (Gossai, 1995:94). But Lot's demonstration of his own 'wickedness' 
serves to turn the spotlight back onto the crowd for, as Westermann notes, 'repentance 
by the men of Sod om even at this moment would have meant salvation' (1985:301). 
The crowd responds to Lot's offer with fury, however. To his designation of 
them as brothers and his attempt to offer hospitality to outsiders in their place, in effect 
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a claiming of rights within the city, they respond with ridicule, reminding him 
mockingly of his status as a 1~ who is overstepping the mark in disputing their actions, 
in presuming to judge them. As Matthew's puts it: '[Lot] has usurped privileges which 
no sojourner could ever claim, has styled himself a citizen without official sanction, and 
has stood in judgement of the actions of men over whom he has no jurisdiction' 
(1992:6). Indeed, by doing so he demonstrates that he is not wholly with them~ if he 
was, then he could not oppose them by disputing their right to deal sexually with his 
guests (Gossai, 1995:87) 
That all the men of Sodom are hypocritically laying claim to the rights of 
citizenship when not one of them has carried out the citizen's obligation to hospitality 
demonstrates their desire to appear righteous but without the effort of actually being 
so. Nevertheless whatever rights Lot once had in the city are now irrelevant as the 
men reject Lot's implied claims and attempt to punish him. Lot's attempt to involve 
himself as a dweller within Sodom has fallen flat and he is rejected. In what follows 
this contemptuous dismissal of Lot signifies the beginning of a separation between Lot 
(and his household) and his neighbours which will in part allow his rescue. 
The men surge forward to do more evil to Lot than they had planned to do to 
the visitors (Cv~ 17 I1J~ ~~l1), making him their 'rape object' (Gunn, 1993: 182). As 
the 'men put forth their hands', however, it is not the hands of those who wish to harm 
which reach out but those of the visitors~ Lot is pulled into the relative safety of the 
house, the door closing behind him. Rather than Lot saving his guests from the crowd, 
they ironically save him, initially by closing the door and then by striking the crowd 
blind (C")1~~~~ only here and in 2 Kgs 6: 18), an act which reveals something of their 
identity. Hamilton notes that this does not indicate that those outside could not see 
(for surely, even a blind crowd could find a door before which they were stood), but 
that their sight became faulty-'it does not correspond to reality' {l995:37~ Skinner's 
designation of the blindness as 'demonic,' however, is unnecessary, 1910:307). The 
scene concludes with the comic sight of the crowd wearying itself trying to find Lot's 
door, a persistence which demonstrates the intensity of their wickedness. 
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Despite their blinding by the representatives of YHWH-perhaps as a preliminary or 
warning act of divine judgement (cf. Wenham, 1994:56)-they show no signs of 
change, of repentance from their wicked way. 
But the investigation appears over~ in v. 12 the visitors will announce the 
verdict of destruction. Those outside have provided sufficient evidence for YHWH to 
accept the general accuracy of the more wide-ranging outcry, and provided 
justification for a guilty verdict and punishment. They also have demonstrated the lack 
of a single righteous 'man' among them. Lot inside has demonstrated his willingness 
to act wickedly as and when necessary, revealing that he is already part of the wicked 
city. And because Lot's female kin play no role in this decision and because no further 
search for females is envisaged, it seems that YHWH has adopted the patriarchal 
corporate model of judgement in full~ women will not count as righteous in their own 
right here, and their destruction is due to the wickedness of 'their' men. Gunn' s 
questions-' So where are the women? Where are the young, not the young men but 
the children-the daughters and sons? Where are the babies? Where are all these in this 
facile talk of the innocent/righteous and wicked' (I 993: 189)?-are not answered here, 
because they are totally irrelevant to the model of justice in operation. But rather than 
being 'facile', as Gunn claims, the talk of righteous and wicked here is actually totally 
consistent if one begins with the premises of a patriarchal corporate model of 
justice. 160 Sodom is justly doomed for the iniquity of its men, and its women folk and 
160 In response to a similar question to Gunn's-'What had the infants done to deserye to be 
swallowed up in the same destruction as their parents?' -Calvin offers markedly different responses 
to the question, while still finally insisting on a just deity. First, he places the fate of the infants in the 
hands of a deity free to choose how to deal with the human race. Then he counsels a willingness to see 
the humanly incomprehensible as explicable in the deity's secret judgement, before finally 
categorising all of the seed of Sodom as 'accursed and execrable', and so even the babies are beyond 
being justly spared (1965:513). 
Calvin's commitment to a clear debate between Abraham and the deity resulting in an 
individualistic judgement leaves him no choice but to eventually condemn the babies as 'sinners' 
precisely in order to safeguard the justice of YHWH (and to this type of move Gunn responds with 
vehement condemnation). Here, however, I have argued that innocent babies die for the sake of their 
wicked fathers, but YHWH still remains 'just'; it is only later within the outworking of the biblical 
story that conclusions about the nature(s) of 'justice' may be drawn. Indeed in the light of the 
continuing theodicy debate, there might be no final. conclusive stance in the biblical witnesses at all 
(though an acceptance of that must await further exegesis). My decision to sec Abraham as 
incoherent has very far reaching consequences indeed! 
children are doomed because of the wickedness of the men on whom they are wholly 
dependent. 
But the contradictions within Abraham's dialogue with YHWH (18:23-32) 
with regard to the distinction between corporate and individualistic models are now 
shown to be irrelevant to the immediate situation in Sodom; because the city does not 
even contain one righteous man both individualistic and corporate models of justice 
cohere in the just punishment of a totally wicked-at least in patriarchal terms-city. 
But when J. Crenshaw notes that the lack of a single righteous man means that 
Abraham's words lose something of their force (1983: 7), he is only partially correct. 
The fate of Sodom itself is left untouched by the debate, but Israel itself will be very 
much moulded by what has passed between Abraham and YHWH as they stood 
overlooking Sodom. Indeed, the implications of the debate will continue to resound 
throughout the Old Testament account of Israel and far beyond (as Gunn's feminist 
concerns clearly show). 
III. Excursus: Is there a Sin of Sodom? 
A. A Single Sin? 
Much has been made of the concept of the 'sin of Sodom' as though it was a 
single identifiable sin which led to the destruction of the city, the events of Genesis 19 
being seen as portraying what may be termed the 'only sin in town'. Typically, the 
more general, non-specific indicators of Sod om's guilt (Gen. 13:10,13 and 18:20-21) 
are interpreted as referring to this 'crime' alone. Hamilton, for example: 'Here for the 
first time the nature of Sodom' s sin is revealed. An earlier statement (13: 13) was 
content to evaluate the men of Sodom as "evil" and "sinners." The story that is about 
to unfold will substantiate that statement with specific details' (1995: 3 3) . Similarly, 
Westermann states that 'Gen. 18:20-21 ... deals with the crime of Sodom and Gomorra 
in general terms; if there is to be an inquiry about the "outcry", then the crime must be 
portrayed concretely; that is what 19:4-11 does' (1985:301). Though arguing for a 
different crime, Matthews also implies that the only crime that the men of Sodom are 
guilty of is that they are inhospitable (1992:3-6). Indeed much of the recent argument 
about homosexuality and Genesis 19 assumes that it is that particular sexual practice 
which is or is not the 'sin of Sodom'. 
But the narrative so understood has a very restricted view of the evil of Sodom, 
with Gen. 19:4-11 being considered wholly equal to other less specific statements of 
the wickedness of the city. This assumption is unnecessarily reductionistic. In fact it 
would be better to say that there is no sin of Sodom at all if by that term a specific 
course of sinful action is meant, but there is a sin of Sodom if that term is held to mean 
a particular wicked way of life. Further evidence for such a reading is supplied by the 
placing of these events within the context of YHWH' s intentions for Abraham and his 
descendants to walk on the 'way of YHWH', doing 'righteousness and justice' (Gen. 
18:18-19). Sodom is an exemplar within this process of education in which 
wickedness itself is not reducible to a single act of sin, but rather indicates a failure to 
walk on the way. In such a context, the point of judging Sodom is not to demonstrate 
abhorrence for a particular sin, but to show the consequences of going off the path in 
any way. Equally, the text does not claim that the actions of Gen. 19:4-11 are the 
concretisation of the actual cause of the initial outcry which brings YHWH to 
investigate; YHWH only states that if the men of Sodom are not guilty of the outcry, 'I 
will know' (18:21). That the actions of 19:4-11 in some way confirm the guilt of the 
men of Sodom-their own straying from the way of YHWH-is true, but they do not 
constitute the totality of their sinful actions. The fact is that the action(s) which caused 
the outcry of Gen. 18:20-21 is(are) never revealed; the terminology used allows only 
the general designation of the cause as 'violence' and makes it much more likely that 
the range of sinful actions involved is wider than those which can be gleaned from Gen. 
19:4-11. A better attitude towards the narrative then is that of the guitarist Jerry 
Garcia in the first verse of his song, Gomorrah (1997): 
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Just a song of Gomorrah, 
wondering what they did there, 
must have been a bad thing, 
to get shot down for. 
The actions of the men of Sodom are-to the canonical reader-a blank space which 
nevertheless includes the sins of Gen. 19:4-11, however defined, and which clearly 
merits judgement. The required response therefore is to look on, 'wondering what they 
did there'. 
B. Exploiting a 'Wicked Space' 
The existence of this wicked space in the narrative has been exploited many 
times in the history of reflection on this text, an exploitation which is, in effect, fully 
legitimate. A brief exploration of some examples involving the explicit mention of 
Sodom will demonstrate the effect of the text's reticence about defining the cause of 
the outcry (I am assuming those sins already present in Gen. 19:4-11). Of course, the 
presence of 'the wicked' at Sodom also opens up many other implicit links between 
later sins of any group designated 'the wicked' and the sins of 'the wicked' of Sodom 
(cf. e.g., Ezekiel 18). 
The details of the 'sin' which made up the lives of the men of Sodom were 
much developed in later usage. In the book of Jeremiah, the claim that adulterous 
prophets of Jerusalem have become 'like Sodom' to YHWH (23:14), leads to the 
attribution of adultery to the men of Sodom. Examples of other forms of sexual 
immorality are also listed as sins of Sodom: Lust (Philo, Ahr., 134-45), fornication 
(JI/h. 16:5-6~ 20:5~ T. Ben). 9:1), sexual impurity (JI/h. 16:5-6~ 20:5), the making of 
married women impure (T. Levi. 14:6), sex with prostitutes and adultrous wives (J: 
levi. 14:6), marriage with heathen women (T. Levi. 14:6), unnatural sexual practices 
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(T Naph. 3:4) including sexual contact-lewdness-between males (Augustine, City 
of God, 16:30), unnatural lust (Jude 7), and licentiousness (2 Pet. 2:7). 
But alongside the traditions of sexual sin, the hostility of the men of Sodom to 
visitors also suggested additional sins. 161 YHWH, in Ezek. 16:49-50, compares the 
sins of Jerusalem with Sodom: 
This was the guilt of your sister Sodom: she and her daughters had pride, 
excess of food, and prosperous ease, but did not aid the poor and needy. 
They were haughty, and did abominable things before me (NRSV). 
Other aspects of characterisation related to the treatment of guests 'identified' in the 
behaviour of the men of Sodom include arrogance (Sir. 16:8; 3 Macc. 2:5; Jos. Ant. 
1: 194-95), hatred of foreigners (Jos. Ant. 1: 194-95), gluttony (Philo, Abr. 134-35), 
greed (t. Sot. 3; b. Sanh. 109a; m. Ab. 5:10), and either failure (Mt. 10:14-15) or 
refusal (Wisd. 19:14; Ramban, cf. Leibowitz, 1973:178-79) to be hospitable. 
Injustice, perhaps hinted at both in the unspecified outcry and in the hypocrisy 
of Gen. 19:4-11, has also seen as a major 'sin' of the men of Sodom. For example, the 
grammatical form of the suffix attached to the word for outcry (rTDi?~~:P;:T) in Gen. 
18:21 led to some speculation among the Rabbis as to the identity of the victim whose 
cry was heard by YHWH. Although grammatically the antecedent to the feminine 
suffix is that of the city itself (' outcry of it' [her] = 'outcry of the city'), dissatisfaction 
with that reading lead to the following story: 
They issued a proclamation in Sodom, saying: Everyone who strengthens 
the hand of the poor and the needy with a loaf of bread shall be burnt by 
fire! Pelotit the daughter of Lot was wedded to one of the magnates of 
161 Kugel notes that in Gen. 13:13 Sodom is called both wicked (C'~'J) and sinful (C~~~I}) 
and wonders if the rather redundant use of two terms perhaps indicates already the twin strands of 
sexual and social iniquity. He quotes the following targumic passages in support: 
Now the men of Sodom were wicked with their wealth, and they were sinful \\;th their 
bodies before the Lord, exceedingly (Targ. Onq .. Gen. 13: 13). 
And the people of Sodom were wicked toward one another and sinful with sexual sins 
and bloodshed and idolatry before the Lord. exceedingly (Targ . .veof. Gen. 13: 13). 
But evcn if this was the case, this docs not preclude the later ascription of a much wider rangc of 
sinful acts to the violent empty space within the Sodom narrative. 
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Sodom. She saw certain very poor man in the street of the city and her 
soul was grieved on the account. What did she do? Everyday when she 
went out to draw water she put in her pitcher all kinds of provisions from 
her house and she sustained that poor man. The men of Sodom said: how 
does this poor man live?162 When they ascertained the facts they brought 
her forth to be burnt by fire. She said: Sovereign of all worlds! Maintain 
my right and my cause at the hands of the men of Sodom! And her cry 
ascended before the throne of glory. In that hour the holy one blessed be 
He said: 'I will go down and see whether they have done altogether 
according to her cry which has come unto me'-and if the men of Sodom 
have done according to the cry of that young woman, I will tum her 
foundation upwards and the surface downwards (PRE, 25; cf. Leibowitz, 
1973: 173). 
Leibowitz notes that far from being embarrassed by their failings, this enshrining of 
their values in their laws-'They issued a proclamation in Sodom'-indicates the 
brazenness of the men of Sodom (1973: 174). Another midrashic story which 
illustrates this theme of injustice through everyday legal practice is that of the visit of 
Eliezer, the bondsman of Abraham, to Sodom at the bidding of Sarah, to enquire after 
the welfare of Lot. 
[Eliezer] happened to enter the city at the moment when the people were 
robbing a stranger of his garments. Eliezer espoused the cause of the 
poor wretch and the Sodomites turned against him; one threw a stone at 
his forehead and caused considerable loss of blood. Instantly, the 
assailant seeing the blood gush forth, demanded payment for having 
performed the operation of cupping. Eliezer refused to pay for the 
infliction of the wound upon him and he was haled before the judge 
Shakkara. The decision went against him for the law of the land gave the 
assailant the right to demand payment. Eliezer quickly picked up a stone 
and threw it at the judge's forehead. When he saw that blood was 
flowing profusely, he said to the judge, 'pay my debt to the man and give 
me the balance' (Ginzberg, 1947:247-48). 
An additional element of later developments of the sins reckoned to the men of 
Sodom was the their expansion to cover the other cities of the plain (however named): 
As Sodom had a judge worthy of itself (Sherek), so also had other 
cities-Sharkar in Gomorra, Zabnak in Admah, and Manon in Zeboiim. 
Eliezer, the bondsmen of Abraham, made slight changes in the names of 
these judges in accordance with the nature of what they did: the first he 
called Shakkara, Liar; the second Shakura, Arch-deceiver; the third 
162 B. Sanh. 109a,b records that the men of Sodom had strictly forbidden charity. 
. . 
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Kazban, Falsifier~ and the fourth MazIe-Din, Perverter of Justice 
(Ginzberg, 1947:246-47). 
By this manner of device, the cities of the plain are shown to share in the corruption of 
Sodom and to merit the punishment meted out (for other developments of the 
tradition, see for example, Loader, 1990:75-138~ and Newman, 1998 [on early Jewish 
and Christian works]; Frantzen, 1997 [on medieval Anglo-Saxon prose works]~ 
McDonald, 1963 [on the Samaritan tradition tRue, 1996 [on staging Genesis 19 as a 
modern play D· 
The violent empty space left by the reticence of the text is available to be amply 
filled with all manner of sin and wickedness as and when the need arises. In one sense 
then, despite the phenomenon of sins generally being collected around the twin poles 
of sexual sin and social iniquity, the 'sin of Sodom' can include anything considered 
wicked by later interpreters. Field's argument that the 'sin of Sodom' functions 
archetypally so that those who sin differently may still be considered sinners in 
Sodom's mould is only half right (1997:171-72), because the sins of those later 
communities may also be seen typologically as once having taken place in Sodom. A 
good example of this dynamic can be found in von Rad' s historical-critical arguments 
about the sources underlying the Sodom narrative. He argues that the rape scene in 
Gen. 19:4-11 is perhaps based upon the story of the rape of the concubine in Judges 
19, it being placed in its present context because it was 'connected only secondarily 
with Sodom as the seat of all sin' (1961 :213-my italics). In the light of how the 
judgement of Sodom is to function within Israel as an example to Abraham and his 
descendants, it is significant that Abraham never knows the specifics of what caused 
the outcry (or even the events of Gen. 19:4-11). He only sees the consequences of the 
guilt of the men of Sodom. For Abraham and Israel, there is no 'sin of Sodom' as 
such, save that of failing to walk on their own way of YHWH and perhaps causing an 
outcry to the deity. Anything which the later hearers or readers of this tradition see as 
leading to a diversion off the path is as the sin of Sodom. It can thus be attributed by 
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them to the void in Genesis 18-19 and viewed as part of the original sins which 
occasioned the judgement and destruction of that 'wicked' city. This, of course, 
assumes that such inheritors of the tradition can tell the way of YHWH (and its ethics) 
from the available alternatives. But can they? 
In effect, the way of Sodom is an anti-type of the right way, the way of 
YHWH, and Sodom itself is an anti-type of Israel, and by extension the people of God. 
Its importance can be gauged by the fact that, as Westermann notes, '[ t ]here is no 
event in the whole of Genesis that is mentioned so frequently in the Old Testament as 
the destruction of Sodom (1985 :298; whether as Sodom and Gomorra, Admah or 
Zeboiim; Deut. 29:23; Isa. 1:9-10; 13: 19; Jer. 49: 18; 50:40; Ezek. 16:46-50, 53-55; 
Amos 4: 1 C Zeph. 2:9; Lam. 4:6; Ps. 11 :6). In the context of the proclamation of the 
later prophets and their insistence that righteousness and justice are at the heart of 
Israel's relationship with YHWH (cf W. Brueggemann, 1992: 169), it is clear that 
failure on Israel's part results in its becoming 'as Sodom' and so becoming worthy of 
sharing its fate in destruction. As YHWH's example of his justice to Abraham, 
Sodom overshadows the life of Israel and as the Torah takes its place in the life of 
Israel, it's ideological power is implicitly enforced by the looming events of Genesis 18 
and 19. Abraham's dialogue with YHWH and its confused content thus take on a 
new life in subsequent narratives. Though there is no righteous man in Sodom, the 
question as to the role of the righteous man in Israel will reappear (e.g. Jer. 5: 1) as will 
questions regarding an individual's guilt for crimes committed by others (e.g. Ezekiel 
18). Equally, the triumph of the wicked and the suffering of the righteous will surface 
(e.g., Psalm 73) and hark back to Abraham and Sodom. Alter's designation of Sodom 
as 'nexus' has deep implications for the Old Testament and its depiction of Israel and 
its God (1980). 
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IV. Instructions for Lot and His Family (19:12-14) 
A. 'Bring Them Out of the Place' 
With the door closed and those outside unable to find even the doorway, the 
visitors now turn to Lot with a perhaps surprising question: 'Have you anyone else 
here? Son-in-law (singular, but generic), sons, daughters, or anyone you have in the 
city-bring them out of the place' (v. 12). The reason for this is that they are about to 
destroy (C'Dr:T~t}--hiphil participle of nnrti 'ruin') the city because 'their outcry'-
detailed for the first time, if only as 'their'-against it has become great before YHWH 
and he has sent them to destroy (;:TQr:r~7-piel infinitive construct of nmz,i 'ruin') the 
city. nmd here harks back to the repeated occurrences of this verb in the hiphil during 
Abraham's dialogue with YHWH (cf Abraham's n'r:T~D in 18:28 and YHWH's 
threefold use of n'r:T~~ in vv. 28, 31, 32). The timing of the destruction at sunrise 
(cf. the temporal indicators rl~iJ-'ll K~~ rdt?~";:t [in v. 23] and ,~.~~ CiJ'J~~ C:;)~~J 
[in vv. 27-8]) is the cause of all of the subsequent night-time haste. 
The men/angels, having revealed something of their power by striking the men 
outside blind, now explain their purpose in visiting the city of Sodom. As yet they do 
not speak with the voice of YHWH as in Gen. 18: 10-14, but will remain unidentified 
as representing the deity until Lot recognises them as such in 19:18 (contra Skinner's 
view that their language here proves that YHWH is not present, 1910:308; cf also 
Wenham, 1994:57, Turner, 1990b:93).163 Neither is it clear that Wenham's view that 
Lot now recognises them as angelic figures is correct (1994:56; though the SP reads 
'angels' here-appropriately according to Speiser, 1964: 140-the MT does not). 
Even if Lot has understood what has happened outside the house, there seems no 
reason why the blinding could not have been a miracle performed by human 
representatives of YHWH (cf Elisha in the only other use of C'}.1~~~ in 2 Kgs 6: 18). 
163 Hershon records a tradition that the angels were subsequently punished for their 
presumption, being demoted for one hundred and thirty-eight years for having claimed that it was 
they who were destroying Sodom rather than YHWH (1885: 108) 
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At most, Lot now seems to have some awareness that his guests are beyond the 
ordinary, but their true identity is still beyond him~ he will only recognise them fully in 
v. 18. 
Though the decision to destroy the city was not taken before YHWH's 
investigation, the acts of the men of Sodom outside Lot's house and Lot's own 
response have both demonstrated-somehow-that the outcry was accurate, and that 
punishment is therefore required. Gossai's conclusion that 'it is the face to face 
encounter between Yahweh and the evil Sodom which finally brought about the 
decision to destroy' seems justified (1995:95). Since no man of Sodom is righteous 
(including Lot), YHWH is justified in the light of his debate with Abraham in 
destroying the city. The words of the men that 'the LORD has sent us to destroy 
[Sodom], ' are intended only to reflect the situation after the outcry has been 
confirmed, and do not imply a prior decision on the part of YHWH. By the terms of 
Abraham's and YHWH's joint agreement that a corporate judgement will be applied to 
Sodom, Lot has lost all chance of salvation from the destruction of Sodom. Its very 
destruction indicates his failure to be righteous~ his choice to live there has-or should 
have-cost him his life~ his hospitality is not enough to save him (contra Matthews, 
1992:6). Yet echoing the earlier rejection of the men of Sodom (19:9), the men tell 
him to leave the city quickly, but give no reason why he is being offered the chance of 
salvation (as Brueggemann notes, this will only become clear in Gen. 19:29, 
1982: 165)~ their simple message is that Lot and his family must leave (before sunrise) 
in order to live for if they stay, they will surely die. 
B. Saving Lot's Sons-in-Law 
Lot now must attempt to persuade those who are of his family that they must 
leave the city. His wife and daughters are presumably with him in the house and hear 
the words of the visitors, but Lot must also try to talk those betrothed to ('CTP:"", lit. 
'takers of ... ) his daughters, his future sons-in-law, into taking flight. The term 'ICTP:"" 
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could indicate either a present situation with a future consummation (making the 
daughters betrothed rather than married) or a past state involving consummation (as 
Gen. 27:46; cf. Gen. R. 's '[Lot] had four daughter, two betrothed and two married, 
50:9; also Rashi, 1900:79; Hershon, 1885:109; R. Davidson, 1979:75; Wenham, 
1994:57); if so, Lot's description of the two daughters inside the house as virgins 
suggests that they were not the wives of these men, and Lot must therefore have other 
daughters, a view given some support perhaps by the occurrence of rfK~9~;:t in v. 15 
('your daughters who are here'). But surely Lot would have told these daughters the 
news of the impending destruction of Sodom as well as his sons-in-law. Since he does 
not, it seems more likely that he has only two daughters 'betrothed' to his 'sons-in-
law', and they apparently require no persuasion to leave Sodom at all. 
Lot leaves the safety of the house alone to find his prospective sons-in-law. It 
is not yet morning and the men around the house receive no mention, presumably 
having left alone the house they were unable to enter. Gossai notes that Lot is only 
said to go out to them, there being no mention of a visit to their house (1995 :96). But 
his subsequent claim that Lot showed his indifference to the warning of forthcoming 
destruction by staying with them all night (1995 :98) is problematic because although 
Lot is inside his own house at dawn, we are not told at what time he returned; given 
the response of those he sought, it seems more likely that he came back immediately. 
When Lot found his future sons-in-law, he related the warning message of the angels 
about the city's forthcoming destruction, telling them to get up and get out. But their 
response was only to mock, and the last chance of salvation for any of Sodom' s 
inhabitants is turned down. It is unclear exactly who these men are (men of Sodom or 
assimilated C'}~), but there seems little doubt that the narrative implies both that they 
had been part of the mob around Lot's house (Gossai. 1995:96-97) and that their 
response of a disbelieving laughter to Lot's message of ruin seals their fate. If they had 
but listened, they would have been saved (so Wenham, 1994:57). But again it is not 
just the judgement of YHWH which is being rejected by (those who here represent) 
Sod om, but also the person of Lot himself. 
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At this point, it should be noted that even if these men do show some sign of 
taking the warning seriously, do perform this one act which would perhaps indicate 
something approaching repentance and thereby indicate a certain degree of personal 
righteousness, it is already too late for them to count as righteous men on whose 
account the city could be saved. This is because they can only demonstrate such 
'righteousness' by leaving, and therefore would no longer count as being among those 
living in the city for the purposes of Abraham's argument. That argument-or at least 
the corporate aspect of it taken up by YHWH-is no longer in force because following 
YHWH's judgement, the righteous are no longer to be found in the city by definition; 
anyone who stays has forfeited any claim to righteousness by doing so in disobedience 
to YHWH's command that they should leave. If Lot leaves, this will demonstrate his 
decision against the way of Sodom; he will be saved because YHWH has given him the 
opportunity, yes, but his salvation will also be reliant upon his own act of righteousness 
in departing. 
V. Lot's Departure From Sodom (19: 15-22) 
A. A Tendency to Linger 
The arrival of' dawn' ('r:r~";:t) sees Lot back inside his house, wholly rejected by 
all the members of Sodom who had previously given him some measure of acceptance 
(e.g., his daughters's prospective husbands, his neighbours, and his 'business' 
contacts). Only those within the house are now in view, and all must leave the city 
immediately: 'The angels urged Lot, saying, "Get up, take your wife and your two 
daughters who are here, or else you will be consumed (i1~tpI:1) in the punishment of the 
city'" (v. 15), consumed, swept away, destroyed, in the manner feared earlier by 
Abraham (cf Gen. 18:23, 24). The instruction to leave the city is only implied here 
and not repeated (cf vv. 12 and 14). 
But a feature of Lot's character causes complications~ as Letellier puts it, Lot 
demonstrates a 'tendency to linger in the familiar environment .... a constitutional 
inability to flee' (1995: 166). Despite the blinding of the men of Sodom, Lot seems 
unable to take the warning of his visitors seriously himself-perhaps as a result of the 
scorn of his daughters's once future husbands-and he dithers, refusing to take leave 
of his home, the city in which he once chose to dwell, and the attractive lands of the 
valley (cf Driver, 1909:200). Westermann's depiction of this tendency to remain as 
being because city dwellers feel more secure in the city (1985:303) would, if accepted, 
lend further strength to a view of Lot as having become assimilated to the life-style of 
the men of Sodom. In the rabbinic tradition, Rashi sees Lot as unable to leave his own 
property (1900: 79), but Genesis Rabbah goes much further in attributing Lot's 
reluctance to his distress over the loss of Sodom' s 'gold and silver and precious 
stones' (50: 11). Lot may even have been so disposed towards staying that he is fast 
asleep as dawn came: 'get up' may mean 'wake up' (so Wenham, 1994:57). 
Lot dithers to the extent that the angels have to take him by the hand and lead 
him and his family out of the city and towards the mountains (lit. 'mountain'~ cf Gen. 
14:10). His own lack of righteousness is again demonstrated and he is now to be 
saved by YHWH alone~ this act being recorded as 'the LORD having compassion 
(n?~Q) on him', a mercy for which at present there is still no reason given and which 
stands in stark contrast to YHWH's abandonment of Lot's sons-in-law to their fate 
when they took no notice of the warning of destruction. Why save one and not the 
others? 
One of the angels, an individual 'he' (contra NRSV), again tells Lot that he 
must flee, and then warns Lot that he must look only forwards on leaving the city, that 
he must leave the plain itself, and that he must go to the hills. If he does this, he will 
live. If he does not do these things, he will share in the destruction of the city (19: 17)~ 
'Sodom is a world to be repudiated' (Letellier, 1995: 164). 
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B. An Escape to Zoar 
Lot, however, cannot do these things; he still cannot reach the hills. The weak 
side of his character is emphasised further, under the cover of an admission of physical 
weakness (which will eventually prove unfounded; cf his making it to the hills in w. 
30-38). But while admitting his inability to reach the hills 'for fear evil will overtake 
me and I die' (19: 19; cf 'the evil' in Amos 3 :6), it becomes clear that he has finally 
recognised those with whom he has been dealing and addresses YHWH directly. Lot 
acknowledges that he is being favoured by YHWH who is saving him, but again no 
hint of a reason for such favour is forthcoming; Lot's belated claim to be a 'servant of 
YHWH' ('9~tl}) is ironically contrasted with Abraham's early claim to be such (18:3) 
and, given Lot's actions in choosing to live with the men of Sodom, his offer of his 
daughters to the crowd, and his failure to leave Sodom of his own volition, it can bring 
no great delight to the judging deity that such acts are being associated with service to 
YHWH. Lot, though, has finally recognised the God whose promise of land, 
descendants and relationship to Abraham he has so disastrously abandoned, and asks 
that YHWH allow him to go to a nearby city: 'Let me escape there-is it not a little 
one?-and my life will be saved!' An aetiology explains the city's subsequent name of 
Zoar, small (cf Westermann,1985:304); according to Gen. 14:8, its former name was 
'Bela' (11,?~). 
YHWH's response is to accept Lot's request and grant the favour asked. The 
city of Zoar will not be destroyed and Lot may find safety there (19:21). But Lot must 
hurry, judgement for Sodom and the other cities of the plain is at hand and is being 
withheld only until Lot is safe. It is clear from the combination of designations used 
here that the judgement of Sodom stands for the judgement of the whole of the vaHey 
(in contrast to Gunkel's atomising approach, the terms are to be taken as a creative use 
of narrative). The outcry and the events which have validated it to YHWH's 
satisfaction bring destruction on the 'whole area'. Lot hurries on and arrives in Zoar 
as the sun rises in the sky (v. 23). 
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The ironic contrast between the prospective fates of Zoar and Sodom has been 
noted by Gunn; while Lot's intervention for Zoar is successful (at least for now), 
Abraham's intervention for Sodom fails. Zoar contains no righteous man, certainly not 
Lot, and is, it appears at first glance, saved only because of Lot's request that it should 
be so. Why then did Abraham not just ask for Sodom to be saved? Is he being 
implicitly criticised here for his failure to do as Lot did? Two features of the story 
suggest that this is not the case. Firstly, Lot's request must be understood in the light 
of his own salvation, a salvation not yet explained. The reader does not know why Lot 
should be saved by YHWH, but that is what is happening. When Lot asks for and 
receives Zoar, the mystery deepens. Who is Lot that his request should abrogate 
judgement for Zoar? Hardly the to-be-congratulated scheming 'card player' depicted 
by Gunn (1993: 184-85). This mystery will lie unresolved until v 29. Secondly, for 
Abraham to be deemed a failure as an intercessor here, it must first be assumed that he 
wanted the cities of the plain to be saved at any cost, and that their destruction 
indicates that he did not succeed in that task. But however difficult the discerning of 
Abraham's aim has proved to be, it is clear that Abraham never denies that the wicked 
should be punished; if Sodom contains no righteous people, its fate is sealed. Abraham 
does not fail to achieve that aim because he never intends to achieve it. Lot, however, 
has saved a city which appears to fully deserve its punishment; ironically, injustice 
there is to go on simply because of Lot's exaggerated weakness and his overwhelming 
desire to preserve his own life (and, perhaps, 'life-style'; so Gunn, 1993: 184). 
VI. The Destruction of Sodom (19:23-29) 
A. 'Sulphurous fire' 
A description of the destruction follows the report of Lot's safe arrival in Zoar. 
At this point the temporal consistency of the narrative sequence is lost, Lot's story 
being put to one side for a moment as the destruction is described. A more consistent 
temporality could be achieved if the text was re-arranged as follows: 
1) 19:23 19:26 19:30ab: Lot in Zoar, Lot's wife, Lot leaves Zoar 
2) 19:24-5: Destruction 
3) 19:27-9: Abraham's view of the destruction, reason for Lot's 
salvation 
4) 19:30c-38: Lot and daughters 
However, the effect of the temporal shifts in the canonical text is to emphasise the 
multi-scene account of the destruction, with the safety of Lot, the once dominant 
narrative plot, demoted by its broken interspersion with flicking reports on Abraham, 
YHWH's reason for saving Lot and the destruction of the cites. Anomalies do 
occur-the narratives concerning both Lot's wife and of Zoar can be read as they 
stand as out of sequence, thereby raising questions about their respective fates; here, 
the effect will be emphasised with the temporal distortions noted but not smoothed 
out. 
Both Loader (1990:116-17,138) and Fields (1997:158-71) have argued that 
in considering the biblical afterlife of the Sodom narrative, there are two main strands 
of development: alongside the 'sin of Sodom' already mentioned (see pages 264-70) is 
the paradigmatic application of the stereotypical language and imagery of its 
punishment to God's potentially sudden and spectacular destruction of cities or places 
which then become 'as Sodom'. Sulphur (n'\)~~ and fire (rtJ~) rain down from the 
skies onto Sodom and Gomorra and all the plain, destroying the cities, inhabitants, and 
vegetation (v. 25; for the pairing of rtJ~l n'\)~~ see Ps. 11 :6; Ezek. 38:22; rtJ~, 'fire', 
alone occurring in Ezek. 28:27; 39:6; and Lam. 1: 13; with n'\)~~,., 'sulphur', occurring 
alone in Deut. 29:22; Isa 30:33; 34:9; Job 18: 15). Hamilton suggests that rather than 
the traditional 'fire and brimstone' these two actually form a 'hendiadys-hence 
sulphurous fire (NAB) or "burning sulphur" (NIV)' (1995:47; also Speiser, 
278 
1964:141).164 The verb 'to overthrow' (":J"::l~~1) is used here to describe the results of 
the destruction, often appearing in later texts in connection with the fate of Sodom (cf. 
Deut. 29:23~ Isa. 1:7~ 13:19; Jer. 49:16; 50:40; Amos 4:11; Lam. 4:6), sometimes 
clearly as 'figurative' (Isa. 30:33; W. Brueggemann, 1982:165). Clearly then attempts 
to explain what happens to Sodom as the result of natural phenomena related to the 
Dead Sea area such as, for example, Driver's 'eruption of petroleum, occasioned by an 
earthquake' (1909:202) are misguided (so Westermann, 1985:306). 
The peculiar construction here, ilb'~ n~~ ... "~~;:1 ilb"l, is held by Dillmann to 
indicate the presence of YHWH both in the men/angels as the agents who send the 
sulphur and fire and in the heavens as their source (1892:273-74).165 Too much should 
not be made of any perceived distinction, however; for Hamilton, 'the clear impression 
created by the addition of this phrase, if in any way it contributes meaningfully to the 
narrative, is that Yahweh hurled blocks of burning sulphur on the cities' (1995:47-
my italics). In this light, Westermann suggested reading-'Yahweh then rained on 
Sodom and Gomorrah-brimstone and fire from Yahweh in the heavens' 
(1985 : 296)-seems appropriate. Since the angels have also now left the scene, leaving 
Lot attempting to get to Zoar, there is little difficulty now seeing YHWH in the 
heavens, returned from the visit to Abraham and the investigation into the conduct of 
Sodom (thus resolving the problem seen in Dillman's view of the angels by Skinner, 
that YHWH was both above and below, 1910:309). But in all the destruction which 
takes place, the narrative has been careful to stress, not one single 'righteous man' 
died. According to the model of judgement operative here, the corporate patriarchal 
one, YHWH is just. 
164 W.E. Watson defined hendiadys as 
the expression of a single but complex concept by using two separate words, usually 
nouns .... The two words may be collocated, be joined with a copula or be in apposition. 
Hendiadys is used very often in Hebrew... and the reader should be always on the 
lookout for its occurrence in the tex1. The important aspect of hendiadys is that its 
components are no longer considered separately but as a unit in combination. 
(1978:324-25). 
165 Calvin records his disagreement with those in his own day who saw this construction as 
portraying the trinity at work (1965:512). 
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B. Lot's Wife Looks Back 
The description of the destruction is followed by the now proverbial story of 
Lot's wife. As Lot arrived at Zoar, his wife behind him looked back, and was instantly 
turned into a pillar of salt. Although not explicitly addressed to her, the warning to 
Lot not to look back apparently includes his family as well. Coats assumes that she has 
actually heard the instructions, (1983: 145), but Gunn prefers to see her as 'the woman 
subsumed in her husband who is expected to obey' (1993: 187). Her loss at this late 
stage functions both to emphasise that Lot and his family were being rescued 'from the 
very brink of the abyss' (Westermann, 1985:307) and creates the space for the 
subsequent account of the sexual relationship between Lot and his daughters after the 
destruction of the valley (19:30-38~ cf Coats, 1985:124). 
No explicit reason is given as to why she looked back, but the implication is 
that she, rather like Lot with his dawdling, was not able to let go off her attachment to 
the city of Sodom, and so could not leave her home, the city, and the bounteous valley 
behind her. For Driver, she is 'the type of those who, in whatever age, "look back" 
with regretful longings upon possessions and enjoyments which are inconsistent with 
the salvation offered to them' (1909:202). Gunn, however, notes the different 
responses of male and female readers of this text to Lot's wife, recording the poetry of 
K. Batey and A. Akhmatova which sees her positively. Indeed, for Gunn, Lot's wife 
as 'salt' is the fundamental point (or, perhaps, failing) of the narrative, indicating the 
presence of unmentioned women and children in Sodom (1993: 188-89). Set over 
against this positivity, is the desire of (usually male) exegetes through the ages to 
explain her death as resulting from her own great wickedness~ a note to Genesis 
Rabbah, for example, records that when the angels visited Lot, 'she went about to all 
her neighbours and asked them, "Give me salt, as we have guests," her intention being 
that the townspeople should become aware of their presence' (51 :5). 
Yet in this exegesis, the presence of women is Sodom and their inability to 
count as righteous is fully recognised (see pages 218-21, 262-64). In the light of 
2XO 
YHWH's subsequent destruction of Sodom's women and children through the 
consistent application of a patriarchal corporate judgement, many more 'innocent' 
women then Lot's wife may have died; her 'crime' is differentiated from theirs only 
because she actually does something-a small thing really-in looking back which may 
mean that she is personally culpable. There is no need to ascribe great crimes to her at 
all because Gunn is fundamentally correct; she is simply to be seen as one involved in a 
catastrophe most likely not of her own making (she could be wicked, I suppose), who 
subsequently loses her life because of her unexplained disobedience to YHWH's 
instruction to her husband. Gunn might argue that this is unjust, but that simply raises 
what is for me the fundamental point of the narrative: what does it mean to be just? 
By the lights of the model of judgement operating here, the destruction by YHWH of 
the 'innocent' women (including perhaps Lot's wife), children, and babies of Sodom 
on the grounds that all of their men folk are wicked is wholly an act of divine justice. 
C. Abraham Learns of Sodom's Fate 
The text now returns to the person with whom it began, Abraham. And to his 
discussion with YHWH. Lot's catastrophies-his loss of wife, possessions, and 
station-are all implicitly contrasted with Abraham who is physically unaffected by the 
events on the plain. Abraham is changed, however, through his learning of one 
potential future for his descendants as he sees the consequences of Sodom's guilt and 
judgement. It may be that the temporal indicators here are intended to indicate the 
passage of a night during the destruction, but it seems more likely that Abraham rose 
early to return to the place overlooking Sodom where he had argued with YHWH (cf. 
18: 16, 22). There he expected to see whether or not YHWH's investigation had 
resulted in the sweeping away of the city or the discovery of a righteous person within 
the city on whose behalf it could be spared. Abraham, even with some knowledge of 
the wickedness of the men of Sodom, would probably have been more likely to expect 
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the cities to be spared; his dialogue with YHWH demanding a good probability that the 
righteous existed for its intelligibility. 
But on arriving at the viewpoint, he discovered a smoke-covered and ruined 
land. At that moment, he knew-or at least thought he knew-that Sodom was wholly 
evil. The wicked had received the punishment that Abraham and YHWH had agreed 
was their due, and the righteous one needed to save the city did not exist. But of 
course, Abraham's lack of clarity as to the gender of the righteous one means that 
while he is no doubt sure that he understands what has happened, he might not actually 
do so. If he believes that YHWH found no righteous women in Sodom, he would be 
wrong, because the deity never looked for them. Nevertheless, Abraham will assume 
that YHWH had carried out his judgement with justice (even if he does not know the 
exact details). And Abraham must also think here that Lot is dead; after all, if he was 
righteous, he would have saved the city and if not, then he should also have incurred 
punishment. Abraham himself is not told that Lot is saved, but the ensuing narrative 
comment (v. 29) and the narrative of 19:30-38 may be held to indicate that Abraham 
and Israel (through the writers of its texts) came eventually to know that Lot had been 
saved and why. 
But the canonical reader will know now the mystery of Lot's salvation from 
Sodom. The text notes that 'when God destroyed the cities of the Plain, God 
remembered Abraham, and sent Lot out of the midst of the overthrow, when he 
overthrew the cities in which Lot had settled'. In the history of exegesis, two main 
interpretive options have been offered for this verse: 'And YHWH remembered 
Abraham' (C;:r'J~B.~~-n~ C';:t"?~ .,.~~~]) may mean that YHWH remembered the patriarch 
himself, saving Lot for his sake alone (so e.g., Coats, 1983: 145) or it may mean that 
YHWH remembered the words exchanged with Abraham overlooking Sodom and 
saved Lot because of the argument (e.g., Wenham, 1994:59-60).166 If the words are 
166 Two other variations have been suggested here: first. Hershon suggests that Lot is savcd 
because of the good that he has done for Abraham in the past (1885: 110); namely, not revealing 
Sarah's identity in Egypt. But the text expressly states that YHWH rcmembers Abraham, and not Lot. 
Gi\'cn the alternatives. it seems unnecessary to stretch that far back into the patriarch's narrati\'c past. 
and so this option is rejected here. Alternatively, Sarna suggest that while Lot is righteous ('he was 
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taken on their own, there is no way to decide between these options, but by this point 
in any exegesis, reaching a decision is fairly straightforward. For the second option to 
be chosen, Lot's escape must be attributable to Abraham's intervention-he must be 
either a righteous man (or even Wenham's individual who is 'relatively righteous,' 
1994:42) or perhaps a 1~ who YHWH must remove so as to punish only the men of 
Sodom (so Mafico, 1983: 16). I have argued that these reading cannot stand (see 
pages 229-33 and 249-53) and that Lot's salvation is not the result of the dialogue 
between YHWH and Abraham-that argument should actually have resulted in either 
Lot's salvation with the city or his destruction with the city. Neither of these has 
happened; the city is destroyed, yet Lot is still saved. Partially, of course, a case may 
be made for his flawed hospitality or his rejection of the men of Sodom having some 
influence on his escape. If he had not offered hospitality, however incorrectly, he 
would have been swept away. If he had not been rejected by the men of Sodom, he 
would still be with them in their punishment. But also his actual willingness to leave 
the city, though reluctant, plays its part. If he had stayed, he would have been 
destroyed with the city (cf 19:12). But these are all situational factors which only help 
Lot to escape-none of them in itself would have saved Lot, it being only the forceful 
encouragement of the visitors to flee that ultimately save Lot in contrast to his sons-in-
law who-though in a very similar position to Lot, having been told to flee-are 
destroyed. In such a context, the words, 'YHWH remembered Abraham,' can only 
refer to the salvation of Lot for the sake of his kinsman. The argument of Gen. 18:23-
32 is thus irrelevant-here it is Abraham's kinship with Lot that is in the forefront. 
Turner has argued that if Abraham had but known that Lot would be saved in 
this way, he would not have spoken to YHWH at all, having already got what he really 
wanted (1 990b : 101). But Abraham's motives are much more complex than Turner 
allows. Lot is not Abraham's heir and has essentially made himself irrelevant to the 
certainly superior to his neighbours') his salvation resulted not from his own merit but from that of 
Abraham (1966:150; similarly, Calvin, 1965:516-17). Since I have argued that Lot is far from 
righteous as far as the violence of Sodom is concerned, Sarna's option can also be rejected here. 
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promise made to Abraham by YHWH. But, nevertheless, as Abraham went to save his 
kinsman in Gen. 14, so YHWH saves Lot again because of his kinship with Abraham. 
The only question that remains is whether or not Lot will return to Abraham and the 
promise after such calamity. 
VII. The Origins of Moab and Ammon (19:30-38) 
A. The Last People on Earth 
The final section of the Sodom narrative is concerned with the actions of Lot 
which follow the destruction of the cities of the plain. On one level, the length of this 
section of the narrative is out of all proportion to its importance to the reading offered 
here, but on another level, the final episode of Lot's journey away from the promised 
land is of considerable significance to Abraham and the subsequent story of Israel. 
In v. 30 the reader discovers that Lot, perhaps in response to the loss of his 
wife, has left Zoar. Did he do so before or after the destruction of the valley? Is Zoar 
still in existence? Wenham, for example, sees Zoar as having been saved, Lot having 
left after the destruction (1994: 5 8-61; cf also Rashi, 1900: 82). He argues that the 
daughters subsequent need for intercourse with their father reflects a situation in which 
they see no eligible men who may become their husbands (cf also Keil-Delitzsch's 
'Not that they imagined the whole human race to have perished ... but they were afraid 
that no man would link himself with them, the only survivors of a country smitten by 
the curse of God,' 1980:237). 
But the fact that Abraham sees only destruction from his vantage point 
overlooking the region (19:27-28), and no oasis of salvation at Zoar leads me to prefer 
the alternative reading in which Zoar has been destroyed. The actions of the two 
daughters can then be easily explained as resulting from their fear that they are the last 
humans left alive after the destruction ofZoar and the valley, in Gunkel's words, as the 
survivors ofa 'universal catastrophe' (1997:217; cf also Hershon's 'as in the time of 
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the deluge', 1885:111; also cf Rashkow, 1998:103; Skinner, 1910:313). Lot's leaving 
of Zoar with his daughters then is out of its exact temporal sequence and reflects the 
pre-destruction scene after the loss of his wife. Afraid to stay in Zoar, the place where 
he was to be safe but where his wife has now died, Lot finally makes for the hills. No 
longer trusting in the words of the one who would save him (v. 21) and with his feeble 
protestations of weakness forgotten, Lot makes it to safety in the hills before 
destruction comes, and takes refuge in a cave. 167 Zoar, however, is destroyed; the one 
whose intercession once promised to save it now having abandoned it to divine justice. 
Lot has now lost almost everything, and his distancing from Abraham and the promise 
is nearly complete. As Wenham puts it: 
Lot, the rich rancher who had so many flocks and herds that he had to 
separate from Abraham (13: 8-11), chose to live in the fertile Dead Sea 
valley, which has been destroyed and with it all his other relations [sic] 
and property. He and all that he has can be accommodated in a cave. His 
ruin can hardly be more complete (1994:60). 
B. The Incestuous Conception of Moab and Ben-Ammon 
But clearly it can. Believing that humanity has been destroyed, and therefore 
acting in order both to survive personally and to perpetuate their race, the eldest of the 
two daughters suggests that they must get their father drunk so that they might 
become pregnant by him.168 Although perhaps in some senses a worthy aim, their 
decision reflects a certain lack of trust in the message of the angels who were clear that 
it was only Sodom (and the valley) which was to be destroyed. This lack of trust in the 
one who was represented by the angels serves to indicate the daughters's distance from 
167 Rashkow's comment about the sexual connotations of the cave in both psychoanal~1ic and 
linguistic terms is probably unnecessary (1998: 102). After all. as Freud himself is once reported to 
ha\'c said. when asked by a student about the significance of the big cigars he smoked. 'sometimes a 
cigar is just a cigar'! 
168 In rabbinic tradition. howevcr, thc initiative shown by the daughters is lessened 
somewhat by their argument that Lot desired his own daughters: 'R. Leyi said. Whoever is inflamed 
by sexual desire will, in the end, be made to eat his own flesh' (Gen. R. 51 :9: citing Pro\". 18: 1). 
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YHWH, matching that of their father (as young virgins, it is not even clear that they 
would have ever been anywhere but Sodom. Lot has been living there for at least 
thirteen years, and probably many more). Their remedy may also indicate a certain 
affinity to the men of Sodom, even to their unself-conscious naming of their infants 
with words which openly declare their incestuous parentage (so Keil-Delitzsch, 
1980:237-38; cf Isa. 3:9). In effect the daughters's actions reflect a mind-set which is 
altogether different to those who will be Abraham's true descendants, walking on the 
way of YHWH doing righteousness and justice; in itself initiative is not necessarily a 
laudable quality. 
Their scheme works perfectly. Although Lot may not know what is happening, 
that does not alter his culpability at all. The distancing of Lot's family from YHWH, 
begun in Genesis 13, is now complete. Lot's sons/grandsons and their descendants 
are not to be C')~ in a foreign land as he was in Sodom, nor will they return to 
Abraham as part of the nation which his descendants will become in line with the 
promise of YHWH; Lot's descendants will not live under his name, but rather under 
the names of his sons. The first born daughter 'bore a son, and named him Moab; he 
is the ancestor of the Moabites to this day. The younger also bore a son and named 
him Ben-ammi; he is the ancestor of the Ammonites to this day' (19:37-38; NRSV). 
They will be two foreign peoples who will live alongside the chosen people, the 
descendants of Abraham through Isaac. 
Gunkel's noting of the neutral tone of this passage, leading to his attribution of 
it to a Moabite source, hits an important canonical note. The delicate balance which 
results between the dual elements of foreignness (incestuously conceived) and familial 
connection (through Lot, however, distantly removed now) will now be enshrined in 
the history of Israel as the end result of Lot's move away from Canaan through Sodom 
to, finally, Moab and Ammon. On occasions, foreignness will predominate, with 
rivalry and war between Israel and Moab and Ammon (e.g., Deut. 23:3; Isa. 16:6; Jer. 
48:26~ Ezek. 25:3, 6; Zeph. 2:8-10). But on others the nations comprised of the 
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descendants of Lot will once again be close to Israel and its God. In Deut. 2:9,19, 
Israel is told the following: 
Do not harass Moab or engage them in battle, for I will not give you any 
of its land as a possession, since I have given Ar as a possession to the 
descendants of Lot' (2:9)... 'When you approach the frontier of the 
Ammonites, do not harass them or engage them in battle, for I will not 
give the land of the Ammonites to you as a possession, because I have 
given it to the descendants of Lot' (2: 19; both NRSV). 
As nations, both Moab and Ammon will partake of the promise that all of the nations 
will be blessed in Abraham (cf Gen. 12:1-3). But alongside this universal level of 
blessing stands a further irony which will once again tie the descendants of Lot back 
into the life of Israel. For Ruth, daughter of Naomi, is a Moabitess, a descendent of an 
incestuous union between Lot and one of his daughters in a cave overlooking the 
destroyed valley. And she is linked, through her own son abed and his son Jesse, to 
the one who would one day reign as king over Israel, David (Ruth 4: 21-22). And 
ultimately, through the Davidic line to the messianic figure of whom Isaiah writes: 
For a child has been born for us, a son given to us; authority rests upon 
his shoulders; and he is named Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God, 
Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace. His authority shall grow continually, 
and there shall be endless peace for the throne of David and his kingdom. 
He will establish and uphold it with justice and with righteousness from 
this time onward and forevermore (9:6-7; NRSV). 
A shoot shall come out from the stump of Jesse, and a branch shall grow 
out of his roots. The spirit of the LORD shall rest on him, the spirit of 
wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of 
knowledge and the fear of the LORD. His delight shall be in the fear of 
the LORD. He shall not judge by what his eyes see, or decide by what his 
ears hear; but with righteousness he shall judge the poor, and decide with 
equity for the meek of the earth; he shall strike the earth with the rod of 
his mouth, and with the breath of his lips he shall kill the wicked. 
Righteousness shall be the belt around his waist, and faithfulness the belt 
around his loins (11:1-5, NRSV-my italics). 
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VIII. The Way Forward: Old Testament Texts in the Light of the Suggested Canonical 
Exegesis of Genesis 18-19 
A. Where to from here? 
Towards the end of his Theology of the Old Testament, W. Brueggemann 
concludes that 'Israel characteristically presents itself, in "theodic" texts, as the great 
advocate and champion of justice, on which YHWH has reneged' (1997:739), no 
doubt following on from his earlier characterisation of Abraham as YHWH's teacher 
(1982: 168). But in the light of the conclusions reached in the preceding exegesis, it 
seems that Brueggemann is only half right. Yes, Israel does confront its deity about 
justice in the world, but what Brueggemann has missed are the elements of education 
and the polyvalence of justice as they are involved in YHWH's relationship with 
Abraham and Israel~ it is certainly not the case that justice is simple and YHWH simply 
reneges on carrying it out. Rather justice is complex and YHWH is totally 
consistent-at least in Genesis 18-19-in carrying out whichever model of justice 
happens to be in view. Israel's task is to wrestle with what justice can mean in such a 
situation. 
Our consistent failure to recognise the diverse expressions of justice in the 
biblical texts usually leads to our reading whichever model suits us best into the text. 
As Kaminsky notes, much of modern scholarship on this topic is 'tainted' with the 
Enlightenment's assumption that individualism is best (1995: 16-29, 179-89~ 1997), 
leading either to the open rejection of corporate notions or their re-interpretation in 
terms of individualism. By recognising both corporate and individual notions as 
available here and refraining from prior judgement, however, this tainted choice has 
hopefully been avoided, and the way opened for an exploration of the models of 
judgement used in the wider biblical material and a critical investigation of their inter-
relationships: Do they simply sit side-by-side? Are they mutually critical? Or is there 
an answer beyond the mere fact of difference? 
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There is no doubt that knowledge and practice of justice is of fundamental 
importance to Israel: after all, is that not what YHWH's decision to inform Abraham 
about the outcry is all about? In subsequent texts, it becomes clear that while YHWH 
will continue to act as judge in some situations over Israel (e.g., Exodus 32-34; 
Numbers 14) and the nations (e.g., Amos 1:3-2:3), the deity has in part delegated the 
application of divine justice to the judges of Israel. As Moses reminds Israel: 
I charged your judges [at Horeb]: "Give the members of your community 
a fair hearing, and judge rightly between one person and another, whether 
citizen or resident alien. You must not be partial in judging: hear out the 
small and the great alike; you shall not be intimidated by anyone, for the 
judgement is God's" (Deut. 1: 16-17-my italics ).169 
When Israel becomes a monarchy, it is the king who now has this responsibilitY,170 and 
the results of success or failure in carrying it out are summarised here in the words of 
YHWH to Jeremiah: 
Go down to the house of the king of Judah, and speak there this word, 
and say: Hear the word of the LORD, 0 King of Judah sitting on the 
throne of David-you, and your servants, and your people who enter 
these gates. Thus says the LORD: Act with justice and righteousness, and 
deliver from the hand of the oppressor anyone who has been robbed. And 
do no wrong or violence to the alien, the orphan, and the widow, or shed 
innocent blood in this place. For if you will indeed obey this word, then 
through the gates of this house shall enter kings who sit on the throne of 
David, riding in chariots and on horses, they, and their servants, and their 
169 Samuel sums up his career as judge as follows: 
"I have led you from my youth until this day. Here I am; testify against me before the 
LORD and before his anointed [Saul]. Whose ox have I taken? Or whose donkey have 
I taken? Or whom have I defrauded? Whom have I oppressed? Or from whose hand 
have I taken a bribe to blind my eyes with it? Testify against me and I "ill restore it to 
you" (I Sam. 12:1-3; NRSV). 
The people of Israel agree with Samuel's summary and reply: "You have not defrauded us or 
oppressed us or taken an~1hing from the hand of anyone" (I Sam. 12:~: NRSV). 
170 2 Sam. 8:15 records that 'David reigned over all Israel: and ... administered justice 
(~~r~i~)and equity (;"lP''J~) to all his people'. On meeting King Solomon. Sheba says: "Blessed be the 
LORD your God. who has delighted in you and set you on the throne of Israel! Because the LORD 
100'cd Israel forever. he has made you king to execute justice (~~~i~) and righteousncss (;"lP''J~~)'' (1 
Kgs 10:9; NRSV). 
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people. But if ~ou will not heed these words, I swear by myself, says the 
LORD, that this house shall become a desolation (Jer. 22: 1-5; NRSV). 
Israel must walk on the way of YHWH in order to be blessed itself and in order that 
the blessing which is to come upon the nations through Abraham may happen (cf e.g., 
Muilenberg, 1961; Whitelam, 1979). If its appointed judge or judges cannot keep 
Israel on the way, then either YHWH or the prophets will call them back to doing 
righteousness and justice (e.g., Nathan to David, 2 Sam. 12:1-12; Elijah to Ahab, 1 
Kgs 21:17-19; etc.). 
Justice is essential for two reasons apart from the concrete consequences for 
Israel and the nations: first, it is the very nature of YHWH: 'For the LORD your 
[Israel's] God is God of gods and Lord of lords, the great God, mighty and awesome, 
who is not partial and takes no bribe, who executes justice for the orphan and the 
widow, and who loves the strangers, providing them food and clothing' (10: 16-18; cf 
also e.g., Ps. 89: 14: 'Righteousness and justice are the foundation of your [YHWH's] 
throne'). This assertion is continually made until the point, when uttered by Elihu to 
Job, it even brings divine condemnation on its speaker: 
Therefore, hear me, you who have sense, far be it from God that he 
should do wickedness, and from the Almighty that he should do wrong. 
For according to their deeds he will repay them, and according to their 
ways he will make it befall them. Of a truth, God will not do wickedly, 
and the Almighty will not pervert justice (34:10-12; NRSV; cf 42:7). 
Second is the relationship between justice and creation: 'At the set time that I appoint I 
will judge with equity. When the earth totters, with all its inhabitants, it is I [the divine 
judge] who keep its pillars steady' (ps. 75:2-3; NRSV). This move to chaos through 
the practising of injustice is also reflected in the wisdom view of the role of the king: 
'By justice a king gives stability to the land' (prov. 29:4a).171 
111 Cf. also 'It is an abomination to kings to do evi1, for the throne is establisbed by 
ripteousness. (Prov. 16: 12; NRSV). 
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Yet the actual application of this justice can no longer be set against a defining 
moment in Gen. 18 :25 and the Sodom narrative. There YHWH carries out-
consistently-a very specific kind of justice, but does not decry the other possible 
options or insist that the model of justice applied there is universal. It is left to 
Abraham and Israel to work out what has happened. In taking this thesis forward, an 
investigation of the subsequent history of Israel and the way in which YHWH judges 
must be carried out. Cases of judging by the deity in each of the four models-
patriarchal corporate, patriarchal individual, egalitarian corporate, egalitarian 
individual-must be investigated and any elements of support or criticism offered by 
YHWH for examples of human justice must be noted. Important here are each of the 
four following passages; the first two reflect corporate ideas and the second two 
individualistic (all NRSV): 
You shall not bow down to [idols] or worship them; for I the LORD your 
God am a jealous God, punishing children for the iniquity of parents, to 
the third and the fourth generation of those who reject me, but showing 
steadfast love to the thousandth generation of those who love me and 
keep my commandments (Exod. 20:5-6). 
Run to and fro through the streets of Jerusalem, look around and take 
note! Search its squares and see if you can find one person who acts 
justly and seeks truth-so that I may pardon Jerusalem (Jer. 5: 1). 
The word of the LORD came to me [Ezekiel]: Mortal, when a land sins 
against me by acting faithlessly, and I stretch out my hand against it, and 
break its staff of bread and send famine upon it, and cut off from it human 
beings and animals, even if Noah, Daniel, and Job, these three, were in it, 
they would save only their own lives by their righteousness, says the Lord 
GOD (Ezek. 14:12-14). 
The word of the LORD came to me: What do you mean by repeating this 
proverb concerning the land of Israel, "The parents have eaten sour 
grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge"? As I live, says the Lord 
GOD, this proverb shall no more be used by you in Israel .... [I]t is only 
the person who sins that shall die (Ezek. 18: 1-4). 
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How, for example, do the ideology of the covenant and the ideology of the remnant 
support or subvert each of the multiple strands within the Old Testament's complex of 
judicial models? 
Equally, the contextuality of lament texts such as Psalm 13 must be re-
assessed. Brueggemann may see 'How long, YHWH' as a pushing of the deity to act, 
but I suggest that one answer by the deity to such a question could well be to say, 
'well, that is the result of what Abraham (or whoever) wanted, to spare the wicked-
who go on being wicked-with the righteous. Don't complain to me when I give you 
the kind of justice you asked for!' When Israel cries out for justice, what exactly does 
it want? Obviously, the detailed study of the use of different models of justice within 
the Old Testament is a considerable task far beyond the scope of this thesis, but here I 
want to briefly pursue two questions as pointers to some of the answers which may 
arise: What is to be made of Job's complaint that YHWH kills the righteous with the 
wicked in the light of my reading of Genesis 18-19? And does the Old Testament rest 
with simply incompatible, though implicitly mutually critical, notions of YHWH's 
justice? 
B. Job and the Interplay Between Models of Justice 
On pages 213 -14 a number of different 'just' judgements were noted: 
(Context A) 
(Context B) 
(Context C) 
(Context D) 
(Context E) 
(Context F) 
the innocent become as the guilty and all are punished 
the guilty become as the innocent and all are reprieved 
the righteous are vindicated, the wicked are punished 
a group of innocent people is vindicated 
a group of guilty people is punished 
an innocent/guilty individual is vindicated/punished 
These different contexts can be sub-divided into two distinct groups: A-C and D-F. 
What makes them distinct is the fact that contexts D-F are treated identically by both 
corporate and individualistic models of judgement. If everyone in a set group is either 
guilty or innocent or if an individual has been found guilty or innocent of a particular 
crime, then both modes of judgement cohere in their punishment of the guilty and 
vindication of the innocent. It is only when a group becomes mixed-or when 
numerous events within the life-span of one individual are being considered-that 
these models of judgement become separated and contradictory. In such an instance, 
the individual model relies on strict differentiation for it to be properly carried out 
correctly-it can therefore be unjust-but in contrast, the corporate model is always 
'just', the proportion of just to unjust in any given group being completely irrelevant to 
its actual judgements. With this in mind, let us briefly consider Job. In 
Job's problem is that he believes that he is being punished when he is righteous, 
a fact testified to even by the deity (1 :8~ readers are, of course, aware that the situation 
does not involve divine judgement-Satan has rather been given permission to 'test' 
Job-but it is highly significantly that Job is thinking in terms of a judgement). His 
friends claim that this cannot be so and that he must have sinned (though Eliphaz 
almost immediately implies another possibility when he notes that the sons of the fool 
are 'far from safety', 5:4; perhaps Job's father sinned). Job, in response to the friends, 
challenges YHWH to let him present his case, and asserts that YHWH 'destroys both 
the righteous and the wicked' (9:22). When YHWH finally appears out of the 
whirlwind (38-41), Job admits that he spoke of that which he did not understand (42:1-
6), yet Job's previous words are then characterised by YHWH as correct (42:7). 
Three points-at least-must be accounted for: Job is righteous throughout~ Job has 
spoken rightly ofYHWH in that the deity 'destroys both the righteous and the wicked' 
(9:22; cf 42:7); nevertheless, Job admits that he has spoken of what he does not fully 
understand and repents (42: 1-6). 
One option worth exploring further is the effect of the interplay between 
different models of judgement within Job, particularly perhaps because he is a patriarch 
In Obviously. givcn the historical effect and complexity of this text. not to mention the vast 
amount of secondary literature (for which see Clines. 1989). what follows is thus a vcry tcntative foray 
which I ncyertheless am unable to rcsist engaging in here. 
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like Abraham. I have already pointed out that YHWH can punish the righteous and it 
be called 'just' in a scenario involving a corporate judgement: Why then does Job 
defend himself and charge YHWH when his own punishment does not necessari ~l' 
mean that he himself is guilty? The answer suggested here is that Job is operating 
with a particular view of judgement; namely, one in which YHWH cannot punish the 
righteous because that would be unjust. If this is correct, then it is possible to attribute 
one of two world-views to Job: The first is that Job is simply thinking of a 
individualistic justice in which his own punishment despite his innocence can only 
indicate that YHWH is unjust. But remembering the overlap between individualistic 
and corporate models in contexts D-F above with regard to injustice, a second 
possibility arises; Job is thinking of himself in terms of a corporate judgement, but sees 
himself as the totality of the entity being judged, as 'one'. Further research may make 
one of these options more likely that the other (perhaps 9:22 itself counts against the 
latter), but, regardless, it should be noted that if Job is correct in his diagnosis of his 
situation as being one involving the corporate judgement of an individual, then both 
judgements would agree, and, in Job's eyes, YHWH would be rendered unjust by his 
suffering. 
But the discussion of overlapping models of justice in this thesis also raises the 
possibility that YHWH is dealing with Job just as he has dealt with Abraham. When 
YHWH appears out of the whirlwind, Job admits that he has spoken of things he does 
not fully comprehend as Abraham and Israel do not fully comprehend what has 
happened in Genesis 18-19; justice is not so straight-forward as Job and Abraham 
think. As far as it goes, Job has spoken truthfully of a YHWH who is capable of 
killing the righteous with the wicked in corporate judgements. Job's 'error' is either to 
have assumed (incorrectly) that such killing must be understood within an 
individualistic model of judgement or to have assumed that he is being judged 
corporately as a single person, that he stands alone in his context. It is not, however, 
necessary to go on to show that Job is being judged because of someone else's sin (the 
reader knows he is actually being tested)~ the point here is simply that such a 'just' 
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judgement is possible and that for Job to charge YHWH with unjust behaviour without 
taking consideration of this alternative is to have spoken of things of which he is not 
fully aware. But once again, YHWH does not point out the actual error of Job's 
ways, although unlike Abraham the latter at least knows that he has a problem, a very 
useful step beyond Abraham's position. But like Israel-and the rest of us-he will 
still have to work out for himself what exactly it means for the 'judge of all the earth' 
to do justice! 
C. Towards a Resolution? 
In the light of the importance of divine justice for Old Testament theology, the 
possibility that the biblical texts simply present four (or more) incompatible models of 
justice is perhaps troubling. What is being demonstrated by such a presentation? One 
possibility is simply that judgement is always contextual, that there is no one right 
model for all times and all places. A future study of the use of these models and their 
relationship with each other would be of great help is defining the contours of this 
aspect of divine justice. But a second possibility arises from two related aspects of 
justice in the Old Testament: messianism and resurrection. 
Messianism (in the sense of a utopian present or future) is a much discussed 
topic in Old Testament study, and here I simply want to suggest that texts like the 
following clearly imply that simply having four models of justice co-existing side-by-
side is not the end of the matter: 
His delight shall be in the fear of the LORD. He shall not judge by what 
his eyes see, or decide by what his ears hear~ but with righteousness he 
shall judge the poor, and decide with equity for the meek of the earth~ he 
shall strike the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his 
lips he shall kill the wicked. Righteousness shall be the belt around his 
waist, and faithfulness the belt around his loins (Isa. 11 :3-5). 
When the oppressor is no more, and destruction has ceased, and 
marauders have vanished from the land, then a throne shall be established 
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in steadfast love in the tent of David, and on it shall sit in faithfulness a 
ruler who seeks justice (~~~~ ~:f') and is swift to do what is right ('0~ 
P'J~; Isa. 16: 1-5). . 
Here is my servant, whom I uphold, my chosen, in whom my soul 
delights; I have put my spirit upon him; he will bring forth justice to the 
nations. He will not cry or lift up his voice, or make it heard in the street; 
a bruised reed he will not break, and a dimly burning wick he will not 
quench; he will faithfully bring forth justice. He will not grow faint or be 
crushed until he has established justice in the earth; and the coastlands 
wait for his teaching (lsa. 42: 1-4). 
But if divine justice is to be defined as anything other than the collection of 
models used by YHWH, then the question arises as to what will be done about the 
judgements already practised by YHWH which are now to be defined as unjust. If, for 
example, an egalitarian individualism is the messianic mode of judgement as we, in our 
individual-oriented way, usually seem to assume, then what about the destruction of 
the women and babies of Sodom? Are they simply to be written off as the price paid 
for Israel learning-eventually-what justice really is? A pointer-and that is all it 
really is-to this not being the case is found in the reference to resurrection in the book 
of Daniel: 
At that time Michael, the great prince, the protector of your people, shall 
arise. There shall be a time of anguish, such as has never occurred since 
nations first came into existence. But at that time your people shall be 
delivered, everyone who is found written in the book. Many of those who 
sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and 
some to shame and everlasting contempt. Those who are wise shall shine 
like the brightness of the sky, and those who lead many to righteousness, 
like the stars forever and ever (Dan. 12:1-3; NRSV-my italics). 
It is surely significant that users of these texts as scripture have tended to add 
texts to them: for Christians, the New Testament, for Jews, the rabbinic texts. In both 
sets of texts, however, resurrection plays an important role and, in a Christian biblical 
theology of justice at least, this notion must inevitably be incorporated into the four-
model scenario developed in this thesis. In his small book on Jewish theological 
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responses to the holocaust, D. Cohn-Sherbok has noted that, for various reasons 
bound up with the philosophy of modernity, 
Jewish holocaust theologians have refrained from appealing to the 
traditional belief in other-worldly reward and punishment in formulating 
their responses to the horrors of the death camps. Yet without this belief, 
it is simply impossible to make sense of the world as the creation of an 
all-good and all-powerful God. Without eventual vindication of the 
righteous in paradise, there is no way to sustain the belief in a 
providential God who watches over his chosen people .... If death means 
extinction, there is no way to make sense of the claim that He loves and 
cherishes all those who died in the concentration camps, for suffering and 
death would ultimately triumph over each of those who perished. But if 
there is eternal life in the world to come, then there is hope that the 
righteous will share in a divine life. Moreover, the divine attribute of 
justice demands that the righteous of Israel who met their deaths as 
innocent victims of the Nazis will reap an everlasting reward (1989: 128-
29). 
Although Cohn-Sherbok's argument rests firmly upon an egalitarian 
individualistic model of judgement-which future study of the scriptures in the light of 
this thesis might not confirm as being the messianic model of justice-it nevertheless 
points out some of the problems involved in the theodicy question and the role of 
corporate and individualistic models of justice. YHWH can only fence with Israel for 
so long about the question of 'justice' because one day, the messianic ideal assures us, 
it will have to be enacted for real~ for YHWH to remain just at that point all of those 
who have suffered in educative examples of judgements now designated as 'unjust'-
perhaps including such as that of Sodom-must be recompensed by the deity in order 
for YHWH, the Judge of all the Earth, to finally do justice. 
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Conclusion 
A Critical Appraisal of the Canonical Approach 
I. Insights gained into the Canonical Approach Through Praxis 
A. Setting the Scene 
My principal aim has been to critique the praxis of the canonical approach of 
Brevard S. Childs. But in the execution of that project, its conception has changed 
considerably over the time period involved. Initially, my intention was to offer a 
biblical theology of the 'God as Judge' in both Old and New Testaments as it would 
appear in Childs's approach. I was to take established interpretations of the Sodom 
narrative of Genesis 18-19 and the passion narrative in John's Gospel (18:28-19:30), 
and my 'original' contribution was to be a critical consideration of the relationship 
between the two Testaments as delineated by a study of that particular aspect of the 
deity (a project that has had to be deferred). As I researched the Sodom narrative 
more thoroughly, however, I discovered that there was no established interpretation 
which did justice to the peculiarities of the canonical approach; each could be faulted 
for failing to take account of one or more of Childs's demands. This led to a shift of 
concentration away from a 'biblical theology' towards the more textual aspects of the 
canonical approach as they appeared within a reading of the Sodom narrative itself. In 
what follows, I hope to draw some critical conclusions about this approach to reading 
the biblical text of the canonical approach based upon my experience of reading 
Genesis 18-19 as recorded in chapters 5 and 6. 
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B. Historical Information and the Presupposed Knowledge of the Canonical 
Reader 
Perhaps the most fundamental problem which has arisen during my exegetical 
work on the Sodom narrative relates to the difficulty of deciding when to incorporate 
historical background knowledge and when to discard it. Does the narrative of 
Abraham's dialogue with YHWH in Gen. 18:23-33, for example, require either an 
exclusively corporate (von Rad) or individualistic (Ben Zvi) model of judgement as an 
essential background or may the availability of both be assumed (my own position)? 
Of a different but related order is the question of whether or not the first section of 
YHWH's soliloquy requires as background the knowledge that the deity has decided to 
destroy Sodom (as Westermann states). Each of these questions requires a decision 
about how history and historical knowledge will be used to illuminate the text. But 
what guidance does the canonical approach provide the exegete in making these 
decisions? 
In Childs's own statements concerning the role of historical criticism, it is clear 
that historical background knowledge is expected to contribute a great deal to how his 
approach views the biblical text. This is perhaps not surprising given his start in 
biblical studies in the forties and fifties~ Childs is very aware of his own historical 
critical training and the vast amounts of knowledge generated by its methodologies. I 
have already discussed the difficulties of Childs's wish to use diachronic studies to 
illuminate the final form preliminary to my exegesis of the Sodom narrative and 
rejected such an insistence on knowledge of the diachronic growth of the text as 
necessary for a canonical approach (see pages 88-92). Nevertheless, my experience of 
reading the Sodom narrative makes it clear that there is no easy line of demarcation 
between the illumination provided by the diachronic and that provided by such simple 
background knowledge as prevailing juridical models. If one accepts Provan' s 
description of Childs's use of the diachronic as involving the skewing the canonical 
form (rather than as a 'canonical approach' in a Carr mode), then it must also be 
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acknowledged that the addition of any other kind of historical information inevitably 
results in a similar skewing. 
The essential problem arises from Childs's view of the canonical process itself. 
Childs's has argued that the final form of the text was formed by self-effacing tradents 
who so worked on the texts as to loosen them from their historical moorings (since 
Childs regards certain texts as only achieving a canonical setting with the finalising 
decision, this process was completed only by 'canonisation proper'). This process also 
involved the necessary loss, even deliberate suppression, of presupposed reader 
knowledge as texts were combined and their semantic content altered; in effect, the 
readers in view changed as the texts themselves were changed. What has become 
obvious in this thesis, therefore, is that a problem is created by Childs's view of the 
canonical process with regard to the standpoint of the 'correct' audience of the 
canonical text and therefore with the addition of any pieces of historical background 
knowledge presupposed by the final form of the text. Who exactly are the users of the 
final form supposed to be? Are they the original Israelites or readers who require the 
knowledge of such readers? Are they the first-century canonisers or again readers 
who require the knowledge of such readers? Or are they modem Christian or Jewish 
readers? Just what sort of background knowledge does the canonical text require of 
its reader in order for them to read it as it stands? Or, to put it another way, when is a 
text skewed and when is it illuminated! 
When Westermann posits that YHWH in Gen. 18: 17-19 has already decided to 
destroy the city solely on the grounds that post-exilic readers would have read the text 
that way, is that a mandatory assumption for later readers, especially one like myself 
who is more concerned with the Sodom narrative as narrative? In Childs's own 
reflection on the addition of historical knowledge to the Elijah narrative (1980), he 
asks what exegetes should do with our vastly improved historical critical knowledge 
about Canaanite sacrificial practice when interpreting the narrative of Elijah's battle 
with the priests of Baal on Carmel. (1 Kings 18 has no details about the Baal altar but 
describes in great detail the altar constructed by Elijah with its twelve stones and so 
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on.) Childs concludes that this historical material may only be added when it does not 
obscure the story being told. 
But the addition of that type of information is much more subtle than Childs 
allows. Westermann's view of the text as post-exilic (which in the terms of Childs's 
canonical approach may perhaps also be transposed to the text as passing through a 
post-exilic phase) does not involve the addition of the large chunk of information 
about Canaanite sacrificial practice which Childs rejects for the Elijah narrative, but 
rather entails a subtle twist in the presuppositions of the reader and therefore in the 
shape of the narrative as it appears in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis (though of course 
Westermann could also claim that it is I who have twisted his story). Similarly, a 
resolution of my posited incoherence of Abraham's speech is available to any exegete 
who is able to insist on other historical grounds that this text needs to be read against 
either exclusively individualistic or corporate thought. 
Childs's view of the canonical process does not, it seems to me, provide a set 
of guidelines by which these decisions can be made (cf also Sibley Towner's 
comments on Daniell, 1988:293-95). When Childs argues that 1 Corinthians should 
be read without reference to the actual identities of Paul's opponents as recreated by 
modern socio-historical investigation because the canonical text does not record that 
information, and shifts the semantic centre of the letter from (the historical critic's 
presumed) 1 Cor. 14 to 1 Cor. 15 (1984a:274-76), he merely completes the circle here. 
On what basis does Childs decide that such information is unnecessary for 1 
Corinthians but IS necessary in the case of the Canaanite material in the Elijah 
narratives? When should historical information be either incorporated as illumination 
and when should it be rejected as 'swamping' the text? Equally, if the semantic 
meaning of most, if not all, of these texts has been altered by their placement within the 
final text as Childs has claimed, the exegete must also reckon with the effects of 
canonical harmonisation (whether deliberate or accidental) upon these texts and ask, 
should the original meaning of the text even be allowed to survive? Even if 
Westermann, or von Rad, or Ben Zvi were to be correct about the original meaning of 
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the Sodom narrative, would they necessarily be correct in imposing that meaning upon 
the words as they now appear in the final form? Or should their particular 
interpretations be consigned to the scrap heap of ex-meanings discarded by the 
canonical process? (I can't help thinking that Childs's own argument that Sanders's 
recreation of the canonical process ignores the wishes of the tradents is encountered 
afresh when his insistence on our taking account of a text's original meaning effectively 
countermands its new canonical meaning.) The point of such criticism is not, however, 
to suggest that exegetes must somehow attempt to read these texts without eyes alert 
to historical information; they, of course, have very little choice in the matter. Rather, 
it is the lack of a rigorous procedure within the canonical approach constraining their 
decisions which is significant here. 
It seems likely that there are no rules which can definitively be used to decide 
which information is in or out; Moberly's assertion that there is no one way to apply 
historical criticism to a canonical approach is undoubtedly correct (1983 :23). Two 
extremes are definitely to be avoided: that of asserting that no historical critical 
information that is not in the text may be added and that of de-canonising the text and 
reading it against a detailed historical critical construct. In practice of course neither is 
really possible-information is always added, but never enough to read the text as it 
really was read and understood. In between these two points lies a spectrum of 
readings in which historical critical information is incorporated and semantic shifts in 
texts because of the effects of canonisation are recognised, both to a greater or lesser 
degree. The line between illuminating or distorting the final form is not ultimately a 
question of rule following and a hard text but rather one of the effect of that exegesis 
upon those who encounter it. If it is convincing and satisfying-and this does not have 
to mean inoffensive or culturally conforming-it is likely to be accepted as a correct 
application of historical criticism to the canonical text. If it is judged distracting and 
irrelevant by the community of the texts, it will be rejected. Only its acceptance over 
time will clarify such questions. 
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C. A 'Thick Text' or a Number of 'Thin Texts' 
Deciding to what depth the text should be investigated, what kind of extra-
textual material invoked, and whether a particular piece of historical information 
should be incorporated or discarded is all part of the task of the canonical exegete, but 
these choices are highly unlikely to be made identically across cultural and temporal 
boundaries. Because these decisions do not necessarily lead to a mutually reinforcing 
plurality but rather have in this case led to a number of contradictory readings (contrast 
my reading with those of Ben Zvi and von Rad), the canonical approach is left not with 
a 'thick text' in which partial illumination of a singularity takes place, but rather with a 
series of 'thin texts' which then function as Scripture within contextually differentiated 
Christian or Jewish communities, albeit with the-at least potentially-humbling 
proviso that they are not the 'whole story'. To be sure, Childs does acknowledge that 
community readings change over time (i.e. as their temporal context changes), but he 
does not appear to consider what may occur to two communities sat side-by-side 
temporally but a vast distance apart culturally and socially. This view of the canonical 
text as a thin text which may be radically altered by illumination, whatever its source, 
rather than as the single coherent thick text which Childs presumes to exist, has the 
effect of highlighting the context of the exegete and his or her sources of inspiration in 
the production of canonical meaning. It may also result in a number of different 
'Gods' rather than aspects of one 'God'. 173 
173 A possible example of this may be drawn from the recent work of Staley. In his early 
work, Staley had presented an Iserian reader response to the Gospel of John, constructing its ideal 
reader and outlining that reader's interpretation of the text (1988). But he was bothered by the 
apparently passionless nature of John's passion narrative, with its remarkably serene crucifixion 
scene. No doubt this point was highly influential in the use of the Gospel by early Docetic Christians, 
John's Jesus appearing almost divine in his self-control. (Of course, John's Gospel does not require a 
Docetic interpretation.) But at some point Staley became aware that one feature of first centur) 
crucifixions was the sight of dogs around the crosses, lapping up the blood of the victims. With the 
addition of this gruesome historical information to the exegetical pot. Staley's view of the passion 
narrative as serene and 'docetic' was changed. But in Fishian terms, the additional information 
changed the shape of the text itself and, perhaps, the very image of the divine it contains. 
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In the reconstruction of Childs's approach in Chapter 2, I noted that historical 
criticism was expected to keep control over the effects of social location on the 
exegete (see page 131). By involving Old and New Testament specialists in his 
project, anachronism was to be removed from the readings which arise from the 
canonical approach. But now, the likelihood that historical knowledge will form such 
a strict control on exegetes and their canonical text( s) seems considerably less certain. 
With no clear guidelines as to when to include historical knowledge and when to 
regard it as properly discarded, a grey area is left in which exegetes make their own 
decisions about the relevance of historical data. 
My own preference has been to consider the canonical approach as a largely 
modern project with a passing nod to the periods of the canonical process and of the 
first century CEo It is partially this which allows me to regard both corporate and 
individualistic models as available to Abraham, regardless of their availability to the 
ancient Israelites. (Careful readers will have noticed, however, that I also invoked 
Kaminsky's historical arguments at that point. But did I need to?) I also used models 
derived from canonically later texts to inform earlier readings (e.g., Matthews's 
'protocol of hospitality' , gleaned from Judges 4). Was that legitimate? And I assumed 
that canonical readers should be aware of both Hebrew as a language and of many 
aspects of Yahwism, balancing, for example, their awareness of the covenant 
connotations of 'righteousness' over against the fleeting occurrence of the word in 
YHWH's soliloquy (18: 19). In such an early text, many words appear for the first 
time in the Bible and are canonically programmatic, yet they can only be understood in 
the light of later knowledge of Hebrew. 
Alongside these choices must also be placed the role of other sources in 
illuminating my Sodom narrative. First and foremost is my use of Gunkel's diachronic 
study as an exegetical partner. On a number of occasions, I simply dismissed Gunkel's 
conclusions (e.g., on Gen. 18: 17-19). Other times, the tensions identified by Gunkel 
were obvious and required no illumination from the diachronic to see (e.g., the 
problem of the one and the three). But on a few occasions, his work proved \"ery 
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influential in my choices. A good example is my decision to back a rather minority 
position in asserting that Abraham recognised YHWH from the very start (MT. 
Sailhammer, Keil-Delitzsch). Gunkel's assertion that YHWH is not recognised at all 
in Gen. 18: 1-15, but is obviously known in the following text led me to adopt the view 
that Abraham does not recognise YHWH during the narrative precisely because he has 
already recognised the deity at its very beginning. Provan's claim that diachronic 
studies may prove useful seems to be borne out here, but with the caveat that this may 
well prove to be the exception and not the rule. 
But easily the most significant source of 'illumination' for my reading and proof 
that Childs's emphasis on this concept is not misplaced has been the history of exegesis 
on the Sodom narrative. I cannot imagine having developed a reading in which 
Abraham proves incoherent if the two alternatives exemplified by von Rad (corporate) 
and Ben Zvi (individualistic) had not been available to me (although as I shall argue 
shortly, it would not have been impossible).174 Equally, it is very noticeable that 
Abraham's position as the father of three great religions has led to a certain-rather 
problematic-sanctifying of the patriarch over the centuries. Recent studies (including 
especially those by people not religiously committed to these texts) have, however, 
been less concerned to defend him at all costs, another move which has facilitated the 
reading presented here (though I do not actually consider my reading disparaging to 
the patriarch at all; in contrast to the systematic theologian he is usually portrayed as, 
my reading at least recognises his essential humanity in the face of potential 
catastrophe) . 
174 Certainly not every text will have these kinds of alternatives available, but in other 
research carried out on the character of Gamaliel in Acts 5, I also discovered two contradictory 
exegetical traditions in which he was seen alternatively as either a fool and a Jew or as a closet spy 
and Christian (for further discussion. see Lyons, 1997). 
It is tempting to see the current practice of deconstruction in biblical studies as opening the 
way for more confrontations of these alternatives. but in practice one or other is usually much more 
convincing-that is. relevant-to the contextualised reader. Even in my own reading of Genesis 18-
19 here. it has to be admitted both that some will still continue to prefer either the exegesis of von Rad 
or Ben Zvi and that it may well be a rarity that a canonical exegete will choose not to accept one of the 
alternatives and develop a new reading. 
305 
But the marked effect of this changing attitude to Abraham on the exegesis 
raises the question of the reader's cultural location and, here, his (my!) autobiography. 
Although Calvin was asked the question, what about the children of Sodom, his 
response that they were all 'execrable' is one I cannot imagine giving. Perhaps the 
most obvious source of illumination provided by my Self is the way in which the 
'problem' (for me at least) of the women and children of Sodom is developed. Even 
having been around feminism for the last ten years or so, I still do not know exactly 
what 'it' is, yet it seems clear that feminist concerns inform this present work and are 
being worked out in the exegesis as implications of the gender of the language in use. 
My 'feminist' problem-originating in an inability to deal with the role of Lot's 
daughters in Sodom-has certainly exerted a strong pressure to follow the implications 
of the models of justice problem to its conclusion, pushing it from an original two 
options-corporate and individualistic-to four options-adding patriarchal and 
egalitarian variants. The fact that this was a relatively late move in the writing of this 
thesis probably indicates the ease with which I might simply have covered over the 
problem in other circumstances. 
In all these things, it is a question of balancing the sources of illumination, and I 
cannot claim to have got the right answer because other exegetes will weigh the 
evidence differently; at the very least they will now have to deal with my conclusions in 
a way in which I did not, and who knows what that will produce in the long run. The 
real question about the acceptability of this particular interpretation is therefore one of 
its momentary rhetorical persuasiveness as to the moves I have made and its general 
attractiveness to a believing community, rather than its correct application of a 
rigorous methodology. 
D. The Canonical Text as Narrative 
To any reader familiar with the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament narratives the 
following comments may seem obvious, but they nevertheless demonstrate an essential 
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feature of the canonical approach-the nature of narrative itself On a number of 
occasions, I gained the distinct impression that my 'text' was on the verge of collapse, 
that it would not bear any significant interpretative weight. When Lot finds his sons-
in-law, the exegete can hardly help asking whether or not they are blind in view of 
Gen. 19: 11. Equally, the very existence of additional C'~~ in Sodom is left ambiguous 
by Lot's depiction as an alien and the use of the term 'men of Sodom' in 19:4, and 
there is a temptation to pursue this question into the murky depths. 
Two thoughts occurred to me on encountering this aspect of the Sodom 
narrative. First, that these questions do not seem very central, and therefore imply that 
a level exists within the text below which it would be unnecessary or unwise to go in 
deriving significant exegetical information. But assuming that this will always be the 
case is problematic; a canonical exegete investigating theophanies, for example, may 
come to define the very sketchy detail of the relationship between YHWH and the 
angelic figures as highly significant. But second, the fact that this feeling occurred 
more often in my exegesis of Genesis 19 created in me the suspicion that I was placing 
a greater weight upon texts which are not more secure in any textual sense, but which 
are simply more important to me. Why not dismiss the problems with the narrative of 
Abraham's intervention as simply as I have done with the narrative of Lot and his sons-
in-law? Why spend 27 pages explicating a now highly complex Gen. 18:23-25 and 4 
pages on Gen. 19: 12-14? (I suspect that I cannot easily invoke Gunkel's view that 
some narratives are just better than others, though I feel like doing exactly that). 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that each-even perhaps every-narrative is capable of 
being mined for all manner of (strange) detail if aspects of it are pursued to their 
logical conclusion (for example, see Gossai's claim that Lot stayed with his sons-in-law 
in the street all night, thereby demonstrating his indifference to the angelic warning of 
forthcoming destruction). It is the individual exegete who will decide which details are 
significant and to be pursued, but the problem of gaining acceptance of a given reading 
may become more significant, the more 'tenuous' the exegesis becomes. 
A further example of the uncertainties surrounding the canonical narrative is 
derived from my experience of being forced on two occasions to make an 
interpretative decision based upon what may be described as a restriction of the space 
around the text. In rejecting both the Jewish traditions surrounding the appearance of 
the three menIYHWH recorded by Ginzberg (see pages 169-70) and the interpretation 
of Gen. 19:4 as indicating a desire to become acquainted with the two visitors to 
Sodom offered by R. Wright (see page 259, footnote 159), I applied Occam's razor to 
the narrative. I chose to see the text as being as simple as possible and regarded 
cumbersome extra-textual additions as unnecessary. But it is by no means clear that 
this decision is mandatory in a canonical approach. If a subsequent reader is content to 
expend a very little more effort on the space around the text (as, for example, those 
involved with the homosexuality debate have done with Gen. 19: 4), there seems to be 
no difficulty in creating significantly different readings. Furthermore, I am also left 
open to the charge that other elements of the reading presented here are not as simple 
as they could be. 
A final example of the effects of 'narrative' upon the canonical approach relates 
to the role of paradoxical formulations in a canonical approach to biblical theology~ 
how should they be handled? In Genesis 18-19, a problem of this kind is caused by 
YHWH's announcement that Sodom is to be investigated. For some interpreters, this 
cannot be taken seriously because an omniscient YHWH must know the outcome of 
such an investigation-the text is therefore made to conform to an all-knowing 
YHWH with the result that the Sodom narrative becomes simply a test for Abraham; 
the narrative portrayal of a YHWH who does not yet know the outcome is destroyed. 
The clash between the omniscient YHWH-the all-knowing unchanging 
deity-and the unknowing YHWH-who learns and repents-is one which has been 
played out in theology for millennia. Is YHWH the Aristotelian deity or is YHWH the 
deity of such as Process Theology? Or, as seems most likely canonically, are both to be 
affirmed with approbation reserved for anyone who resolves the problem in either 
direction? Childs himself has castigated Fretheim's study on the suffering of YHWH 
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(l992a:356-58) for straying towards the latter, but concludes himself by stating that 
'the biblical language of depicting God in human form is not an unfortunate 
accommodation to human limitation, but a truthful reflection of the free decision of 
God to identify with his [sic] creation in human form and yet to remain God' 
(1992a:358); a formulation which, despite Childs's 'yes', merely restates the problem: 
does YHWH suffer? 
But perhaps this is as it should be. Given the wide-ranging nature of this 
argument, it seems premature that a canonical reading should attempt to resolve this 
issue textually, by re-interpreting the unknowing YHWH of Gen. 18:20-21 as 
omniscient. That task appears rather to be a later theological one, in which the role of 
a canonical biblical theology would be to delineate the strands of text which show 
YHWH as all-knowing and YHWH as unknowing for subsequent consideration (for 
this problem on another aspect of the deity, see Moberly, 1998; on 'repentance' and 
'non-repentance'). With that in mind, I have read this text as one in which YHWH 
does not know what the answer to the investigation will be, thus making it a genuine 
quest for divine knowledge of the outcry against Sodom. But others have not seen 
things that way (though often influenced by their view of the text as post-exilic rather 
than because YHWH is omniscient) and might consider my formulation of the 
responsibilities of the canonical approach to be an avoidance of the issue. 
The problems of encountering differing levels of stability within the narrative of 
a canonical reader, of choosing which extra-textual material to place around the text, 
and of dealing with paradoxical formulations add further to the possibilities for 
variations in canonical exegesis. Once again, however, it is the lack of rules as to how 
much stability is required, how much space can be left around the text in the canonical 
approach, and how to deal with the paradoxical formulations of the final form which 
mean that actual validation of these readings can only be left to the particular 
community of faith in which the exegete is operating. 
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E. Repeating Tradition and the Creation of New Readings 
A further aspect of the canonical approach rendered problematic by my 
redescription of the 'thick canonical text' as 'thin canonical texts' is Childs's clear 
implication that the reading produced should stand in continuity with those of the 
Christian tradition. Initially this appeared to me to be a rather limiting feature, 
presupposing in some ways a lack of creativity, a view which presumably underlies the 
objections of critics of Childs such as Whybray (1981) and Collins (1990). In 
concluding my thesis, however, I find myself in the rather embarrassing position of 
offering a new reading based upon a canonical approach to the biblical texts. As yet, I 
do not know whether to claim this as a demonstration of the creative potential of the 
canonical approach or of its failure to hold to tradition. Given Childs's own 
characterisation of the approach as illuminating a single thick text, perhaps the latter is 
correct. But two factors should give pause for thought: First, we should now fully 
recognise that the controlling function of the canonical shape (as defined by the 
interpretive community's assumptions) and the freedom inherent in the act of exegesis 
in all its contextuality must go hand in hand, with both contributing to the meaning 
generated wherever that position leads. Second, the pressure which the canonical 
shape places on readings in fact works in my favour in the case of the Sodom narrative. 
In effect, it is my contention that previous exegetes have largely failed to take the final 
form seriously~ for example, those who happily see Gen. 18:23-33 as proposing an 
individualistic judgement despite YHWH's words in Gen. 18: 14a and the 
overwhelming number of subsequent corporate 'injustices' inflicted by YHWH on 
Israel. The emphasis on the canonical shape as restrictive may therefore actually lead 
towards newness and creativity in exegesis rather than towards a stifling repetition. 
And the essentially open-ended nature of human contextuality indicates that while a 
certain 'sameness' may exist about canonical interpretations, they are in fact 'infinite' 
in number. 
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This ability of the canonical approach to force Christian readers to new 
readings has several important implications. Though Sanders has pointed out that 
much of the early Church's use of the Bible was oracular rather than canonical (e.g., 
1987: 168-169~ a view approvingly cited by Barr, 1999:449), it is important to note 
that this relates only to its actual usage~ Kelsey's position that much of the early church 
adopted a canon of scripture still stands. It was in their practice that the text was used 
piecemeal, the correctness or 'orthodoxy' of its everyday application being controlled 
not so much by the canonical shape but rather by the theological sensibilities of its 
users. There are undoubtedly Christian communities today-this may even be the 
norm-who work in the same manner, perhaps through the use of liturgy, lectionaries, 
Bible notes, or the leading of prophetic structures (as with the Pentecostals). Equally 
some presently working in biblical theology have argued for a definition of the 
discipline as one operating in an ecclesiastical setting shaping, ordering and critiquing 
the continuing life of the Christian Community (e.g., Kelsey and Ollenburger), a 
definition which may tend towards the oracular and immediate rather than the 
canonical and mediatory. In these communities, rules for discernment of 'correct' 
interpretations may have biblical (non-canonical?) roots but they may also be 
ecclesiastical or simply sociological in origin; the canonical approach does not, 
therefore, provide the rule of orthodoxy for these groups that Childs claims it 
should. 175 This Barr characterises as the canon's ecclesiastical 'passivity' (1999:448). 
Significantly, however, the rhetoric of these communities (and indeed virtually 
all 'orthodox' churches) explicitly claims that the story of the Creator God and his 
Christ as told from Genesis to Revelation in the canonical scriptures is the 
foundational myth which underlies their theology and praxis. They may operate in an 
175 Whatever the contextual source of an oracular community's rules of discernment. it 
should be understood that contextuality functions rather differently in discernment than it does in the 
creation of the canonical text. The latter is produced out of their contextuality and then used as a rule 
to order the beliefs of the group, thus indirectly affecting their praxis. In the case of discernment, 
contextuality directly affects praxis through its immediate disavowal of unacceptable practices or 
readings. Of course. there is considerable overlap: the canonical shape will impact the criteria which 
govern the acceptability of any readings produced by an oracular community and community rules of 
discernment will result in the non-acceptance of some canonical readings. 
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oracular fashion in their praxis as Sanders suggests, but their self-definition usually 
claims that they operate canonically. A good example of this is provided by the Vigil 
section of the Church of England's Easter Liturgy. Its opening words include the 
following: 'As we wait the risen Christ, let us hear the record of God's saving deeds in 
history, recalling how he saved his people in ages past and in the fullness of time sent 
his Son to be our redeemer' (-,1986:228). Readings are then used in which a 
narrative or prophetic passage is linked with a psalm or song: 
I. Gen. 1: 1-2:2 
II. Gen. 3 
III. Gen. 7:1-5, 10-18~ 8:6-18; 9:8-13 
IV. Gen. 22: 1-18 
V. Exod.14:15-15:1a 
VI. Deut. 31:22-30 
VII. Isa. 54:5-14 
VIII. Isa. 55:1-11 
IX. Job 14:1-14 
X. Baruch 3: 9-15 ~ 32-end 
XI. Ezek. 36:25-28 
XII. Ezek. 37:1-14 
XIII. Rom. 6:3-11; 
(with Ps. 33: 1-9)~ 
(with Psalm 130)~ 
(with Psalm 46)~ 
(with Ps. 16:8-end)~ 
(with Exodus 15)~ 
(with Deuteronomy 32)~ 
(with Psalm 30)~ 
(with Isaiah 12)~ 
(with Psalm 23)~ 
(with Ps. 19:7-end)~ 
(with Ps. 42:1-7)~ 
(with Psalm 126); 
XIV. Mt. 28:2-10 orMk. 16:1-8 orLk. 24:1-12. 
Although the choice of texts is obviously slanted towards its setting within the Easter 
Vigil, it is clear that this sequence of readings is intelligible only in the light of its 
assumption of a canonical form of the biblical text. 
This factor gives the canonical approach a decided advantage in its attempts to 
have its readings appropriated by such communities of faith. Unlike feminist, 
liberationist, and some of the more nihilistic post-modem approaches, the canonical 
approach is able to invoke a community's own belief statements in order to gain a 
hearing and perhaps eventual acceptance, even for those readings which are new and 
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creative. No doubt the sheer inertia of any long-standing interpretation will make this 
process of acceptance a slow one at best, but since, at least in my experience, many 
other readings never even get their foot into the Church door, that is a relatively minor 
problem for the canonical approach. When I first encountered Childs's work in 1993 , 
a friend who was then training for ministry told me that the canonical work of Moberly 
was excellent for preaching. It is this excellence (or the lack of it) which will 
ultimately seal the fate of the canonical approach, but the strategic importance of its 
back door into these communities of faith should not be underestimated. 
F. Reading the Canonical Text Backwards 
It seems beyond doubt that it is inherent in the canonical approach as I have 
described and practised it here that there is no single canonical meaning of the Bible, 
no single biblical 'text'. But an infinite (that is, open-ended) number of texts does not 
mean that absolutely any reading of the canon is freely available to us. Rather the same 
unavoidable contextuality which allows an open-ended number of meanings being 
ascribed to the canon also restricts the kinds of meanings which can be 'discovered' in 
the text. The restricted availability of meanings for the whole of the canon filters down 
into the (still open-ended) number of meanings available to be ascribed to individual 
passages. This is because they each have to survive beyond the confines of their own 
immediate canonical setting. 
A good illustration of this phenomenon--the failure of a reading to last the 
canonical distance--was supplied by my experience of reading the Sodom narrative 
canonically. As I began to study Genesis 18-19, I sought to find a reading on the text 
which I could use in my then larger project of a 'biblical theology of God as Judge'. I 
began by accepting that the 'individualistic' reading of Ben Zvi et al. was correct. But 
when I came to write a short section on YHWH's justice in the rest of the Old 
Testament, I found that these scholars were implicitly arguing that most of God's 
justice in the Bible was profane~ as one reads the history of Israel, justice is dispensed 
in corporate terms with not the slightest embarrassment. I then moved towards the 
opposite pole of seeing the text as corporate, but I soon discovered that von Rad' s 
new collectivism does not last very long before being utterly swamped by the 'old' 
style collective judgements inflicted on Israel by its deity. At that impasse I 
developed/discovered the reading outlined in chapters 5 and 6, a reading which I will 
now happily defend for its own merit. After all, it does best justice to my canonical 
'text' ! 
What I have been arguing for in the interpretation offered within this thesis is 
perhaps, ultimately, a reading driven by my assumption that an intolerable tension 
should not exist between this text and canonically subsequent ones; in that sense, I am 
reading back to front. The strongest justification for my rejecting the coherence of 
Abraham was not originally its obviousness as a reading of this text, but rather my 
personal discomfort with the implications of the readings of Ben Zvi and von Rad for 
subsequent texts, for the whole of the canonical text itself. I find it difficult to imagine 
how any canonical reader can do otherwise (Ben Zvi and von Rad, of course, are 
reading as historical critics and are not being criticised here). It is one thing to see the 
canonical text as containing paradoxes, even contradictions, but to see it as seemingly 
providing a standard of judgement which it then so comprehensively ignores without 
any apology, I deemed intolerable. Others might not. 
But my response to this tension between Genesis 18-19 and subsequent texts is 
not the only one available. Calvin also struggled with the difficulty of reconciling an 
individualistic judgement with subsequent actions thus rendered unjust and resolved 
the question by refusing to see Gen. 18:25 as providing an eternal standard of justice; 
God must be free to be God and so this text only provides a temporary and localised 
justice (1965:488). Though its acceptance would have perhaps left me within the 
tradition as Childs envisaged his project, I rejected this option on the grounds that I did 
not see Abraham as positively as Calvin, and because I could only see Abraham's 
question as requiring a definitive answer. If YHWH affirmed an answer at all in this 
text, it seemed to me that it must be universally valid. Eventually I discovered an 
alternative reading in which YHWH does not affirm a particular mode of judgement 
but leaves the question of Genesis 18:25 open in rather different fashion. 
This description of my journey with the Sodom narrative raises questions about 
the linearity of the canonical approach. Childs has always acknowledged that the 
exegete begins with his or her own faith~ there is no tabula rasa as one approaches 
Gen. 1: 1. But the actual process of reading seems to involve decisions taken 
retrospectively as the ensuing canonical shape denies earlier accepted readings (and, as 
I also discovered, a constant re-appraisal occurs as earlier texts are re-read and shed a 
changing light on the text in question). A strong element of provisionality is, 
therefore, to be acknowledged as readings progress. This cannot involve a total 
silence from the exegete until such time as all provisionality is removed because that in 
fact never happens. Rather, two stages of acceptance are presumably created: the first 
when a reading is proposed and the second when that reading has survived the test of 
the canonical shape. While it is tempting to assume that a text as long as the Bible will 
only allow a single reading, such a conclusion is to be rejected. Ever-widening 
contexts in which these texts are encountered mean that only a limited (by the 
canonical shape) indeterminacy exists. Knowledge of the deity through this source is 
partial indeed! 
In theory then, the reading of the Sodom narrative proposed here could be 
denied by subsequent exegesis and I could be thrown back with Calvin or even with 
Ben Zvi or von Rad. My confidence that this will not happen (easily at least) is due 
mainly to the ironic nature of my exegesis. YHWH has left open the question of 
justice for subsequent investigation. As texts concerning justice are encountered, their 
content effectively gives form to the answer which will eventually be given to Genesis 
18:25. But because YHWH has refused to answer clearly that question now, any 
subsequent divine pronouncements which appear to define justice will invite the 
suspicion that the deity is once again educating rather than informing. Indeed the 
subversive nature of this reading seems to be well matched to the vexed question of 
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YHWH's justice. After all, if the answer was obvious, theodicy would not be such a 
tricky business. 
The ultimate device for forcing a 're-reading' of the Christian canon is of 
, 
course, Christ himself Although Childs disagrees with Luther's view of Christ as a 
Sachkritik which simply divides the texts into Law and Gospel, this is largely a matter 
of not wishing to reduce Christ solely to a formula such as 'justification by faith' . For 
Childs, Jesus Christ does function as the true norm of the canon of Scripture and 
though he writes only of re-reading the Old Testament in the light of the full reality of 
the divine contained in both Old and New Testament and not of changing its senslls 
literalis, a considerable temptation will exist for exegetes to change the canonical text 
in the light of Christ, producing a potentially Marcionite attitude to the Old Testament. 
But the implications of that aspect of the canonical approach must await another day! 
G. Ideological Constraints Leading to a Defence of YHWH' s Justice 
With the effective removal of the canonical text from a context in which 
exegetical decisions can be justified with the words 'for the ancient Israelite, this could 
only have meant ... ,' two further implications of the canonical approach arise~ namely, 
that choices about how to interpret particular actions or words must be made, and that 
these choices are themselves open to the ideological influences placed upon exegetes 
by their setting within a community which has a vested interest in the interpretations 
being proposed. In Genesis 18-19 for example, it was my own discomfort with 
subsequent texts defining YHWH as unjust which led to the rethinking of my whole 
approach to the Sodom narrative. Why did I not simply allow the tension between 
YHWH's justice in Genesis 18 and subsequent texts to stand? 
I could perhaps argue that this tension was rendered problematic by the 
canonical shape itself, but that would be inaccurate for two reasons: first, there is no a 
priori reason why the canonical shape should give a consistent portrait about any 
aspect of YHWH (compare the various assessments of the divine Christ in the New 
Testament). Second, the canonical text includes sections in which YH\VH's justice is 
already seen as in tension, perhaps even as being denied (e.g., Job 9:22). If these texts 
can query YHWH's justice, why not this canonical reader? 
The obvious answer is that I have an undeclared (though now obvious) vested 
interest in defending the justice of YHWH, and it is for that reason that I expended so 
much energy in providing an interpretation in which YHWH's justice is defended. 
Much to my chagrin, however, I now realise that what I have actually done is probably 
provide a justification of YHWH's actions as 'just' wherever they occur in the Old 
Testament. Or rather, I have effectively removed the concept ofYHWH as judge from 
the discussion altogether by raising over it concepts such as YHWH as educator and 
YHWH as planner. But once aware of this ideology, why not simply discard it and 
take what comes, read canonically but without the insistence on defending YHWH? 
There are numerous reasons why it is difficult to envisage a canonical approach 
which denies this ideology (or a version of it). Canonical exegetes may not be willing 
to reject the ideology because they are wholly unable to contemplate the concept of an 
unjust deity~ they feel that they must respond with Paul's words, ~" yevot'to (Rom. 
3 :6). Or they may be so enamoured of the gloriousness of YHWH that they forget to 
play Abraham's role in questioning (the justice of?) the deity. Alternatively, they may 
choose to retain the ideology because of the market value of the reading it has partially 
created~ arguing that YHWH is not unjust is unquestionably a popular move with faith 
communities (even if one cannot then easily say that the deity is just). Fear of being 
unpopular, of being rejected, of being unpaid (!), (in former times) of being burnt at the 
stake for the blasphemy of postulating an unjust deity, (and for myself particularly) of 
not having something 'original' on which to write a thesis on Childs's canonical 
approach, all may lead to an implicit acceptance of the necessary justness of YHWH; 
as W. Brueggemann might put it, one may be tempted to 'legitimate the structure' but 
forget the 'embracing of pain' . 
But the occurrence of such an ideology in itself does not reqUIre the 
abandonment of the canonical approach. If that were so, it seems highly unlikely to me 
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that any canonical interpretation would ever be offered. The problem here is one of fit 
between my own readerly ideology and the ideology of my own version of the 
canonical text. How will I react when I encounter passages in which YHWH's justice 
is questioned? Will lover-write them with platitudes or will I be able to 'embrace the 
pain' they demonstrate? Or perhaps most intriguingly, will the reading I have 
proposed here, whatever its ideological origins, be able to generate a new, even 
creative, synthesis on the justice of YHWH? Perhaps I can even now argue that my 
reading does not actually require the ideology that produced it because-having now 
been propounded-it can actually be derived from the text without having to read the 
text backwards. 
H. Reading Against the Canonical Grain 
The final point I wish to consider concermng ideology and the canonical 
approach is that raised by those who see any reading which attempts to work within 
the ideology of a text as inherently flawed, as an abrogation of one's own moral 
responsibility. This view would, of course, be considered irrelevant by those who 
approach the text with the mind of a Barth or a Childs. They are concerned with the 
reflection of God and are unimpressed by the moral abilities of human beings. Not 
unnaturally, this makes them appear highly dangerous, even deluded, to those who 
wish a priori to resist the grain of the text. 
In this thesis, I have attempted carefully to chart a course between these two 
approaches to the canonical text. Initially I resisted at a number of points the urgings 
of others to read against the grain of the canonical text whilst carrying Ollt my 
exegesis. Sometimes it appeared that the only way I could appear to be carrying out a 
critical project would be to do just that. But I argued that it was only through a 
thorough application of the canonical approach that judgements may eventually be 
made as to the nature of its text, of its grain. In effect I immersed myself totally in its 
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grain in order to avoid the later charge that I had sabotaged the project by stepping 
outside the presuppositions of the approach as I was attempting to carry it out. 
But now that the preliminary grain of at least one canonical reading has been 
made apparent in this thesis, I find that I am not in the best position to decide hov,: to 
proceed on this question. Perhaps it is a case of being too close to one's own work, 
of liking its results too much. I have enjoyed the ironies generated by my reading of 
Abraham's speech and as yet I do not know what manner of foolishness may find 
justification in it. (The inevitably partial nature of this reading of only two chapters of 
Genesis also creates difficulties when considering the full implications of the canonical 
text.) But the most likely source of reading against the grain of this text is not yet 
available to me, the response of critics to my arguments. 
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